THE NATIONAL INTEREST

The New Transatlantic Defense
Doug Bereuter & John Lis

The Neoconservative Moment
Francis Fukuyama

IRAQ AT THE TURN

Daniel Byman *Alexis Debat* *Michael Eisenstadt*
Niall Ferguson *John Hillen* *Hussain Hindawi*
Geoffrey Kemp *Adriana Lins de Albuquerque* *Edward Morse*
Michael O'Hanlon *William Odom* *Yevgeny Primakov*
David Rivkin *James R. Schlesinger* *Harvey Sicherman*
Dimitri Simes *Amir Taheri* *John Thomson*

David Hale on *China's Appetite for Consumption*

The Democracy Project

The Democratic Imperative *Adrian Karatnycky*
Democracy's Trojan Horse *John Fonte*

Number 76 • Summer 2004 • $7.00

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Ronald Wilson Reagan

1911–2004

President Reagan died shortly before we went to press. A considered appreciation of his statecraft will appear in our Fall issue. Surely, however, the broad outlines of any fair judgment on the Reagan years are already clear.

Mr. Reagan is rightfully given credit for three large historic gains. First, in Lady Thatcher's well-known formulation, he won the Cold War without firing a shot. Second, he revived a stagflationary American economy with the result that it has enjoyed more than twenty years of substantial growth interrupted by only two brief recessions. Third, he restored the traditional spirit of can-do optimism to an American people who in the late 1970s were dispirited and even fatalistic.

These claims of improvement must be qualified. But the evidence supports their broad and lasting import. Nor do they exhaust what President Reagan achieved in two terms of office.

Were these the achievements of a simple mind? The idea is improbable in itself—and it is further contradicted by the fact that Mr. Reagan drew on different American traditions of foreign policymaking as the situation required.

Mr. Reagan spoke in terms of Wilsonian idealism when he wished to undermine the Soviet tyrants with their subject peoples. He simultaneously employed Hamiltonian tactics of economic competition to exhaust their military capability. When they began to buckle under the pressure, he was ready with a Jeffersonian compromise. And when Gorbachev produced last-minute demands at Reykjavik, he resorted to Jacksonian obduracy, "just saying 'no'" to his appeals to give up SDI. Less than a year later, the Soviet leader returned to sign the first satisfactory treaty of arms control. Certainly, Mr. Reagan took risks. But they won half a world their freedom and made us safer.

In the light of such prudential statecraft, the American public's approval of the Reagan record looks more far-sighted than the begrudging criticisms of sophisticates. In particular, Mr. Reagan's use of the phrase "evil empire" to undermine his Soviet opponents illustrates, as ordinary people understood, that candor can be an instrument of diplomacy rather than an obstacle to it. We recall Kipling's lines on the death of Teddy Roosevelt:

> Plain speech with plain folk,
> And plain words for false things,
> Plain faith in plain dealing
> 'Twixt neighbours or kings,
> He used and he followed,
> However it sped. . . .
> Oh, our world is none more honest
> Now Great-Heart is dead.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

THE NATIONAL INTEREST

CHAIRMAN OF THE EDITORIAL BOARD
Conrad Black

CO-CHAIRMAN OF THE EDITORIAL BOARD
Henry A. Kissinger

PUBLISHERS
James R. Schlesinger
Dimitri K. Simes

EDITORIAL BOARD
Zbigniew Brzezinski
Eliot A. Cohen
Midge Decter
Martin Feldstein
Francis Fukuyama
Samuel P. Huntington
Josef Joffe
Charles Krauthammer
Michael Mandelbaum
Richard Perle
Daniel Pipes
Alexey K. Pushkov
Stephen Sestanovich
Robert W. Tucker

EDITOR
John O'Sullivan

EXECUTIVE EDITOR
Nikolas K. Gvosdev

MANAGING EDITOR
Damjan de Krnjević-Mišković

ASSISTANT EDITOR
Thomas M. Rickers

BUSINESS MANAGER
Eleonora Pambrun

EXECUTIVE ASSISTANT
Cynthia Grenier

HONORARY CHAIRMAN AND FOUNDER
Irving Kristol

EDITOR EMERITUS AND CONSULTING EDITOR
Owen Harries

EDITORIAL OFFICE
The National Interest, 1615 L Street, NW., Suite 1230, Washington, DC 20036
Telephone (202) 467-4884, Fax (202) 467-0006, Email: editor@nationalinterest.org
Website: www.nationalinterest.org

SUBSCRIPTION OFFICE
Postmaster and subscribers please send address changes and subscription orders to:
The National Interest, P.O. Box 622, Shrub Oak, NY 10588-0622 (914) 962-6297; (800) 893-8944
Rates: $26/yr.; $44/2 yrs.; $59/3 yrs. Please add $10 outside the United States and Canada.

The National Interest (ISSN 0884-9382) is published quarterly in Spring, Summer, Fall and Winter with the cooperation of The Nixon Center. Articles appearing in this journal are abstracted and indexed in *P.A.I.S.*, *Historical Abstracts*, *International Political Science Abstracts*, *U.S. Political Science Documents*, *Political Science Abstracts*, and *America: History and Life*; articles are available on microfilm from University Microfilms International, and archived on *Lexis-Nexis*. Periodicals postage is paid at Washington, DC, and at additional mailing offices. © 2004 by The National Interest, Inc. *The National Interest* is printed by Kirby Lithographic Co., Inc. It is distributed in the U.S. and Canada by Ingram Periodicals (1240 Heil Quaker Blvd., La Vergne, TN 37086-7000; 615-793-5522) and Bernhard DeBoer (113 East Centre Street, Nutley, NJ 07110; 973-667-9300) and in the UK by Comag Special Services (Tavistock Road, West Drayton, Middlesex UB7 7QX; 44-1895-444055). BPA International Member since 2000.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

THE NATIONAL INTEREST

NUMBER 76, SUMMER 2004

Articles

Iraq at the Turn: A Symposium

5 Transferring Sovereignty *by James R. Schlesinger*
8 Auditing Arrogance *by Yevgeny Primakov*
11 Rethinking the Strategy *by Dimitri K. Simes*
15 Insecuring Iraq *by Daniel Byman*
18 Vivisecting the Jihad *by Alexis Debat*
24 Gauging the Aftermath *by Michael O'Hanlon & Adriana Lins de Albuquerque*
26 Thinking Through Liberation *by Amir Taheri*
29 Strengthening the Fainthearts *by John Hillen*
33 Retreating in Good Order *by William E. Odom*
37 Fighting for Oil? *by Edward L. Morse*
41 Averting an Iraq Syndrome *by David B. Rivkin*
46 Losing the Peace? *by Geoffrey Kemp*
48 Rescuing the Future *by John Thomson & Hussain Hindawi*
51 Recovering Our Nerve *by Niall Ferguson*

57 **The Neoconservative Moment** *by Francis Fukuyama*
Charles Krauthammer's "democratic globalism" fails as a guiding principle of foreign policy and creates more questions than answers.

69 **Spain's Atlantic Option** *by Valentí Puig*
Spain's recent election has altered Madrid's foreign policy strategy. The transatlantic window is closing. Can it be re-opened?

75 **Reorienting Transatlantic Defense** *by Rep. Doug Bereuter & John Lis*
NATO is neither obsolete nor a threat to a common European defense force. Rather, it is the centerpiece of Euro-Atlantic foreign policy and a catalyst for European defense reform.

84 **A Strategic Defense Initiative** *by Carnes Lord*
This is not your father's "Star Wars." Missile defense is real, it's coming, and it will be an indispensable instrument of American Power.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

93 **Sand in Our Eyes** *by Martin Sieff*
Relations with the Desert Kingdom suffered before 9/11. Now they're on the ropes. But Washington can ill afford the loss of this critical ally, even when it's not on its best behavior.

101 **Sitting on Bayonets** *by Michael Eisenstadt*
Michael Eisenstadt reckons that the Bush Administration sees the light at the end of the.... Well, let's just say it could be worse.

The Democracy Project

107 **The Democratic Imperative** *by Adrian Karatnycky*
The world's democrats have joined forces, to the benefit of all involved.

117 **Democracy's Trojan Horse** *by John Fonte*
In the 21st century, the gravest threat to representative government may come from within.

129 **Behind the Silk Curtain** *by Joe Bob Briggs*
Despot Watch turns the spotlight on Islam Karimov, America's newest Central Asian ally.

137 **China's Growing Appetites** *by David Hale*
Oh, East is East and West is West, and never the twain shall meet—unless they need to secure access to strategic natural resources.

148 **The Cult of Precaution** *by Roger Scruton*
The high priests of the European Commission invoke the arcane scripture of the Precautionary Principle to justify their environmental encyclicals—the wages of reason be damned.

Reviews & Essays

155 **Not the Faith of Their Fathers** *by Martin Walker*
Two unlikely adherents to their respective faiths, Bush and Blair find peace in war.

163 **Where Have All the Cowboys Gone?** *by Harvey Sicherman*
There is no shortage of books on security and strategy in a world beset by terror. "Fortunately", writes Harvey Sicherman, "most are short."

169 **Russia's Straight-Talk Express** *by Nikolas K. Gvosdev*
Yevgeny Primakov hates to say "I told you so", but....

172 **Prudence and the Prince** *by Fred E. Baumann*
Carnes Lord takes the gloves back off Machiavelli and gives us something we can use.

176 **Requiem for a Genocide** *by Neil McInnes*
Keith Windschuttle revises the revisionists and does the post-colonial "history" of Tasmania a good turn—on its head.

Response

184 Can NATO survive Europe? *by E. Wayne Merry*

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

FOREIGN AFFAIRS BOOKS









American Foreign Policy: Cases & Choices

Perspectives on seven of the most pressing problems
in American foreign policy today
$16.95 ISBN 0-87609-332-2 321 pp. (2003)

America and the World

Twenty top articles assigned in IR and political science courses
$19.95 ISBN 0-87609-315-2 389 pp. (2002)

Clash of Civilizations: The Debate

Samuel Huntington's seminal essay alongside critical responses
in one convenient collection
$9.95 ISBN 0-87609-164-8 67 pp. (1996)

The War on Terror: Updated and Expanded

Chronicles terrorism and the American response
both before and after September 11th
$14.95 ISBN 0-87609-337-3 234 pp. (2003)

To order these titles, call W.W. Norton at 800.233.4830
or visit www.wwnorton.com

For more information: *Foreign Affairs* 800.716.0002 www.foreignaffairs.org/arp

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Iraq at the Turn

A Symposium

At this crucial moment, *The National Interest* has assembled a distinguished panel of experts, practitioners and academics to provide their views and analysis of the impact of the American-led invasion of Iraq on the pursuit of America's national interests, the Greater Middle East (including Iraq itself) and the international system.

Transferring Sovereignty

James R. Schlesinger

SINCE NOVEMBER of last year the United States has been committed to transferring sovereignty to the Iraqis after June 30, 2004. Even though Iraqis themselves will be making their own decisions regarding the civil order, the critical issue of security for Iraq will remain in American hands—and under the control of a selected four-star general. Under United Nations Security Council Resolution 1511, Iraqi armed forces will be "a principal partner in the multinational force operating in Iraq under unified command", in accordance with the Transitional Administrative Law. Thus, even after the transfer of sovereignty, in the crucial area of security (which remains the largest challenge in Iraq) there will be little change from the current situation. Contrary to widespread public impressions, the transfer of authority on June 30 does not mean that the American role in Iraq is ending or that the United States is somehow washing its hands of Iraq.

In other words, June 30 is not a magic date after which unrest in Iraq will cease. Nor does it mean that significant numbers of U.S. troops can be swiftly withdrawn. Iraqis and Americans both must be prepared for the United States to continue to play a major role in Iraq.

Withdrawal before we have successfully stabilized Iraq is not an option. But the statement, "We will stay the course", while perhaps being a necessary exhortation, is not a strategy. "We will stay the course until we have an Iraqi force capable of providing reasonable security for the people of Iraq"—this is a strategy. But it means that there must be a viable plan to create such a force.

And this is why it is important to

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

review the record of the past year, to understand where mistakes may have been made and to determine what needs to be done to ensure that we are successful in our mission in Iraq.

Only by embracing certain fundamental realities can the United States be successful in bringing order and sustaining stability in Iraq. First and foremost, establishing reasonable security is the prerequisite to achieve the goals of political stability. This implies that we should not expect Iraq to rise to the level of security in, say, Denmark or Japan.

Second, neither the American nor other coalition forces can, by themselves, impose security on Iraq. Iraqis themselves must provide indispensable support. Only Iraqis can gather the intelligence to identify the remnants of the old regime, other homegrown radicals and foreign terrorists that must be largely neutralized before adequate security can be insured. Moreover, it will be essential for Iraqi security forces to be the principal element in rooting out terrorists and destroying their cells—with the coalition's military forces increasingly playing a supporting role.

We have failed to convey to the Iraqis what our intentions are—or have conveyed them belatedly.

In principle, we have come to accept this reality, but in practice we have been too slow to act upon them effectively. Regrettably, a year has passed and the United States has not been able to create a functional Iraqi security force. While we have recruited several hundred thousand Iraqis into the security force, those forces have tended to melt away in times of difficulty. It may be that this behavior reflects a problem of morale—though that was not the judgment of those who observed Iraqis in action. Possibly it reflects a deeper unwillingness on the part of Iraqi security forces to use force on recalcitrant fellow Iraqis. But the most obvious answer is our own failure properly to train and properly to equip these security forces.

On the equipping issue, all too many months have gone by without appropriately vetted forces being appropriately equipped with weapons, protective gear and communications. That is a reflection of our own cumbersome budgetary and procurement procedures, which have imposed a high, long-run cost on our operations.

On the question of training, we have not allowed sufficient time for the training of individuals and the organizing of units with a high degree of cohesion. The task of training Iraqi security forces should be a principal obligation of American and coalition forces in country. Other nations, such as India—even if they have not contributed military forces—may be prepared to participate in training these security forces.

Second, we must focus more effectively on economic problems. There is a correlation between the high prevailing unemployment in Iraq and the restlessness and low morale spreading among the populace. Admittedly, initial expectations regarding an immediate and magical boost in living conditions were unrealistic. Yet, months have gone by without the improvement in living conditions that might realistically have been expected. The $18.4 billion that the Congress appropriated for reconstruction should have already begun to alleviate the problem—improving living conditions and expanding employment. It is a shame that so little of that $18.4 billion has been obligated to this point—and even significantly less has been spent. We must get that money flowing. Delay makes the problem worst. Yet, once again, it is our procurement procedures that have imposed these costs upon us. We cannot afford normal peacetime procurement procedures—with 60 days to submit responses to Requests For

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Proposals and another 60 days to assess them, and so on. Congress can act—quickly. It should assess whether existing requirements result in a penny-wise, pound-foolish outcome—and help ease self-defeating restraints.

As we look beyond June 30, we should seek a closer collaborative relationship between the Departments of State and Defense in implementing a strategy in Iraq than has been our experience to this point. The relationship between the civilians in the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), mostly buttoned down in the Green Zone, and the military who have been out in the field, interacting with the Iraqis, has been something less than ideal. After all, it is the CPA that has maintained tight control over the resources, but it is the division commanders who have been in close contact with the Iraqis and know what are the local needs—and have too frequently been obliged to fund local activities out of their quite limited discretionary funds. The civil-military relationship worked far better in Vietnam—after General Creighton Abrams took command in 1968. He and Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker worked intimately in deciding what the needs were for the pacification program, and how to allocate resources. We should seek to achieve that degree of collaborative behavior once the new American embassy team comes into play this summer after the handover of sovereignty.

ONE FINAL but crucial point. To date, our efforts to communicate with the Iraqis have been inadequate. Coalition forces, as well as Iraqi forces and government officials, are now under assault—some calculated and deliberated, but some emotional and mindless. It is time for us to remind Iraqis: "If you want a decent life, you must not support the elements that are destroying your country and may actually be seeking a civil war." We must persuade Iraqis to foresee the consequences of frustrating coalition efforts—on their behalf.

Yet we have failed to convey to the Iraqis what our intentions are—or have conveyed them belatedly. Consequently, all too many excellent and well-intentioned actions on our part have not gotten through to the Iraqi public. It is almost as important that such plans or such actions be understood, as that they be executed. The American-sponsored television station has not been well designed to attract an audience and has thus been peripheral for Iraqi viewers. The upshot has been that Al-Jazeera and Al-Arabiya have filled the void. Remember that Al-Jazeera's general manager was on Saddam's payroll. Al-Jazeera seems to have regularly been tipped off about any clashes in-country and, indeed, may have staged such events. It must be recognized that with unemployment as high as it is, demonstrations are easy to buy. We have discovered many times over the past year that simple payment in cash has been a principal motive for many of those engaged in attacking either Americans or Iraqis.

The decision to go into Iraq was a fateful one—not only for Iraqis, but for the Greater Middle East and for the credibility of American foreign policy. In order to see it through successfully, we must be prepared to adapt to changing conditions. □

James R. Schlesinger is publisher of *The National Interest* and chairman of the MITRE Corporation. He has served as Secretary of Defense, Secretary of Energy and Director of Central Intelligence.

TO SUBSCRIBE

1-800-893-8944 or WWW.NATIONALINTEREST.ORG

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Auditing Arrogance

Yevgeny Primakov

THREE MONTHS before the start of the American operation in Iraq I visited the United States, where I met with Vice President Dick Cheney and National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice. Our conversations were difficult. When I commented that the action in Iraq would lead to serious losses—and not simply during the military operations—the vice president smiled dismissively and said that I was exaggerating the danger. I posed the question as to whether the United States had thought through the Iraq operation "one step ahead" to Condoleezza, with whom I have met several times before, and she answered: "Yevgeny, don't worry. The political decision about the start of the operation hasn't been made yet...."

At any rate, I received a firm impression that in Washington nobody gave much thought to the problems that might arise after Saddam's regime was defeated. And events have confirmed this conclusion.

The Resistance

FIRST AND foremost, it is evident that the United States did not foresee that resistance to the occupation would take on such wide parameters. And the paradox here is that the armed struggle against the occupational government is not identical with the resistance by supporters of Saddam. This makes the American position that much more complicated. It deprives or significantly weakens international support for the U.S. approach. If the situation were different, then U.S. policy in Iraq would be better understood, even by the Arab countries.

One of the centers of resistance in Iraq is the so-called "Sunni triangle." Of course, the Sunnis formed the base of the population upon which Saddam's regime depended. However, current Sunni resistance is not predicated on loyalty to Saddam. Rather, it springs from their fear that, as a result of the occupation, Sunnis will be diminished and become a second-class minority in Iraq.

Nor should we overemphasize the role of the Ba'ath party remnants. Iraq lacks an organized Ba'athi resistance. Some of Saddam's supporters are undertaking actions, but only on an individual basis. We can reach a similar conclusion when assessing Saddam's army, the Republican Guard, the fedayeen and the police. None of these organizations of the former regime has become the overall center of resistance.

Indeed, it is those forces in society that did not fare well under the old regime that are more and more becoming part of the opposition and even taken part in armed resistance against the occupation. Here, the United States can sense Shi'a resistance the most. At first, the main Shi'a organization, comprising those spiritual leaders who returned from exile in Iran—leaders of the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI)—tried to adopt a stance of neutrality toward coalition forces under U.S. command. However, over time, Shi'a organizations that oppose the coalition have started to gain influence, the principal one of which is the Mahdi Army controlled by Moqtada Sadr.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

At one time, the United States thought it could count on the support of the Shi'a, who had been oppressed under Saddam's regime and who made up 60 percent of the country's population. Now, the Shi'a can be considered as neither a "reserve" or even fellow-travelers for the Americans in Iraq.

The situation is aggravated by the notion of autonomy for the Shi'a, which in the end will solve nothing. The Kurdish model is not applicable to them. They are not territorially restricted to the south of Iraq; many reside in Baghdad itself and in other parts of the country. And they basically aspire to take control of the central government.

Furthermore, any decision to move forward with "federalizing" Iraq has to take into account the Iranian factor. Many leaders of Iraq's Shi'a lived in exile in Qom, the religious center in Iran. Giving substantial autonomy to Iraq's Shi'a could have a negative impact on the internal situation in Iran, strengthening the hand of religious-extremist forces in that country. Federalizing Iraq could also increase the chance that an Islamic state would be constructed in Iraq.

The Kurds

THE U.S. COULD have used to its advantage not only the animosity of the Kurds toward Saddam's regime, but also the tensions between Iraq's Arab and Kurdish populations. At present, the Kurds have two main interests: establishing their own control over the oil-rich regions of Kirkuk and Mosul, and returning to the north those Kurds who were displaced under Saddam. However, finding solutions to these questions that benefit the Kurds is extraordinarily complicated.

During the military campaign in spring 2003, the Kurdish *peshmerga* were actively collaborating with the coalition forces. Now, that cooperation will continue only if the United States is prepared to side with the Kurds in their conflict with the Arabs. However, this cannot be done without creating a serious rupture with the Arab side. This once again was demonstrated when U.S. representatives, in order to please the Kurds, tried to insist on giving Kurds a "veto" in the temporary constitution—giving the Kurds effective equality with the Arab population that far exceeds it in actual numbers.

The Turkish position is far from encouraging *vis-à-vis* U.S. maneuvers concerning the Kurdish issue in Iraq. Ankara is afraid that Kurdish control over Kirkuk and Mosul will strengthen Kurdish efforts to establish an autonomous or independent state. Under such circumstances—that is, if Turkey considers the plan for resolving the Kurdish question unacceptable to its own interests—there is a real threat that Ankara will bring its troops into northern Iraq. The possibility that its own territorial integrity might be threatened—since the majority of the world's Kurdish population lives in Turkey—would drive Ankara to take such a drastic measure.

International Terror in Iraq

THE AMERICAN government has said on many occasions that the arrival of coalition forces in Iraq marked a new and major step in the war against international terrorism. However, the statements that Saddam Hussein harbored Al-Qaeda or other Islamist extremists on its territory were either a disinformation or a mistake. Saddam Hussein—a very pronounced Arab nationalist—cruelly suppressed any attempts to try and promote radical Islamist ideology, not to speak of any attempt to put it into practice, in Iraq. After all, any strengthening of the Islamists could have resulted in the imminent demise of his dictatorial but secular regime.

After Saddam's downfall, Iraq turned

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

into a "magnet" for international terrorists, who have entered the country in order to create a new platform for their activity. International terrorist groups, especially Al-Qaeda, want to keep the situation in Iraq as extremely unstable for as long as possible. This helps to reinforce their position in the region. After all, Iraq is more convenient as a center for international terrorism than Afghanistan, due to its advantageous geographic location, which borders on the countries where extremist tendencies are strong. Under such conditions, the number of terrorist organizations and terrorist actions taken in different countries has increased—and will continue to increase.

Is Stability Possible?

MY FIRST point is this: Any hope for the sort of stabilization achieved by rapidly increasing the number of Iraqis willing to cooperate with coalition authorities is weak. This scenario could be possible only if there was a broad-based, national political force that was ready to take action and was inclined to cooperate with the United States—and this is not likely at the present time.

In theory, a national movement could have been created out of the former Ba'ath party. If the fact that under the previous regime most Iraqis joined the party to enhance their career prospects rather than out of ideological commitment had been taken into consideration, then it would have been clear that the most effective part of Iraqi society belonged to this party. Banning the Ba'ath without attempting to extract from it a viable political base for the future was probably a mistake on America's part.

Second, the growth of the resistance to the occupation has been caused mostly by the lack of significant progress in the reconstruction of Iraq's infrastructure, as well as the increase in unemployment and inability of coalition authorities to provide for the security of Iraqis in an efficient way. Yet solving this set of social and economic problems is complicated.

Returning to Collective Action

AS A RESULT of the failure of a policy of "unilateral regulation" of the crisis in Iraq, the United States has undertaken a course toward greater involvement of the United Nations in the process of stabilizing Iraq. This turnabout, something that President Bush assiduously avoided at the start of the Iraq operation, is now considered by Washington as a device that will, first, diminish criticism of the United States for its illegitimate use of force in Iraq and, second, to gain the political and financial support of many of the UN's members. Under conditions of increasing antiwar sentiments among the American population prior to the election season, moving toward the UN helps increase George W. Bush's freedom of maneuver.

It is clear that the international community is interested in a rapid stabilization of the situation, as well as in the formation of a government in Iraq that would be run by Iraqis. In this regard it is important to take into account the fact that this is not achievable in the context of an abrupt departure of American forces unless its mission has first been transferred to the United Nations—a fact Russia understands very well.

Russia has an interest in Washington returning to a position of collective action in dealing with crisis situations, rejecting the unilateralism that has been on display in Iraq. But Moscow understands that this can happen not through a crushing defeat of the United States in Iraq, but by the evolutionary turnaround of the Bush Administration toward involving the United Nations. This has already begun, and the essence of Russian policy is to encourage it forward.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

In support of this, Russia's relationship with the European countries is of vital importance. During the last Iraqi crisis Europe was essentially divided between those who supported the U.S. military action and those who were opposed. Games based on these disagreements, however, are counterproductive. Russia's role might be to encourage European Union member-states, especially France and Germany, to take a position that combines their negative attitude towards the unilateral use of force with active support of collective efforts to stabilize the situation in Iraq using the mechanism of the United Nations. Such actions should be developed in cooperation with the United States. The development of such a consensus should evolve under the aegis of the United Nations in order to solve the problem of legitimacy and to establish the authority of the operation to reconstruct Iraq.

It would be especially useful to utilize a collective effort to identify those forces in Iraqi society to whom power could be transferred—and such a collective effort to locate these forces could take the form of an international conference on Iraq. □

Yevgeny Primakov, the former prime minister and foreign minister of Russia as well as a former head of its Foreign Intelligence Service, is the president of the Russian Chamber of Commerce and Industry. He is also a member of the Russian Academy of Sciences.

Rethinking the Strategy

Dimitri K. Simes

IN ORDER TO deal effectively with America's predicament in Iraq, it is essential to understand that we had begun to walk down the road to Baghdad long before September 11, indeed, quite before the Bush Administration came to power. After the end of the Cold War, a new triumphalist mindset, shared by influential groups in both the Republican and Democratic parties, began to develop an unstoppable momentum. It was Madeleine Albright who started bragging about the United States being an indispensable nation. It was a number of senior officials in the Clinton Administration—and eventually President Clinton himself—who, frequently taking a casual attitude to the facts, brought the United States into the Balkans in a desire to transform the former Yugoslavia—even if it required a military action without UN blessing and in violation of international law, as in the case of Kosovo.

Some of these officials are now important advisors to the presumptive Democratic party nominee for president, Senator John F. Kerry. It is a bit disingenuous on their part to criticize the Bush Administration for launching a campaign against Iraq for reasons in many respects similar to those behind American attacks in the Balkans—except that Slobodan Milosevic, unlike Saddam Hussein, was not an enemy of the United States, was not suspected of having weapons of mass destruction and harboring international terrorists, and was less tyrannical than Saddam Hussein, as his removal from power by democratic means has demonstrated. And of course the Balkan wars took place before 9/11, which means they occurred in a context of much less pres-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

sure to take pre-emptive action against potential threats.

It was during the Clinton era that the export of democracy and nation-building became major drivers of American foreign policy. It was also during the Clinton Administration, back in 1998, that regime change in Iraq became official U.S. policy, having been enthusiastically supported by a bipartisan congressional majority.

REGIME CHANGE, of course, goes far beyond containment. It is not based on the preservation of the status quo, and it left Saddam with few inducements to comply with U.S. preferences. Under Clinton, America was unprepared either to successfully intimidate Iraq or to offer a realistic prospect of accommodation. After 9/11, could the United States safely assume that we could continue with the *de facto* annexation of the Kurdish north, our aggressive policing of the no-fly zones, our frequent air attacks on Iraqi military targets, and our plots to overthrow Saddam himself, and still believe that the Iraqi dictator would sit idly by and attempt no retaliation against the United States, directly or indirectly, using his terrorist connections? Intellectual honesty requires an acknowledgment that in the post-9/11 world, a change-of-regime policy in Iraq had to lead to an attack against the Saddam Hussein regime.

But if the Bush Administration could be excused for taking military action to remove Saddam, it has never been able to offer an adequate explanation of its other ambitions, most importantly, to use Iraq as a launching pad for a transformation of the so-called "Greater Middle East." How the invasion of an Arab country—in the absence of successful movement on the Arab-Israeli dispute—could be perceived by the Arabs as a friendly action escapes logic. The administration clearly was tempted to use military victory in Iraq as a shortcut around the difficult, but from the Arab viewpoint, crucial U.S. role in resolving the Palestinian issue. Some in the Bush Administration went so far in their flights of analytic fancy that they were taken for a ride by a clear charlatan like Ahmed Chalabi, who promised not just to normalize relations with Israel, but indeed to build a pipeline to the Jewish State. Pipe dreams are not prescriptions for serious policymaking.

Interestingly, quite a few proponents of the transformation of the Middle East held two contradictory beliefs. On the one hand, they asserted that the Arab world was ready for democracy. On the other, they held the proposition that democracy, or anything else the United States wanted, could be imposed on the Arabs, who, it was claimed, were particularly subservient to force. The belief that it was possible for an outside hegemonic power to impose democracy by the armed fist so as to bring freedom to the Middle East acquired considerable popularity among influential neoconservatives and liberal interventionist circles alike.

With fantasies like these, it is no wonder that the United States badly misjudged what to expect and how to proceed in Iraq. What we need now is a serious and realistic evaluation of U.S. objectives in Iraq. Two of them have been fulfilled already. We may now be satisfied that there are no WMD—at least in any considerable quantity—in Iraq. And, of course, the Saddam regime is no more. So, is the United States obliged to engage in nation-building against the wishes of the vast majority of the Iraqi people? Is that a credible goal for American foreign policy? Is it a *democratic* goal in a situation in which at least 82 percent of the Iraqi people oppose American and other coalition forces?

It seems that it is most practical and moral to focus on those things that are doable and vital in terms of American interests. What we need is a stable, governable, non-tyrannical and, most importantly, non-hostile Iraq—an Iraq which will not become a sanctuary for

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

international terrorists of all stripes. As long as that much can be accomplished, what kind of government emerges in Iraq, how the Sunnis, the Shi'a and the Kurds relate to each other, what role Islam plays in Iraq's political life, and even whether women have full political rights, are not concerns into which the United States should be prepared to invest a great deal of blood, treasure and international prestige.

Once the Iraqis understand, and only when they understand, that the United States has no long-term ambitions for their country—because America has fairly narrow objectives—it will become much easier to win the cooperation of whomever is in power in Iraq. If they see the U.S. not as a long-term occupier but as a tough but visiting marshal, American leverage would actually increase. We would be able to point out to the Iraqi authorities and people alike that noncompliance with U.S. preferences could lead to a quick withdrawal of most American forces from Iraq, and an end of most American assistance. Being left to their own devices is not what the majority of Iraqis seem to favor at this point, as long as they are allowed to become masters of their own destiny.

The United States is fortunate to have considerable support at the UN for a new international role in Iraq that would greatly limit America's responsibilities. The U.S. should welcome this role, for Iraq is less a prize than a burden. As long as vital U.S. interests are protected, we should welcome Iraq becoming the responsibility of others, especially when the Iraqis and most Arabs seem to prefer this scenario.

WHAT WE need to keep in Iraq in the long run is not a major occupation force but a limited number of highly mobile units that would allow us to go after any terrorists on Iraqi territory. Policing Iraq, however, should become the responsibility of others as soon as humanly possible—especially Muslim nations, with a particular emphasis on those who have multiethnic and multireligious populations and thus would have the expertise to deal with situations like Iraq. Finally, we should learn the right lessons from our difficulties in Iraq.

We should learn to control our messianic instincts. It is revealing that even after Iraq, some thoughtful people capable of reflection, both neoconservatives and liberal interventionists, seem to find a new danger—namely, that there will be a counterattack not of terrorists but of American realists. Neoconservative columnist David Brooks sounded this note, writing in the *New York Times* on May 8, 2004:

> In this climate of self-doubt, the "realists" of right and left are bound to re-emerge. They're going to dwell on the limits of our power. . . . They're going to tell us to lower our sights, to accept autocratic stability, since democratic revolution is too messy and utopian. That's a recipe for disaster.

A day later, approvingly echoing Brooks, a leading Democrat, Senator Joseph Biden, appearing on *Face the Nation*, warned that the "realists are going to take hold", promoting the

> notion that we are incapable of affecting events in the world for the good of the world and the good of our nation. And that is the single greatest damage that's going to be done here.

In the spirit of the new Wilsonian bipartisanship, President Bush agrees. As he stated at the Air force Academy,

> Some who call themselves realists question whether the spread of democracy in the Middle East should be any concern of ours. But the realists in this case have lost contact with a fundamental reality. . . . America is always more secure when freedom is on the march.

True enough, as long as freedom marches

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

forward because of choices states make themselves. America can provide gentle encouragement. But we are demonstrably less secure when our pro-democracy zealotry creates a global backlash that alienates friends, confuses allies and adds new recruits to the ranks of our enemies.

Accordingly, we should—being true to our American heritage—encourage freedom worldwide, but we should stop the *export* of democracy which puts the United States on a collision course with most of the world, interferes with the sovereignty of other nations and complicates our War on Terror and the proliferation of WMD. In that context, we should reject misguided and dangerous suggestions to replace our unilateralism in Iraq with some kind of "alliance of democracies" which allegedly would provide international legitimacy to our meddling in the affairs of other states and whole regions, even absent vital U.S. interests. Such an alliance—even in the unlikely case that it could be organized—would pit the United States and its associates against not just nations with which we currently have problems (such as North Korea or Iran), but even states such as China, Russia, Pakistan, the Central Asian nations and much of the Arab world, including the Gulf states. And these are countries which are indispensable in ensuring U.S. security against terrorism, stemming the proliferation of WMD, combating the spread of narcotics, and some are even critical to America's strategy of energy diversification.

An "alliance of democracies" is a code word for a new pro-democracy crusade. But the problem with crusades throughout history has not been that they were poorly organized on a tactical level, but rather, that they were strategically unsound and morally flawed. Crusades are bound to create a powerful backlash against their proponents and have forced the crusading nations to sacrifice many of their other priorities and indeed principles. In the post-9/11 world, this is a luxury the United States can ill afford, and this is a luxury that the American people, if they were told the truth, would not support. □

Dimitri K. Simes is publisher of *The National Interest* and president of the Nixon Center.

Plus Ça Change

We were told that they were going to smash the Mahdi, but now we are to make peace with the smashed Mahdi. If you smash the Mahdi thoroughly he will be of no use to you, and if you do not smash him thoroughly he may maintain at the bottom of his heart a certain resentment against the process of being smashed. . . . All those advantages can be obtained if England will lay down a definite policy and will adhere to it, but consistency of policy is absolutely necessary. We have to assure our friends that we shall stand by them; we have to assure our enemies that we are permanently to be feared. The blunders of the last three years have placed us in the presence of terrible problems and difficulties. . . . All this will involve great sacrifices and the expenditure not only of much money, but of more of the English blood of which the noblest has already been poured forth. And we are not so strong as we were. At first all nations sympathized with us, but now they look on us coldly and even with hostility. Those who were our friends have become indifferent, those who were indifferent have become our adversaries; and if our misfortunes and disasters go on much longer we shall have Europe saying that they can not trust us, that we are too weak, that our prestige is too low to justify us in undertaking this task.

—R. A. T. Gascoyne-Cecil , in the House of Lords, July 20, 1885

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Insecuring Iraq

Daniel Byman

WHEN Saddam's regime collapsed last year, security for Iraqis collapsed with it. Saddam's brutal rule may have offered Iraqis few benefits—but crime was low and civil strife was largely contained.

In the chaos after the collapse, violent crime soared. Foreign jihadists slipped unimpeded across unsecured borders and Iraqi insurgents began attacking not only coalition forces but ordinary Iraqis as well. One year after the liberation of Iraq, the situation remains abysmal. Iraqis still fear to walk the streets, and in April 2004, the simmering insurgency boiled over, producing the bloodiest month yet for coalition forces.

Security is essential for Iraq's political and economic reconstruction. Without it, Iraqis may look to warlords or thugs who can offer security even at the price of good governance. Democracy cannot take root if voters are afraid to go to the polls or if citizens believe they cannot trust "strangers" from other tribes or communal groups to protect them. Compounding the problem, few investors want to risk their money in a country torn by violence. The "normalcy" most Iraqis long for is still lacking.

Coalition troops cannot depart Iraq in any great numbers, however, until they can hand off their mission to Iraqis. But Iraqi forces are poorly trained, demoralized and penetrated by the insurgents. Not surprisingly, they have added little to Iraq's security and may have made things worse, as President Bush himself noted in April 2004.

Yet success carries its own perils. Creating a competent Iraqi security force increases the risk of a coup d'état down the road, particularly if Iraq's post-Saddam government is weak, venal and inept. Building up Iraq's security while guarding against a coup requires a delicate dance. It demands money, time and a substantial U.S. commitment—all of which may be lacking.

Security Forces Problems

IRAQ HAS FIVE major security forces: the Iraqi Police Service, the Iraqi Civil Defense Corps (ICDC), the army, the border patrol and the Facilities Protection Services. On paper, recruiting Iraqis has not been a problem. The Pentagon reports that almost 80,000 police officers have been hired, along with approximately 25,000 for the ICDC, while another 93,000 or so have signed on to the Facility Protection Service, the army and the border patrol. Because Iraq's economy is in disarray, working for the security sources is one of the few sources of a regular paycheck.

These forces, however, are poorly equipped. After the war's end, Baghdad police officers reportedly stole cars so that they could have something in which to patrol: in today's Iraq, crime prevention begins sometimes with a criminal act. Today, some Iraqi forces still lack uniforms and communications gear, in addition to automobiles. Despite its importance, the United States did not respond promptly to this problem. In March, the Bush Administration had to cancel a $327 million contract that was awarded to the Virginia firm Nour USA Ltd. to equip Iraqi security forces because the contract

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

bidding process was flawed. Training has also been limited. At the end of April 2004, only 22 percent of the police were partially or fully trained (though all the ICDC members were). And policemen who served under Saddam received at most limited training, with the incorrect assumption that they already knew their jobs and thus could be put directly on the street.[1]

The limited competence of the Iraqi security forces is being sorely tested, as they are constant targets for Iraqi insurgents, making it hazardous to be a (loyal) member. Hundreds of Iraqi police and security forces have died from bombings and assassinations throughout Iraq, and Iraqi deaths now probably exceed those suffered by the coalition.

Not surprisingly, it has proven particularly difficult to get Iraqis to fight anti-coalition insurgents. In part, this is due to a strong sense of nationalism. This problem became acute when the chips were down this past April. In Baghdad, 50 percent of Iraq's security forces stood by, quit or changed sides during the fighting. When U.S. Marines needed assistance in Fallujah, Iraqi forces did not rush into the breach. Members of the Iraqi battalion told the U.S. security force commander at the time, "We did not sign up to fight Iraqis."

The problem is worse than cowardice or a squeamishness to shoot fellow Iraqis: The Iraqi security forces have been penetrated by individuals loyal to the anti-coalition opposition. There have been reports that the four American security contractors waylaid by insurgents in early April—whose murder and mutilation in Fallujah prompted the current military operation there—were led into an ambush by members of the ICDC that the contractors had believed were reliable. Such penetrations are one of the few areas of skill of former regime loyalists.

Many among the police who are not loyal to figures from the Ba'ath regime are drawn from various militias loyal to different Iraqi leaders. Not surprisingly, some police gave their weapons, cars and police stations to Moqtada Sadr's "Mahdi Army" when it clashed with coalition forces. After the surge of violence in April, coalition forces increased their reliance on communal and local militias for day-to-day security responsibilities.

Finally, the police are not part of a larger law enforcement system. Without judges, courts and prisons, the police cannot ensure security. Yet Iraqi judges top the list among those targeted for assassination. Meanwhile, Congress did not approve much of the requested funding for new prisons, wrongly viewing spending on prisons as a luxury item for Iraqi prisoners rather than a fundamental one for security in Iraq. The consequences are debilitating for the overall effort to establish security. Police who are not confident that the criminals they catch will be prosecuted are tempted to mete out summary justice or simply to turn the other way, neither of which serves U.S. purposes. The problem may worsen, as the abuses at Abu Ghraib prison are likely to lead to even fewer Iraqis being incarcerated and many of those imprisoned being released.

EVEN IF THE insurgents are contained or defeated, the security problem will shift, not disappear. The Sunni rebels in Fallujah and the Mahdi Army loyal to Sadr are only a few of the

[1]Important security duties under Saddam were given to the intelligence services or others of proven loyalty—the police were the least important security element of the regime. Similarly, Iraq's military forces also were far from professional. Not only did these forces collapse in the face of U.S. attacks, but the Iraqis had a dismal track record when fighting the Kurdish insurgency in the 1970s and 1980s. To win, Iraqi forces resorted to unspeakable levels of brutality, an option thankfully that is no longer available to them.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

many armed groups in Iraq today. Many are currently allies of the coalition. The Kurds, for example, have tens of thousands of fighters with arms. Others are loyal to a local leader or faction. These large militias will remain a concern to any central government seeking to control its territory, just as it is in Afghanistan today.

Quelling these threats by establishing a strong security force should remain a top priority. Yet as this capacity is developed, it poses a new risk to the future of Iraq's nascent democracy.

The Iraqis who take control after June 30—and the ones who will eventually rise to power in the coming years when a new government is elected—may rule in name only. For now, Iraqis remain loyal to their parochial leaders, not to the central government. Security is often in the hands of faction leaders or local militias. No national leader has emerged who can unite Iraqis of all stripes.

The likely structure of a new regime—decentralized and federal in composition—compounds this problem. As a way of keeping all the various factions satisfied, almost all of Iraq's major religious, ethnic and tribal groups will share various government agencies and other prerequisites of power—but this means that the central government will be weak.

Yet if the security services and the military become strong enough to stop the insurgency and bring order to Iraq, they could also easily topple any future government. Iraqi history is replete with strongmen using their position in the military and security services to secure power. Military leaders also may seek to take power if the new civilian regime is inept.

The challenges to be faced by the new Iraqi government are staggering. It must reconstruct a devastated economy, reform a corrupt system, establish the rule of law after decades of tyranny, and satisfy Iraq's myriad communal factions—all while fighting an insurgency and securing Iraq's borders in a dangerous neighborhood. Many Iraqis might initially applaud as a new strongman takes power, promising to end corruption and abolish a weak regime—especially if it is viewed as an American puppet. Certainly, no coup is possible as long as tens of thousands of American troops remain present in Iraq, but eventual withdrawal is a goal shared by both Iraqi and American publics.

Walking the Tightrope

THERE ARE NO simple answers to the broader question of how to improve security—but there are better answers.

Curbing crime and stopping the Mahdi Army are the first steps to making sure the problems do not get worse. The April attacks suggest the insurgency is spreading and that Sunnis and Shi'a might at times work together, if only to counter the Americans. If the United States loses the support, or more accurately the acquiescence, of Iraq's Shi'a community, it will fail in Iraq.

In the short term, more U.S. forces are necessary to assure security in Shi'a areas. But a larger U.S. presence is at best a band-aid. The more the counterinsurgency effort becomes Americanized, the less likely that Iraqi forces will take the painful steps necessary to become more effective.

Yet the Iraqis cannot take these steps without substantial U.S. assistance. As we accelerate the transfer of political power, we need to decelerate the transfer of security. Haste is the enemy of effectiveness. If anything, the training process should be far longer than that for Western security forces. Iraqis have far more to learn, and the tasks they will be called on to do—fighting an insurgency as well as crime—are among the most difficult for any security force. Proper vetting also takes months, not simply a few weeks. One officer who works for the other side can dev-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

astate U.S. efforts to fight the insurgency, and poses a direct risk to U.S. forces.

Such an effort will cost far more. As of March, the United States planned to spend $3.2 billion to improve security in Iraq. Two billion dollars is earmarked for the police—the largest police training program ever. This figure may grow considerably if we seek to put competent police officers on the street rather than just large numbers of them.

U.S. officer rotations to work with Iraqi security forces should also be extended. Gaining the trust of the Iraqis takes time, and the constant rotations destroy the personal relationships that are so important to effective law-enforcement. One of the problems the United States has faced in getting Iraqis to act in Fallujah was that the U.S. liaisons with the Iraqis had only been on the job for a few days.

Training must also be differentiated. Police are often wrongly viewed as simply a lower-echelon security force for fighting an insurgency. But most police duties should still focus on law enforcement, particularly as crime is the most pressing concern for most Iraqis. Moreover, because the police are only as good as the overall law enforcement system, investment in courts and prisons is vital.

These measures to improve security must go hand in hand with efforts to minimize the risk security forces will pose to an elected Iraqi government. The Iraqi police and security forces need a change of culture. This requires not only constant refreshers on how to treat citizens, but also a new leadership cadre. Training must focus on keeping the security forces and military apolitical and responsive to civilian control. Those who will not reform must be discarded, requiring the United States to identify junior officers who are worthy of promotion and work closely with them.

Finally, the United States must recognize that even as political reform and reconstruction depend on security, the process goes both ways. If Iraq lacks strong institutions and stalls economically, Iraqis will be more likely to support the insurgents, while the risk of a coup will rise greatly. This is the true nightmare, undermining both U.S. credibility and any short-term successes the United States has accomplished in Iraq. □

Daniel Byman is an assistant professor at the Edmund Walsh School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University and a non-resident senior fellow at the Saban Center for Middle East Policy at the Brookings Institution.

Vivisecting the Jihad

Alexis Debat

ONE OF THE most crucial and controversial questions confronting Western counter-terrorism analysts revolves around the possible transformation of Iraq from an obscure footnote to a crucial battlefield in the War on Terror. The recent fighting in Fallujah has shed a new light on a category of insurgents that coalition officials refer to as "foreign fighters", whose ideological identity strikes at the heart of this line of argument. Until recently understood as a disparate group of several hundred non-Iraqis, the "foreign fighter" phenomenon

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

has recently emerged as a more cohesive force, structured around a core of Islamic militants themselves a product of the Sunni-jihadist underground that gave the world Chechnya and Afghanistan. This has led the Bush Administration to reassess their potential to destabilize Iraq after the "handover of sovereignty" on June 30, especially in the wake of the recent uprising in the Sunni areas.

While relatively irrelevant from a military point of view, the basic question of how many jihadists are currently operating in Iraq could have devastating political implications. Depending on its scale and quality, Iraq's *mujaheddin* factor is either an anomaly or a tumor, a marginal and strictly military glitch, or the opening of the deadliest chapter yet in the War on Terror.

WE HAVE some statistics to help us sort through this morass. Approximately 300 individuals carrying non-Iraqi passports have been arrested by U.S. forces, Kurdish *peshmerga* and the Iraqi police in the past 14 months, according to senior U.S. military sources. The first wave of these "foreign fighters" (between April and October 2003), was mainly composed of Arab volunteers from neighboring countries, most of them Palestinian refugees enlisted to enter the struggle either by the remnants of the Iraqi *mukhabarat* or any number of terrorist organizations before and during the war in refugee camps in Jordan, Lebanon and Syria.

The second wave, which seems to be growing in size, is composed mostly of Islamic militants recruited throughout Europe and the Middle East and then sent to Iraq through the same elaborate human pipeline used by the *mujaheddin* to send volunteers to the Balkans, Chechnya and Afghanistan in the 1990s.[1] On November 19, 2003, the *New York Times* quoted American government sources as estimating the "foreign fighters phenomenon" to number between 1,000 and 3,000 individuals. A more reasonable approximation currently being floated by U.S. and British intelligence analysts puts the overall force at between 300 and 500 "foreign volunteers", most of them Islamic militants, and spread in small cells of between five and eight operatives. This fits the *modus operandi* of Al-Qaeda and its affiliates.

THE SECOND wave of "foreign fighters" poses a major threat to U.S. strategic goals in Iraq. Once poorly structured and exclusively military in nature, this cluster is now streamlining around a few organizations linked to foreign jihadist networks strongly intent on investing in the future of the country's Sunni minority past the June 30 handover. According to European and American intelligence sources, Ansar Al-Islam leads this second wave of "foreign fighters." Founded in Afghanistan's Herat training camp around 1998, this international terrorist organization is loosely affiliated with Al-Qaeda, which some experts say it aspires to succeed. Ansar Al-Islam has a strong history of activity in Iraq, where it operated training camps in the country's northeast before the war, beyond the reach of Saddam Hussein, and along the border with Iran, where some of its members have sought refuge in the past year. But its reach is impressive: The group has been mentioned in just about every terrorist plot uncovered in Europe

[1]First indoctrinated by "recruiters" in mosques in Europe and the Middle East with graphic videos praising suicide bombers and leaflets denouncing the "atrocities" committed by U.S. forces in Iraq (rendered more credible by the pictures coming out of the Abu Ghraib prison scandal), the volunteers are then turned over to an elaborate network of "facilitators", whose technical and financial resources, as well as their wide-ranging international connections, ensure a relatively safe journey to Iraq.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

in the past 15 months. With its infrastructure damaged in Iraq, the organization has retreated to Georgia, Turkey and western Europe, where it is re-organizing its networks around one objective: recruiting and sending dozens of volunteers to fight under the banner of its new Iraqi branch, Jaish Ansar Al-Sunna.

According to senior British intelligence officials, Ansar's Iraqi branch was formally established last November in Baghdad with a goal to promote the group's radical interpretation of *Tawhid* against the "infidel" Christians and Shi'a involved in the new Iraq.[2] The organization is reported to rely on between 100 and 150 members operating mainly in Kurdistan, as well as the Sunni triangle and the Baghdad area. Like other terrorist organizations in Al-Qaeda's orbit, it focuses on large suicide operations.[3] It has claimed responsibility for the February 1 bombings in the northern city of Irbil that killed 109 people, and the February 13 suicide attack on the police station in Kirkuk, which killed seven policemen. Assisting Ansar abroad is Al-Tawhid, a group established in Kabul in the late 1990s to provide support to Jordanian volunteers trained at Al-Qaeda's camps in Herat. Now operating largely out of the UK and Germany, it provides other jihadist groups with the logistical base necessary to smuggle scores of *mujaheddin* into Iraq since the fall of Saddam.

This connection is crucial: In a recent German intelligence document, one of Al-Tawhid's main operatives in Germany ranks the forging of passports as "the most important activity" of the organization in Europe. Almost all of these smuggling networks then run through safehouses in Istanbul and Damascus, and on to Iraq with the help of smugglers operating along the porous border, especially in the many wadis of the Al-Qa'im district and in the vicinity of Al-Rutbah and Qusaybah, two longtime smuggling hubs. Volunteers from Middle Eastern countries also enter the country from Iran, Jordan and Saudi Arabia.

These entry points offer a relatively safe and direct access to Al-Anbar province and the Sunni triangle, especially the flashpoint towns of Ramadi and Fallujah, as well as Baghdad's Al-Moalemeen and Yarmuk neighborhoods, where these Sunni jihadists can then disappear into the Ba'athi underground.

Both Ansar and Al-Tawhid are headed by a 38 year-old Jordanian Bedouin known as Abu Musab Al-Zarqawi, who took responsibility for the beheading of Nicholas Berg in retaliation for the treatment of Iraqi prisoners in May (in fact, it is highly probable that he was the actual executioner). A former protégé of Omar Ibn Al-Khattab and Khalid Sheikh Mohamed in Afghanistan, Ahmad Fadl Al-Khalayleh—his real name—has been linked directly or indirectly to about two dozen terrorist plots worldwide since 1999, as well as several suicide bombings in Iraq and a foiled chemical plot in Baghdad in late January.[4] Despite his extensive training in Afghanistan—especially with chemical weapons—and

---

[2] *Tawhid* refers to the unity of Allah as the one and only God. While the Quran states that all religions (including Christianity and Judaism) revealed to the prophets have the same essence and knowledge of *Tawhid*, Wahhabis consider that the logic of *Tawhid* immediately turns Christians, Jews and Shi'a into mortal enemies of "pure" Islam.

[3] U.S. troops have so far recovered stockpiles of as many as 500 "suicide vests", including approximately 200 found in a safe house used by Jaish Al-Ansar Al-Sunna in Fallujah last April, along with a few dozen pounds of explosive, and several American uniforms.

[4] Khattab went on to become "one of Chechnya's most powerful warlords", as Yevgeny Primakov writes in his new book, *A World Challenged* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2004).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

his past allegiance to Al-Qaeda, Zarqawi is establishing himself both as an alternative and a successor to Osama bin Laden.

Intercepted communications between what senior Middle Eastern intelligence officials believe to be the two terrorists have Bin Laden acknowledging Zarqawi as being at the "forefront" of the global jihad, and as leading the "vanguard of the jihad in Iraq." These same intelligence officials have evidence that Zarqawi was detained by Iranian intelligence in autumn 2001 and that he was kept in a secured location along with Saif Al-Adl, Suleiman Abu Graith and Saad bin Laden, all high level Al-Qaeda lieutenants. Around the new year, Zarqawi crossed into Iraq and then into Turkey and Syria, where he met up with his main deputy, Abu Ghaadiyh, in Aleppo. In March 2002, he crossed back into Iran, where he was again taken into the custody of the Islamic Republic's intelligence services and transported to Tehran. At that time, it appears likely that he accepted Iran's offer to provide him with material and logistical support, and was given orders to go to Iraq and attack the Americans. Soon thereafter, he returned to Iraq to lay the foundation for the establishment of Jaish Ansar Al-Sunna.

Zarqawi's intention to commit acts of terror inside Iraq has been further confirmed by the capture of two of his top lieutenants in January 2004. One of them, Hassan Guhl, a Pakistani veteran of Al-Qaeda operations captured in Kurdistan, was carrying a CD-ROM allegedly containing a 17-page "progress report" from Zarqawi to the leadership of Al-Qaeda which claimed that the group had been responsible for 25 terrorist attacks (almost all major assaults against U.S. forces) and solicited Bin Laden's consent and support to turn Iraq into a "field of jihad", in part by stirring up religious strife between the Sunnis and the Shi'a. If genuine, the letter is another piece of evidence that suggests Zarqawi is planning to use Jaish Ansar Al-Sunna as a vehicle for his premeditated "third act" in Iraq.[5]

ANOTHER consequence of the Iraq War one year on is the *post facto* alliance between the heretofore fiercely independent foreign *mujaheddin* (and, in particular, Zarqawi's men) and the remnants of their former enemy, the Ba'ath Party. This alliance is much less artificial than it appears. Contrary to popular belief, radical Wahhabi militants had built a powerful, if discreet, movement in Iraq through the 1980s and 1990s. Centering on several mosques, like Ibn Taymiyah in Yarmuk, this fundamentalist Sunni underground was built around a handful of charismatic clerics such as Madhi Al-Soumaydai, who is now considered its main leader. Despite Saddam's ruthless repression, this movement not only survived but thrived, thanks to Saudi funds and the popular appeal of Islam facilitated by the considerable impoverishment of the country due to the 1990s sanctions regime and consequent criminalization of the Iraqi economy. It built a small but powerful following in the army, even enlisting one of the generals heading the *mukhabarat* (reportedly married to a member of Saddam's clan). When the regime collapsed, these officers openly joined the movement and now manage the crucial interface between the Ba'athi underground and the jihadists. (When coalition forces raided Ibn Taymiyah in January and arrested Al-Soumaydai

[5]Zarqawi's networks operate alongside other, smaller jihadi organizations such as the Mujahedi Al-Salafiyah, an offshoot of the Algerian Salafist Group for Call and Combat, which has sent a few dozen volunteers to Iraq since January. An increasing number of jihadists from the Gulf are also teaming up with some of the rich and well-equipped Ba'athi resistance organizations, such as Jaish Mohamed (Army of Mohamed), towards which many Saudi volunteers seem to have been drawn.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

and 31 suspected "foreign fighters", they uncovered a large cache of weaponry and explosives.)

Indeed, U.S. intelligence sources suspect that former officers of the *mukhabarat*'s M14 section (responsible for monitoring the activities of terrorist groups inside Iraq and beyond) have used their experience in navigating the intricate Sunni fundamentalist underground of the Middle East to co-opt some of them with the rhetoric of protecting Iraq's "Sunni identity" against the Shi'a and the Iranian threat.

On the ground, the strategy of integrating the fundamentalists with the secularists has made it difficult to assign blame to specific groups for particular terror operations inside Iraq. But as the attacks multiplied and the resources devoted to tracking Saddam and his elusive WMD were reassigned to fight the insurgency, U.S. intelligence analysts have been able to build a general typology. Most of the small-scale but deadly roadside bombings, sniper and RPG attacks against coalition troops are the work of a mixture of former regime elements, Arab volunteers and ordinary Iraqis; by contrast, most of the large-scale suicide bombings have been squarely attributed to groups dominated or heavily infiltrated by Islamic militants.[6]

This suggests a rigorous division of labor between Ba'ath types and jihadists, in which the former provide money, explosives and logistics while the latter provide the foot soldiers and suicide bombers. Radical Islamic militants have also been suspected in less-deadly and high-profile attacks, such as the shelling of the Al-Rashid hotel in Baghdad during Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz's visit in October 2003, as well as the attack against oil installations in Basra this past April. The recent wave of kidnappings of Westerners has also sometimes been attributed to these foreign jihadists, and CIA bomb-making experts have also noted a clear technical shift in the fabrication of the "improvised explosive devices" (IED) made by insurgents—and which have proven so deadly for U.S. and coalition forces—suggesting that they are now "jihadi-made."

NONE OF this is good news for the American-led coalition. Not only are terrorist organizations linked to the global *mujaheddin* underground slowly taking over the insurgency itself, but they are pushing to turn Iraq into what Afghanistan was before autumn 2001: a public relations windfall for their ideologues, a training ground for their "rookies", and even a safe-haven for their leadership. While this somber horizon is still taking shape, its potential implications must be thought through. Iraq's transformation into a new "field of jihad" will force the U.S. government to abandon the long-term requirements of building a modern and multi-confessional Iraq and focus on the

[6]Among the most prominent, we find the August 2003 bombings of the Jordanian embassy and the UN headquarters in Baghdad; the car bombing of the Imam Ali mosque in Najaf, which killed Ayatollah Mohamed Baqir Al-Hakim; the bombing of the Italian paramilitary police headquarters in Nasiriya in November 2003; the New Year Eve's bombing of a popular restaurant in Baghdad's Karrada district; the bombing outside the U.S. occupation headquarters in Baghdad in January 2004; the February 2004 suicide bombing against the of the headquarters of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan in Erbil; and the suicide attack on the police station in Kirkuk. They are also heavily suspected of involvement in the Ashura bombings in Najaf in early March. Most of these operations have involved vehicles (some, like the Tarmaz truck used in the UN bombing, smuggled from Syria) driven by suicide bombers, as well as a mix of conventional explosives and military ordinance stockpiled before and after the regime's downfall.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

short-term necessities of waging direct war on terror.

Another consequence of the Iraq War and the presence of the "foreign fighters" is the emergence of a common Sunni identity between former enemies, one that transcends ideological differences in the name not only of the defense of the Sunni identity in Iraq (what the Ba'athi want) but also of its triumph over other religious and political forces (Shi'i and secularism). If the trend holds, two consequences emerge. First, it will jeopardize the Bush Administration's remaining democratic ambitions for Iraq this year and beyond. Second, it will throw the whole region's fragile ethnic and religious patchwork in a chaos of such proportions that the United States and its allies might have no alternative but to cultivate a new generation of Saddams: brutal dictators able to keep the region from imploding. To break the Sunni Islamist-Ba'athi alliance, the United States will need to revise significantly its democratic plans for Iraq by giving the Sunnis enough economic and political guarantees to ensure the viability of their entity in the face of considerable Shi'a and Kurdish resistance.[7]

Finally, the possibility that Zarqawi, a Sunni, has been turned by Shi'a Iran, that he has been annoited as the "vanguard of the jihad in Iraq" by Bin Laden, and that the head of Wahhabist and therefore Sunni Al-Qaeda is aware of Zarqawi's Iranian support-system, should send shivers down our collective spines. This development, if true, will require the intelligence community and policymakers to rethink many of their deepest-held understandings of the region's dynamics.

THE IRAQ WAR has not up to now constituted a step forward in the War on Terror. Quite the contrary, it has complicated the global efforts begun well before 9/11 to disrupt and destroy radical jihadist networks throughout the Greater Middle East and beyond. Indeed, the Pentagon's blind ambition for Iraq has fostered a resistance movement armed with more concrete, deadlier and (unfortunately) more realistic plans for the country than anything that the Department of Defense's luminaries have so far devised.

More broadly, the logic of the Bush Administration's rhetoric of freedom for the Middle East betrays a fundamental misreading of the War on Terror's cultural dimension. Not only has Al-Qaeda taken terrorism beyond its initial function as a vehicle for resistance, it has turned it into a global instrument by which to challenge not only Western influence in the Muslim world but the West itself. In this new and global "clash of uniqueness", success is not measured in the number of rogue states overthrown or militants arrested or killed, but by the number of young Muslims who feed their hunger for an identity with the teachings of Jefferson and Montesquieu rather than those of a Mohamed Ibn Al-Wahhab. Triumph will lie in the capacity of our thinkers and political leaders to pull those young men and women away from the slogan printed on a flier circulating in radical Islamic mosques in Milan: "Leave this meaningless life and expect the highest rewards in heaven. The doors are open for new recruits."

If the second year of a free Iraq looks very much like the first, we are in for a long and bloody war indeed. □

[7]We have already seen that change at play with the turning over of Fallujah to General Jasim Mohamed Saleh, a former officer in the Iraqi Republican Guard, presumably in exchange for a crackdown on the "foreign fighters."

Alexis Debat, a former official in the French ministry of defense, is a consultant on terrorism for ABC News and a senior analyst for the *Institut Montaigne* in France. He is at work on a comprehensive history of the Central Intelligence Agency.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Gauging the Aftermath

Michael O'Hanlon & Adriana Lins de Albuquerque

SINCE WE last wrote for *The National Interest*—in the Winter 2003/04 issue ("Scoring the Iraq Aftermath"), presenting data on security and economic trends in Iraq from the fall of Baghdad through autumn 2003—the news coming out of Iraq has worsened.

In our article, we observed:

> A successful counterinsurgency must have security and economic dimensions. In the security sphere, it is necessary to try to assess progress in the counterinsurgency: namely in neutralizing resistance forces, reducing crime rates and building Iraqi security forces.

And here, the news appears to be bad. More Americans have died in Iraq in the six months from November 1, 2003 through April 30, 2004 (371 in total) than in the preceding eight. April 2004 was deadlier for American forces than even the invasion months of March and April 2003. And death totals among Iraqi security personnel have been roughly comparable in number.

Central Command's current estimate of the number of hardened insurgents still facing U.S. troops has not diminished even after six months during which more than 10,000 Iraqis have been arrested or killed by U.S. forces. And while coalition military forces are getting better at finding improvised explosive devices before they detonate, insurgents are getting better at building the explosives and at using car bombs, meaning that casualty rates have not declined but have gone up—way up.

The above will not surprise most Americans. Excepting the capture of Saddam in December, the daily news from Iraq has been almost uniformly bad in recent months. American troop levels, once scheduled to diminish this spring, are now greater than anytime since last August, with scant signs of greater troop contributions from coalition partners. Indeed, there has been a gentle trend in the opposite direction, with the announced withdrawal of forces from Spain, Honduras and Costa Rica.

Compounding the problem is the woeful lack of training for both the new Iraqi military and police force. By April 2004, only some 6 percent of the number of soldiers expected to staff a new Iraqi army had been trained. Only 22 percent of Iraqi police had even started an eight-week training course.

In the end, there can be no successful Iraq strategy without better security—and increasingly the Iraqi people sense it. April's scenes from Fallujah of American forces bringing down an Iraqi city to save it caused the coalition significant strategic damage, whatever tactical benefit might have been gained. The horrific prisoner abuse scandal has also not helped matters. Moreover, the insurgents' willingness to target Iraqi "collaborators"—a trend that has accelerated in 2004—is also a major worry. But politically motivated violence is not the only security threat. For nearly all Iraqis, the biggest concern remains being affected by "routine" crime in their normal lives. Since 2003, crime rates (for theft, murder and so on) have declined somewhat, but Iraq is still among the more dangerous countries in the world.

IS THERE any good news at all? Thankfully, the answer is yes. It is not enough to counter the above, and does not change the overall story that Iraq has

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

gone much worse in recent months than expected. But it does provide welcome reason for some optimism that success may still be achievable, especially if the political transition process now underway in Iraq proves acceptable to the Grand Ayatollah Ali Al-Sistani and the bulk of his countrymen. Leaving aside the politics—too much a moving target for an article like this that must be written weeks before it is read (and in the run-up to the June 30 handover of sovereignty)—there are a fair amount of welcome developments on the economic and quality of life fronts.

Here is the tally on where we have gotten to date. First, Iraq's moves towards greater economic self-reliance continue—even if Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz's aspiration of last spring that Iraq would soon fund its own reconstruction remains as unrealistic as ever. Crude oil production is now almost 2.5 million barrels per day (in contrast to late Saddam-era levels that were closer to 3 million barrels, but up from the 2.1 million barrels per day in October 2003). Exports are now over 1.5 million barrels a day. There is concern about whether the new pace of production is sustainable and whether wells are being properly maintained, but the overall story is still good.

The next few months will be critical for whatever remaining prospects for sucess we still possess.

Quality of life indicators are also improving, albeit slowly. Availability of motor fuels is up by almost 50 percent since late last summer and is within 10 percent of the stated coalition goal. Cooking and heating fuels are also about 50 percent more prevalent than last summer. Improvement in nationwide electricity production remains sluggish—up only 15 percent since last summer, and still only 60 percent of the target—but the real key is whether it will take a big leap in time for the summer heat.

Potable water and telecommunications availability both exceed their prewar levels. Schools and hospitals are virtually all open, even if three-fourths of the former still need a lot of renovation and 10 to 20 percent of the latter do not have even as many supplies as in the late Saddam Hussein period.

So there is a growing economic base of solid, even if not spectacular, news. This comes despite the fact that only a very small fraction of the $18 billion appropriated by the U.S. Congress for Iraq for 2004 had been spent by midspring, as of this writing. Remarkably, red tape and bureaucratic procedures had prevented more than about $1 billion being spent by the end of April. Some 2003 money and Iraqi funds were also available, meaning that the flow of resources was not quite as limited as the $1 billion figure suggests, but it was still quite limited.

The slowness of spending aid dollars is a serious indictment of the American budgetary system, even if it gets better fast in the coming months. It has also kept unemployment rates distressingly high—probably still close to 50 percent, down somewhat from last summer but much higher than in Ba'athi days and much too high to offer any real hope of a stable security environment: Angry, unemployed young men tend not to throw flowers at the feet of foreign occupying troops. But the slowness of the disbursements to date also makes the positive economic news out of Iraq to date more impressive. As large sums of money finally start to flow into the country, the good news should accelerate.

Recent polling in Iraq reflects these schizophrenic realities (a worsening security situation alongside positive economic signs). We have reached a point where more Iraqis now think the invasion of their country has done more harm than good—yet half still think it has at least

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

marginally improved their own lives. A majority now favor a quick departure by the coalition—even if, paradoxically, they also say they would feel less safe if coalition forces promptly left. And what is most worrying is that some 70 percent now view coalition troops as occupiers more than liberators. This raises the specter we outlined in the winter issue of *The National Interest*, that the United States could "mishandle the operation" in Iraq "to make anti-Americanism that rallying ideology" behind the insurgency.

The only dependable ways to turn around these numbers are to complete a successful political transition process in Iraq this summer, autumn and upcoming winter; to employ the huge numbers of Iraqis now unemployed; and to dispel the impression among most Iraqis that the country's towns and villages are ungoverned and unsecured. We wrote last winter that "If this mission does eventually show signs of failure, we must react and adjust our policies promptly, because failure in Iraq is not an option." The United States has already taken too long to make progress on most of these matters. The next few months will be critical for whatever remaining prospects for success we still possess. □

Michael O'Hanlon is a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution. Adriana Lins de Albuquerque is a research assistant at the Brookings Institution. Their "Iraq Index" tracking data trends can be accessed online at www.brookings.edu/iraqindex.

Thinking Through Liberation

Amir Taheri

FOR THE PAST year a four-letter word has emerged as the key to the future of the Middle East. This word—Iraq—is being presented in some Western media outlets as a code word for chaos and "another Vietnam", but it has a different resonance in the region itself.

To Arab and Iranian despots, Iraq is a code word for reforms that could end their monopoly on power. To radical Islamists fighting for power in a dozen Muslim countries, Iraq is seen as the "the final battleground" between Islam and democracy. And to the people of the region, Iraq is a code word for change.

The conventional wisdom in the West is that democratization in Iraq is a forlorn outcome. Self-styled experts in London and Washington are urging Tony Blair and George W. Bush to settle for a "possible", as opposed to an "ideal", Iraq. Translated into practical terms it means the instauration of a "lite" version of a despotic Arab regime in Baghdad followed by a quiet retreat by the U.S.-led coalition. Call it a policy of "cut and stroll away while whistling", if you like.

The arguments why Iraq could not, indeed should not, become a democracy are well known: Arabs have no experience with democracy; Iraqis are too divided by ethnic and religious differences to think of the common good; there is no popular base for democratic politics in the newly liberated country.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

While these claims are easily refutable, I fear that those who advance them are unlikely to allow their minds to be changed. The Iraq debate is becoming a bit like trench warfare on the Western Front in the stalemate years of World War I.

BETWEEN 1925 and 1958 Iraq was a fairly open society with a Westminster-style parliamentary system and a constitutional monarchy. It had several political parties, from the communist to the conservative, a relatively free press and a robust civil society. For much of that time there were no political prisoners, and no one was ever executed for his political beliefs. The 1958 military coup, inspired by pan-Arabism and backed by Moscow, ended all that. But the memory of the "good old days" remains, and many Iraqis believe that they can resume their nation's quest for democracy.

As for Iraq's ethnic and religious diversity, rather than regarding it as a barrier to democratization, one could see it as an incentive. Iraqis of whatever ethnic or religious background know that only through democracy can they manage their differences. "For us, democracy is a necessity, not a luxury", says Muhammad Bahr Al-Olum, a prominent Shi'a cleric and member of the Iraq Governing Council. "The alternatives are dictatorship and civil war."

The claim that there is no popular base for democracy in Iraq is absurd. This is a country with 32 political parties, representing all shades of the ideological spectrum. Within three months of liberation, the Iraqis launched over 200 newspapers and magazines, the freest in the Arab world. Visitors to Iraq are impressed by the numerous political and social clubs that have mushroomed everywhere.

That Iraqis want and can practice democracy has also been proved on the ground. Since liberation, elections have been held for 37 municipalities. In every case, an alliance of democrats and secular politicians won easily. In most cases, Islamist radicals, the bogeyman of self-styled Iraq experts, finished last.

Today, the people of Iraq have an opportunity that other Arab nations suffering under despots only dream of. Within just a year, all the pillars of totalitarianism, erected over half a century of tyranny, have been razed. The "Supreme Leader" languishes in prison, waiting to be tried domestically for crimes committed against Iraqis and neighboring countries. The ruling party has disappeared. The army and the half-dozen paramilitary organizations that terrorized the nation have been disbanded, along with the dreaded security networks—the *mukhabarat*—without which no Arab regime can last more than a week. The command economy that provided the infrastructure of tyranny has collapsed. Most importantly, perhaps, the ideology of pan-Arabism that had dominated Arab political discourse for half a century has been discredited.

WHAT IS NEEDED most of all is time: The peoples of Iraq need four or five years in which to develop and test solid democratic institutions. Here we come to the crux of the matter, for the building of democracy in Iraq is opposed by powerful forces inside and outside the country. Inside, one still has to cope with the remnants of the Ba'ath regime. In 2002, the party claimed a membership of 2.2 million, but it seems clear that no more than a few thousand were genuinely committed to its national-socialist ideology. Some of these have regrouped. In January they elected a new Central Committee to replace the one headed by Saddam Hussein. Their power base consists of thousands of former security agents and their families. They are joined by disgruntled military officers and civil servants who have lost their positions and social standing. But—with the excep-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

tion of a few hundred diehards who understand only the language of violence—even the remnants of the Ba'ath could find a place in the broad tent of a democratic Iraq.

The same cannot be said of radical Islamists, whether they be linked with Al-Qaeda or backed by Iran, for they regard democracy as anathema and are prepared to kill and die to defeat it in Iraq. These are well-funded and well-organized groups that could fight for years, as was the case with their counterparts in Egypt and Algeria in the past two decades.

The new Iraq also faces a powerful coalition of foreign foes. Most Arab states fear a democratic Iraq, and some are actively campaigning behind the scenes to delay its advent. Egypt, under the septuagenarian dictator Hosni Mubarak, sees Iraq as a rival for the leadership of the Arabs. The Egyptians are trying to make things difficult for the new Iraq in two ways: by ostracizing the Iraqi leadership and by waging a campaign of rumors and disinformation against the U.S.-led coalition. (Earlier this year, for example, the Egyptian security services spread a rumor that Jews were buying land and oil wells in northern Iraq to dispossess the Arab tribes. The aim was to foment bloodshed between ethnic Arabs and Kurds.)

Saudi Arabia is also anxious to prevent the emergence of a democratic Iraq. It is rumored to be using its not negligible influence in Washington to persuade the Bush Administration that Iraq is not ready for democracy and that the United States should settle for a mild form of Arab authoritarianism. Riyadh is also financing a string of conservative figures and groups inside Iraq to oppose secularism.

Syria, Iraq's neighbor to the northwest, is even more active in efforts to sabotage Iraqi democratization. Terrorist groups, using safe-havens inside Syria, organize cross-border attacks into Iraq. The ruling Ba'ath in Damascus is funding the revival of its sister party across the border, and Syrian diplomacy has taken the lead in preventing Arab and other Muslim states from fully recognizing the Iraq Governing Council.

The United Arab Emirates, for its part, is funding a number of anti-democratic clubs and newspapers in Iraq while offering a safe-haven to fugitive Ba'ath military and political figures, among them the notorious information minister, Saeed Al-Sahhaf (alias Comical Ali), and several former generals of Saddam's Presidential Guard.

Qatar, although home to the largest U.S. military base in the region, is also doing its bit to undermine democratization in Iraq. This is largely done through the Al-Jazeera satellite television owned by the Emir, Sheikh Hamad Al-Thani. The channel has become a pulpit for former Saddam henchmen and radical Islamists who opposed the country's liberation. It has emerged as the principal mouthpiece of the maverick Shi'a strongman, Moqtada Sadr, as well as of the Fallujah insurgents.

But by far the most ardent opponents of democratization in Iraq are the mullahs of Tehran. Not only have they allowed Ansar Al-Islam, a Sunni terror group linked with Al-Qaeda, to operate several bases inside Iran, they are also funding other terror groups, including the Iraqi branch of Hizballah. It is now also certain that Moqtada Sadr received the bulk of his funding from Tehran.

Iran is doubly worried about the emergence of a democratic Iraq. In both countries Shi'a form a majority and the mullahs of Tehran regard the mullahs of Najaf, Iraq's main "holy" city, as potential rivals. In a word, democracy in Iraq could boost Iran's democratic movement.

THE SHOCK of Iraq has already forced a number of Arab countries and Iran to announce, and even implement, some democratic reforms. In most cases this is only cosmetic. But some

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

of the smaller Arab states—notably Oman, the UAE, Qatar, Bahrain and Jordan—have triggered changes that cannot be easily reversed. The shock of Iraq has also speeded up progress towards democratization in Algeria and Morocco, and strengthened the democratic forces in Yemen.

In some cases the shock of Iraq has persuaded the Arab regimes to seek new anchors. In June six Arab states—Mauritania, Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Egypt and Jordan—will sign partnership-for-peace style agreements with NATO. Libya, currently working a complete rethink of its foreign policy, has also expressed interest in "some form of cooperation" with the Atlantic Alliance. Preliminary talks are also planned by Oman, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Bahrain and Kuwait to develop a NATO link.

The May 2004 Arab summit in Tunis showed a three-way division within the bloc. One group, led by the new Iraq, and backed by Algeria, Morocco and Jordan, is seeking speedy democratization. Another group led by Egypt and Saudi Arabia advocates slow, largely cosmetic measures in the hope that regime change in Washington in the form of an electoral victory for John F. Kerry would bury the Bush Administration's plans for democracy in the Middle East. A third group, consisting only of Syria and the Sudan, remains opposed to any change, still preaching pan-Arabism and Islamism as ramparts against Western "domination."

To write that Iraq's future is uncertain is to say nothing that is not obvious. What remains less obvious is the power of a future Iraq's example to effect change on the rest of the Middle East. If democracy fails to take root in Iraq, it will almost certainly fail in the rest of the region. Are we willing to live with that? □

Amir Taheri, a commentator on the Middle East for CNN, is an Iranian author of ten books on the Middle East and Islam.

Strengthening the Fainthearts

John Hillen

WASHINGTON loves to panic over impending snowstorms, ongoing heat waves, the Redskins' playoff chances, and policy implications. The panic has set in on Iraq because American policy there carries enough of a whiff of incoherence about it not only to embolden critics, but cause formerly stalwart supporters to express doubts. It's one thing when Senator Ted Kennedy or Susan Sontag uses the Abu Ghraib prison scandal to argue for moral equivalence between the Bush Administration and Saddam Hussein's regime. It is another when conservative allies (of all flavors) start deserting President George W. Bush in his moment of need.

They have reasonable concerns. Is the United States attempting to achieve a utopian end with a very limited set of means (with the ties between the two not patently obvious or frequently articulat-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ed)? The tactics vary enough to give the impression of convenience (we use agents of the Hussein regime in Fallujah but do the dirty work ourselves in Karbala) rather than well-thought out operational flexibility. The CPA/Pentagon arrangement about who is in charge of what and answers to whom violates the age-old dictate, "if you can't explain the chain of command in ten seconds or less it won't work in a crisis." The only Iraqi ally almost any American can name has just been dropped, and the rest appear incapable of accomplishing much of anything outside their tribe or ethnic group. Finally, the mounting sacrifice incurred in blood and treasure appears to many Americans as if it might be suffered in vain if we fail, run, or soldier on to no certain end.

President Bush's Army War College speech of May 24, 2004, was an important political finger in the dike. While there was very little that was new in the way of policy, and the detailed issues that have bedeviled this occupation were not addressed, it did show him engaged and resolute. Even so, the timing of the speech—coming as it did to choke down the rising panic—seemed determined by media cycles, flustered political allies and the relentless election year polling calendar. Moreover, the Bush Administration has let its supporters flounder and discern on their own where the Administration's ideology ends and the policy begins. Senator Dick Lugar's recent complaint about Iraq policy was not one of reproach and alternative, but confusion.

A holistic approach to the root causes of global terrorism should be an important part of American strategy.

By responding to these cycles, rather than setting its own, the Bush Administration has let three very important issues become obscured—all of which can be rescued by an appeal to that most durable American political quality: old-fashioned horse sense. Americans would rally around the president if the Administration would tone down the utopian neoconish rhetoric and take care to point out the enduring value of what we have achieved in Iraq, the practical plan for getting out and leaving a better place behind, and the continuing utility of the Bush Doctrine in the age of terror.

Surprisingly, the administration has not been effective in reinforcing just what a gift it bestowed on Iraq, the Persian Gulf region and the world by removing Saddam Hussein. Prison scandals, continued small numbers of casualties and sporadic civil unrest in Iraq cannot diminish the abiding benefit of this feat. One can argue without end about whether this was a war of choice or war of necessity, a legitimate *casus belli* or a rogue strike, but the utilitarian fact remains: Almost every single soul on the globe is better off in a world without Saddam Hussein than with him. This is not disputed—even by those who use the frequently heard but careless argument, "I too think Saddam needed to go, but only at no cost." The Bush Administration should have no truck with that shameful dodge and ought to beat its chest about this contribution to humanity and global security.

Indeed, the Iraq War bagged two dictators in one campaign. While Senator John Kerry chalked up Muammar Qaddafi's dramatic surrender to the triumph of "multilateralism" and the *Washington Post* proclaimed that two decades of economic sanctions had finally broken the only man in Libya unaffected by them, practical Americans know better. Only days after Saddam was shown having his hair picked for lice by an American medic, the lion of Libya and scourge of North Africa capitulated. As Charles Krauthammer has pointed out, gangster regimes may not have much time for

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

American values, but they certainly understand American force. The ancillary effects of decisive American action against Saddam are worth trumpeting too.

Going Forward

PRAGMATISM has another side: recognizing the potential mess on America's hands in Iraq. Hubris and political underselling of the costs and risks backed the Administration into a corner with fewer resources and partners than it needed; key assumptions went awry in the postwar planning; at critical points the wrong agencies and the wrong leaders were on the scene and in charge at the wrong times; and the Iraqis on whom the United States placed its hopes have been able to generate precious little legitimacy in the troubled parts of the country.

Nonetheless, a practical strategy exists for an exit that is timely, achievable and, most importantly, leaves behind an Iraq that is considerably more peaceable than the one the coalition found in March 2003. That strategy must be framed by four competing dynamics.

First, Bush must deal with the actual situation on the ground—as it is, not as one might want it to be. Second, he needs to understand not only the potential of the enormous power the United States can wield, but have a sober appreciation of its limits. Third, there must be a recognition of the inherent constraints and caprice of trying forcefully to establish a modern American-style democracy in the Middle East. Fourth, Bush must take as the starting point the obligation to Iraq and the Gulf region to leave behind a stable and sustainable regime after having removed its predecessor. What emerges is a limited role for the United States while at the same time a reduction in the expectations for Iraq from those Washington expressed a year ago, namely that the country be the insta-democracy that transforms the Arab world.

It would be wonderful, of course, if Iraq flowered into a contagious, pluralistic, free-market democracy during the U.S. military occupation. But that should not be the goal in this round of engagement. There is neither the time nor the tools (nor the climate) to do so now. Rather, the United States should seek to leave behind a fairly trim political system and an economic order that allows for most citizens to make a living. More important, the standards for order, security and a structure for economic advancement should be Iraqi standards, not American. The trains don't run on time in Iraq or the Middle East, and never have. Call it lowered standards if you will, but any system of political order that must have some guarantees of individual freedoms, representation, minority rights and economic wherewithal in Iraq must make sense to Iraqis even if they don't to Americans. While the United States has a solemn obligation to leave behind a better Iraq than the one it found, it need only do it to the standards of that country.

This sort of strategy applied to the many political, economic and social issues affecting Iraq today is neither an excuse nor a low window out of which to crawl because the going has gotten tough. Rather, it reflects a meaningful, achievable and sustainable role the United States can play in Iraq. Bush himself has realized this and struck a powerfully pragmatic note in his Army War College speech when he declared his goal to be a "representative government that protects basic rights", and stipulated that "Iraqis will raise up a government that reflects their own culture and values."

Ultimately, the United States has an "over-the-horizon" interest in Iraq—and any other country in the region, for that matter. Over time, America's military posture in the region should also take that physical form. The U.S. military is not there to police Fallujah's street corners and cares little for who runs that city or

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

any other in Iraq. America *does* have a powerful interest, however, in making sure whatever Iraqi government emerges is stable, unthreatening to the region, able to defend itself, mindful of the role that its oil supply plays in the global economy, respectful of the general tenets of basic human freedoms and minority rights, and unwilling to harbor or collude with terrorists. The United States must reserve the right to mobilize the international community or just itself to help assure these general conditions persist.

The Bush Doctrine's Utility

THE BUSH Doctrine of preemptive action against terrorists or rogue states has come in for a beating due to the struggles of the Iraq occupation. The media have portrayed the choices in Republican foreign policy as either "Wilsonianism in combat boots" or a caricature of reflexive anti-interventionism. But the Bush Doctrine is sound if practically applied—and represents an important middle ground between neocons and Buchananites. In a world of dramatically changed threats, it is important to have a president who is entrepreneurial by nature and unafraid to confront the status-quo-worshiping tradition of caricatured Kissingerian policies. But Bush's bold initiatives have to some degree been hijacked by the Bush Doctrine's most enthusiastic and ideological proponents—and discredited in much of America as a result.

For these proponents, to compromise in applying the doctrine is anathema. Universal values cannot be compromised, after all; to do so would refute their universality, so it could be said. Some neoconservatives have even suggested that if our values are not fully implemented everywhere, than they are illegitimate even in our own tradition! It is hard to understand however, how the U.S. Constitution loses legitimacy after 215 years of struggle and interpretation in our own country if not implemented tomorrow, or the day after that, in Kyrgyzstan. Moreover, neoconservatives believe that the enemies America faces will grow even stronger if America does not forcefully escort them into the modern age—with all the trappings of political freedom and free-market prosperity.

Perhaps. But it is possible for Bush to apply the basic tenets of this doctrine while recognizing seriously two pragmatic considerations. First, power has limits, even American power. To recognize this, work through it, and even accommodate it in policy on occasion is not to be unpatriotic or defeatist. Second, American values do have universal appeal to some extent; nonetheless, one is not surrendering to cultural determinism or relativism to recognize that these values are not easily applied in their "pure" form on ancient or failing societies struggling with the challenges of modernity. Nor should they be. Democracy is, by its very nature, a homegrown enterprise—with all the quirks and baggage that complex societies can hang on it. There is nothing inherently wrong with societies getting to modernism in their own way and on their own pace provided that they do not threaten America or its allies' peace along the way.

If pragmatic conservatives do not help the Bush Administration define an ideologically uninspiring but eminently practical "middle way" for the Bush Doctrine, it could end up being junked for its failure to transform the Middle East via democracy in Iraq. But the Bush Doctrine must remain.[1] Bush is right in recognizing that the United States cannot wait to be attacked and must have a proactive and muscular engagement with all parts of the world in the furtherance of American and global security

[1]See Philip Zelikow, "The Transformation of National Security", *The National Interest* (Spring 2003), pp. 17–28.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

interests. The Bush Doctrine is also correct in recognizing that a holistic approach to the root causes of global terrorism should be an important part of American strategy—and not simply be bent on the final act of capturing or killing a core group of irredeemable and apocalyptic terrorists.

But the Bush Doctrine—applied to terrorists, rogue states or even malevolent rising powers—does not require the United States to democratize the world or even small parts of the world in a generation. Iraq is an important opportunity to define the Bush Doctrine for what it is: a cold-eyed and sober strategy to protect American interests, guard allies and the global systems on which U.S. prosperity depends, and to promote principally through example and support the values that allowed the country and world to flourish. □

John Hillen is a contributing editor at *National Review* and trustee of the Foreign Policy Research Institute. A reconnaissance officer in the Gulf War, he is a co-author of *Iraq Strategy Review: Options for U.S. Policy* (Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 1998).

Retreating in Good Order

William E. Odom

THE UNITED States should begin a strategic withdrawal from Iraq now because it was never in the interest of the United States to invade that country in the first place. The mood in the United States before the war, created by the Bush Administration and supported by both parties in Congress, made a serious public discussion of the prudence of the invasion impossible. One year later, however, such an examination is difficult to avoid because the president and his aides assured us that the Iraqis themselves would greet U.S. forces as liberators and form a liberal democratic regime friendly to the United States in a very short time—months, not years. Clearly that has not happened and will not happen soon not in years or even decades.

My arguments for withdrawal fall into roughly four categories. *First*, the question of war aims and whose strategic interests were served. *Second*, the argument that "liberal" democracy cannot be created soon, if ever, in Iraq, but "illiberal" democracy can and probably will be. *Third*, the implications for the United States of continuing to pursue the war. And *fourth*, I discuss how to reframe and address the strategic challenge the Greater Middle East presents, not just to the United States but also to allies in Europe and East Asia, including the unfinished war with Al-Qaeda.

Aims and Interests

PRESIDENT Bush has not always been consistent about American war aims in Iraq, but he has repeated three too often to deny:

- Destruction of WMD in Iraq
- Overthrow of Saddam Hussein and his regime

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

• Creation of a pro-U.S. liberal democratic regime in Iraq.

Fighting terrorism has been mixed and muddled with these three goals, but it should not be included, given that there is little or no evidence of Saddam's Iraq supporting terrorist groups in general and Al-Qaeda in particular.

Achieving the first aim was a hollow victory since no WMD has been discovered in Iraq. Second, Saddam is now in U.S. custody and his regime overthrown. Thus two of the three war aims have been accomplished. But the illusive third aim recedes daily like the horizon. That said, achieving the first two war aims has not necessarily served the American interest. Yet they have benefited the interests of America's foes. The destruction of Saddam's regime serves Iran's aim of sweet revenge for Iraq's invasion in 1980

Four of Osama bin Laden's interests have also been served. First, he has long been dedicated to toppling secular Arab leaders. Second, Iraq is now open to Al-Qaeda as a base of operations, especially if an Islamic regime emerges there—a likely outcome. Third, the invasion has distracted the United States from its campaign against Al-Qaeda in Afghanistan and northern Pakistan. Fourth, the war has put the United States at odds with its European allies. Beyond these adverse consequences, we must remember the fiscal costs of the war to the United States—costs not shared by U.S. allies, as they were in the Persian Gulf War in 1991.

Thus Bin Laden and the Iranians have been the winners thus far. Presumably the proponents of the war would argue that spreading "liberal" democracy first to Iraq and then throughout the Arab world will offset these negative outcomes and also undercut support for Middle East-based terrorist groups. The case of continuing the war, therefore, hinges on whether the attainment of the third war aim is possible.

Arab Liberal Democracy?

HOW DO liberal democracies come about? The answer is key to understanding the strategic disaster confronting the United States in Iraq unless it changes course soon.

I provide a detailed answer in a recent book; here, I can merely summarize it.[1] There are about two dozen mature liberal democracies in the world today. Another dozen are tending toward constitutional breakthroughs, mainly countries in central and eastern Europe, but most of them will not achieve this over the next decade or two. Beyond this set, the prospects for new "liberal" democracies worldwide are very dim, especially so in the Arab world.

Democracies, however, are another matter. Electoral democracies are easy to create, but they can turn out to be illiberal regimes, like the one in Iran and in many states in Africa, Asia and Latin America. They never become "liberal", that is, truly constitutional regimes. Of the nearly fifty new democracies established since World War II, about ten are mature constitutional regimes, and they all had highly favorable preconditions to their establishment that are missing in the Arab world. The challenge is not "creating democracy." It is installing "constitutional order." And once "illiberal" democracy is installed, it has precluded, almost without exception, evolution to liberal democracy. In other words, establishing electoral democracies is a sure way to prevent the

[1]William E. Odom and Robert Dujarric, *America's Inadvertent Empire* (Yale University Press, 2004), Chapter 1. Hundreds of scholarly books and articles have been written on this question—too many to list here—but one only needs to take the list of conditions conducive to liberal democracy in Robert Dahl's *Polyarchy* (Yale University Press, 1970) and match it to the conditions extant in Iraq to see how improbable the creation of a popularly supported constitutional order is in that country.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

establishment of constitutional democracies. Liberal regimes inexorably resort to democratic procedures, but illiberal democratic regimes do not become liberal. Yet it is precisely an illiberal democracy that is being constructed in Iraq, given the schedule for elections in the next six months or a year.

At least a dozen other strong arguments from the academic literature could be advanced—for example, ethnic and religious minority regions, religious traditions, cultural patterns, distribution of property ownership, anti-liberal legal traditions—showing that a liberal regime will not emerge soon, not even in decades, in Iraq. At the same time, I cannot find any scholarly literature that offers strong reasons to reach the contrary conclusion.

No matter what kind of regime emerges in Iraq, it will be anti-American, and it will be deeply hostile to Western constitutionalism.[2]

Implications of the Status Quo

THE implications of continuing the fight in Iraq can be divided into those within the country, within the region and, finally, globally.

In Iraq: U.S. military forces may exhaust the remnants of the Ba'ath but that will not overcome Shi'a groups like Moqtada Sadr's militia. Shi'a can count on support from Iran because that country will take great pleasure in seeing American blood flow in Iraq. Sunni groups may also receive outside aid from supporters in Syria for similar reasons. Al-Qaeda and other terror organizations are reportedly in Iraq (although I have seen no fully confirmed evidence of the scale and size). At some point, the Kurds may declare an independent state. That, in turn, may bring direct Turkish military intervention.

Even if U.S. forces have periodic successes at various stages in the progression of a widening conflict, that will hardly guarantee eventual overall success. Why? Any Iraqi leader who can rule the whole country will also have to be anti-American. And he will have to claim that he has liberated the country from American invaders.

In the region: So-called moderate Arab leaders are deeply conflicted. On the one hand, most of them are glad to see Saddam defeated. On the other hand, their own youth are being radicalized. We should not exaggerate what the so-called "Arab street" will do, but we should worry about where Arab oil money will end up and to what purposes it will be put.

Looking back to (relatively) more stable times in this region, we note that they were based on the United States having a firm foot in all camps—Israeli, Persian and Arab. When the Shah of Iran fell, the United States lost its footing in the Persian camp. To restore the balance required larger U.S. military force projection capabilities. That prompted the creation of the rapid deployment force and the Central Command in 1979–81. The invasion of Iraq and the strong tilt to Sharon's side in Israel endangers U.S. footing in the Arab camp. If it is lost, the resulting imbalance will require huge military power: Far greater land forces than the United States now possesses.

These trends have so weakened the U.S. position in the region that it no longer makes sense to stay on the present course. Abandoning Iraq and accepting the consequences is the obvious way to slow the trends—if not to reverse them outright. Moreover, a U.S. pullout might galvanize the moderate Arab regimes themselves to try to control events within Iraq.

---

[2]On the likely anti-American character of even a democratic regime, see Ray Takeyh and Nikolas Gvosdev, "Democratic Impulses versus Imperial Interests: America's New Mid-East Conundrum", *Orbis* (Summer 2003).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Critics will warn of all the untoward implications of withdrawing. Civil war in Iraq, the breakup of the country into three smaller ones, Iraq becoming a base for terrorist groups and others. All of these things may happen, but most of them will occur even if U.S. forces remain. It has become an "internal war", one the United States cannot win without destroying something like 20 percent of the population and imposing a ruthless U.S.-run regime in Baghdad. Failure to recognize that the nature of the war has been transformed will lead to a much larger defeat for the United States in the longer run.[3]

In the global context: The U.S. unilateral initiation of the war in Iraq has come close to breaking the Atlantic Alliance. Gaining an Iraq of any form is not worth losing Europe. If the United States is to maintain some kind of regional stability in the Middle East and Southwest Asia, it cannot do it alone. American power depends on collaborative efforts with the informal members of its empire. In total, it produces roughly 70 percent of the world's gross product, and its collective military budgets are 66 percent of the world's total.[4] President Bush's unilateralism has denied us the military support of almost half of the 66 percent, not to mention the political and moral support from most of America's allies. Moreover, this and previous administrations have maintained an overly large maritime military force structure and dangerously small land force structure. Aircraft carriers and submarines do not help in Iraq. At present, the U.S. Army is so over-stretched that its tactical vulnerabilities are worrisome. In the course of the next six months, they will become strategic vulnerabilities unless fresh units in twice the present number are deployed there. Since that is not possible in the time available, we must address this reality openly, not hidden by sleight-of-hand rotation schemes for troops to Iraq or pretty much anywhere else.

To regain international support and to have the resources of our allies available for a comprehensive strategy toward the region, the United States will have to produce a highly positive outcome in Iraq or withdraw. Since we are reasonably sure that a positive outcome is impossible, and certainly decades away in the best event, withdrawal is the most sensible course today.

Our military investment in Iraq is what economists call a "sunk cost." We cannot retrieve it by investing more there, no matter how much. Thus, to say that we cannot afford to fail is a costly illusion. We ensured failure when we decided to invade. Our choices now are to get out of Iraq early, regroup with our allies, and try to stabilize the region, or to continue down the present path in Iraq and risk the dissolution of the American-led international order. □

---

[3]See Odom, *On Internal War* (Duke University Press, 1992). This book deals with U.S. and Soviet approaches to supporting governments in countries involved in internal wars. Its analysis, however, is just as relevant to the U.S. predicament in Iraq, where it engages in "colonialism by ventriloquy", and the inability of the U.S.-supported regime to seize the tax base, denying it to opposition groups, and to wall off support coming to them from outside the country.

[4]*America's Inadvertent Empire*, pp. 37, 66. The explanation of the nature of American power in this book, especially in chapters 1 and 2, clarifies why such a strong country destroys its own power by assertive unilateralism that alienates its allies. The Bush Administration seems to have failed to grasp the *nature* of U.S. power while underestimating its *extent* when properly used.

Lt. General William E. Odom, U.S. Army (Ret.), senior fellow at the Hudson Institute and a visiting professor at Georgetown University, was the director of the National Security Agency.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Fighting for Oil?

Edward L. Morse

IT IS HARD to find any public statement from an American official justifying the ouster of Saddam Hussein in terms of oil. Yet oil had everything to do with regime change in Iraq—and it would be hard to find an official elsewhere, and certainly not in the Middle East, for whom the linkage would be anything but direct.

Both the Gulf War and the ouster of Saddam a dozen years later were essentially about oil. Saddam would not have been a threat to the status quo in the region in a way vital to U.S. interests if it were not the center of the world's oil supplies. Nor could he have mustered the wherewithal to build a powerful military machine or to have developed WMD capabilities without the cash generated by oil exports. And outsiders, especially the United States, would not have been as concerned about his attacks on his two neighbors—Iran in 1980 and Kuwait in 1990—if they did not believe that his military successes, unchecked by U.S. power, could have altered the balance of power to the detriment of U.S. strategic interests by threatening directly Saudi Arabia, the Emirates, Qatar and Oman and the passageway through the Strait of Hormuz: Saddam could have controlled the taps of up to 24 million barrels a day of the world's oil—or nearly one-third of the globe's total supply.

But few if any people who analyzed the geopolitics of oil before spring 2003 would have predicted—let alone been able to forecast—how radically different the energy situation is today, one year later. How might we sort out these ironies and contradictions? And how can we begin to assess how history likely will judge the role of oil in this critical event in U.S. foreign policy?

Three Dimensions

THERE ARE three dimensions to this question that provide criteria for passing judgment. The first dimension is the "geopolitics of oil"—the desire, in a post-9/11 world, to use Iraq and its oil sector as a fulcrum to transform existing realities. After September 11, three concerns were raised. First, there was apprehension about Saudi stability and the potential for upheaval, if not revolution, from within the kingdom and its impact on the global economy. Second, there was heightened awareness of high oil prices, which supported high rents from oil resource exploitation, and a flow of funds to activities that were antithetical to vital U.S. national security interests, including terror as practiced by Al-Qaeda. And finally, there were concerns about long-term growing dependence on OPEC oil and the monopolies that governments in core OPEC countries hold over the largest oil resources in the world so long as the governments in these countries carry out policies that restrict investment and production.

Iraq was thought by many—some of them occupying high positions in the White House and in the departments of State and Defense—to be the key to overcoming each of these concerns. Many geologists both from Iraq and elsewhere believed the country's reserves were twice those of conventional wisdom, or about on a par with Saudi oil resources, which

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

could mean that Iraq could be the new Saudi Arabia.[1] Postwar Iraq would eagerly move to return to the country's pre-1991 production capacity of 3.5 million barrels a day. A new regime could attract foreign investment that would enable it to aggressively and quickly double its pre-sanctions capacity by 2010, enabling it to rival Saudi production potential of 10 million barrels a day.[2]

The second dimension in judging the role of oil relates to what spokesmen for Foggy Bottom and the White House insisted on both before and during the Iraq War, that Iraq's oil would be treated as a trust for future generations of Iraqis. The stated American goals were to preserve the integrity of the oil sector, to restore it and to allow Iraqis to control it. Malapropisms from members of the administration who spoke of ways that Iraqi oil would pay for the war, or pay for reconstruction, or provide collateral for loans for the rebuilding effort, fueled many concerns and speculations about ulterior motives, but in the end came to naught.

Finally, there is a third dimension to the role of oil in formulating Iraq policy, which has to do with what has happened to the international oil sector, partially as a result of the attack and its consequences. Here the striking contrast is between the expectations widely held not only in the United States, but also among OPEC member states and in the analytical community, that the tight pre-war market would give way to a rather soft market, with substantially lower oil prices. Yet the result is the tightest market the world has confronted since the late 1970s and early 1980s.

Despite the rhetoric, it is clear that the actions and inactions of both Washington and the occupying administration in Baghdad, whether under General Jay Garner or Ambassador L. Paul Bremer, did nothing to lay the basis for transforming Iraq into the next Saudi Arabia. They immediately turned over direct administration of the oil sector to Iraqi professionals and later ceded control to the CPA's appointed officials. They allowed Iraqi officials to run Iraqi oil sales and to plan Iraqi oilfield development. Washington basically limited its efforts to purchasing fuels in short supply and to assessing and funneling money to reconstruction of oil fields and oil infrastructure. It did virtually nothing to lay the foundations of an investment regime or even a foundation for an oil partnership with Baghdad in a post-occupation environment that would even begin to suggest reliance on Baghdad as a surrogate or replacement for Riyadh. Indeed, all the evidence points in a different direction. In all fairness, Washington actually tried to push the Iraqi authorities to build a strong national oil company to replace the fragmented power vacuum that enabled the Iraqi oil ministry to control all commercial activities related to Iraq's petroleum. The intent was a new regime to foster foreign investment, but Iraqi authorities ignored these efforts. In the end, vested local Iraqi political interests have prevented even this sort of reform from being adopted.

If Washington has done little to support the thesis that Iraq was to be the new Saudi Arabia, what about the second dimension of our analysis? How has Washington performed as protector of the interests of the Iraqi people in maintaining the integrity of Iraq's oil sector?

---

[1]Virtually no exploration had taken place in the country for more than a generation to confirm or deny these assumptions.

[2]For those who worried that Iraq alone could not replace Saudi Arabia, the renaissance of Russian oil and the realization that Russian oil reserves, like those of Iraq, might rival Saudi resources provided hope that together, Baghdad and Moscow would form a new energy alliance with the West, replacing Saudi Arabia and the old OPEC.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

While public documentation about these efforts are difficult to come by, it is fair to say that any assessment of Washington's management of Iraqi oil would give the occupier very low grades.

Washington has, if anything, provided too little oversight to the Iraqi oil sector, and did not even implement rudimentary mechanisms to assure transparency. It even dismantled such controls as did exist when the UN administered the Oil for Food program. Thus, contrary to its obligations to the United Nations, let alone to the Iraqi people, Washington failed to monitor the flow of Iraqi oil by allowing UN overseers to leave and not replacing inspectors with a system to monitor the flow of exports. By suspending oversight of contracts, it enabled Iraqi political authorities to sign whatever contracts for the sale of oil they wanted, with no ability to judge whether oil was being sold at market rates. Nor has the CPA been able to determine whether side payments were being made to Iraqi officials similar to those that were legendary under the Oil for Food program, for they installed no system of controls to account for revenues received from oil sales.

If even the failure to install such rudimentary controls and guidelines were not enough, other policies pursued by the coalition can be seen as having impaired the security of oilfield facilities and delayed the restitution of even pre-Iraq War oil production capacity. We leave aside any commentary on the scandalous payments through Kellogg, Brown and Root for oil products in short supply in Iraq at prices substantially higher than those prevailing in the region for gasoline, diesel and liquefied petroleum gases like propane. This has been the subject of press and Congressional inquiries. It is also the case that the dismissal of groups defending oilfield facilities, including pipeline infrastructure, has had its toll on oil infrastructure integrity and resulted both in the delay in oilfield and infrastructure repair and frequent interruptions to the flow of oil exports. What is more, actual damage done to these facilities, including the bombing of the critical pipeline junction under the Al-Fathi bridge during the battles in 2003, which still has not been repaired, have severely constrained Iraqi export potential. Until these repairs are made, exports from Kirkuk to the Turkish port of Ceyhan will be limited to half of what they were before the Iraq War.

This list of errors of omission and commission are just the beginning of what will eventually come to light. Undoubtedly, Washington's failure to protect the integrity of this vital resource on behalf of the Iraqi people and to build a political infrastructure for controlling the sector will cast long shadows on the occupation, even if, technically, Washington has helped to restore pre-war levels of Iraqi production.

The actions and inactions of the United States did nothing to lay the basis for transforming Iraq into the next Saudi Arabia.

The third dimension of our analysis is perhaps the most surprising and unexpected, as is the role Washington played in what may charitably be called the perverse result of the highest and best of intentions. This dimension has to do with the surprising tightening of the oil market a year after the liberation of Iraq. Prevailing oil prices were about $30 per barrel throughout 2003. They have moved closer to $40 per barrel during the first half of 2004. Spot prices have reached the highest point ever, in nominal terms, surpassing the peaks attained during the prelude to the Gulf War in 1990 and the immediate aftermath of Iraq's attack on Iran in September 1980. What is more, they appear likely to stay at high

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

levels for a long time even if there are no new disruptions, and could skyrocket to substantially higher levels in the event of new outages in supply in the near future.

Whatever the other complex causes of this unexpected turn of events in the world's oil markets, Washington's role in triggering the recent price rise is undeniable. It seems clear in retrospect that the severe imbalances that exist between crude oil and petroleum product inventories in the United States and elsewhere (that underlie much of today's high prices) date back to the preparations for war in 2003. Still other elements of today's prices relate to the consequences of the modalities of the occupation and its administration in Iraq.

The imbalances date back to what happened in the oil market in the winter of 2002, when Venezuela's oil sector was shut down by a domestic strike and some 200 million barrels of oil (including some 60 million barrels of gasoline and other petroleum products) were lost to the market. At the time, the United States considered the release of strategic stocks as a defensive measure. Newspaper reports indicate that all of the president's advisors except the vice president were in favor of such a release at the time. It was reported that the vice president argued that Saudi Arabia could be relied on as the substitute for lost Venezuelan oil. He also apparently argued that the option of a release of strategic stocks needed to be held in reserve in the event the world required more oil at the time of an attack on Iraq.

There is no doubt that Saudi Arabia did try to come to the rescue, but too late to be effective: The increase in Saudi output occurred 45 days after the Venezuelan strike and began arriving in the market another 45 days later. In a world where oil stocks were being held low as a consequence of Saudi and OPEC policy, market imbalance and shortages this year were clearly a result of problems that emerged before the Iraq War began. Had Washington not been obsessed with holding on to strategic stocks in the winter of 2002, oil prices would undoubtedly be substantially lower today, perhaps by more than $5 per barrel.

The other factor that forms part of today's record price is, of course, the fear factor. This factor is based on the numerous attacks on oil facilities, including infrastructure. These attacks have centered in Iraq, where the steady flow of exports has been made impossible by lack of security, but they have occurred elsewhere as well, including Saudi Arabia. Thus, Washington's failure to assure the steady flow of Iraqi oil and work toward increasing the country's capacity has served to make the market tighter. But the lack of security at Iraq's oil facilities has also been responsible for a price premium, which some analysts peg at another $5 per barrel. So the Iraq War and its consequences may have raised the price by up to $10 per barrel.

We remain too much a part of unfolding events in Iraq and in the global oil market to provide a clear assessment of the multiple and complex roles Iraqi oil play in American foreign policy, in the politics within OPEC and in today's oil market. What is clear, however, is that what has occurred over the past year has surprised virtually all analysts and players in the market. But the path taken here, as elsewhere in human affairs, is paved far more by the perverse consequences of good intentions than it is by bold or farsighted statesmanship. □

Edward L. Morse is executive adviser at Hess Energy Trading Company and was Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for International Energy Policy in 1979–81.

WWW.NATIONALINTEREST.ORG

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Averting an Iraq Syndrome

David B. Rivkin, Jr.

WHILE Iraq-related debates continue to dominate the headlines, Morton Abramowitz, in the Spring 2004 issue of *The National Interest*, was the first senior member of the foreign policy establishment to attempt to furnish a veneer of intellectual respectability for the proposition that a precipitous American withdrawal from Iraq would not necessarily be calamitous. (He has been followed more recently by William Odom, former head of the Defense Intelligence Agency, who is a contributor to this symposium as well.) Accordingly, these views merit attention, even if they are, in my opinion, ultimately unpersuasive.

Abramowitz analyzes both the probability and the consequences of our success in Iraq—success being defined as the establishment of "a stable, reasonably democratic system"—as well as the implications of an early departure, both on the country itself and the Greater Middle East. Although there is some analytical overlap between these two issues, they are not identical. Indeed, while the prospects and strategic implications of building a U.S.-prompted Iraqi democracy are probably better than Abramowitz seems to suggest, it is fair to acknowledge that they are inherently speculative and uncertain.

The analysis is further complicated by the fact that there is a range of plausible outcomes in Iraq which feature different degrees of stability and democracy. For example, the United States could succeed in stabilizing Iraq and a reasonably friendly and democratic, albeit weak, government could emerge. Should this government be eventually displaced by an authoritarian regime either as a result of a democratic process or through some less salutary means, the consequences of this regrettable evolution might well be manageable. Likewise, should an interim Iraqi government or its elected successor request a withdrawal of American forces—a possibility inherent in the restoration of Iraq's sovereignty—American credibility should not be adversely affected. While the United States is willing to spend blood and treasure to shore up a friendly Iraqi government, it cannot and should not seek to impose its largesse. Yet what Abramowitz seems to countenance is a prompt, unilateral American withdrawal, literally under fire, which would leave Iraq a failed state. Unfortunately, the consequences of our cutting and running in this scenario are far more certain and disastrous than Abramowitz acknowledges.

His overarching thesis is that the United States enjoys such global preeminence that it "can endure early withdrawal from Iraq", just as we had survived our defeat in Vietnam and have apparently muddled through various other ignominious withdrawals. Unfortunately, this proposition is true only in the truistic sense. The United States did not, indeed, collapse or fall prey to foreign occupation in the aftermath of Vietnam. In all other respects, the view espoused by Abramowtiz and others is profoundly wrong.

To begin with, the defeat in Vietnam cast a long shadow over American foreign and defense policy, greatly emboldened our key strategic adversary at the time—the Soviet Union—and led to more than a

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

decade of Moscow's ambitious foreign endeavors in Latin America, the Middle East, Asia and Africa. To be sure, the Soviet Union's eventual collapse—driven by its fundamental internal weaknesses and the decades of relentless American pressure, culminating with bold Reagan-era policies, not to mention the Sino-Soviet Cold War confrontation—provided the United States with important geopolitical leverage, fortuitously mitigating the adverse consequences of our Vietnam defeat. Yet, these developments did not negate its strategic importance. They certainly do not establish any valuable lessons for the future, except to point out that sometimes, even very bad American decisions do not produce disastrous results—because our enemies can suffer even more consequential defeats. While true, this observation is certainly not a prescription for a viable American foreign policy.

In addition to miscasting the lessons of Vietnam, Abramowitz blithely ignores the novel strategic dangers posed by cutting and running from Iraq. In the aftermath of September 11, few reasonable observers can question the magnitude of the threat posed to Western polities in general and the United States in particular by the forces of radical Islam. This threat (whether arising from pan-Islamic organizations like Al-Qaeda or the various rogue states that support them) has a particularly important psychological dimension that Abramowitz and most analysts ignore.

While our Cold War enemies liked to prattle about the inevitability of capitalism's global demise and the certainty of their eventual triumph, they exhibited considerable caution and reason in their policy choices. This is fundamentally not the case with our Islamist foes. In this regard, one would do well to review Osama bin Laden's infamous "Declaration of War Against the Americans", which exalts in the recitation of alleged indicia of American weakness, such as the "disappointment, humiliation and defeat" exhibited in various U.S. retreats under fire, leading the author to conclude that the United States "had been disgraced by Allah" and is a "weak horse." Given the historical importance of martial valor and military prowess in the Islamic tradition, Bin Laden's musings make perfect sense. Thus, there is no doubt that the very same examples of America's precipitous withdrawals, including our disengagements from Lebanon in 1983 and Mogadishu in 1994, which Abramowitz so casually recites, have greatly emboldened our enemies. It is precisely because the secular Arab governments have been repeatedly defeated by the Western powers, including a small Jewish state, that even a semi-successful performance by the Islamists—against Israel in Lebanon, in the course of the ongoing Palestinian *intifada*, and against the United States in Iraq—is likely to generate such a momentous impact. Ironically, most ordinary Americans appreciate this point far better than foreign policy sophisticates. They believe that our immediate withdrawal from Iraq would only intensify the terrorist threat to the United States. Thus, according to a recent *Washington Post* poll, 66 percent of Americans continue to believe that we should stay the course in Iraq.

***Clamoring for an exit strategy and obsessing about casualites is much more of an elite's pursuit than a* vox populi.**

Indeed, the pattern of resistance in Iraq demonstrates that any perceived weakness by coalition forces has been a major factor in prompting additional and intensified attacks. For example, it can be argued that the recent violence in Fallujah, including the murder and mutilation of the four American

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

contractors and the subsequent stubborn resistance to the efforts by the U.S. Marines to reestablish law and order, stems directly from the previous decisions to leave Fallujah largely alone and not to crack down on various anti-coalition elements that made the city a base of operations.

At the strategic level, the extent of the threat is magnified by the fact that, unlike the Cold War struggle, the existential challenge to the United States is posed not, in large measure, by governments in the Arab world, but by Islamism. (To the extent that some Arab regimes support American policy, however begrudgingly, timidly and in private, this cooperation is entirely opportunistic and predicated upon their belief that we are going to prevail in whatever ventures on which we choose to embark.) The Islamist opponents of the authoritarian and secular regimes in the Middle East are not like Soviet-era dissidents who espouse Western-style democracy as the solution. Rather, most Arab critics blame the West for their economic, political and social ills. Not surprisingly, there is a powerful tendency to view some version of fundamentalist Islam, which fuses secular and religious power and seeks to restore a global Islamic caliphate, as the true "reform" alternative.

Significantly, the appalling governance record amassed by the Iranian mullahs and the Taliban's functionaries does not seem to arouse much opposition in the proverbial Arab street—which also views with strange equanimity the horrendous violence visited by Al-Qaeda and other radical movements on their co-religionists, including women and children. Meanwhile, the failure of Islamist parties to come to power, even in those instances where reasonably free elections were held, also does not seem to have diminished their luster.[1] They draw strength by juxtaposing Islam's former glory and its current considerably reduced circumstances, which provides a fertile environment for Islamist rage.

Hence, discrediting the very viability of militant Islam—best accomplished by demonstrating its military weakness—is a prerequisite for effecting fundamental change within the world of Islam, prompting its long-overdue "reformation" and rendering it more compatible with democracy and modernity. Serious theological and political reform is the only viable alternative. Yet its Western champions do not seem to appreciate that decisively defeating the Islamists is the necessary prerequisite. Failing to grapple with these key historical and psychological components of the current Islamist challenge is even more dangerous than the willful ignorance of communist ideology and Soviet writings that unfortunately drove so much Western myopic thinking about the Soviet threat.

Certainly, in a place like Iraq, the strategic environment that we face is peculiarly challenging. The United States enjoys an enormous margin of military, economic and technological superiority, but has not been particularly successful in leveraging these advantages. We also do not seem to do a very good job in the "divide and conquer" dimension. As we are discovering in Iraq, and as Israel has come to learn while fighting the *intifada*, when it comes to anti-American or anti-Israeli ventures, all radical Islamic groups—whether Sunni or Shi'a, and even nominally secular entities—collaborate in varying degrees. The fact that this alliance is certainly driven by expediency and may well be temporary in nature does not render the problem any less dangerous. It certainly underscores the extent to which anti-American and anti-Western sentiments trump virtually all other policy

[1]This is explored in greater detail in Ray Takeyh and Nikolas K. Gvosdev, *The Receding Shadow of the Prophet: The Rise and Fall of Radical Political Islam* (Praeger, forthcoming).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

considerations for the radical Islamists of all stripes and their secular fascist counterparts. This reality, by the way, underscores the intellectual error of the argument that, because Saddam Hussein was a secular Ba'athi thug, he could not make a common cause with a Wahhabi fundamentalist like Bin Laden. Unfortunately, in today's Middle East there does not seem to be a strategic equivalent of the Sino-Soviet split that proved so helpful to the West during the Cold War.

There is no doubt that an ignoble U.S. withdrawal from Iraq would produce the impression that the United States is "on the run." This is certainly what happened when Israel withdrew from Lebanon, under what everybody perceived to be pressure from Hizballah and a sense of exhaustion. Indeed, most Israeli experts believe that this withdrawal, and the related perception that Israel was beatable through an unconventional guerrilla warfare, has directly led to the second and far deadlier round of the *intifada*, which is still underway and has killed hundreds of Israeli civilians.

This is also why Abramowitz's assertion that "ending the Arab-Israel conflict would have far more influence on transforming the Arab world than creating a new [democratic] Iraqi government" simply ignores the fundamental and broad nature of the Islamist challenge, which is animated by issues that have little, if anything, to do with the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. In this context, having Washington force Israel to accept terms that do not guarantee its survival as a Jewish state—which, unfortunately, remains the core Palestinian position—far from eliciting Arab affection for the United States, is certain to prompt derision and the feeling that the United States is unable to sustain its position in the Middle East.

Any precipitous U.S. withdrawal would also engender disastrous political results for most leaders in the coalition of the willing, and demonstrate that being an American ally is far more dangerous than being our foe. Moreover, if the United States cuts and runs from this challenge, it is difficult to imagine what other military engagement against a serious adversary, be it in Iran or North Korea, we can successfully prosecute. The stakes are further magnified by the tendency of many of the administration's critics to seek to impose an unrealistic interpretation of the laws of war on the United States that is unprecedented and incompatible with any robust use of force.[2] Abramowitz, and now Odom, having concluded that a successful outcome in Iraq is either unattainable or does not matter enough to spend the necessary resources, rather than looking for a decent interval (to borrow a term from Vietnam-era parlance), evidently contemplate an immediate withdrawal. This would only enhance the perceived magnitude and the acuteness of our defeat.

Furthermore, contrary to this analysis, the costs of staying the course are not that formidable and the odds of a reasonably successful outcome remain quite decent. Given the revelations of the abuses at Abu Ghraib and the recent shift in Iraqi public opinion, which suggest that a majority of the Iraqis favor an early U.S. withdrawal, this opinion may strike the reader as unrealistically optimistic. However, the fact that both the Kurds and Shi'a are keenly aware of the decades-long legacy of the brutal Sunni rule in Iraq, and do not wish to be re-subjugated again, still provides the U.S. with considerable strategic leverage.

The huge disparity in the level of

[2]For a discussion of the growing gulf between the U.S. and much of the rest of the world regarding the legal and normative principles that govern warfare see Rivkin and Lee A. Casey, "Leashing the Dogs of War", *The National Interest* (Fall 2003).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

battlefield performance of the Fallujah-based, mostly Sunni fighters, who were able to inflict considerable casualties on the American troops, and that of Sadr's Shi'a Mahdi "army" underscores the extent to which the Shi'a, despite their demographic strength, remain vulnerable to the better trained Sunnis. Indeed, one can argue that one of the reasons why Sistani and other senior Shi'a leaders have finally given the United States the green light to move against Sadr's forces in Najaf, Kufa and Karbala is because of their extreme disquiet and even fear at the spectacle of the senior Saddam-era military officers being brought back by the coalition forces. Meanwhile, the Kurds remain perhaps America's only true friend in Iraq. Given these factors, it is still possible for the United States to emerge as the strategic ally of the Iraqi Shi'a and Kurds and, post-June 30, wield considerable power in Iraq and shape a positive outcome. Having an even modestly pro-American Shi'a-run Iraq, with appropriate protections for the Kurds and Sunnis would in itself be a major strategic boon. This would require an extremely adroit American policy, especially since the U.S. would have to deal not only with the Iraqi factions, but with the UN representatives, with little, if any, margin for error—but it can be done.

The deaths and maiming of our troops in Iraq are tragic, and the budgetary costs are high; yet, they do not approach anything comparable to the Vietnam-era level of losses. In the age of the all-volunteer military and at a time when most Americans understand that we are at war with the forces of radical Islam that seek our demise, perseverance in Iraq should be politically sustainable. So long as the American people believe that their government has a credible long-term strategy for winning in Iraq, they will support the war. Clamoring for an exit strategy and obsessing about casualties is much more of an elite's pursuit than a *vox populi*.

Reading Abramowitz's well-written article induces, at least in this reader, a sense of depression. The author misreads the lessons of Vietnam and miscalculates the post-September 11 threat. The consequences of our perceived defeat in Iraq would be shattering. They would be tantamount to an admission that, while the United States can defeat any conventional military, it can be routed by a sufficiently ruthless and motivated insurgent force. They certainly would also include an inability by the United States to use military force on a large-scale (in the foreseeable future), accompanied by a virtual impossibility of finding countries (friend, foe or neutral), willing to bet their survival on American staying power and credibility. In a world where no other status quo power seems to be willing to use military force to deal with international problems, and the prevailing public sentiment among most of our allies seems to be that nothing is worth fighting for, this result would be nothing short of calamitous. □

David Rivkin is a partner in the Washington, DC office of Baker & Hostetler LLP. An expert on international law, he served in the Department of Justice and the White House in the Reagan and George H. W. Bush Administrations. He is also a visiting fellow at The Nixon Center.

If they hadn't done what I told them not to do, they'd still be alive.
—Michael Madsen as "Mr. Blond", *Reservoir Dogs* (1992)

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Losing the Peace?

Geoffrey Kemp

AT THE TIME of triumph a year ago when Saddam Hussein's statue was toppled and the Iraqi army vanished, the most ardent supporters of George W. Bush's war argued that Iraq was merely the second stage, following the Afghani operation, of a grand campaign to rid the Greater Middle East of corrupt regimes. It was said, "Men go to Baghdad, but real men go to Damascus and Tehran." Another phrase was popular: "The road to Jerusalem lies through Baghdad", implying that the victory in Iraq would make an Arab-Israeli settlement easier. A year later, the most powerful military establishment in history finds itself bogged down fighting a vicious insurgency in a country that has shown little appreciation for our loss of blood and treasure. At home, many of the original cheerleaders for the war are now blaming various individuals and agencies of the Bush Administration for the many mistakes that have been made. Their internecine quarrels have intensified in the wake of the disasters of April and May 2004.

To be fair, there is good news out of Iraq that does not make the headlines everyday. A vigorous free press, an open and intense political discourse, and a restored oil industry provide evidence that the Ba'athi totalitarian era is over and that, whatever happens after July 1, 2004 when Iraqi sovereignty is restored, the old regime is gone and a more pluralistic society will evolve. Whether it will be united, secular, humane and supportive of women and minority rights remains unclear. But even if Iraq has to undergo further civil strife, with serious fighting among the various groups, it is difficult to imagine a situation that could be any worse for the majority of Iraqis than it was under Saddam.

However, for the Bush Administration, things can indeed get much worse in the Middle East. A march on Damascus has been stalled. Instead, economic sanctions have belatedly been imposed on Syria, but they are expected to have little impact since U.S.-Syria economic ties are minimal. As for Tehran, the conservative mullahs, though hated by most Iranians, are stronger than ever and are well on their way to achieving a nuclear weapons capability. Former president Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani has likened the United States in Iraq to a "wounded beast." Iran has a growing presence in Iraq and, should it wish, it could cause far more trouble for the Coalition as it prepares to hand over sovereignty to Iraqis. On a related front, Iran has used its leverage in Iraq to dissuade the Bush Administration from tough, unilateral activities to stop its nuclear program. Instead, Washington has wisely chosen to work with the EU and International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to constrain Iran's nuclear program. However, it is unlikely this will be successful unless the United States is prepared to offer Iran large carrots, including an agreement not to push for regime change. This will be a difficult choice for any American administration given continuing animosity towards Iran, especially in Congress.

The Israeli-Palestinian peace process is in reverse gear. There has been no postwar bonus. The United States, rather than acting as a powerful and honest broker using its great clout to influence both

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the Israelis and the Palestinians to compromise and reach a deal, has instead decided to bypass the Palestinians and side with Israel's prime minister, Ariel Sharon, and support his unilateral plans to withdraw from the Gaza Strip. While this policy has some clear upsides, the side letter Bush wrote to Sharon essentially endorsing Israel's annexation of large West Bank settlements and denying the Palestinians the right of return to Israel is seen by the rest of the world as politically motivated capitulation. To make matters worse, Sharon's plans were rejected by his own party in a referendum held on May 2, leaving the future of the proposal in doubt.

Concerning his initiative to spread democracy to the Middle East, President Bush gave a high decibel speech to the National Endowment for Democracy on November 3, 2003. He argued that "sixty years of Western nations excusing and accommodating the lack of freedom in the Middle East did nothing to make us safe." It says volumes about the gap between the Bush Administration's theory and practice of changing the Middle East when one of the few examples touted as proof of American success is the rehabilitation of Libya's dictator Muammar Qaddafi. Bush would appear to have rejected his own advice and seems happy to cut deals with authoritarian regimes on behalf of the national interest of the United States. Bob Woodward, in his book *Plan of Attack* (Simon & Schuster, 2004), informs us that Saudi Ambassador Bandar bin Sultan was privy to the decision to go to war before Secretary of State Colin Powell was told. Indeed, the war that was to change the Middle East could not have been fought without the active cooperation of key authoritarian Arab regimes including Egypt, Saudi Arabia and the lesser Gulf states. Likewise, the war in Afghanistan, which is still underway, requires that the United States coddle the dictator of Uzbekistan, Islam Karimov, and give Pakistan's dictator, Pervez Musharraf, a free pass on one of the most horrendous violations of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty in history, namely the black-market sale of nuclear material by A.Q. Khan to an "axis of evil" country or two.

All these compromises are perfectly understandable and justifiable. Qaddafi has, after all, given up terrorism and weapons of mass destruction; Saudi Arabia is now cooperating on anti-terrorism and is a responsible player on oil prices; without Uzbekistan and Pakistan, we would have lost the war in Afghanistan. However, how does the reality of American policy appear to those Middle East audiences who themselves are yearning for reform? When Bush hosted Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak at his ranch in Crawford on April 12, and a few weeks later apologized to Jordanian King Abdallah at the White House for the treatment of Iraqi prisoners at Abu Ghraib, the image of what America stands for can only be described as confusing. A healthy dose of realism has always been present in the administration's actions on international relations. This would be more acceptable to many around the world if its policy pronouncements were trimmed of the intense ideological rhetoric that accompanies them.

CLEARLY THE most troubling problems for the Bush Administration are not the slow pace of reform in the Middle East, but rather the growing doubts of the American people about the prudence of initiating the Iraq War. Bush has lost the support of those Democrats who supported him for the war in Afghanistan and the initial phases of the Iraq War. However, the erosion of confidence among independent-minded Republicans is a sure sign of "buyers' remorse." Woodward informs us that

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Powell pleaded with the president prior to the war to think carefully about what he was planning. Powell put it very bluntly: "you are going to be the proud owner of 25 million people." This advice was prescient.

Ultimately, the views of Powell and Congress are not as important as those of the American people. On this score, the public has a high tolerance for the loss of blood and treasure if the goals are in the national interest and, equally important, achievable. Americans will accept casualties, but they will not do so if the goals are fuzzy and those we are trying to liberate are resentful and will not fight for their own freedom. The number of active combat casualties in the current insurgency suffered by coalition forces is far higher than to those suffered by Iraqi loyalists. If this number does not change very soon, the American people will quit on the war, and an early exit strategy will be demanded. Invariably, it will be difficult and we will probably leave behind a mess, but far worse would be an open-ended presence which could embroil the United States in a major uprising. For months, there have been warnings about the dire consequences of quitting Iraq. Now a small but growing number of voices have begun to talk about the dire consequences of staying. □

Geoffrey Kemp is director of regional strategic programs at The Nixon Center. He was special assistant to the President for the Middle East during the first Reagan Administration.

Rescuing the Future

John Thomson & Hussain Hindawi

AMERICA'S Iraqi experience since the end of its brilliant military campaign has been an object lesson in what *not* to do. However, it is not too late to reverse the downward spiral and to implement in clarity and conviction what can and should be done to bring peace and stability to the country and the region.

It is a self-defeating urban myth that Americans have lost the respect and support of Iraqis. The overwhelming majority of Iraqi leaders and men in the street are grateful and hopeful that America will stay the course by providing security and guidance, until Iraqi forces and governmental structures are in place.

There are three constituencies the coalition will never win over: Iraqi Ba'athi and assorted Muslim fanatics; Al-Qaeda and other foreign inspired terrorist groups; and neighboring nations' governments, including most significantly Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Syria and Iran. The Ba'athi diehards despair of the loss of their perks and power under Saddam Hussein, and the firebrands are would-be tyrants supported by the mullahcracy in Tehran. The foreign terror organizations know that a stable Iraq will give hope and opportunity for peaceful change to their popular support base in the region. For the same reasons autocratic, despotic regimes fear for their crowns and lifetime presidencies.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

A critical step for improving relations with Iraq's Shi'a is for the United States to open direct discussions between Grand Ayatollah Ali-Muhammad Sistani and a senior U.S. representative. Having made the egregious mistake of treating Sistani like a 19th-century Japanese emperor, speaking only via his emissaries, the arrival in Iraq of Ambassador John Negroponte with letters from President Bush can create the basis for mutually face-saving and profitable talks with the country's single most influential Shi'a leader. Undeniably important, Sistani is *primus inter pares* of Iraq's Shi'a clergy. The perception of further American kowtowing can only result in jealousy among his colleagues.

Another doubly important way to improve U.S.-Iraq relations is for the United States to cease discussions with Iran's leadership, whom Sistani and many other Shi'a clergy in Iraq despise. President Bush correctly identified Iran as a charter member of the Axis of Evil 18 months ago, and the reigning mullahs wish America no luck whatever. Tehran provides inspiration and support for the bellicose rebel strongman Moqtada Sadr. Talks between Washington and Tehran do not just negatively impact the U.S. course in Iraq, they severely undercut the surging democratic opposition in Iran.

Open and effective contact with Iraq's major leaders must be maintained to provide counsel and support as they develop the country's new constitution and conduct elections. Simultaneously, Washington must continue to expand communications with the mass of Iraqi citizens, to offset the flood of negative propaganda from those who wish nothing good for a free Iraq or the United States.

Governance

SOVEREIGNTY appears to be devolving to prudent leaders on June 30, individuals willing to guide Iraq through the writing of a constitution and the holding of fair and open elections. Guidance and counsel must be provided to these patriots in establishing a constitution that will not only appeal to Iraqis but also endure. Inter-communal problems and rivalries are not so much at the street level as among the respective leaderships, who have frequently inflamed their rank-and-file over competing political positions. The authoritarian tradition of all Arab societies extends to Iraq, requiring resolution and clear codification in law. Fortunately, at the leadership level, good judgment increasingly seems to prevail.

A cantonal system similar to the Swiss model should be commended as a viable option as the Iraqi leadership explores democratic and free market governmental models. In our talks with Iraqi leaders of the various communities, it appears eminently possible to maintain an Iraqi national fabric while allowing for semi-autonomous governance in different sectors of the country. Such a formula has peacefully embraced very different communities in one nation, the very challenge facing Iraq, for 800 years in Switzerland.

A system of five cantonal districts would be established. Three would respectively be Kurd, Shi'a and Sunni dominated, based in the northern, central and southern areas of the country. Two other cantons would have special administrative status: the one, based in Baghdad (a melting pot of Shi'a, Kurds, Sunnis, Turkmen and Christians, among others), would be recognized by all Iraqis as the country's capital "special administrative canton;" the other, embracing oil-rich Kirkuk plus Diali-Khanaqin, would also have special status owing to its equally diverse ethnicity.

Post-Transition Security

THE SLIGHTEST question about America's willingness to stay the course creates waves of mistrust and insecurity among all Iraqis, causing

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

many to look the other way regarding guerrilla and terrorist activities. The reason is simple: fear of retaliation when the Americans leave. The solution is to engage in unstinting, proactive applications of force wherever and whenever required, always underscoring our resolve to remain at the side of peaceful Iraqis while the country develops into a stable, free market democracy. No single action has undercut Iraqi confidence more than U.S. dithering about cleaning out the guerrillas and terrorists in Fallujah.

Had the Marines moved in and taken out the terrorist gangs in the initial hours of what proved to be a month-long standoff, Iraqis would have been assured of our fidelity to paving the way to real peace. Moreover, the Americans would have killed or captured an estimated 1,200 to 2,000 armed enemy, dealing a crippling blow to the opposition.

Viable, professional military and police forces must be established. To dispel concerns of American dominance, these critical duties can be undertaken by Great Britain, Australia and Jordan for the military, and by Britain, Germany and Oman for the police. Dedicated fulfillment will vitiate the horrendous mistakes made a year ago, when we simultaneously disbanded Iraq's military and police, and stood by while thousands of convicts who were released in Saddam's last days who, along with other Iraqis, later brazenly looted governmental offices and public utilities.

The maintenance of American military men and equipment must be agreed upon. Short term, the vast majority of Iraqis want American forces to remain until sufficient indigenous troops and police are recruited and trained. Longer term, it is critical to regional security and the international system that the United States retain manned bases and supply depots, well out of the Iraqi mainstream but nevertheless present.

Petroleum

IRAQ'S VAST petroleum wealth is an asset of inestimable potential, and must be developed to the benefit of all the country's citizens. There can be no question about oil in the north being solely for the benefit of Kurds, or oil in the south for the Shi'a: petroleum is an asset which should benefit Iraqis equally.

The nation's enormous oil patch clearly requires professional local oversight. Local management, reporting to a Board of Directors (for instance, one-half of whom could be designated by the national parliament and the other half by shareholders) would see to the effective and honest operation of the industry, utilizing international companies to prospect and develop the oilfields and market the production.

Actual ownership should be Iraqi, adopting a modified Norwegian model that provides direct participation in the profits of its oil industry to those to whom the resources belong—the citizenry. The keys to a successful citizen-owned, locally managed and internationally developed petroleum sector are threefold. An equal number of shares would be distributed to every citizen age 18 or older; shares would be held by the original recipient for a minimum of five years, except in the event of death, when they would be deeded to the next of kin; and shares could only be held by Iraqi citizens.

A citizen-owned oil industry would send a resounding message to Iran, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and every other oil producing state in the region that petroleum is a resource of the people of each country. In so doing, state-owned companies would no longer have the option, as currently, to creak with inefficiency, reek of corruption.

The above alternative policies and programs would have the great benefit of being broadly accepted by all Iraqis.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Besides providing security, they would avoid much of the predictable dispute that the coalition's current centralized approach for government and the petroleum sector have produced. Indeed, they would be as refreshing to good governance and nascent capitalism as the widely popular 15 percent flat tax for individuals and corporations already in place. Their implementation would lead to:

- The development of trusted leadership cadres in the three major population groups;

- A reduction in potentially disastrous inter-communal rivalries;

- No need to deal with the foul regime in Tehran, simultaneously encouraging the already strong Iranian opposition;

- Iraq as a genuine beacon of free market democracy in the Middle East.

This is, in short, decidedly *not* the time to cut and run. With renewed, enlightened commitment in Iraq plus the recognition in Washington's corridors of power that progress will evolve in different ways at different times in different countries, we come to the conclusion that the way forward is indeed promising. □

John R. Thomson has lived and worked in the Middle East for more than three decades, having been based in Beirut, Cairo and Riyadh as a businessman, diplomat and journalist. He covered the Six Day War and its aftermath as well as the Gulf War. Hussain Hindawi has recently returned to his native Iraq after 32 years in exile. He established the Arabic Service of UPI and served as its editor-in-chief for eight years.

Recovering Our Nerve

Niall Ferguson

"GETTING the wind up", is an old British expression for panicking. To be "windy" in the trenches during World War I was to be openly terrified. Since the graphic revelations of the mistreatment of Iraqi prisoners at Abu Ghraib, Washington, DC, has replaced Chicago as America's windy city.

But it is not just America's political elites who have got the wind up. To judge by the most recent opinion polls, nearly half the electorate feels the same way. As many as 50 percent of voters say they would like to see American troops wholly or partially withdrawn from Iraq, and soon. The starting point for any serious analysis of America's predicament must be that this is not a serious option. Sometimes, to borrow a more recent British catchphrase famously used by Margaret Thatcher, there is no alternative. That lady was not for turning. This president must make sure that the wind blowing through the nation's capital doesn't turn him either.

First, let's refresh our collective memory. It *was* right to overthrow Saddam Hussein; the biggest defect of American policy towards Iraq was that the task was left undone for twelve years. The Bush Doctrine of pre-emption is eminently sensible and has good historical precedents.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

But the overthrow of Saddam wasn't pre-emption; it was post-emption, since he had done all the mischief of which he was capable some time before March 2003.

Continuing with "containment"—the implicit alternative proposed by France and others last year—would have been a worse policy. The regular Air Force fly-overs and strikes were expensive and indecisive. Sanctions were simply impoverishing ordinary Iraqis. The United Nations' Oil-for-Food program was a screaming farce that did nothing more than to entrench Saddam in power. Regime change was not the Bush Administration's invention; it had been U.S. policy since 1998. We should all be glad Saddam is gone, as are most Iraqis. The most vociferous critics of the Bush Administration cannot seriously wish him back in power.

So what went wrong? We all need to admit that mistakes have been made, some of them grave. I count seven.

Just how can American history tell anybody about the problems of governing Iraq?

1. In planning for a war to topple Saddam, Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld did a brilliant job. But in planning for the peace that would follow, he did a dreadful job. The wild over-optimism on the part of key Washington decision-makers about the way Iraqis would welcome an American occupation was inexcusable. Anyone with any historical knowledge of the region could have foreseen that there would be small but dangerous pockets of resistance. Those who made light of the task of postwar reconstruction—who argued as if it would be a spontaneous consequence of Saddam's deposition—screwed up. And note that it wasn't only the Iraqi exiles and the neocons who believed the "liberators" would be showered with "flowers and sweets"; even Tommy Franks anticipated getting troop levels down to 50,000 after just 18 months. Only the State Department appears to have had a serious plan for the postwar period, and only Secretary of State Colin Powell appears to have understood that this was an implicitly imperial undertaking. As he told President Bush, the Pottery Barn rule was always going to apply in Iraq: "You break it, you own it."

2. In arguing that Saddam Hussein *definitely* possessed weapons of mass destruction, Vice President Dick Cheney, CIA Chief George Tenet and ultimately George W. Bush himself—to say nothing of Prime Minister Tony Blair—did us all a disservice. It would have been perfectly sufficient to have argued that, after all his obfuscations, it was impossible to be sure whether or not Saddam Hussein possessed WMD. On that basis, the war could have been adequately justified on the precautionary principle. But when Cheney declared that "Saddam Hussein possesses weapons of mass destruction", he was going far beyond a legitimate interpretation of the available intelligence. The subjunctive exists for a reason. He *might* have possessed them; we simply didn't know. By claiming we did know, Cheney gave America's critics a hostage to fortune. By echoing Cheney's certainty, Bush added another hostage. By reassuring Bush that it was a "slam dunk case", George Tenet added yet another. Even Colin Powell added to the impression of certainty in his presentation to the UN. As for the alleged links from Saddam to Al-Qaeda, there was scarcely a shred of credible evidence for such assertions.

3. Diplomacy can proceed on more than one track, but the tracks need to run in the same direction. With respect to the role of the United Nations, the Bush Administration went down two completely opposing tracks. One (Cheney's) was to regard the UN as irrelevant. The other

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

(Powell's) was to regard it as indispensable. One or other of these policies might have been successful. But a hybrid of the two was bound to fail. By pitching for a second UN resolution, having failed to conclude 1441 with an unequivocal threat of war, the Bush Administration handed the French government a big, baguette-like stick with which to beat the United States over the head. And it did so at the very moment that the majority of European governments had written letters pledging their support for a U.S. invasion! This was simply bad diplomacy; it was in turn a function of the State Department's failure to win the Washington turf war.

4. It was probably unwise to flout the Geneva Convention at Guantanamo Bay; it was certainly fatal to indicate to military prison warders that it could be flouted in Iraq as well. We have since reaped the whirlwind sown by those decisions. Evidence of torture and gratuitous abuse at Abu Ghraib have done more than anything to discredit the claim of the United States and its allies—introduced as a subsidiary *casus belli* rather late in the day—to stand for human rights and the rule of law.

5. It was a mistake to set a June 30 deadline for the handover of power to an Iraqi government. The moment that deadline was set, the incentives for ordinary Iraqis to collaborate with the CPA became much weaker.

6. It was a blunder not to let the Marines finish off the Ba'athi rump at Fallujah. Nothing could have done more to affirm the credibility of American arms. Now it has been established that if you hole up in a city with enough guns and RPGs, the United States will negotiate with you. It may even try to co-opt you.

7. Finally, it was madness to execute a *volte face* and call in the United Nations in the belief that it might help legitimize the handover of sovereignty. All that UN envoy Lakhdar Brahimi has done so far has been to undermine the credibility of the quite adequate system established by CPA administrator L. Paul Bremer. What was wrong with the Iraqi Governing Council? What was wrong with the basic law upon which it (miraculously) managed to agree? The arrival of Brahimi on the scene has threatened to nullify Bremer's achievements.

ALL OF THESE mistakes have one thing in common. They betoken a failure to learn from history. Among the most obvious lessons of the history of modern imperialism is the lesson that an empire cannot rule by coercion alone. It needs legitimacy above all—in the eyes of the subject people, in the eyes of the other great powers and, above all, in the eyes of the people back home. Did those concerned know no history?

We know President Bush was reading Edward Morris's *Theodore Rex* as the Iraq War was being planned, but had he not got to the bit when the war in the Philippines turned nasty? We know that his speech writer Michael Gerson has a sense of historical perspective and looked back at least as far as Truman when drafting the President's West Point speech of June 2002. But didn't he get to the part when Truman abandoned hope of victory in the Korean War, partly in deference to the overblown anxieties of America's allies? We know that Donald Rumsfeld has recently read a biography of Ulysses S. Grant. But hasn't he got to the miserable epilogue about the reconstruction of the South?

Note that all this worthy reading has been concerned exclusively with *American* history. But just how much can American history tell anybody about the problems of governing Iraq? Last year, Deputy National Security Adviser Stephen Hadley was heard to refer to a purely unilateral American invasion as "the imperial option." Did no one else grasp that occu-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

pying and trying to transform Iraq (with or without allies) was a quintessentially imperial undertaking—and one that would cost money and take many years to succeed? Why did nobody bother to read about the last Anglophone occupation of Iraq? Couldn't Tony Blair have lent the president the letters of Gertrude Bell?

Well, we are where we are, and the clock cannot be turned back. The question is: What is to be done now to bolster sagging morale at home—the traditional Achilles' heel of the American empire? The President has evidently been advised that sacking his own Defense Secretary at this juncture might do more harm than good. Having initially succumbed to a very British impulse to wave my order paper and bay for his resignation—frankly, I think I had the wind up—I am now less sure. It was not the Viceroy who resigned after the Amritsar massacre in 1919; it was the officer responsible who was hauled over the coals. Those who must answer for the events at Abu Ghraib are, by analogy, the officers in charge.

In any case, nothing would do more to add to the mood of panic in America than a high-level resignation. Rumsfeld certainly succumbed to hubris last year. His model of an Army Lite—small, but perfectly formed—has proved incompatible with the task of the occupation of Iraq, as any number of weary National Guardsmen and reservists out there will confirm. But only a micromanaging Defense Secretary could credibly be held to blame for the vile misconduct of Private Lynndie England and her comrades.

No, what is needed at this stage is double helpings of humble pie all round, followed by an address to the nation by President Bush reminding us, as I have tried to do here, of the case for the overthrow of Saddam; frankly and penitently acknowledging the mistakes that have been made; and spelling out clearly and firmly why American can and must stick to the task of salvaging Iraq from the wreckage of Saddam's tyranny.

The American people have shown great faith in their president. In the light of recent events, the continued willingness of so many voters to give George W. Bush the benefit of the doubt is little short of amazing. But he owes it to them to spell out how we are going to achieve, ultimately, a success in Iraq that will genuinely set back the cause of the extreme Islamists and their sponsor, and that will genuinely increase the chances of an enduring peace in the region. If he cannot do this convincingly, he will not deserve to be re-elected.

IT WAS A famous anthem of the Vietnam generation: The answer, my friend, is blowin' in the wind. The wind that is blowing in Washington today is not the kind of wind Bob Dylan had in mind. It is a wind not of change but of panic—a wind that would take America back to the failed tactics of appeasement, brokering and containment that have yielded such dismal results in the Middle East since the beginning of the Islamist revolution in 1979. As I write the wind is howling. President Bush has much to do if he is to avoid being blown clean out of the White House by it. □

Niall Ferguson's new book *Colossus: The Price of America's Empire* is published by Penguin Press. He is Herzog Professor of History at the Stern School of Business, New York University, and a senior fellow of the Hoover Institution, Stanford University.

TO SUBSCRIBE
1-800-893-8944 or WWW.NATIONALINTEREST.ORG

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

CENTER FOR PEACE AND SECURITY STUDIES

Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service
Georgetown University



ISBN 0-87840-142-3, paper, $29.95

Grave New World
Security Challenges in the 21st Century
Michael E. Brown, Editor

"Michael Brown has pulled together a volume that thoughtfully and comprehensively surveys the security challenges of the 21st century. Those seeking an overview of the new security agenda would do well to start with this book."
—Steven Miller, Director, International Security Program,
Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University

"Michael Brown and his knowledgeable contributors present a comprehensive, multifaceted, up-to-date tour of today's international security challenges, ranging from weapons of mass destruction to transnational crime—and everything in between."
—Jack Snyder, Robert and Renée Belfer,
Professor of International Relations, Columbia University

Attacking Terrorism
Elements of a Grand Strategy
Audrey Kurth Cronin & James M. Ludes, Editors

"Attacking Terrorism *brings together many of the world's foremost experts on terrorism and counter-terrorism, who begin the important process of developing a grand strategy to address contemporary, real-world threats. Scholars and policymakers alike will benefit from the advice of contributors to reject anachronistic thinking about the relative importance of state and non-state threats, as well as their warning that an uninformed, emotional response that ignores the dynamic relationship between terrorism and counter-terrorism could increase the risk of catastrophic attack."*
—Jessica Stern, lecturer in public policy, Harvard University



ISBN 0-87840-347-7, paper, $26.95

GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY PRESS
c/o Hopkins Fulfillment Service P.O. Box 50370 Baltimore Maryland 21211-4370
1.800.537.5487 or 410.516.6956 FAX: 410.516.6998
www.press.georgetown.edu

Founded in 1987, **Women In International Security** (WIIS) is the foremost organization in the world devoted to the academic and professional advancement of women—in government, academia, think tanks, the media, and business—in the field of security studies.

WIIS organizes more than 40 events a year on a wide range of issues, advancing the dialogue on international security while showcasing women experts.

WIIS Women In International Security

Join more than 1200 women and men from around the world by becoming a member of WIIS. For more information, visit: http://wiis.georgetown.edu

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Master of Arts in Security Studies

Attend the **largest graduate program** in the United States devoted to **professional education in security studies.**

Choose from more than 50 different courses in U.S. national security, international security, and technology and security.

Draw on a tradition of academic excellence. **Advance your career. Make a difference.**

Attend classes on a full-time or part-time basis. For further information visit http://ssp.georgetown.edu or call 202.687.5733.

Center for Peace and Security Studies
Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service
Georgetown University

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The Neoconservative Moment

Francis Fukuyama

ONE OF Washington's most exclusive clubs during the 1990s was the annual board dinner of *The National Interest*. Presided over by founding editor Owen Harries and often kicked off with a presentation by Henry Kissinger, the group included Jeanne Kirkpatrick, Irving, Bea and Bill Kristol, Samuel Huntington, Paul Wolfowitz, Norman Podhoretz, Daniel Pipes, Charles Krauthammer, Marty Feldstein, Eliot Cohen, Peter Rodman and a host of other conservative thinkers, writers and doers, including just about everyone now characterized as a "neoconservative."

What I always found fascinating about these dinners was their unpredictability. People's views were very much set in concrete during the Cold War; while this group was divided into pro- and anti-détente camps, virtually everyone (myself included) had staked out territory years before. The Berlin Wall's fall brought a great change, and there was no clear mapping between one's pre-1989 views and the ones held thereafter. Roughly, the major fault line was between people who were more realist and those who were more idealist or Wilsonian. But everyone was trying to wrestle with the same basic question: In the wake of the disappearance of the overarching strategic threat posed by the former USSR, how did one define the foreign policy of a country that had suddenly become the global hegemon? How narrowly or broadly did one define this magazine's eponymous "national interest"?

It was at one of these dinners that Charles Krauthammer first articulated the idea of American unipolarity. In the winter of 1990–91, he wrote in *Foreign Affairs* of the "unipolar moment"; in the Winter 2002/03 issue of *The National Interest*, he expanded the scope of his thesis by arguing that "the unipolar moment has become the unipolar era." And in February 2004, he gave a speech at the annual dinner of the American Enterprise Institute in which he took his earlier themes and developed the ideas further, in the aftermath of the Iraq War.[1] He defined four different schools of thought on foreign policy: isolationism, liberal internationalism, realism and his own position that he defines as "democratic globalism", a kind of muscular

Francis Fukuyama is Bernard L. Schwartz Professor of International Political Economy at the School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University, and author most recently of *State-Building: Governance and World Order in the 21st Century* (Cornell University Press, 2004).

[1] Charles Krauthammer, *Democratic Realism: An American Foreign Policy for A Unipolar World.* The 2004 Irving Kristol Lecture, the American Enterprise Institute, Washington, DC.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Wilsonianism—minus international institutions—that seeks to use U.S. military supremacy to support U.S. security interests and democracy simultaneously.

Krauthammer is a gifted thinker and his ideas are worth taking seriously for their own sake. But, perhaps more importantly, his strategic thinking has become emblematic of a school of thought that has acquired strong influence inside the Bush Administration foreign policy team and beyond. It is for that reason that Krauthammer's writings, particularly his AEI speech, require careful analysis. It is in the spirit of our earlier debates that I offer the following critique.

THE 2004 speech is strangely disconnected from reality. Reading Krauthammer, one gets the impression that the Iraq War—the archetypical application of American unipolarity—had been an unqualified success, with all of the assumptions and expectations on which the war had been based fully vindicated. There is not the slightest nod towards the new empirical facts that have emerged in the last year or so: the failure to find weapons of mass destruction in Iraq, the virulent and steadily mounting anti-Americanism throughout the Middle East, the growing insurgency in Iraq, the fact that no strong democratic leadership had emerged there, the enormous financial and growing human cost of the war, the failure to leverage the war to make progress on the Israeli-Palestinian front, and the fact that America's fellow democratic allies had by and large failed to fall in line and legitimate American actions *ex post*.

The failure to step up to these facts is dangerous precisely to the neo-neoconservative position that Krauthammer has been seeking to define and justify. As the war in Iraq turns from triumphant liberation to grinding insurgency, other voices—either traditional realists like Brent Scowcroft, nationalist-isolationists like Patrick Buchanan, or liberal internationalists like John Kerry—will step forward as authoritative voices and will have far more influence in defining American post-Iraq War foreign policy. The poorly executed nation-building strategy in Iraq will poison the well for future such exercises, undercutting domestic political support for a generous and visionary internationalism, just as Vietnam did.

It did not have to be this way. One can start with premises identical to Krauthammer's, agree wholeheartedly with his critiques of the other three positions, and yet come up with a foreign policy that is very different from the one he lays out. I believe that his strategy simultaneously defines our interests in such a narrow way as to make the neoconservative position indistinguishable from realism, while at the same time managing to be utterly unrealistic in its overestimation of U.S. power and our ability to control events around the world. It is probably too late to reclaim the label "neoconservative" for any but the policies undertaken by the Bush Administration, but it is still worth trying to reformulate a fourth alternative that combines idealism and realism—but in a fashion that can be sustained over the long haul.

Excessive Realism

KRAUTHAMMER and other commentators are correct that what is seen as "Kissingerian" realism is not an adequate basis for American foreign policy. A certain degree of messianic universalism with regard to American values and institutions has always been an inescapable component of American national identity: Americans were never comfortable with the kinds of moral compromises that a strict realist position entails. The question, which was the constant subject of those board dinners, was: What kinds of bounds do you

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

put around the idealistic part of the agenda? Krauthammer answers this key question in the following manner:

> Where to intervene? Where to bring democracy? Where to nation-build? I propose a single criterion: where it counts. Call it democratic *realism*. And this is its axiom: *We will support democracy everywhere, but we will commit blood and treasure only in places where there is strategic necessity—meaning, places central to the larger war against the existential enemy, the enemy that poses a global mortal threat to freedom.* [italics in the original]

While this axiom appears to be clear and straightforward, it masks a number of ambiguities that make it less than helpful as a guideline for U.S. intervention. The first has to do with the phrase "strategic necessity", which of course can be defined more and less broadly. Krauthammer initially appears to be taking a realist position by opting for the narrow definition when he refers to an "existential enemy" or an enemy posing a "mortal" threat. If these words have any real meaning, then they should include only threats to our existence as a nation or as a democratic regime. There have been such threats in the past: the Soviet Union could have annihilated us physically and conceivably could have subverted democracy in North America. But it is questionable whether any such *existential* threats exist now. Iraq before the U.S. invasion was certainly not one: It posed an existential threat to Kuwait, Iran and Israel, but it had no means of threatening the continuity of our regime.[2] Al-Qaeda and other radical Islamist groups aspire to be existential threats to American civilization but do not currently have anything like the capacity to actualize their vision: They are extremely dangerous totalitarians, but pose threats primarily to regimes in the Middle East.

This is not to say that Iraq and Al-Qaeda did not pose serious threats to American *interests*: the former was a very serious regional threat, and the latter succeeded in killing thousands of Americans on American soil. Use of WMD against the United States by a terrorist group would have terrible consequences, not just for the immediate victims but also for American freedoms in ways that could be construed as undermining our regime. But it is still of a lesser order of magnitude than earlier, state-based threats. The global Nazi and communist threats were existential both because their banner was carried by a great power, and because ideologically there were many people in the United States and throughout the Western world seduced by their vision. The Islamist threat has no such appeal, except perhaps in countries like France that have permitted high levels of immigration from Muslim countries.

I suspect that Krauthammer's intended use of the term "strategic necessity" is actually broader than is implied by his own words about existential threats. At the end of his axiom he leaps to the need to fight an "*enemy that poses a global mortal threat to freedom*", and elsewhere speaks of the United States as "custodian of the international system", suggesting a broad-minded understanding of self-interest. Does "global" here mean threats that transcend specific regions, like radical Islamism or communism? If the enemy's reach has to be global, then North Korea would be excluded from the definition of a "strategic" threat. Or does "global"

[2]Iraq could have posed such a threat at some future date under the scenario sometimes hinted at by the Bush Administration, whereby they were to acquire a nuclear weapon and then turn it over to a terrorist group. The problem with this scenario is that (1) they were very far away from acquiring a nuclear weapon, and (2) there are a host of reasons for thinking that they would not turn such a weapon over to terrorists.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

instead mean any mortal threat to freedom around the globe? Does the fact that an "enemy" poses a mortal threat to another free country but not to us qualify it as our "enemy?" Is Hamas, an Islamist group which clearly poses an existential threat to Israel, our enemy as well? Is Syria? And if these are our enemies, why should we choose to fight them in preference to threats to free countries closer to home like the FARC or ELN, which threaten democracy in Colombia, or Hugo Chavez in Venezuela? What makes something "central" in *this* global war? Was Iraq central to the war against radical Islamism?

It is clear that Krauthammer's axiom provides very little practical guidance for answering these questions. He might respond that applying the general principle requires prudential judgment. He might further respond that his position is very distinct from that of the realists because he is using democracy as an instrument to advance U.S. strategic interests: By transforming Iraqi politics and turning a bloodthirsty dictatorship into a Western-style democracy, new possibilities will open up for the entire region that promises to get at some of the root causes of terrorism. This is indeed an ambitious and highly idealistic agenda, and it is precisely in the prudential judgments underlying the current project of transforming the Middle East that his argument is fatally flawed.

Excessive Idealism

OF ALL OF the different views that have now come to be associated with neoconservatives, the strangest one to me was the confidence that the United States could transform Iraq into a Western-style democracy, and go on from there to democratize the broader Middle East. It struck me as strange precisely because these same neoconservatives had spent much of the past generation warning—in *The National Interest*'s former sister publication, *The Public Interest*, for example—about the dangers of ambitious social engineering, and how social planners could never control behavior or deal with unanticipated consequences. If the United States cannot eliminate poverty or raise test scores in Washington, DC, how does it expect to bring democracy to a part of the world that has stubbornly resisted it and is virulently anti-American to boot?

Krauthammer picks up this theme in his speech. Noting how wrong people were after World War II in asserting that Japan could not democratize, he asks, "Where is it written that Arabs are incapable of democracy?" He is echoing an argument made most forthrightly by the eminent Middle East scholar Bernard Lewis, who has at several junctures suggested that pessimism about the prospects for a democratic Iraq betrays lack of respect for Arabs.

It is, of course, nowhere written that Arabs are incapable of democracy, and it is certainly foolish for cynical Europeans to assert with great confidence that democracy is impossible in the Middle East. We have, indeed, been fooled before, not just in Japan but in Eastern Europe prior to the collapse of communism.

But possibility is not likelihood, and good policy is not made by staking everything on a throw of the dice. Culture is not destiny, but culture plays an important role in making possible certain kinds of institutions—something that is usually taken to be a conservative insight. Though I, more than most people, am associated with the idea that history's arrow points to democracy, I have never believed that democracies can be created anywhere and everywhere through sheer political will. Prior to the Iraq War, there were many reasons for thinking that building a democratic Iraq was a task of a complexity that would be nearly unmanageable. Some reasons had to do with the

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

nature of Iraqi society: the fact that it would be decompressing rapidly from totalitarianism, its ethnic divisions, the role of politicized religion, the society's propensity for violence, its tribal structure and the dominance of extended kin and patronage networks, and its susceptibility to influence from other parts of the Middle East that were passionately anti-American.

But other reasons had to do with the United States. America has been involved in approximately 18 nation-building projects between its conquest of the Philippines in 1899 and the current occupations of Afghanistan and Iraq, and the overall record is not a pretty one. The cases of unambiguous success—Germany, Japan, and South Korea—were all ones in which U.S. forces came and then stayed indefinitely. In the first two cases, we were not nation-building at all, but only re-legitimizing societies that had very powerful states. In all of the other cases, the U.S. either left nothing behind in terms of self-sustaining institutions, or else made things worse by creating, as in the case of Nicaragua, a modern army and police but no lasting rule of law.

This gets to a much more fundamental point about unipolarity. Krauthammer has always stressed the vast disparity of power between the United States and the rest of the world, vaster even than Rome's dominance at the height of its empire. But that dominance is clear-cut only along two dimensions of national power: the cultural realm and the ability to fight and win intensive conventional wars.

Americans have no particular taste or facility for nation-building; we want exit strategies rather than empires—a point Krauthammer reiterated at the start of his lecture. Where then does he think the domestic basis of support will come from for this unbelievably ambitious effort to politically transform one of the world's most troubled and hostile regions? And if the nation is really a commercial republic uncomfortable with empire, why is he so eager to expand its domain? Lurking like an unbidden guest at a dinner party is the reality of what has happened in Iraq since the U.S. invasion: We have been our usual inept and disorganized selves in planning for and carrying out the reconstruction, something that was predictable in advance and should not have surprised anyone familiar with American history.

Allies, Institutions and Legitimacy

THE FINAL area of weakness in Krauthammer's argument lies in his treatment of legitimacy, and how the United States relates to the rest of the world. Failure to appreciate America's own current legitimacy deficit hurts both the realist part of our agenda, by diminishing our actual power, and the idealist portion of it, by undercutting our appeal as the embodiment of certain ideas and values.

Krauthammer avoids confronting this issue by creating a bit of a parody of foreign critiques of American policy, something easily dismissed because it comes from "the butchers of Tiananmen Square or the cynics of the Quai d'Orsay." He manages to lump both the Democratic Party and most of our European allies into a single category of liberal internationalists. He argues that their opposition to the Iraq War was founded on a self-proclaimed normative commitment to multilateralism and international law. For liberal internationalists, war is legitimate only if it is sanctioned by the United Nations. But this high-mindedness, he argues, masks motives that are much baser: the Europeans are Lilliputians who want to tie the American Gulliver down and reduce American freedom of action. So they are both naive and hypocritical in the same breath.

What Krauthammer here describes as the Democratic/European position is one that is readily recognizable and does in

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

fact characterize the views of many opponents of the Iraq War. But if he had listened carefully to what many Europeans were actually saying (something that Americans are not very good at doing these days), he would have discovered that much of their objection to the war was not a normative one having to do with procedural issues and the UN, but rather a prudential one having to do with the overall wisdom of attacking Iraq. Europeans tended not to be persuaded that Iraq was as dangerous as the Bush Administration claimed. They argued that Ba'athi Iraq had little to do with Al-Qaeda, and that attacking Iraq would be a distraction from the War on Terror. Many Europeans, moreover, did not particularly trust the United States to handle the postwar situation well, much less the more ambitious agenda of democratizing the Middle East. They believed that the ongoing Palestinian-Israeli conflict was a more dangerous source of instability and terrorism than Iraq and that the Bush Administration was undercutting its own credibility by appearing to side so strongly with the policies of Ariel Sharon.

All of these were and are, of course, debatable propositions. On the question of the threat posed by Iraq, everyone—Europeans and Americans—were evidently fooled into thinking that it possessed significant stockpiles of chemical and biological weapons. But on this issue, the European bottom line proved to be closer to the truth than the administration's far more alarmist position. The question of pre-war Iraq-Al-Qaeda links has become intensely politicized in America since the war. My reading of the evidence is that these linkages existed (indeed, it would be very surprising if they did not), but that their significance was limited. We have learned since September 11 that Al-Qaeda did not need the support of a state like Iraq to do a tremendous amount of damage to the United States and that attacking Iraq was not the most direct way to get at Al-Qaeda. On the question of the manageability of postwar Iraq, the more skeptical European position was almost certainly right; the Bush Administration went into Iraq with enormous illusions about how easy the postwar situation would be. On the question of Palestine, the Europeans are likely wrong, or at least wrong in their belief that we could move to a durable settlement of the conflict if only the United States decided to use its influence with Israel.

The point here is not who is right, but rather that the prudential case was not nearly as open-and-shut as Krauthammer and other neoconservatives believe. He talks as if the Bush Administration's judgment had been vindicated at every turn, and that any questioning of it can only be the result of base or dishonest motives. Would that this were so. The fact that our judgment was flawed has created an enormous legitimacy problem for us, one that will hurt our interests for a long time to come.

THE PROBLEM of judgment gets to the heart of what is wrong with the vision of a unipolar world that Krauthammer lays out. In his words, the United States "has been designated custodian of the international system" by virtue of its enormous margin of military superiority. If we had in fact been designated global custodian, we would have no legitimacy problem, but we have unfortunately designated ourselves. We have in effect said to the rest of the world, "look, trust us, we will look out for your interests. You can do this safely because we not just any run-of-the-mill hyperpower. We are, after all, the United States." While we would not trust Russia, China, India, France or even Britain with a similar kind of power, we believe that the rest of the world should trust us. This is because the United States is different from other countries, a democracy espousing universal values and

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

therefore not subject the same calculations of self-interest as other would-be hegemons.

There is actually something to this argument. But it is also not very difficult to see why it does not gain much traction outside the United States, and not just among those endemically hostile to America. Krauthammer-the-realist, after all, argues for a narrow definition of national interest, which does not suggest we will be a very reliable partner to a struggling friend when we do not have important interests at stake. And even if we were willing to bear other people's burdens, what about our judgment?

Legitimacy is a tricky concept. It is related to substantive principles of justice, but it is not the same thing as justice. That is, people believe that a set of institutions is legitimate because they believe they are just, but legitimacy is always relative to the people conferring legitimacy.

Legitimacy is important to us not simply because we want to feel good about ourselves, but because it is useful. Other people will follow the American lead if they believe that it is legitimate; if they do not, they will resist, complain, obstruct or actively oppose what we do. In this respect, it matters not what *we* believe to be legitimate, but rather what *other* people believe is legitimate. If the Indian government says that it will not participate in a peacekeeping force in Iraq unless it has a UN Security Council mandate to do so, it does not matter in the slightest that we believe the Security Council to be an illegitimate institution: the Indians simply will not help us out.

Krauthammer and others have dismissed the importance of legitimacy by associating it entirely with the United Nations—and then shooting at that very easy target. Of course, the UN has deep problems with legitimacy. Since membership is not based on a substantive principle of legitimacy, but rather formal sovereignty, it has been populated from the beginning by a range of dictatorial and human-rights abusing regimes. Our European allies themselves do not believe in the necessity of legitimization through the Security Council. When they found they could not get its support for the intervention in Kosovo because of the Russian veto, they were perfectly willing to bypass the UN and switch the venue to NATO instead.

But our legitimacy problem in Iraq went much deeper. Even if we had switched the venue to NATO—an alliance of democracies committed to the same underlying set of values—we could not have mustered a majority in support of our position, not to speak of the consensus required for collective action in that organization. The Bush Administration likes to boast of the size of the "coalition of the willing" that the United States was eventually able to pull together. One can take comfort in this only by abstracting from the *quality* of the support we received. Besides Britain and Australia, no one was willing to put boots on the ground during the active phase of combat, and now that post-conflict peacekeeping looks more like real warfare once again, Spain, Honduras and other members of the coalition are pulling out. Those countries that did support the United States did so on the basis of an elite calculation of national interest—in almost all cases against the wishes of large majorities of their own populations. This is true alike for Tony Blair, our staunchest ally, and for Poland, the most pro-American country in eastern Europe. While the behavior of Germany's Gerhard Schröder in actively opposing the war was deeply disappointing, I would still much rather have Germany on my side than a feckless and corrupt Ukraine.

IT IS CLEAR, in other words, that a very large part of the world, including many people who are normally inclined to be our friends, did not believe in the legitimacy of our

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

behavior towards Iraq. This is not because the Security Council failed to endorse the war, but because many of our friends did not trust us, that is, the Bush Administration, to use our huge margin of power wisely and in the interests of the world as a whole. This should matter to us, not just for realist reasons of state (our ability to attract allies to share the burden), but for idealist ones as well (our ability to lead and inspire based on the attractiveness of who we are).

I do not believe that the Bush Administration was in fact contemptuous of the need for legitimacy. What they believed and hoped, rather, was that legitimacy would be awarded *ex post* rather than *ex ante* by the international community. There was a widespread belief among members of the administration that once it became clear that the United States was going to disarm Iraq forcefully, other NATO allies including France would eventually come on board. Everyone was taken aback by the vehemence with which France and Germany opposed the war, and by the U.S. failure to line up normally compliant countries like Chile and Mexico during the Security Council vote.

While the behavior of Schröder was disappointing, I would much rather have Germany on my side than a feckless and corrupt Ukraine.

The hope that we would be awarded *ex post* legitimacy was not an unreasonable calculation. It might indeed have materialized had the United States found a large and active WMD program in Iraq after the invasion, or if the transition to a democratic regime had been as quick and low-cost as the Bush Administration expected. Many people have argued that American unilateralism towards Iraq breaks a long pattern of transatlantic cooperation, but they are forgetting history. The United States during the Cold War repeatedly pushed its European allies to do things they were reluctant to do, often by staking out positions first and seeking approval later. In the end, American judgment on these issues was better than that of the Europeans, and legitimacy was in fact awarded retrospectively. When this happened, the United States was not blamed for unilateralism, but praised for its leadership.

One could then interpret the Iraq War simply as a one-time mistake or unfortunate miscalculation coming on the heels of a long string of successes. Certainly, it would be utterly wrong to conclude that the war teaches us that the United States should never stick its neck out and lead the broader Western world to actions that our allies oppose or are reluctant to undertake. Nor should we conclude that pre-emption and unilateralism will never be necessary.

On the other hand, it is not simply bad luck that we failed to win legitimacy as badly as we did this time. The world is different now than it was during the Cold War in ways that will affect our future ability to exert leadership and claim to speak on behalf of the world as a whole. This is so for three reasons.

The first difference is, of course, the demise of the Soviet Union and the absence of an overarching superpower threat. During the Cold War, there was rampant anti-Americanism around the world and popular opposition to U.S. policies. But our influence was anchored by center-right parties throughout Europe that were both grateful for America's historical role in the liberation of Europe and fearful of Soviet influence. The global terrorist threat may some day come to be interpreted in a similar fashion, but it is not yet.

A second difference has to do with the very fact of our military dominance. During the Cold War, when our power was more or less evenly matched against

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

that of the Soviets, we cared a great deal about credibility and slippery slopes. We were afraid that withdrawal in the face of a challenge would be taken as a sign of weakness and exploited by the other side. Today, the United States is utterly dominant in the military sphere. Credibility in our willingness and ability to use force remains important, but we simply do not have to prove our toughness to the rest of the world at every turn.

The final difference has to do with the fact that the current battlefield is not Europe but the Middle East. There were always sharp differences of opinion between the United States and its allies on how to proceed with respect to the Soviet Union, but they pale in comparison to the differences between the United States and virtually everyone else in the world with respect to the Arab world. So it is to this issue that we must turn.

Dealing with the Middle East

KRAUTHAMMER has thought long and hard about the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and his views on how the Israelis need to deal with the Palestinians colors his views on how the United States should deal with the Arabs more broadly. Krauthammer has not supported strongly engaging the Arab world through political strategies. In the past, he has put forward a particular view of Arab psychology, namely, that they respect power above all as a source of legitimacy. As he once said in a radio interview, if you want to win their hearts and minds, you have grab a lower part of their anatomy and squeeze hard.

Towards the end of his AEI speech, Krauthammer speaks of the United States as being in the midst of a bitter and remorseless war with an implacable enemy that is out to destroy Western civilization. This kind of language is appropriate as a description of Israel's strategic situation since the outbreak of the second *intifada*. The question is whether this accurately describes the position of the United States as well. Are we like Israel, locked in a remorseless struggle with a large part of the Arab and Muslim world, with few avenues open to us for dealing with them other than an iron fist? And in general, does a strategic doctrine developed by a small, vulnerable country surrounded by implacable enemies make sense when applied to the situation of the world's sole superpower, a country that spends as much on defense as the next 16 most powerful countries put together?

I believe that there are real problems in transposing one situation to the other. While Israel's most immediate Arab interlocutors are indeed implacable enemies, the United States faces a much more complex situation. In Al-Qaeda and other radical Islamist groups, we do in fact confront an enemy that hates us for what we are rather than for what we do. For the reasons given above, I do not believe they are an existential threat to us, but they certainly would like to be, and it is hard to see how we can deal with them other than by killing, capturing or otherwise militarily neutralizing them.

But the radicals swim in a much larger sea of Muslims—1.2 billion of them, more or less—who are not yet implacable enemies of the United States. If one has any doubts about this, one has only to look at the first of the United Nations Development Program's two *Arab Human Development* reports, which contained a poll asking whether respondents would like to emigrate to the United States if they had the opportunity. In virtually every Arab country, a majority of respondents said yes. On the other hand, recent Pew surveys of global public opinion show that positive feelings about the United States in Jordan, Egypt, Turkey, Pakistan and other supposedly friendly Muslim countries has sunk to disastrously low levels. What these data taken as a

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

whole suggest is that for the broad mass of public opinion in Muslim countries, we are disliked or hated not for what we are, but rather for what we do. What they do not like is a familiar list of complaints about our foreign policy that we somehow continue to fail to take seriously: our lack of concern for the plight of the Palestinians, our hypocritical support for dictators in Muslim countries, and now our occupation of Iraq.

The War on Terror is, in other words, a classic counter-insurgency war, except that it is one being played out on a global scale. There are genuine bad guys out there who are much more bitter ideological enemies than the Soviets ever were, but their success depends on the attitudes of the broader populations around them who can be alternatively supportive, hostile or indifferent—depending on how we play our cards. As we are seeing vividly in Iraqi cities like Fallujah and Najaf, counter-insurgency wars are incredibly difficult to fight, because we must somehow destroy the enemy without alienating the broader population and making things worse. Counter-insurgency requires a tricky mixture of precisely targeted force, political judgment and extremely good intelligence: a combination of carrots and sticks.

Israel used carrots during the Oslo process and then shifted to sticks after its collapse and the beginning of the second *intifada*. I do not want to second-guess either of these approaches, neither of which seems to have worked very well. But an American policy toward the Muslim world that, like Sharon's, is largely stick will be a disaster: we do not have enough sticks in our closet to "make them respect us." The Islamists for sure hated us from the beginning, but Krauthammerian unipolarity has increased hatred for the United States in the broader fight for hearts and minds. This suggests that we need a much more complex strategy that recalibrates the proportion of sticks and carrots. This has begun to happen with the leaking of the Bush Administration's Greater Middle East Initiative, but that is only the beginning of a much longer political struggle.

Israel's policy of constantly being on the offensive, pre-empting and taking the initiative (as in its policy of targeted assassinations) is also something that does not scale well. Unlike Israel, the United States has a substantial margin of strategic depth and does not constantly have to run risks in order to stay on top. A sole superpower that is seen being as inclined to intervene pre-emptively and often will frighten not just its enemies but its friends as well. The United States must never abjure its right to pre-empt, but it is a right that needs to be exercised cautiously. Even talking about such a strategy, as we did in the *National Security Strategy* document, will tend to promote opposing coalitions and resistance to U.S. policies. Israel can afford to antagonize potential allies and disregard international public opinion as long as it can count on support from the United States. The United States could, I suppose, survive if it were similarly isolated, but it is hard to see why we would want to put ourselves in this position. It is hardly an advantageous position from which to launch an idealistic Wilsonian crusade to reshape the Middle East in our image.

What Now?

SINCE I HAVE volunteered only to write a critique of the views expressed by Charles Krauthammer and am not myself running for president, I am under no obligation to lay out in depth a positive agenda for American foreign policy that would serve as a substitute. On the other hand, there are elements of a different neoconservative foreign policy that are implicit in what I have said thus far. The United States should understand the need to

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

exercise power in pursuit of both its interests and values, but also to be more prudent and subtle in that exercise. The world's sole superpower needs to remember that its margin of power is viewed with great suspicion around the world and will set off countervailing reactions if that power is not exercised judiciously.

This means, in the first instance, doing the simple work of diplomacy and coalition-building that the Bush Administration seemed reluctant to undertake prior to the Iraq War and not gratuitously to insult the "common opinions of mankind." We do not need to embrace the UN or multilateralism for its own sake, because we somehow believe that such institutions are inherently more legitimate than nation-states. On the other hand, we need like-minded allies to accomplish both the realist and idealist portions of our agenda and should spend much more time and energy cultivating them.

America needs to remember that its margin of power is viewed with great suspicion around the world.

The promotion of democracy through all of the available tools at our disposal should remain high on the agenda, particularly with regard to the Middle East. But the United States needs to be more realistic about its nation-building abilities, and cautious in taking on large social-engineering projects in parts of the world it does not understand very well. On the other hand, it is inevitable that we will get sucked into similar projects in the future (for example, after a sudden collapse of the North Korean regime), and we need to be much better prepared. This means establishing a permanent office with authority and resources appropriate for the job the next time around as part of a broader restructuring of the U.S. government's soft-power agencies.

To this list I would add a final element that for reasons of space I cannot elaborate here. The visionary founders of the postwar order were institution-builders, who created not just the much-maligned UN system, but the Bretton Woods institutions, NATO, the U.S.-Japan and U.S.-Korea alliances, the GATT, the WTO, and a host of other international organizations. Institution-building is not something that has occupied the time of officials in the Bush Administration, but it should. If the United States does not like the fact that the UN is dominated by non-democratic regimes, then it should invest in an effort to build up other institutions, like NATO or the Community of Democracies founded during the Clinton Administration, that are based on norms and values we share. The Community of Democracies initiative, which the French foreign minister Hubert Védrine tried to strangle at its birth, was never taken seriously by the Republicans, for, I assume, "not invented here" reasons. But such a global alliance of democracies, led by newer ones in eastern Europe and Latin America, could play a legitimizing function around the world in a way that NATO cannot.

If the United States cannot create new global institutions, then it could try to pursue a vision of overlapping multilateral organizations on a regional basis. The Bush Administration has stumbled into a six-power format for dealing with North Korea; why not seek to make permanent a five-power caucus once we (hopefully) get past the current impasse over nuclear weapons with Pyongyang? Such an organization could play a very valuable coordinating function in the event of, say, a sudden North Korean collapse. Mutual suspicions between Japan, Korea and China are high, and a multilateral forum would be a much better vehicle for sharing information and plans that the current system of bilateral alliances running through Washington. The Chinese in recent years have been pushing a series of regional

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

pacts—ASEAN Plus Three, the China-ASEAN Free Trade Area, a Northeast Asian Free Trade Area, and ultimately, an East Asian Free Trade Area—that they argue may some day serve as the basis for regional security arrangements as well. While the Japanese have seen these as bids for regional leadership and have replied in kind with trade pacts centered on themselves, the Bush Administration has not, as far as I am aware, formulated anything like a coherent response. Do we simply want to swat down proposals for regional multilateral organizations, as we did in the case of Mahatir's East Asian Community in the early 1990s or Japan's proposal after the Asian financial crisis for a regional IMF, or do we want to engage with the region and shape such proposals in ways that can suit our own interests? I believe that East Asia is under-institutionalized and ripe for some creative thinking by the United States.

I believe that this kind of recalibration of American foreign policy still qualifies as falling in Krauthammer's fourth "democratic globalism" basket, being neither isolationist, liberal-idealist nor realist. Whether it will ever be seen as neoconservative I doubt, but there is no reason why it should not have this title. □

The Human Prospect: Our Civilizational Future
Seymour W. Itzkoff, Smith College

I ***The Inevitable Domination by Man, An Evolutionary Detective Story***
2000 387 pp. Cloth *Illustrated* $28 ISBN: 0-913993-16-6
"Masterful" (*Contemporary Psychology*) "Intriguing and informative" (*Choice*)
"Impressive"..."Worthwhile" (*Acta Biotheoretica*)
"Extraordinary"..."Recalling Darwin" (*ASCAP, World Psychiatric Association*)

II ***2050, The Collapse of the Global Techno-Economy***
2003 136 pp. Softcover $16 ISBN: 0-913993-19-0

III ***Intellectual Capital in Twenty-First-Century Politics***
2003 143 pp. Softcover $16 ISBN: 0-913993-20-4

IV *Rebuilding Western Civilization, Beyond the Twenty-First-Century Collapse*
Forthcoming, 2005

ψ ψ

All prices include shipping and handling

Please send check to: Paideia Publishers
P.O. Box 343
Ashfield, Massachusetts 01330

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Spain's Atlantic Option

Valentí Puig

THE UNEXPECTED victory of the Spanish socialists in the general elections last March, just a few days after the bombing attack in Madrid, has changed the face and direction of Spanish politics. Its most obvious and immediate impact has been on the U.S.-led War on Terror, and in particular on Spain's participation in the coalition of the willing. Rodríguez Zapatero, Spain's new prime minister, had diametrically opposed the U.S. intervention against Saddam Hussein, and since the election he has fulfilled his electoral promise to withdraw the 1,300 Spanish troops from Iraq. By doing so, however, he will almost certainly make it impossible for Spain to form prudential alliances for global security and so be compelled to take refuge in dreams of a "moralpolitik."

Yet as subsequent events have proved, it would be a catastrophic error to think that Al-Qaeda will switch its attention from Spain merely because a general election has changed the government. Osama bin Laden had proposed the "reconquest" of Spain long before the Iraq War. Indeed his express purpose is to revive the Caliphate, the golden dream of Islam, and to restore the Moorish rule of Al-Andalus that ended with the fall of Granada. His terrorist ideology stems from an extreme pathology of anti-Westernism coupled with the desire for revenge against a world that, in Bin Laden's eyes, has been corrupted by freedom and hedonism. In the end, this reality of a terrorism that cannot be appeased by gestures of non-belligerence will inevitably shape Spain's foreign policy—as it had done under the government of conservative prime minister, José María Aznar.

After September 11, Aznar had firmly aligned Spain with the United States with a policy of considered and resolute Atlanticism. That alignment had triggered tensions with the Paris-Berlin axis in the European Union; it was also opposed by a socialist opposition that thought warmer relations with Washington conflicted with Spain's commitment to the European Union. Aznar's realignment was without doubt a substantial adjustment of Spanish foreign policy in both positioning and influence. But it was rooted soundly in Spanish national interests.

For some time, the main problem for Spanish society has been Basque terrorism. A closer relationship with George W. Bush encouraged the United States to help in the Madrid government's fight against it. The United States also helped smooth the sometimes ominous relations between Spain and

Valentí Puig writes for the Spanish newspaper *ABC* and is also a member of its editorial board. He is about to publish a book in praise of the future as imperfection.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

neighboring Morocco—ominous because the Spanish-Moroccan border is where the European Union meets North Africa, and where illegal immigrants start their journey across the continent. These were immediate and pressing reasons why Spain collaborated with the global strategy of the United States against terrorism. ETA (the Basque terrorist group) wishes to destroy Spain, and the Al-Qaeda attack on Madrid on March 11, 2004, was the start of a campaign to Lebanonize Europe—to hold it hostage and punish it for being the land of cathedrals and the Enlightenment. These were sufficient reasons for Aznar's Atlantic strategy.

Even before September 11, however, Aznar had been working towards this shift in foreign policy. His premise was that, in order to grow both economically and politically, Spain's engagement with the rest of world needed to be wider and bolder. He wanted to confront Spanish society's traditional fear of commitments abroad. He believed that this fear gave no weight to the costs of isolation. As the early 20th-century statesman, Count Alvaro de Romanones, warned: "Being everyone's friend means not having any friend at all at a time of danger or need." And that dictated closer relations, political and economic, with Spain's former colonies and the United States across the Atlantic.

It must be said that many factors in Spanish society worked against this reorientation: the reluctance of Spanish public opinion to face the realities of foreign policy, the systematic anti-Americanism of the Left, and the public's low opinion of Bush. Even so, Aznar's conservative government opted firmly for a wider Euro-Atlanticism rather than a narrow Europeanism, a warmer and more direct relationship with Washington, and a willingness to embark on collective security with the United States in the face of terrorism. September 11 merely strengthened the case for this change of direction.

The first fruits of that policy were seen in Latin American policy where Aznar aligned Spain clearly alongside the United States. Even before September 11, he had already reshaped Spain's Latin America policy in regard to counter-terrorism. Previously, Madrid had tacitly asked Latin American governments to "accept" fleeing ETA terrorists, if only to keep them away from Spain. Now the Madrid government began asking for their extradition. Spain also increased its help for Colombia in its own war against terror. And when the Iraqi crisis hit, Aznar threw his full weight behind the United States—even though that brought Spain into conflict with some Latin American countries at the United Nations.

Seven countries in Latin America supported President Bush; another seven "regretted" America's hard line; and three opted for diplomatic ambiguity. Of course, there was no more cohesion in the European Union either. But the diplomatic rift between the Spanish-speaking countries underlined an important lesson: it would take time and diplomatic effort to reach agreement and rapprochement in the Hispano-Atlantic world. That had created a problem for Aznar's Atlantic diplomacy. But he was helped by the fact that political and economic realities were pushing Spain, Latin America and the United States together.

The Hispanosphere and Atlanticism

IN RECENT years Spain has greatly expanded its links in Latin America in several fields simultaneously. Spain began to restore its political presence there when it carried out a democratic transition that served as a model for the later democratic transformation of Central and South America. At that time, the Spanish monarchy renewed its prestige all over the Spanish-speaking

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

world because it symbolized change without trauma. Madrid's example of "national conciliation" inspired successive agreements designed to avoid civil war and retribution there.

The Moncloa Pacts were another Spanish "demonstration effect." These were economic stabilization measures agreed to by the major democratic parties in response to the IMF's warning that the country's fragile economy needed a period of stability, including social peace. By demonstrating a commitment to democracy on all sides, these measures helped stabilize the nation in the run-up to the referendum on a new democratic constitution.

Spain subsequently met all the requirements of fiscal orthodoxy for the introduction of the euro. In the process, it achieved economic growth that outpaced the European average and became an investing country, reaching a zero deficit and creating over 4 million jobs. The success of the Spanish economic model as applied by Aznar's governments between 1993 and 2004 prompted several Latin American governments to strive (not always successfully) for macroeconomic stability as a means of underpinning political stability.

The net effect of all these economic and political changes over thirty years has been to transform the image of Spain in Latin American eyes from a stagnant and repressive society to a dynamic and democratic one. That in turn has made Spain better able to cultivate its Atlantic ties—and Latin America more willing to be wooed—in a context that is now being called the Hispanosphere.

This is, so to speak, the Hispanic complement of what James C. Bennett, writing in the Winter 2003/04 issue of *The National Interest*, has called the Anglosphere, which brings together the oceanic civilization of the English-speaking world. In this view, new technology, the Internet, satellite television and cheap air travel strengthen links between communities separated by geography but united by language, culture, history and legal and political tradition. In the Hispanosphere hypothesis, the large Spanish-speaking global community, with its historical origins, moral values, legal traditions and core literary convergence, abolishes the Atlantic's "tyranny of distance" through these multiplying communication networks. Indeed, they restore an older concept of the Atlantic as a link in a maritime civilization.

A crucial determining factor is the presence of the Spanish language on the Internet. This unites a total of 400 million people who speak Spanish—the fourth most widely spoken language on the planet after Chinese, English and Hindi and, according to Global Reach, the fourth most widely used language among Internet users. What we have here is a "tele-proximity" that nourishes the Hispanosphere—and not only because of a linguistic presence on the Internet, but also of the growing global market of television in Spanish. These are forming new "network communities" of people in different countries (and indeed continents) who nonetheless watch the same television programs, read the same newspapers, and communicate with each other over the same cheap systems of communications. Such communities are beginning to restore linguistic, cultural and historical ties that had been in decline. And as they do so, they are encouraging and facilitating economic ties between countries in the same cultural spheres.

SPAIN TODAY is the largest EU investor in Latin America, nearly surpassing the United States. In just one decade—between 1990 and 2000—over €100 billion of Spanish capital was invested in the sub-continent. Despite all the economic risks of Latin America, Spanish firms saw the chance to achieve clearly dominant positions in the market—something less feasible for them

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

in Europe. According to a February 2004 report from the Real Instituto Elcano, Spain was the leading investor in Argentina and Chile, the second in Brazil and Colombia, the fifth in Peru, and the seventh in Mexico.

Important for Latin America, such investment has been vital for Spain. According to *Cinco Días*, a Spanish newspaper, Latin America has provided over 30 percent of the 2001 profits for the 48 listed companies with interests in the zone. The spread of investments by Spanish companies in Latin America is, among other things, a response to the competitive pressures experienced by Spanish businesses in recent years. They had to seek new markets owing to the opening up of their own markets, the reduction in the size of the public sector on which they had depended, the arrival of the euro and, above all, the era of globalization. Latin America, because of cultural, legal and political affinities, was a natural market for their expansion.

Such significant levels of foreign investment inevitably produced mixed feelings in a continent as mired in economic nationalism as Latin America. Foreign investment often invites ambivalence as public opinion becomes polarized between the appeal of dynamism and the fear of impotence. On the one hand, people appreciated the fact that their country could attract investors, while on the other hand, they felt that national identity was being eroded. Also, the sale of national firms, as well as eroding national pride, meant greater competition for local companies, inevitably generating some resistance. In light of its history, Latin America looked especially susceptible to the temptations of retreating behind barriers and thus cutting the new investment and trading links with Spain.

The test came financially when the "golden decade" of the 1990s went through a succession of crises: the "tequila effect", the Russian crisis and the "Asian contagion." Latin America was hard hit from the beginning of 1999 when Brazil was hit with its currency crisis. The Argentinean crisis followed in 2000. It was a bumpy ride. But by the end of the 1990s, the results of applying the "Washington consensus" showed themselves to be generally positive, except in particularly serious cases of currency mismanagement such as Argentina (where Spanish investors sustained major losses.) Privatization and economic deregulation had helped to reduce inflation significantly, to underline the advantages of macroeconomic balance, and to entrench the region's integration in the world market. By and large, Latin America passed the test and the temptations of economic nationalism were resisted. This should solidify and entrench the "openness" of Latin American economies—and the growing integration with Spain to which such openness has led.

BUT THE MOST vital component of the Hispanosphere may be its cultural unity—and its sense of being a part of "the West." Since religion is one of the foundations of culture, it is of no small significance that there are 300 million Catholics in Latin America outside Brazil. Through an evolutionary process starting with the arrival of Columbus and the spread of the Spanish empire and Catholic apostolate, the idea of the West has remained a fixture in Latin American thought. It has always resisted challenges from the philosophies of civilizational singularity (what is called in Latin America "indigeneity") and Third-Worldism that—beginning with Frantz Fanon—have helped to legitimize violence and terrorism. Even during the most violent and ideologically confused times, this traditional idea of the West held sway in Latin American thought by virtue of its Spanish roots.

Much more recent—though not less significant—is the identification of the

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

West with the values of the "open society": reformism rather than revolution, a preference for society over the state, a free market versus a planned economy, citizenship as opposed to ethnicity, and civil authority versus military power. These are ideas that are very familiar to the heirs of the Anglophone civilization from Britain to Australia. Hence, this new and broader idea of the West links Latin America to North America and the Anglophone world as much as to Spain. In more ill-fated times for freedom, Octavio Paz published *Tiempo nublado* (1983), repeating that the most destructive phenomenon of the 20th century was totalitarianism and that only the West, with North American leadership, could recognize and challenge this. In those same years, alas, most of those who passed for the Latin American intelligentsia opted for a model of separatism and for violence as a sort of ideological exorcism.

Yet the fall of the Berlin Wall changed all that. As the great Venezuelan writer Arturo Uslar Pietri observed, one of its effects was the undermining of all the theoretical systems that had striven to construct an "existential community" of a Third World uniting Latin America with Africa and parts of Asia. Except in the eruptions of such provincial volcanoes as Chiapas in Mexico, the Pleistocene permanence of Castro in Cuba and the radical populism of Hugo Chávez in Venezuela, these utopian perversions have been largely abandoned. The passing of the future economic elite of Latin America through North American universities and the gradual drying up of ideological pollution from Paris, have together produced a recognition of realities. Even the old Brazilian Leftist Ignacio Lula de Silva has compromised with his own ideological origins and come closer to political realism as president.

The main surviving obstacle to a deeply rooted civil society is an intelligentsia that seems not to have noticed the fall of the Berlin Wall and the near-universal acceptance of free markets over state inertia as the best means to economic progress. But even this obstacle is crumbling with the passage of time and generations. One clear and significant indication of Latin America's recognition of the truth of Paz's argument and of the continent's rejection of Castro's long short-cut to progress is the democratic clause that links the member states of Mercosur.

If the emergence of a Hispanosphere today is feasible, it is because, looking back, there is no period in the history of Latin America that shows such economic, social or political potential as that of today. This optimistic prospect not only strengthens the Hispanosphere but also brings the two great Atlantic civilizations, Hispanic and Anglophone, closer together in political thought, economic theory and even cultural sympathy than at any time since Columbus discovered the New World. As the Chilean sociologist Claudio Veliz has argued in *The New Age of the Gothic Fox*, the cultural interpenetration of the English- and Spanish-speaking worlds is growing rapidly, even as each of them intensifies its own cultural affinities.

Forward to the Past?

FOR SOME, proposing to remodel Atlanticism is not only awkward but somewhat obsolete. But something new has to arise from the slow fragmentation of that old alliance that won the Cold War. If it is not to be two hostile superstates confronting each other across the pond, then the future of NATO requires new energy and the intellectual tools from an updated Atlantic culture. Aznar's reversal of foreign policy pointed ultimately towards a broadening of the Atlantic Alliance by gradually drawing the Latin American nations into it in a way that did not signify their sub-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ordination to the "Yanquis." It was rooted not only in Spanish *raison d'état*, but also in growing economic integration and in a cultural transnationalism made possible by new communications. And it promised to make Atlanticism palatable to the European Union by making it more than a synonym for "the Anglo-Saxons."

There is now sufficient evidence to establish that the new socialist government of Spain will neither continue with the Atlanticist approach employed by Aznar, nor be a good friend to Washington, let alone look for an equidistant policy between Washington and Brussels. From Spain, the horizon of the Hispanosphere is shrinking. It will continue to develop and grow spontaneously through trade, commerce, investment, cultural exchanges, family links, increased communications, diasporas and all the other expressions of market economics and civil society. Politically, however, it will be becalmed—an idea whose time has either gone or not yet truly arrived.

In Latin America, Zapatero's game of political alliances will pivot on different axes, protected by the winds favorable to a Left that has manifestly lost any sense of historical possibilities. Rejecting Atlanticist values and, even more so, the Bush Administration, Spain's new government will simply not see the potential for Hispanic consolidation and Atlantic convergence that the resurgence of liberal values within the Hispanic world offers. Its most likely course will be to drift back to the network of interested ambiguities that go to make up the Franco-German axis and to become bogged down in the redistribution of power within the European Union—even as the EU itself, with Al-Qaeda on its doorstep, gets still more entangled in the confusion of national referenda on a constitutional treaty of doubtful necessity. A great opportunity is being lost. It is as if Zapatero believes that Columbus was less a great man than a great mistake. □

The Sherman Doctrine

I would . . . assert the broad doctrine . . . [that] we will do it in our own time and in our own way; that it makes no difference whether it be in one year, or two, or ten, or twenty; that we will remove and destroy every obstacle, if need be take every life, every acre of land, every particle of property, every thing that to us seems proper; *that we will not cease till the end is attained; that all who do not aid us are enemies*, and that we will not account to them for our acts.

—William Tecumseh Sherman, September 17, 1863

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Reorienting Transatlantic Defense

Rep. Doug Bereuter & John Lis

THE FUTURE of NATO has been a subject of intense debate, including in the two most recent issues of *The National Interest*. In the Winter 2003/04 issue, E. Wayne Merry unveiled a picture of an Atlantic Alliance that is casting about in search of a mission, having outlived its usefulness with the demise of its original adversary. Indeed, he argued that NATO continues to keep Europe in a state of dependence, frustrating the rise of a European Union that can act as an equal partner to the United States. Yet even some of NATO's defenders—such as John Hulsman, writing in the Spring 2004 issue—view NATO primarily as a useful toolbox from which the United States can draw as it undertakes military adventures far from Europe's shores, cherry-picking allies on a case-by-case basis.[1]

Yet these visions of the alliance are at odds with the view of those who work on transatlantic security policy on a daily basis. The reality is that NATO is not a Cold War institution in search of a mission to keep itself alive, but remains an indispensable tool for the democracies of the Euro-Atlantic region to ensure their security against common threats.

For a few heady years after the collapse of the Soviet Union, it appeared that the long-held dream of a Europe at peace had become a reality. The newly freed nations of central and eastern Europe aligned themselves definitively with the West, and even Russia developed a peaceful, non-adversarial relationship with its former rivals. Today, there is no risk of an invasion of western Europe, and it is tempting to conclude that a united Europe is now secure. However, the terrorist bombings in Madrid on March 11 horribly demonstrated the error of that belief. Europe still faces threats to its territory and to its citizens from international terrorism, weapons of mass destruction, states that sponsor terrorism and proliferate WMD, and the conjunction of these challenges: the horrifying prospect of these states providing WMD to terrorist groups. These are the same threats confronting North America, and the defense of our two continents remains indivisible.

Rep. Doug Bereuter (R-NE) is chairman of the Subcommittee on Europe of the House International Relations Committee and president of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly. John Lis is senior policy adviser for transatlantic relations for the committee and former director of the Assembly's Defense and Security Committee in Brussels.

[1] See Merry "Therapy's End" (Winter 2003/04) and Hulsman's contribution to "Can NATO Survive Europe", (Spring 2004).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

NATO's Three Ongoing Missions

WHEN THINKING about NATO's primary purpose, many commentators fall into a geographic trap. Because NATO was founded to defend against the Soviet threat that was directed at Western Europe, it follows for some that NATO exists for the defense of this specific geographic area.

Instead, it is more useful to view NATO in functional terms, with three main and currently ongoing missions. First and foremost, the Alliance enables its members to provide collectively for the defense of their states against external threats, a role it has played for 55 years. Its second mission consists of peace-enforcement operations. The Alliance assumed this function nine years ago, when it became clear that only NATO (and not the United Nations, the OSCE or any other international organization) could actually enforce the peace agreement ending the war in Bosnia-Hercegovina. The third mission is political: maintaining and enhancing the partnerships that NATO has developed since the end of the Cold War with non-members in Europe and Eurasia. These partnerships have promoted cooperation and permitted the Alliance to enlarge the Euro-Atlantic zone of stability beyond the core of its member-states.

No one would ever have predicted that NATO's first collective-defense mission—more than five decades after the Alliance was created and ten years after the collapse of the Soviet Union—would be in response to an attack on the United States. But it is important to remember that collective defense applies not only to the European allies, but to the United States and Canada as well. After the September 11 attacks, the North Atlantic Council, comprised of representatives of the then-19 member countries, proclaimed that if those attacks were "directed from abroad", they would be covered by Article 5 of the Washington Treaty, NATO's collective defense guarantee. The Council declared:

> The commitment to collective self-defense embodied in the Washington Treaty was first entered into in circumstances very different from those that exist now, but it remains no less valid and no less essential today, in a world subject to the scourge of international terrorism.

The Alliance itself sent AWACS aircraft to patrol the skies over the United States, and several countries sent special operations forces to Afghanistan to fight alongside U.S. troops in Operation Enduring Freedom. Since September 11, Al-Qaeda and its affiliates have again struck against NATO members in Istanbul and Madrid, as well as targeting the citizens of NATO states elsewhere in the world. The Soviet threat may have vanished, but not NATO's reason for existence. Recognizing this fact, NATO's Strategic Concept notes that

> Alliance security interests can be affected by other risks of a wider nature, including acts of terrorism, sabotage and organized crime, and by the disruption of the flow of vital resources.

One cannot predict where NATO will need to act in the future, which is all the more reason to ensure that it is able to operate wherever needed. The War on Terror is a multi-faceted struggle, but ongoing operations in Afghanistan show that there is an important military component.

The decision by NATO to take command of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), which is helping to stabilize the region around Kabul, is an example of NATO's growing second mission: peace enforcement operations. NATO first assumed this role in 1995,

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

when the first military action in NATO history was carried out, not to defend a member state but to guarantee the Dayton Peace Accords that halted the civil war in Bosnia. Since then, NATO has also undertaken peace enforcement missions in Kosovo and in Macedonia. These missions demonstrated that NATO is the only international organization with the experience, organization, military capabilities and robust rules of engagement needed to compel adversaries to accept, or at least conform to, a peace agreement.

NATO's third mission—its partnerships with non-member nations in Europe and the former Soviet Union—has enabled the Alliance to bring ten new members into the fold. The decade-old Partnership for Peace (PfP) program facilitated political and military cooperation with the nations of central and eastern Europe and Eurasia and helped former Soviet-bloc countries begin needed political and military reforms. By holding out the promise of eventual membership, PfP kept NATO's door open and assisted aspirant nations in meeting the criteria for membership. Now, with most central and eastern European candidate countries having joined NATO, the geographic focus of PfP must move to Ukraine, the Caucasus and Central Asia. At the same time, its functional emphasis will shift in part from preparing countries for NATO membership to engaging with countries that may never join the Alliance but which may become key security partners. The success of PfP in extending a zone of security to the east also needs to be replicated to the south, as recent events have underscored the importance of the non-European countries of the Mediterranean as well as those of the Persian Gulf to the security of NATO members. Therefore, the Alliance should enhance and expand its Mediterranean Dialogue. It currently brings seven nations—Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Mauritania, Morocco and Tunisia—together with the NATO nations to discuss regional security issues such as civil emergency planning, crisis management, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and terrorism.

Capabilities, Capabilities, Capabilities

WHILE NATO remains committed to collective defense, many of its members have been slow to develop the forces needed to carry out the pledges that they have made to defend one another. Former NATO Secretary General Lord Robertson often said: "When I took up my post as Secretary General, I said that I had three priorities: capabilities, capabilities, capabilities." Soon afterward, he noted that this became a mantra "which all of you will have heard—and some of you, in government, may have politely ignored."

In order to fulfill their responsibility for carrying out collective defense, NATO members must continue to transform their forces to address today's threats. No longer does NATO need heavy armored units with large numbers of conscripts arrayed in fixed sectors along the inter-German border. What is required today is a number of highly mobile professional units that can deploy quickly where they are needed in order to apply effective force to accomplish their mission. Allied countries have no shortage of military personnel, but NATO does lack units that can actually be used for the missions the Alliance now needs to conduct.

In November 2003 Robertson used his final address to the NATO Parliamentary Assembly to cite the need "to increase substantially the usability of European armed forces." Robertson noted that the 18 allies outside of the United States have 1.4 million active duty troops, plus another 1 million reserves. He said,

> Yet with only 55,000 soldiers currently deployed on multinational missions, most of your countries plead that they are over-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

stretched and can do no more. That is quite simply unacceptable.

The first step toward increasing the usability of European forces has been the creation of the NATO Response Force (NRF). This force has two tasks. First, the NRF is a vehicle to enable European and Canadian allies to join with the United States in developing forces that can rapidly deploy wherever they are needed and apply decisive power in combat or in less demanding missions. Second, the NRF can be an effective means to drive force transformation throughout the Alliance. Before national units are chosen to take part in the NRF, they will have to meet the tough standards of this elite NATO force. Then, when they train with other NRF units, they will be exposed to cutting-edge capabilities and procedures that they will take home and share with their nation's armed forces, serving as a catalyst for change.

The NRF was set up in October 2003 as a small "prototype" intended to define requirements and to test procedures, doctrines and concepts. By October 2004 the NRF will have an "initial operational capability" that will allow it to carry out smaller-scale missions. It is to reach "full operational capability" by October 2006. At that time, it will consist of one enhanced combat brigade, roughly 5,000 ground troops. Maritime, air, command and support elements will bring the total strength to around 20,000 personnel. Some of those units will be kept at "very high readiness", able to deploy within five days, with the rest of the force deployed within thirty days.

Unfortunately, the NRF has been plagued by the typical initial misunderstandings over what it is and what it is not, particularly by Europeans who fear that it is an American-led vehicle to undermine the European Union's Rapid Reaction Force (RRF). It is important to put to rest this fallacy, which led one leading European defense analyst to conclude that "the creation of an NRF potentially holds devastating consequences for the further development of European capabilities" and "could effectively undermine the EU's RRF. . . ."[2]

In reality, the NRF is not designed to compete with, but rather to promote the further development of European capabilities. The NRF is designed for the full spectrum of missions, including combat operations; the RRF, to undertake the EU's Petersberg tasks, which focus on crisis management and humanitarian operations. Nor is there any danger that the NRF would supplant the much larger RRF. The RRF is to facilitate the large-scale deployment of European forces to deal with crises and is expected to have a sixty-day deployment capability and to be comprised of roughly 15 small brigades, or 60,000 ground troops, with additional air and maritime components.

IF THE NRF is to succeed, the NATO allies must develop the capabilities that are necessary for effective combat operations. Unfortunately, NATO's ability to compel its members' actions has always been limited. While NATO does work with each member to set force goals, it is the responsibility of each state to fulfill those pledges. Often, a defense ministry's good-faith promise to the Alliance is not fulfilled because that country's defense budget request is later cut by the finance ministry in order to fund other government programs. A further difficulty arises because the NATO force goals are classified and not open to public scrutiny. In most countries, members of parliament—even those serving in the NATO Parliamentary Assembly—do not have either the required clearances or access

[2]Rob de Wijk, "European Military Reform for a Global Partnership", *The Washington Quarterly* (Winter 2003/04), p. 207.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

through oversight; thus, they are often unaware of their government's pledges to NATO, and they are unable to question whether defense budgets adequately fund their force goals and whether progress toward these goals is sufficient. While NATO force goals do contain some sensitive information and cannot be completely declassified, member states should strive to increase the transparency of the force planning process to the extent possible and to extend the required clearances to members of the parliaments responsible for defense oversight.

To ensure that NATO has the critical capabilities that it needs, its national leaders agreed in 2002 to the Prague Capabilities Commitment (PCC). This initiative assigned lead nations for multinational working groups to rectify shortfalls in key areas like air-to-air refueling, strategic lift and precision-guided munitions. Despite some progress over the past year, the report card on this initiative continues to be mixed. Governments must fully fund the pledges that they have made under the PCC because a failure on this point will ensure that the PCC ends up on the trash heap with previous NATO capabilities initiatives.

More fundamentally, European forces must be streamlined to generate more deployable units. While several states, notably Britain and France, have an expeditionary capability, large numbers of European soldiers cannot be deployed on actual military missions. Given the absence of a massive land-invasion threat, this leaves them with little to contribute in the field to the Alliance. Reducing personnel levels in European militaries can free up money to develop more agile, more capable forces. For example, Germany has announced plans to reduce the size of the Bundeswehr from 285,000 to 250,000 personnel; Defense Minister Peter Struck said in mid-January 2004 that these cuts "will enable us to markedly reduce the amount of personnel costs in favour of new investments." While the Bundeswehr today is strained by deploying 10,000 troops abroad, plans call for 105,000 troops to be available for intervention or stabilization operations.

WHILE EUROPEAN armed forces must become more efficient, the two North American allies can also take steps to increase their defense cooperation. Since 1958 the air defense of North America has been a joint effort through the North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD), but maritime and land defenses have remained separate. The inauguration of U.S. Northern Command in 2002 provided an opportunity for closer defense integration between the United States and Canada. However, Canada declined an offer to include maritime and land defense in NORAD at that time. Instead, the two countries agreed to establish a Binational Planning Group (BPG), headed by the Canadian deputy commander of NORAD, to improve bilateral cooperation to defend against common maritime threats and to respond to land-based attacks or natural disasters.

The new Canadian government of Prime Minister Paul Martin has demonstrated greater receptivity to closer defense cooperation with the United States. Already, Canada is negotiating terms for participation in the U.S. missile defense program, which could be headquartered at NORAD. Other options for closer cooperation include a "naval NORAD" that would integrate the maritime defense of North America; in this area, the BPG already has developed a binational maritime awareness and warning capability. Some Canadian opponents of greater integration argue that naval and land defense are different from air defense because the response times are greater, which allows Canada to maintain exclusive control of its naval and land forces. Proponents of including naval and land cooperation in NORAD argue that

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

weapons like sea-launched missiles mean that naval defense is subject to the same time pressures as air defense. Similarly, they argue that a terrorist attack on land could come without warning.

The conventional wisdom is that the Martin government is unlikely to move forward in this area before federal elections, which could come as late as autumn 2004. If the victorious party appears amenable, then American officials should again offer closer defense ties to Canada in order to better protect both North American allies on land, sea and air.

An Organizational Division of Labor

THERE ARE too many folks in the corridors of the EU institutions who view defense as just another area for demonstrating, as one European commissioner put it, "a deeper commitment to our common political project." Further reflecting this attitude, he added,

> I sincerely believe that defense issues . . . are crucial for the Union's future. The future and credibility of the European body politic will hinge on the decisions which we will take on them.[3]

However, defense is different from many other political issues. As we saw a decade ago in Bosnia, when mistakes are made or when there is a failure to act, people die. When mistakes are made in defending your own territory, it is your own people who die. For those EU "true believers", however, defense policy is no different from agricultural policy or trade policy. Their main concern is, as they would say, "building Europe"—not the vital responsibility to protect European citizens.

In line with this thinking, Finnish General Gustav Hagglund, then-chairman of the EU Military Committee, proposed in January of this year a European security arrangement in which "The American and European pillars would be responsible for their respective territorial defenses . . . ." This ill-conceived idea would undermine the fundamental commitment that lies at the heart of the North Atlantic Alliance and would render the citizens of all the Alliance's member states less secure. Shocking as it seems, the proposal was not inconsistent with a provision in the proposed EU Constitution to have the European Union take on a mutual defense role that duplicates the very reason for NATO's creation and its primary mission. If Europe creates a competitor to NATO, it will risk undermining the rationale for the Alliance, and it will risk undermining the support of the governments and people of the United States and Canada for participating in NATO.

Rather than trying to create a mutual defense commitment, the EU should assume primary responsibility for what could be characterized as intra-European crisis management; that is, for undertaking military operations in Europe when the security of the continent is threatened by domestic instability or civil war. In other words, there should be an organizational division of labor: While NATO deals with external threats to Europe's security, the EU should take the lead in keeping the peace within Europe.

THE BALKAN conflicts, of course, are the best example of such crises that need to be addressed in a timely and forceful fashion. Such an effective peacekeeping capability will complement other EU competencies,

[3]Michel Barnier, Presentation of the Final Report of the Working Group "Defense", European Convention, Brussels, December 20, 2002. Barnier, who chaired the group while serving as commissioner for regional policy and institutional reform, is now foreign minister of France. See also the speech by Romano Prodi, President of the European Commission, to the European Parliament, March 26, 2003.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

such as its work to build civil institutions, its economic and infrastructure assistance, and its deployable pool of civilian police officers. Included in this responsibility would be a commitment among the EU nations to assist one another in responding to terrorist attacks and natural or man-made disasters, as outlined in the "solidarity clause" of the draft constitution.[4]

Furthermore, the EU should assume command of the peacekeeping missions in Bosnia—perhaps at the beginning of 2005—and later in Kosovo. In fact, NATO leaders are expected to agree at Istanbul to end the Stabilization Force mission in Bosnia at the end of this year and turn over responsibility to the EU. The combination of improving EU capabilities and an improving security situation in Bosnia has created a situation in which NATO can withdraw without a large risk of an immediate return to violence. NATO should retain a small office in Sarajevo to work with the newly unified Bosnian military and to help track down indicted war criminals. In addition, the Alliance will maintain an "over the horizon" reinforcement capability in case the security environment should deteriorate.

To the south, Kosovo is a much more difficult case because it remains an integral part of Serbia, despite the desire of its ethnic Albanian majority for independence. The deplorable outbreak of ethnic violence in March 2004, much of it apparently orchestrated by ethnic-Albanian elements, underscored the instability in Kosovo. Therefore, NATO should retain command of the Kosovo Force (KFOR), at least until the final status of the entity is resolved. The acceptance of the decision on final status and its implementation could be a difficult and volatile process. Once that danger passes, the EU should succeed KFOR. Even before that happens, the EU should actively guide the development of the entity's institutions in keeping with European standards, with an eye toward the possibility of Kosovo's eventual membership in the EU.

The EU also aspires to play a role in operations outside of Europe, as demonstrated by the operation in 2003 in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. The EU should be encouraged to undertake crisis management and humanitarian tasks outside of Europe, provided that it has the necessary capabilities. Having the EU avoid duplicating NATO's collective defense function in no way limits the geographic scope of EU operation. In fact, there are regions like Africa where European interests and historical relationships may lead to an EU operation. Given that 19 of the 26 NATO members are also EU members, the Berlin Plus agreements that are meant to facilitate NATO-EU military relations should be scrupulously followed. These seven agreements make NATO assets and capabilities, including operational planning, available to the EU, and they facilitate smooth coordination between NATO and EU missions. This allows two organizations to avoid conflicting calls on the same national assets.

That overlap in membership between the two organizations also means that the EU can take advantage of the interoperability that NATO has engendered among its member countries. By standardizing communication and doctrine among its 26 member states and by integrating officers from those nations in headquarters with a single operational language, NATO facilitates multinational operations. That cooperation has been extended to partner nations through the PfP and through on-the-ground collaboration in Bosnia and Kosovo.

[4]The solidarity cause (Article 42) should not be confused with the mutual defense clause (Article 40(7)) of the draft constitution.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Retooling NATO Partnerships

WHEN NATO invited the seven newest members to join at the 2002 Prague Summit, it recognized that the emphasis of its PfP program would have to shift from helping candidate countries become members to cooperation between the Alliance and states that may never formally join the Alliance but may become close partners. The Alliance already has offered enhancements to PfP that range from improvements in interoperability and greater consultations with the twenty partner nations to individualized assistance with defense reforms. Russia is a special case, and the Alliance has already developed the NATO-Russia Council as a unique institution for a closer relationship.

At a minimum, NATO should engage in technical military cooperation with all nations of Europe and Eurasia which are at present members of the OSCE. Afghanistan should be included in the existing PfP programs, given its geographic proximity and cultural ties to the Central Asian members of PfP.

Several PfP nations are authoritarian dictatorships that are no closer to democracy than they were under Soviet rule. NATO must not lend such countries political legitimacy, but the realities of the international security environment mean that defense cooperation may advance the security of both Alliance members and a given partner nation. The most obvious example is Uzbekistan, a detestable dictatorship that nonetheless has offered invaluable assistance with military operations in Afghanistan. America and its allies should do nothing to sustain the oppressive rule of President Islam Karimov, but they should continue cooperation with Uzbekistan in counter-terrorism and at the Karshi-Khanabad Air Base. To the extent that NATO can enhance its ability to work with such countries through PfP, it should do so. It could also create benefits in the longer term, by exposing local officials to concepts like democratic control of the armed forces.

Beyond that, PfP assists nations that are moving toward democracy to reach Western norms, particularly in transforming their militaries from instruments of internal repression to guarantors of external security. Most notably, the Planning and Review Process enables the Alliance to help partners develop armed forces that can work alongside NATO forces. Some partners might never apply for NATO membership, but the Alliance nevertheless can assist them in developing the structures that are needed to ensure democratic civilian control over armed forces that are efficient, effective, and able to contribute to regional security alongside NATO forces.

Three aspirant countries—Albania, Croatia and Macedonia—currently remain in NATO's Membership Action Plan, the process through which the Alliance helps countries prepare for full membership. At the Istanbul Summit this June, NATO leaders should act on the recommendation of the House of Representatives (H.Res. 558) and agree to hold a summit no later than 2007 to consider their applications and decide at that time whether they and perhaps others should be invited to begin accession negotiations. Already, these nations are acting as allies, with all three contributing to NATO's ISAF operation, and Albania and Macedonia contributing troops to coalition forces in Iraq. Admitting these countries into NATO should cement their transformation from crisis zones to full membership in the Alliance's zone of stability.

IN ADDITION, NATO's Mediterranean Dialogue should be both enhanced and enlarged. Given today's security threats, deeper cooperation with the region is imperative. A new partnership that incorporates elements of PfP would enable cooperation in counter-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

terrorism operations and could allow the Alliance to work with regional actors to increase their ability to work alongside NATO. It could assist them in defense planning and reforms, along the lines outlined above, and facilitate their transition to more representative forms of government. Moreover, it could help promote understanding and perhaps build confidence between Israel and some of the more moderate countries in the region with regard to security concerns.

Likewise, the NATO Parliamentary Assembly's Mediterranean Special Group should intensify its activities, particularly in assisting the parliaments of the region develop effective defense oversight. The Assembly should also consider extending associate status, heretofore reserved for PfP nations, to the members of this new partnership. This would allow their parliaments to gain a deeper understanding of the role of an independent legislature in a democracy and to build ties to their counterparts across the Mediterranean.

At the same time, this new partnership should be broadened, for example, to the states of the Gulf Cooperation Council (Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates). These six U.S. allies have experience working cooperatively on defense matters. A broader partnership with the Mediterranean Dialogue countries could facilitate this defense cooperation under a NATO umbrella. A democratic, sovereign Iraq should also be offered membership in this partnership, which would enable the NATO nations to work directly with nations of the Middle East on security issues of mutual interest.

The Future of Cooperation

SECRETARY of State Colin Powell recently wrote, "NATO is transforming itself from an Alliance whose main task was the defense of common territory to an Alliance whose main task is the defense of common principles."[5] No longer are NATO troops stationed along the Fulda Gap, prepared to halt a Soviet invasion of Western Europe. The values that set the West apart have been embraced by former adversaries. Many of those states have become a part of NATO, and they have pledged their willingness to fight for our collective freedom. They recognize that there are those who seek to destroy democracies not because of what they may do, but because of what they are.

Collective defense has taken on a different manifestation, but at its heart, the principle remains the same: 26 democracies, standing together to defend one another against those who seek to do us harm. This mission requires new capabilities and new doctrines, but the same depth of commitment. Defending freedom requires more than military hardware; it requires keeping NATO's door open to help bring freedom's blessings to lands that have not known them. We must ensure security beyond our borders, and we must work alongside partners, some of whom may someday embrace our principles and become our allies.

Those who declare that NATO should be euthanized either misunderstand how the Alliance has transformed itself to confront today's security threats or value institutional development above the safety of their citizens. Maintaining NATO's primacy in transatlantic security is not a barrier to European integration. Rather, it is essential for the security of Europe and North America. No one nation alone can defend against today's primary security threats: global terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and the states that support them. The United States needs allies in this effort, and NATO must remain the cornerstone of our common defense. □

[5]Colin L. Powell, "Flexible and Unbreakable", *Frankfurter Allgemaine Zeitung*, March 31, 2004.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

A Strategic Defense Initiative

Building A Better Shield

Carnes Lord

THE TERRORIST attacks on New York and Washington on September 11, 2001, were both good and bad news for the Bush Administration's early commitment to the near-term deployment of defenses against ballistic missiles. The good news was that the vulnerability of the American homeland to devastating attack was demonstrated to be real, not merely a figment of the overactive imagination of Reagan-era strategists. The bad news, on the other hand, was that the method of attack utilized by the terrorists involved neither ballistic missiles nor nuclear weapons. Al-Qaeda's largely unanticipated concept—the use of fuel-laden commercial airliners in suicide missions to produce enhanced conventional explosive effects—inflicted less damage than might be anticipated from most so-called weapons of mass destruction, but it was well suited to a technically constrained and low-budget terrorist organization.

Critics of ballistic missile defense (BMD) were quick to seize on 9/11 as proof that the real threats of the future were likely to come not from intercontinental-range missiles with a recognizable "return address", but rather from a variety of possible weapons or devices clandestinely inserted into the United States, or even from aircraft or cruise missiles originating within the country or not far from its borders.[1] They argued that states capable of attacking the United States with long-range ballistic missiles will continue to be deterred from such a step by America's overwhelming retaliatory capabilities. And missile defense is technically problematic and enormously expensive compared to other pressing defense needs.

But the debate over missile defense, nuclear strategy, and arms control ignited some twenty years ago by Ronald Reagan's Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) and sustained since then in well-worn paths is now winding down. The president's announced commitment at the end of last year to deployment of a limited BMD capability beginning in 2004 has made clear to all concerned that BMD in some form is shortly to become a reality. And yet bad habits contracted in the course of that debate continue to color much commentary on this

Carnes Lord is currently professor of strategy in the Strategic Research Department of the Center for Naval Warfare Studies, U.S. Naval War College. He has held a number of positions in the U.S. government, including assistant to the vice president for national security affairs (1989–91).

[1] See, for example, Michael O'Hanlon, "Cruise Control: A Case for Missile Defense", *The National Interest* (Spring 2002).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

subject.[2] Perhaps the fundamental point is that missile defense must not be narrowly viewed in technical or purely military terms. The various technical problems and limitations of the BMD systems that the United States has had under development over the last two decades have figured prominently in the critics' case. While these challenges should not be underestimated, one would be foolish to bet against American technological ingenuity in the military realm, so spectacularly demonstrated in our recent demolition of Saddam Hussein's armed forces and regime; this is even more true now that the political constraints that hobbled BMD development in past years have been removed by American withdrawal from the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty of 1972. Nor can the issue be reduced to a calculus of exchange ratios of the kind that so often dominated analyses of hypothetical nuclear conflict in the Cold War, though there are certainly abundant operational and tactical issues concerning BMD that remain to be addressed. Rather, missile defense needs to be analyzed as a strategic capability that is part of the larger tool kit of American power, one with an important psychological and political dimension that can generate benefits but also holds potential risks. Above all, missile defense must be considered not merely in relation to adversaries but as an instrument for reinvigorating existing alliances and forging new ones—indeed, as a central component of the "new world order" that is now being shaped by American global activism in the war on terror.

Getting Serious

IN DECEMBER 2001 the Bush Administration took a long-anticipated step away from the Cold War nuclear arms control regime by providing notice to Russia that the United States intended to withdraw from the venerable ABM Treaty. Critics of the Administration's commitment to BMD had predicted it would cause a diplomatic uproar, but Russian reactions were surprisingly muted, and previously vociferous European critics were as a result largely silenced. Indeed, the Russians began to talk increasingly of developing or enhancing their own defenses against rogue-state missiles, perhaps in cooperation with the Europeans or with the United States itself. Immediately following the treaty's expiration, the United States began aggressive testing of missile defense radars and interceptors in ways that would not have been permitted under the treaty regime. By the end of the year, enough progress had been made in various BMD technologies that the president felt confident in taking the next step, formal commitment to the deployment of a rudimentary BMD capability beginning in 2004.

In a statement released by the White House on December 17, 2002, the president emphasized the importance of missile defenses in the new strategic environment, where hostile states or terrorist groups not subject to the traditional calculus of deterrence can threaten the United States with catastrophic destruction. He also made clear that the commitment to develop viable BMD systems was not a narrow commitment to the integrity of the American homeland, but extended as well to American military forces deployed abroad and—not least—to the nation's friends and allies, and he declared obsolete the distinction between "national" and "theater" defense systems that the

[2]Noteworthy recent exceptions are James M. Lindsay and Michael E. O'Hanlon, *Defending America: The Case for Limited National Missile Defense* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2001;, and Anthony H. Cordesman, *Strategic Threats and National Missile Defenses: Defending the U.S. Homeland* (Westport, CT.: Praeger, 2002).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

United States had previously observed in the context of the ABM treaty. He also called on other nations to join the United States in a common effort to develop advanced technologies for missile defense.[3]

The detailed plan released by the Pentagon in conjunction with the president's statement distinguished initial capabilities from additional measures to be taken by the end of this decade. Initial capabilities were said to include up to twenty ground-based interceptors designed to destroy intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) in the mid-course phase of flight, with 16 of them to be based in Fort Greely, Alaska, and four at Vandenberg Air Force Base in California; up to twenty interceptor missiles based on U.S. Navy Aegis cruisers and destroyers with a capability to counter ballistic missiles in the boost or ascent phase; air-transportable PAC-3 (advanced Patriot) systems geared to counter shorter-range ballistic missiles in the terminal phase of their flight; and upgrades to various sensors, including early warning radars located in the United Kingdom and Greenland. Additional measures to be pursued after 2005 were said to include additional ground- and sea-based interceptors; the Theater High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) interceptor geared to shorter-range missiles; the Airborne Laser, a Boeing 747 equipped with a high-energy chemical laser capable of destroying missiles in their boost phase from hundreds of miles away (seven of these aircraft are slated for eventual procurement); enhanced radars and other sensor capabilities; and the development and testing of space-based defenses, including kinetic-energy interceptors. This program built on the BMD development effort of the Clinton years, but went beyond it in several ways, notably in its new emphasis on sea- and space-based systems, previously proscribed by the ABM Treaty.

Defense Department officials have emphasized that it is too early to predict the exact mix of capabilities to be deployed after 2005, but the intent is to create a multi-layered missile defense system capable of providing protection against the full range of potential "limited" ballistic missile attacks, whether on the homeland or on American forces or allies abroad. In this respect, the president's program differs dramatically from the original SDI concept, which was directed to countering a massive Soviet nuclear attack. It is not designed to thwart an attack by contemporary Russia, with its much reduced but still very large strategic missile inventory. Nevertheless, robust BMD capabilities, actual or prospective, will necessarily have implications for America's strategic relationship with Russia and other current nuclear powers, as well as for international security more broadly. We will return to these important issues in a moment. First, though, it may be useful to restate the case for a limited American BMD system in our current security environment.

Why We Need It

FORMER Director of Central Intelligence George Tenet recently warned of the growing appetite of second-tier states for nuclear weapons and the weakening of international controls on them.[4] Most dramatically, North Korea's break with the international non-proliferation regime in January 2003 and its preparations for resuming plutonium production in early March of that year seemed to make inevitable—barring unilateral military

[3]This was subsequently formalized as National Security Presidential Directive 23, "National Policy on Ballistic Missile Defense", May 20, 2003.

[4]Walter Pincus, "CIA Head Predicts Nuclear Race", *Washington Post*, February 12, 2003.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

action by the United States, which seems highly unlikely at the present time—Pyongyang's emergence in the very near future as the classic "rogue state" possessed of nuclear-armed, long-range ballistic missiles with at least some capability to threaten the continental United States. Iran also appears determined to acquire weapons of mass destruction (WMD), in particular nuclear weapons, and the United States and its allies have become increasingly alarmed about the scale of the clandestine nuclear program it is pursuing in contravention of international safeguards.

In addition, only recently has it become clear to what extent the nuclear programs of North Korea, Iran and also Libya benefited from the technical assistance they received over many years from the putative renegade Pakistani scientist A. Q. Khan, the founder of Pakistan's own long-standing nuclear program. There is also some evidence that the Pakistanis may have worked out a secret agreement with Saudi Arabia to share nuclear weapons technology or missile systems.[5]

There is also the danger that Pakistan's existing nuclear arsenal could fall into the hands of Islamic radicals should that country undergo a revolution or coup, a scenario that is far from outlandish given the internal turmoil created by the government's cooperation with the United States. The acquisition of such capabilities by a revolutionary Islamist regime would be most worrisome for the United States, especially given Al-Qaeda's efforts to obtain such weaponry on its own. And let us not forget the continuing danger of leakage of nuclear weapons, materials and expertise to rogue states and terrorists from Russia and other parts of the former Soviet Union.

Many continue to find comfort in the fact that no rogue states or entities currently possess ballistic missiles of true intercontinental range, even though North Korea is fast approaching such a capability. Yet shorter range missiles could be equally devastating if fired close to the United States. This is, after all, the lesson of the October 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis. Latin America and the Caribbean remain strategically important. The extensive presence in Panama today of a Chinese corporation with links to the People's Liberation Army has attracted little notice, but should at least raise some eyebrows in this context.[6] Hizballah has for some time maintained a significant presence in the hemisphere.[7] Finally, there is the scenario of shorter-range ballistic missiles launched against the United States from nondescript commercial vessels near its shores. We would be defenseless against such an attack.[8]

Yet the greatest immediate threat to American interests posed by ballistic missiles is in fact not to our homeland, but to American forces and friends overseas. In recognition of this fact, as noted earlier,

---

[5]Arnaud de Borchgrave, "Pakistan, Saudi Arabia in Secret Nuke Pact", *Washington Times*, October 22, 2003; Yossef Bodansky and Gregory R. Copley, "Pakistan Agrees to Station Nuclear Weapons, Long-Range Missiles in Saudi Arabia; European, Indian Targets Within Range", *Defense and Foreign Affairs Daily*, October 22, 2003. President Bush reportedly raised this issue with President Musharraf of Pakistan during the latter's visit to the United States last summer.

[6]See notably Bill Gertz, *The China Threat* (Washington, DC: Regnery, 2000), Chapter 5.

[7]See, for example, Jeffrey Goldberg's two-part article, "In the Party of God", *New Yorker*, October 21 and 28, 2002.

[8]Al-Qaeda has been estimated to have a "navy" of 15 ships or more (John Mintz, "15 Freighters Believed to be Linked to Al-Qaeda", *Washington Post*, December 31, 2002.). One near-term solution that is now being discussed is the deployment of elements of the Aegis BMD system, or possibly PAC-3 or THAAD, on flat-bed ships in North American waters.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the Administration has formally ceased to draw a distinction between "national" and "theater" missile defense. Defenses against shorter-range, conventionally armed ballistic missiles are an increasingly integral aspect of American overseas power projection capabilities and therefore also of American alliance commitments. By the same token, effective protection of the American homeland against ballistic missile attack, far from encouraging a withdrawal to "Fortress America", can only strengthen the willingness of the American political leadership and general public to take risks on behalf of overseas allies and interests menaced by regional ballistic missile powers.

Two sorts of objections continue to be made to American BMD deployments from the standpoint of what might be called orthodox Cold War-era nuclear strategy. One is that such a step will only stimulate a new arms race either in numbers of offensive missiles or in technical countermeasures that would help them penetrate defenses. The other is that BMD is fundamentally unnecessary because even leaders of rogue states will continue to be deterred from attacking the United States by the threat of U.S. nuclear or conventional retaliation.

The answer to the first objection is that rogue states will have little ability or wherewithal to challenge American defenses, while major powers will not feel sufficiently threatened by the United States to invest large resources in what could well prove a futile competition in any case. It is by no means clear, as critics often assume, that cost considerations will continue to favor offensive over defensive systems—technological developments on the horizon, such as miniature autonomous mid-course interceptors, may well provide a significant cost advantage to the defense. More generally, the Bush Administration's oft-repeated argument that BMD will devalue ballistic missiles and discourage states from expanding their arsenals or acquiring them at all is in fact compelling.

To the second objection, several rejoinders are in order. First, it ignores the possibility of acquisition of ballistic missiles by terrorists lacking a return address and culturally and psychologically resistant to deterrence. Second, it may well overestimate the probability of success of pre-emptive attacks, as well as the likelihood of deterrence failure in the case of a rogue state leader who is actually under attack or has reason to believe an attack is imminent or fears for the demise of his regime. Finally, it ignores the possibility of accidental or unauthorized launch—something that should not be ruled out given the recent history of disastrous accidents in the Russian and Chinese submarine forces. BMD is the strategic equivalent of an insurance policy against unlikely catastrophes.

Costs and Tradeoffs

PERSUASIVE AS this case may be overall, there are still legitimate concerns, especially the costs and tradeoffs. As is the case with many experimental military programs, research and development (R&D) and projected operating costs for ballistic missile defense have tended over the years to outpace initial estimates, sometimes by very large amounts. Current spending for BMD R&D, at around $9 billion per year, is relatively modest by Pentagon standards, but acquiring and operating certain BMD systems will in some cases prove very expensive. Space-based systems raise particular questions, especially considering the technical risks, vulnerabilities, and political baggage associated with them. Just the new space-based infrared radar system for missile warning and tracking (STSS, formerly SBIRS-Low) will require a constellation of more than twenty satellites costing upward of $10 billion.

The costs of any defense systems can

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

only be meaningfully analyzed by comparing the costs of systems performing similar missions or meeting other defense priorities. Ballistic missile defense necessarily competes with homeland security requirements that were scarcely on the national agenda before 9/11. Some of these requirements—defense of ports, for example—respond to threats that are at least as plausible as foreign ballistic missiles and could levy very substantial costs in force structure and operating expenses on the U.S. Navy and Coast Guard in the decades to come. BMD also competes with other forms of so-called active defense that meet plausible threats from cruise missiles, unmanned aerial vehicles, and small aircraft—increasingly potent threats even when armed with conventional explosives, due to the spread of precision-targeting technologies.

BMD has never been especially popular within the U.S. military because it has been seen as a competitor for scarce defense dollars, particularly at the expense of the strategic nuclear forces. Though theater BMD has gradually gained acceptance in military ranks as a critical enabler of American forward presence and attack operations, there is still substantial resistance to committing significant resources to national or homeland BMD.

This brings us to the second area of concern. From the 1980s onward, national missile defense in the United States has been driven by an unhealthy combination of technological and political factors. Without denying the necessity of political leadership here, it has to be recognized that the ideological controversies over BMD and the absence of a stable and vested BMD constituency in the military and in industry have resulted in a history of erratic and politically inspired decision-making. At the same time, and paradoxically, they also led to a certain abdication of strategic direction in favor of bottom-up technological experimentation, in an effort to fly under the radar of intellectual and political controversy and to kick key decisions as far as possible down the road. To his great credit, George W. Bush has been willing to take crucial political decisions concerning the future of BMD. It is hard to quarrel with his decision to begin fielding some capability as soon as possible in spite of technical and programmatic risks, given the sorry history of procrastination in this matter, especially during the Clinton years, as well as the gathering threat. At the same time, it is also difficult not to wonder whether technology remains too much in the driver's seat. There is as yet no clearly articulated strategic framework that would provide a basis for doing the appropriate cost-trade-off analyses and—what is perhaps most important—for reassuring allies and adversaries alike about American intentions in this sensitive and contentious area of international security. Other nations are unlikely to make substantial financial or political commitments to joint technology development with the United States absent a reasonable strategic roadmap.

International Complications

WHILE America's present global dominance will almost certainly rule out classic, Cold-War style arms races, there can be little doubt that Russia and China, as well as other possible adversaries, will explore avenues that offer asymmetric advantages relative to the American defense posture generally. Elements of the Russian military and political elite, for example, view any substantial American BMD effort with foreboding, and are actively seeking to develop ways to counter or neutralize it in order to preserve the viability of their ballistic missiles, which remain the sole effective instrument of Russian global power projection.

Yet, the Russians have already recognized that they have a substantial interest

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

in common with us in discouraging and defeating missile attacks originating in the Middle East—to which they are of course much more directly exposed at present than is the United States. There are interesting possibilities for collaboration with Russia in theater missile defense, and perhaps especially in boost phase systems situated on Russian territory. But we also have to recognize the continuing sensitivity of the Russians to the prospect of a global missile defense capability monopolized by the United States—something that would in their eyes give the United States an unparalleled ability to threaten the security of the Russian state. Accordingly, in the near term we need to explore the possibility of forming a special security relationship with Russia centering on some sort of limited missile defense cooperation, while at the same time demonstrating prudent restraint in the reach of the BMD architecture we decide to develop. This might involve a more or less formal understanding relative to space-based BMD or space-based weaponry in general (on which more in a moment). Over the longer term, when a new generation has taken the reins in that country, the time may arrive when Russian attitudes in these matters are more relaxed.

As for China, the Administration has for various reasons been reluctant to spell out the anticipated impact of the American BMD program on the Chinese strategic missile arsenal. China has been given assurances from time to time by American officials that the program is not directed at that country. It is hardly surprising that the Chinese have had difficulty taking these assurances seriously. Bluntly stated, there is no escaping the fact that a limited American BMD program that is worth anything will be inherently capable of seriously degrading if not simply stopping any attack on the American homeland by Chinese strategic forces now and for some years to come. China currently has some twenty operational ICBMs presumed to be targeted against the continental United States, and a handful of sea-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) in a single aging and unreliable nuclear-powered submarine. Even if the Chinese upgrade their strategic missile force with multiple warheads and penetration devices of various kinds, as they are reportedly in the process of doing, or expand it incrementally, it is far from clear that they could stay ahead of American countermeasures or additional defensive deployments even if they chose to do so.

Is there any reason to continue to grant Chinese nuclear missiles a free ride to the United States? One of the standard complaints among critics of BMD is that it threatens the "stability" achieved during the Cold War by fostering a new arms race between offensive and defensive systems. For example, some have predicted that China would respond to an American missile defense system by a major buildup of its ICBM force, which in turn would lead India to expand its own missile force and thus trigger a new arms race between India and Pakistan to the general detriment of the strategic balance in Asia.

There is little evidence to support such hypotheses. The Chinese have preferred to invest their missile dollars in shorter-range conventional systems designed primarily to exert pressure on Taiwan (and to a lesser extent Japan), and in new mobile ICBMs and SLBMs that will provide them for the first time with a secure second-strike capability as a hedge against pre-emptive attack by the United States. The Chinese are no doubt keenly aware that recent technological advances by the United States hold great promise for improving the relative efficacy of defensive systems. They are very unlikely to invest in large numbers of modern long-range missiles that could be rendered totally ineffective within a few years by (relatively inexpensive) defensive innovations.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

China is much more apt to concentrate its limited resources on building a capability to deny the United States easy access for its naval and expeditionary forces to East Asia and its allies there. But how vigorously they pursue such advantages will depend to a considerable extent on their perceptions of American intentions. This is why the United States cannot afford to pursue its missile defense project in isolation from its overall foreign policy. While the United States should make clear to China that it reserves the right to defend its national territory from all potential threats insofar as it is able, we should continue to avoid defining our military requirement for a BMD system with specific reference to an actual or potential Chinese threat to the American homeland; and the extent of U.S. support for regional missile defense in the western Pacific should be conditioned on the evolution of Chinese strategic behavior in the region as well as its democratic development.

Involving Allies

THE UNITED States needs to make clear to its traditional friends and allies the role it envisions for them in a new international security system centrally featuring defense against missile-delivered WMD. Many have wondered whether NATO still makes sense in a world in which there is no longer a plausible conventionally armed adversary close to its borders. Missile defense provides an attractive common mission for the alliance as a whole, one that is likely to be decreasingly controversial as potential threats loom larger on the horizon and the Europeans get over their nostalgia for the comfortable assumptions of the Cold War security environment. The United States must take the lead not only in technical-industrial cooperation in BMD development, but in shaping political expectations on the part of our NATO allies concerning the overall architecture of a NATO BMD system, burden-sharing arrangements, the problem of constraints on technology transfer, rules of engagement, operational command and control, and a host of related issues that have as yet barely been articulated publicly. The good news is that there appears to be a growing consensus throughout Europe that missile defense makes sense and is something that needs to be carefully studied. And just recently, the Europeans invested some $3.5 billion in an anti-tactical ballistic missile defense capability for the existing Aster air defense system, to be based at sea as well as on land. These are important developments.[9]

In Asia, a major breakthrough occurred in August 2003 when Japan announced its intention to spend $1 billion per year through at least 2007 to develop, in close collaboration with the United States, a nationwide BMD system utilizing its existing U.S.-made Aegis destroyers as well as the PAC-3 system. Assuming relevant political and constitutional issues can be resolved, this development could help raise the U.S.-Japanese defense relationship to a new plane of truly global rather than just regional cooperation. In addition, Australia has made a public commitment to develop its own sea-based BMD capability in collaboration with the United States.

Mention should also be made of the special relationship the United States maintains with Israel in the BMD area. The two countries have jointly developed the Arrow anti-missile system, which is now operationally deployed in Israel and is expected to play a critical role in deterring or defeating missile attack by Israel's

[9]Luke Hill, "Missile Defence Advances at NATO", *Jane's Defence Weekly*, June 4, 2003; Michael A. Taverna and Andy Nativi, "A Missile Shield for Europe", *Aviation Week & Space Technology*, November 17, 2003.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

various regional adversaries. It may be worth contemplating a more formal relationship with the Israelis on these matters, perhaps in cooperation with other friendly regional states or even as part of an American guarantee of a final Israeli-Palestinian settlement.

A final word about space. Bush's willingness to pursue missile defense technologies that could be based in space does not yet amount to a policy of militarizing space, but it certainly raises a question as to the ultimate intention of the United States in this area. It may well accelerate efforts by other nations (particularly the Chinese) to develop space weaponry or otherwise to erode existing constraints on the use of space for military purposes. It is not at all clear that this would be in the best long-term interests of the United States. The United States is militarily more dependent on space now than any other country. Adversaries may well see attack on American space systems as the core of an asymmetric strategy to counter our conventional military power.

Having said all this, it may well be the case, as is now commonly said within the American defense community, that the militarization—more precisely, the weaponization—of space is inevitable, and that the United States has to be prepared not only to hold its own in space but to dominate space as it now dominates the oceans. It would be rash, however, to precipitate such a development by a narrow calculus relating to the advantages of space-based missile defenses. The United States needs a coherent strategy—integrating political, military, civil and commercial considerations—to govern its policy and activities in space in the new century. The recent space shuttle disaster is but one indication of the distance that has to be traveled in this regard. One possible approach might be for the United States to refrain from basing weapons in space so long as other nations did the same, but to maintain a capability to do so in a relatively short period in response to certain contingencies, such as proliferation of anti-satellite weapons, a quantum increase in the Chinese ICBM/SLBM force, or a sharp deterioration in U.S.-Russian relations.

The United States needs missile defense now more than ever. The U.S.-Soviet relationship during the Cold War may well have been less stable in retrospect than was generally thought at the time, but the prospects for the use of mass destruction weaponry are certainly greater today than at any time since at least the Cuban Missile Crisis. With North Korea's departure from the international nonproliferation regime, we may well face a set of cascading effects that will push more countries to pursue more seriously ballistic missile and WMD options. (Already, the Japanese are beginning to talk openly about the need to reconsider the nuclear option in reaction to North Korean developments.) Critics continue to complain about the costs of missile defense and to question its technical feasibility. It is increasingly clear that such concerns are misplaced. The costs of the current development effort are modest. Building and fielding every system we are now working on would clearly be prohibitively expensive, but is not likely to happen. We can be fairly confident that a reasonable relationship will be maintained between the evolving BMD architecture, the nature of the emerging threat, and other military and national needs. As for feasibility, to repeat what was said earlier, it would be rash to wager that the United States will fail the technical challenges we face. The more daunting challenge will be to think through the manifold ways our new commitment to missile defense—both national and global—will contribute to the political fortunes of the United States in its current unipolar moment. □

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Sand in Our Eyes

U.S.-Saudi Relations After Iraq

Martin Sieff

OSAMA BIN LADEN has certainly achieved one of his cherished goals from the appalling mega-terrorist attacks of Sept. 11, 2001 that destroyed the World Trade Center and mauled the Pentagon. He has upset U.S.-Saudi relations and effectively wrecked an alliance that had previously endued for six decades to the vast benefit of both parties. Before 9/11, the Saudis had been viewed by U.S. policymakers, especially in the Republican foreign policy establishment, with great favor. Certainly, Democrats tended to be less comfortable with the Saudis—troubled both by the Kingdom's illiberal domestic policies as well as its staunch opposition to the state of Israel. However, all administrations generally found it possible to find a *modus vivendi* that permitted the smooth functioning of the "special relationship" with the Desert Kingdom.

Within days after the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, however, the way in which Washington policymakers and pundits viewed Saudi Arabia was transformed. And many of those that for generations had been the most enthusiastic about the "special relationship" with Saudi Arabia became, effectively overnight, its fiercest critics. On the Saudi side, there was no equivalent sudden shift, because Saudi attitudes towards the United States had been inexorably changing over the last several years, and not for the better. The American reaction to 9/11 has accelerated these trends and brought them to a head.

What is at stake is the relationship that was forged, if a single dramatic political event can be said to start it, when President Franklin Roosevelt met the ailing but still potent, powerful and shrewd old King Abdul-Aziz Ibn Saud on the cruiser USS *Augusta* in 1945.

The U.S.-Saudi Compact

FROM THE beginning, the U.S.-Saudi relationship was firmly grounded in realpolitik considerations. FDR and Ibn Saud both opposed continued British hegemony in the Middle East, each for their own reasons. Both saw Britain exhausted by the Second World War and in no real position to block the expansion of Soviet influence and its atheistic ideology (which Ibn Saud loathed) throughout the region. The shield of American protection as well as the lure of limitless U.S. petrodollars beckoned.

On this basis, the relationship flourished for decades. The United States emphasized its role as the protector of a conservative, religious Saudi Arabia against a godless Soviet superpower.

Martin Sieff is chief news analyst for United Press International.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Soviet communism threatened both America's liberal democracy and Saudi Arabia's theocratic monarchy. In return for security, America was to have guaranteed access to an inexpensive and steady source of petroleum.

The bargain was interrupted in 1973, in the form of the Yom Kippur War. Along with Iran, another long-standing U.S. ally in the region, Saudi Arabia decided to alter unilaterally the terms of the arrangement. Along with Iran, the Saudis became one of the prime motivating forces behind the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) and succeeded overnight in quadrupling the price of oil. The Saudis briefly became, in American eyes, the villains of the piece. But after King Feisal Ibn Abdul-Aziz—the son of the old king who had relaxed with FDR on the decks of the *Augusta*—was assassinated by a deranged young fringe member of the royal family in 1975, power passed to Feisal's younger brother, the ailing King Khalid and, functionally, to Khalid's self-indulgent but exceptionally bright and pro-American sibling, Crown Prince Fahd. While the Saudis continued to use OPEC as a way to gain more revenue by keeping oil prices higher than their pre-1973 levels, their general demeanor towards the United States became far friendlier. They perceived a renewed threat from Soviet expansionism to their own survival, which was heightened by the development of a Soviet navy able to project power in the region. So, when Ronald Reagan entered the White House, the stage was set to recreate the U.S.-Saudi special relationship.

Reagan and his colleagues over the next eight years embarked on a series of interlocking policies, first to contain and then to drain the Soviet Union, and Saudi Arabia was at the heart of their calculations. It was the golden age of the special relationship. The Saudis helped to fund anticommunist movements around the world, with America's blessing. In particular, the Saudis poured hundreds of millions of dollars into Pakistan to send clandestine aid to the *mujaheddin* in order to bleed the Red Army in Afghanistan. Even when the Soviet Union collapsed, the decisive and successful U.S. response to Saddam Hussein's conquest of Kuwait in 1990 appeared to confirm that the Saudis would need America's protective shield as much in the chaotic and unpredictable new world following the collapse of communism as they had in the old Cold War one.

In return, the Saudis were happy to use their role as the key, low-cost, high-quality "swing" producer on global petroleum markets to lower energy prices. The great Reagan and Clinton booms, the longest and biggest sustained surges in prosperity in history, were raised on a huge tide of ever-cheaper, high-quality global crude thanks to Saudi cooperation.

And when the George W. Bush Administration took office in January 2001, there was an almost universal expectation that the incoming team would end the strains in the relationship that had developed during the eight-year tenure of a Democratic president. After all, both parties stood to gain from a continuation of the status quo. This remained the comfortable U.S. assumption through to 2001, and neither Republican nor Democratic policymakers and foreign policy analysts by and large queried it.

Signs of Strain

EVEN BEFORE the thunderbolts of 9/11, however, there were growing signs of strain in the relationship that the old compact might not be able to assuage. The pro-American Crown Prince Fahd became king upon his brother's death in 1982, and continued his policies of close cooperation with the United States, particu-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

larly with President Reagan. But Fahd grew old and infirm, and so, over time, effective power in the Kingdom passed into the hands of the next in line of old Ibn Saud's sons, Crown Prince Abdullah, who remains the effective ruler of the Desert Kingdom today. Abdullah was not as pro-American as his brother, and by the second Clinton Administration, Abdullah's disenchantment had grown with U.S. policy. The Saudis in general felt the United States remained far too partial and indulgent towards Israel, even during the superficially halcyon years of the Oslo peace process. Yet Abdullah's fears of Iran and of a possible resurgence of Saddam Hussein kept him, publicly at least, on the U.S. team in the region—but he was not an enthusiastic ally.

In the spring of 1999, Crown Prince Abdullah had quietly authorized a policy of cooperation with Iran to shore up global oil prices. Many were the American pundits who proclaimed that the diversification of primary oil sources and the cost-effective revolution wrought by new technologies had smashed the OPEC's cartel power for good. They were wrong. Buoyed by the new backbone of Iranian-Saudi cooperation, oil prices rapidly rose from an anemic $10 a barrel to more than $30 a barrel.

And the return of a Republican administration to power in Washington in 2001 did not herald a return to the Reagan-Fahd model of partnership. The Bush team turned out not to be "Daddy's" administration after all. Under "Bush 43", U.S. policy in the region was far more openly partial to Israel and far more outspoken in its rhetorical opposition to the practice of terrorism in the region against Americans or Israelis. And the new president showed a determination to confront and contain, even eventually topple Saddam Hussein, unlike his more cautious father. Crown Prince Abdullah, Saudi insiders said, felt his concern about the moralistic, pro-Israel and unpredictable nature of U.S. policymaking was confirmed rather than relieved by the new team.

More disquieting was the fact that the Bush Administration was prepared to be more openly critical of the Kingdom's internal and external policies than any previous Republican administration. The small but articulate and highly influential neoconservative group in the Republican Party had always been highly critical of the Saudis for their opposition to Israel and resistance to allowing any democracy—at least as Americans generally understood the term—into the Desert Kingdom. There was no longer a godless communist menace to provide grounds for common cause. And the critics who had been out of power during the Clinton years were now occupying key positions, especially in the Pentagon and the vice president's office.

Even the holy grail of the relationship—energy—was under scrutiny. Did the United States need to "coddle" Riyadh if new sources of supply—particularly in the former Soviet Union—offered a real alternative to Saudi Arabia? Perhaps now was the time for the United States to try and "drive down the price of oil" and "break the ability of OPEC to set prices", and in the process, deprive Saudi Arabia of the income it could use to promote anti-American and anti-Israeli policies.

Further, the Saudis noted proposals and visionary predictions generated from conservative think tanks known to be highly influential with the Administration that a democratic, pro-U.S. Iraq could supplant the Kingdom in the role of keeping global energy prices down. And they could not help but notice that, even before 9/11, the administration appeared far more interested in exploring the possibility of expanding U.S. oil imports from Nigeria and other west and central African countries with significant deposits.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Discovering the Saudi "Enemy"

BY SEPTEMBER 11, 2001, therefore, the premises on which the U.S.-Saudi relationship was based were under question. Americans and Saudis soon found themselves looking at each other as strangers.

For the neocons, the attacks vindicated their position that the dangerous "swamp" of Middle East Arab backwardness needed to be "drained" with policies that ensured more open and tolerant democracies in the region and that deprived, in particular, the Saudis of the financial revenues that helped to fund terrorism. But the neocons were not alone. As the American media shone a new spotlight on Saudi practices, disturbing features never hidden but previously ignored or explained away came rapidly to light. From the *madrassa* system to Afghanistan and the "creation" of Osama bin Laden, hindsight seemed to paint a clear picture of Saudi malfeasance over more than a decade.[1] As these grim developments became clear in the shocked aftermath of 9/11, U.S. policymakers and opinion-shapers reacted fiercely. Some probably felt embarrassment or even shame that they had overlooked such trends. Others rushed, as always happens when any unforeseen crisis erupts, to make up for lost time. However, for all the expressions of understanding and pledges of efforts at more understanding on both sides, in the two years after 9/11, U.S-Saudi relations became ever more a dialogue of the blind and the deaf.

Saudi policymakers were at first largely deaf to U.S. concerns. There was, it seemed, no serious effort to rein in or reform the curriculum in the *madrassa* school systems across Asia. Saudi television continued to fund and broadcast telethons raising money for the families of Palestinian suicide bombers after the Oslo peace process broke down in 2000. According to estimates supplied by Riyadh's own security and intelligence services, almost 1,000 Saudi Muslim clerics were linked to or openly in sympathy with Al-Qaeda in the months after the 9/11 attacks.

Before 9/11, Saudi religious conservatism was seen as preferable to communism, so these supposed quirks were tolerated. But soon after the attacks, Washington policymakers and think-tank intellectuals that had been so comfortable for so long about the Saudis rushed to make up for lost time. Many of them swung like a crazed pendulum from one extreme to the other. Saudi oil wealth was suddenly seen as the core source of all the problems the United States faced. Cut off that wealth flow, some argued, and the "swamp" of extremism would rapidly drain. Allow it to fester unchecked, and things could only get worse. Before 9/11 such views were expressed in Washington only by individuals with no serious clout in policymaking and usually with strong links to the extreme right in Israeli politics far beyond the Likud Party.

Like most Manichean, overly simplistic, black-and-white formulations, this one only served to blind its adherents to the very different realities of the situation. For starting in May 2003, the Saudi leadership belatedly came to realize that the proliferation of extreme Wahhabi teachings posed a fundamental threat to their own security. The rhetoric of "draining the swamp" is simply a reckless use of metaphor that bears no connection with the problems U.S. policymakers face in dealing with Islamic extremism and rethinking the U.S.-Saudi relationship.

---

[1]For example, since 1979, Saudi Arabia's Wahhabi religious establishment has spent an estimated $70 billion on Islamist missionary work, including the creation and support of 12,000 *madrassas* in Pakistan alone. At any given time, they have 700,000 boys enrolled from ages six to 16. The Philippine island of Mindanao alone has another 3,000 Saudi-funded *madrassas*.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

But there is no doubt that following 9/11, supposed "solutions" that involved wildly ambitious geopolitical redrawing of Middle East maps gained ground in influential Washington circles. Influential figures in and close to the Bush Administration had not hesitated to say as much—and more. On July 10, 2002 the Defense Policy Board, an advisory committee headed by Richard Perle, on which former House Speaker Newt Gingrich and other political and policy heavyweights sat, had listened to a presentation from Laurent Murawiec of the Rand Corporation. He described Saudi Arabia as "the kernel of evil, the prime mover, the most dangerous opponent" the United States faced in the Middle East. If the Saudis refused to comply with U.S. pressure, the United States should "target" Saudi oil fields in unspecified ways.

In fact, such ideas never came close to being adopted as official U.S. policy. But the U.S. drive to invade Iraq was real enough. Suddenly, unprecedented and previously unthinkable things were happening in the region. From the Saudi point of view, with Saddam toppled so easily, what would or could stop America doing the same thing to them next?

Furthermore, with so many openly supportive friends of Israel in high places in the Bush Administration and the U.S. government—in Saudi eyes certainly—abandoning any pretense of even-handedness between Israelis and Palestinians, suddenly the United States no longer appeared to be the safest, most secure place for Saudi wealth to be. By the end of 2002, some 15 months after 9/11, huge amounts of Saudi investments had quietly but rapidly been removed from the United States. Experts believe the figure is certainly in excess of $100 billion. Some estimates claimed it was as high as $600 billion. No one knows for sure. The details would be embarrassing for both the U.S. and Saudi governments, so neither was eager to spotlight the process. But the increasing weakness of the U.S. dollar against even the chronically weak euro in recent months certainly appears to have been affected by the move.

As the Saudis began to look for balance against a far more unpredictable United States, previously unthinkable options rapidly became reality. Like Saudi Arabia, Russia's future hopes for prosperity and stability rested on strong global energy prices; thus, Russian oil and financial interests entirely coincided with Saudi ones. Moreover, the Saudis were alarmed, not just by the prospect of the United States seizing de facto control of Iraq's oil reserves, but also that President Bush really believed the rhetoric he expressed about the need for democracy throughout the Middle East.

To be sure, the far weaker, still impoverished Russia of President Vladimir Putin was a very different country from the overstretched, ideologically driven superpower of Leonid Brezhnev a quarter of a century before. The Saudis and many other conservative Arabs had come to see—and fear—the United States as the revolutionary disrupter of the regional status quo that needed to be guarded against and contained. It was exactly the way they had seen and feared the Soviets for so long. But now, in Saudi eyes, the dangerous, revolutionary and unstable ideology that an alien and secular superpower was determined to unleash upon the region was not communism but democracy, on U.S. terms and with U.S.-defined free markets as well.

Toward a New Relationship

WHAT, THEN, can and should be done to repair the gaping chasm that now yawns between the United States and Saudi Arabia? Is there anything U.S. policymakers can and should do, short of abject passivity towards the Saudis or unrelenting hostility towards them?

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Indeed there is. U.S. policy towards Saudi Arabia should not be allowed to lapse back into either the delegated complacency of the pre-1973 Aramco era or the triumphal but equally uncritical lovefest of the Reagan Golden Age. The Saudi role in funding Pakistan's nuclear program and the radical *madrassa* systems, and turning a blind eye to Bin Laden and the spread of radical Islamist ideology throughout the Muslim world, cannot be ignored.

But on the other hand, the now widely proclaimed "solution" of forcing radical change in the Desert Kingdom and forcing Western definitions of media and political openness and democracy down the Saudis' throats is no solution either. In fact, it will only make things worse.

There is an extraordinary irony in the fact that such panaceas come in large part from those who inspired the revitalization of conservative foreign policy concepts for dealing with the then-dominant Soviets in the 1970s. For that was the very era that liberal President Jimmy Carter undermined the shah of Iran by promoting precisely such values.

There is no doubt that Carter meant well, but the road to hell, as has been so often said, is paved with good intentions. Carter's policies fatally undermined the shah and opened the way for the first great triumph of radical Islamic fundamentalism in the region, an exceptionally hate-filled and destructive new ideology wrapped in the robes and language of the revered and comforting ancient Islamic faith. It was revolution posing as tradition. Neither Soviet nor Chinese communism had ever managed to blend such a potent appeal.

At the time and thereafter, realist and the school now known as neoconservative analysts and scholars alike lambasted Carter for his well-meaning but catastrophic naivety. Yet today, virtually identical arguments are regularly made in the American media arguing the need to force greater openness and change on the Saudis. Alas, if such policies were to be implemented tomorrow or in the next few months, there can be virtually no doubt that the result would be just as it was in Iran, and with even more catastrophic consequences. Control of what remains the largest high-grade and cheaply available oil resources in the face of the earth, along with control of the two most ancient holy places of the Islamic faith, would pass into the hands of Bin Laden or other extreme fundamentalists wedded to their vision of a Muslim world united in implacable hatred against the West, against Israel and most of all, against the United States.

U.S. POLICY towards Saudi Arabia, therefore, must avoid the Scylla of passive, defeatist compliance with every long-established Saudi bad habit and the Charybdis of seeking to undermine, destabilize, weaken or just "democratize" the current regime. Realists and conservatives should remember the 200-year old tested wisdom of Edmund Burke—one does not try to repair one's house in the middle of a thunderstorm.

The United States needs to renew its strategic dialogue with the House of Saud at the highest level. Figures at the level of the vice president or the secretary of state—for no one at any lesser level would carry credibility, however impassioned his assurances—should visit Riyadh, not just for a few hours as part of one of the "whistle-stop", "blink and you miss it" stopovers that have become all too much a part of U.S. diplomacy, but for days of dialogue and serious negotiations. The Saudis need to be given serious U.S. assurances that the United States is renewing its commitment to the kingdom and that it will not embarrass or undermine them by any public calls or pressure for reforms or concessions they regard as unwise.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

In fact, since the Al-Qaeda suicide bomb attacks in Riyadh on May 12, 2003 that killed 35 people, the Saudis belatedly woke up to the security threat they faced internally. The cozy informal concordat with their own most extreme clergy that had endured for 14 years since Islamic extremists seized the Grand Mosque in Mecca during the 1979 Hajj was thrown aside. All the 1,000 or so clerics openly sympathetic to Al-Qaeda were either fired or banned from addressing the faithful after weekly Friday prayer meetings.

In light of all this, U.S. policy towards the Saudis in dealing with their own internal problems should be clear. First, the United States needs to maintain its own pressure on Riyadh either to slash general *madrassa* funding or to reform their curricula—including removing inflammatory, hate-filled teachings about the United States and its allies.[2]

Second, the Saudis should be supported in the efforts they themselves have already initiated to revise their relationship with their own Wahhabi religious establishment. But U.S. diplomats, intelligence officers and analysts need to work with more culturally sophisticated officials from countries like France and Britain in pursuing this end. It is typical both of traditional U.S. policymaking as well as the fashionable mantras now embraced by the Bush Administration that they will seek broad and unrealistic goals that can only alienate the Saudis from their own people when much narrower, more focused goals are really required.

While it would be nice to see free elections, freedom of the press, full democracy and women's rights in Saudi Arabia, none is essential or indeed more than peripheral to U.S. national interests. Preventing the Al-Saud from being toppled by a fundamentalist Wahhabi revolution is central. So is cutting off the educating and funding of future generations of young Muslims in extreme sentiments and values at odds with the historic traditions of their own religion. U.S. policymakers need to focus on what is essential and achievable, not on what is desirable and impossible.

Third, U.S. policymakers must be restrained and cautious in preparing any "shopping list" of reforms they wish to see implemented in Saudi Arabia. As the current experience in Iraq grimly demonstrates, reckless U.S. enthusiasm for hands-on policies around the world, especially in the Arab Muslim Middle East, can rapidly backfire or spin out of control. The worst thing the United States can do in Saudi Arabia is force the Saudis to move too far too fast. The second worst thing is already happening: The Al-Saud have been given the impression that key policymakers in the Bush Administration are determined to topple and destroy them. Until such fears are convincingly laid to rest, no senior Saudi policymaker can be expected to trust any advice from current Administration figures, no matter how altruistic or well-meaning it may be.

For in dealing with Saudi Arabia today, U.S. policymakers are handling an unexploded bomb, and many of them do not seem to realize it. Sixty percent of the Saudi population, conservatively estimated at 18 million (and perhaps as high as 25 million) is below the age of 21. Popular sympathy for Bin Laden and Al-Qaeda appears to be widespread. Whatever problems the United States has in dealing with the Al-Saud, any radical takeover—and realistically there can be no other kind—would be worse. If moderating the *madrassa* system is a key first step to "draining the swamp" of Islamic

[2]The Clinton Administration failed to enforce such controls on education on the Palestinian Authority with the result that, from 1994 (when the PA first began to take administrative control of West Bank territory) to 2000, a generation of Palestinian youths were taught genocidal hatred of Israel, even while the supposed "peace process" was going on.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

extremism, pushing too much change too soon on the Desert Kingdom would be dynamiting the flood gates that protect us all, from being swept away in an Islamist deluge.

There is more. To restore the sundered bonds of trust between Washington and Riyadh, the Saudis need to be convinced by a serious commitment that the United States will not initiate any new ambitious operation or strategy for "regime change" in neighboring countries such as Syria or Iran. To those who would argue that it is not realistic for the United States to foreswear putting such pressure or leverage on Syria and Iran, I would only reply that avoiding confrontation with either country, especially Iran—at a time when 135,000 U.S. troops are stretched to the limit and at least 20,000 more may soon be required in Iraq—is the height of realism and common sense. The United States will not be able to "settle" Iraq without coming to some kind of accommodation with current or future rulers in Tehran. Nor can the Bush Administration realistically hope that Israel may "tame" Syria by toppling President Bashar Assad.

Of course, the United States retains many economic and diplomatic, not to mention military, weapons in its arsenal to deter Tehran or Riyadh alike. Sensible caution in pursuing policies is very different from craven appeasement. But the fevered dreams still heard in some Washington circles about using the brilliant success of democracy in Iraq to effect change in Syria, Iran and Saudi Arabia is quite simply a fantasy without any empirical evidence to support its practicality. Does Iraq look peaceful and content now? How long will it take to make it that way when the British Empire failed most notably to do so in forty years of military occupation from 1918 to 1958? The dream of "exporting democracy" from Iraq to its neighbors reminds one of World War I British First Sea Lord Sir John "Jacky" Fisher's favorite recipe for cooking jugged hare. "First catch your hare."

Indeed, far from giving Riyadh the impression that Washington is in any way prepared to return to its complacent "hear no evil, see no evil" policy towards the Desert Kingdom, the Saudis need to be warned that the light of U.S. intelligence henceforth will be shining continually on operations and fund-raising activities by Bin Laden, Al-Qaeda and similar groups. In the immediate aftermath of 9/11, Saudi intelligence did indeed provide much extremely valuable information to the United States. The United States must develop a mutually beneficial intelligence-sharing relationship with the Saudis. And just as President Reagan convinced the Saudi leaders of his day that the lowering of oil prices was in their interests, U.S. leaders need to be able to convince today's Saudi leadership that while they recognize its need to shore up global oil prices, America will require some measure of energy-price stability.

Developing this kind of give-and-take in the second Bush Administration, or, for that matter, in the first Kerry Administration, will not be easy. But it is not impossible either. The old realist wisdom that great powers usually are ready to abandon the indulgence of emotion, whether of gratitude or grudge, to further their own enlightened self-interest should guide our future policies towards Saudi Arabia. Despite their new relationships with Iran and Russia, the Saudis recognize and fear U.S. power. They recognize the potential internal threat they face from Al-Qaeda and its allies all too well. The United States still has much to offer Saudi Arabia and the Saudis have it in their power to deliver much that the United States needs too. The old "special relationship" can never be revived and restored as it once was. But recognizing that should open the way to build a new relationship based on realism and mutual interest. □

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Sitting on Bayonets

America's Postwar Challenges in Iraq

Michael Eisenstadt

WARS ARE ill-judged by their military outcomes or by the political repercussions that may follow in their wake. They often unleash social and political forces the ultimate impact of which can only be discerned years on. And they frequently produce unintended consequences that can pose complex and vexing challenges of their own that may contain within them the seeds of future conflicts. Those pondering the implications of Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) one year on would do well to keep that in mind.

To a great extent, OIF was supposed to take care of the unfinished business of the Gulf War. It was intended to eliminate, once and for all, the regime of Saddam Hussein and the threat it posed to regional stability, and to set the stage for the emergence of a stable, peaceful Iraq, free of weapons of mass destruction, with a legitimate, representative government on the path to democracy.

The Iraq War had several additional objectives: leveraging regime change in Iraq to deter Iranian and Syrian support for terror; enabling the withdrawal of U.S. troops from Saudi Arabia, thereby eliminating a source of friction with the kingdom and a pretext for the jihadist's war on America; establishing conditions conducive to the resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict; and clearing the way for political reform and democratization in the region—the putative cure for the dysfunctional Arab politics that led to 9/11.

The initial phase of OIF was an outstanding success. Coalition forces took Baghdad and toppled the regime of Saddam Hussein in three weeks, immediately yielding substantial benefits: the Iraqi people were liberated from a tyrant, the Middle East was freed from the threat posed by an aggressive regime and the United States was able to pull its troops out of Saudi Arabia. But the occupation of Iraq has been beset by troubles. Efforts to restore basic services, quash violent insurgencies in Sunni and Shi'i regions, and establish a legitimate Iraqi government, have encountered numerous difficulties. Instability and violence in Iraq will pose a new set of challenges for the people of that country, for the Middle East and for the United States. Meanwhile, efforts to

Michael Eisenstadt is a senior fellow at The Washington Institute for Near East Policy. An officer in the Army reserve, he served on active duty in 2001–02 at U.S. Central Command and subsequently as an adviser to the State Department Future of Iraq Defense Policy working group. The author would like to thank Jeff Cary, Ryan Phillips and Bjorn Delaney for their research assistance in preparing this article.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

revive Israeli-Palestinian negotiations have foundered.

While it is still too soon to judge how all this will end, or to assess the historical significance of this war, it is possible to discern some of its near-term consequences, and to speculate about their long-term impact on the United States, Iraq and the region.

Imperiled Transition

THE NATURE of the war and the way in which it was fought had a direct impact on the character of its aftermath—particularly the emergence of the insurgency centered in the so-called "Sunni triangle", and the transformation of Iraq into a major battleground in the jihadists' war on the West.

Although the coalition quickly took Baghdad and rapidly occupied the rest of the country, it failed to achieve a key precondition for postwar stability: ensuring that Saddam's hardcore supporters were either killed or captured and that those who survived the war emerged from it broken and defeated. This was in part a function of the decision by U.S. commanders and policymakers to favor a small force employing speed and overwhelming precision fire to bring about the rapid collapse of the regime in place of a larger, slower force designed to defeat the enemy methodically. The military planners made the right decision. The latter option would have produced higher casualties, provided opponents of the war with more time to press for a halt to the fighting before America's war aims were met, and given Baghdad time to wage a "scorched earth" campaign. This outcome was also a function of Baghdad's reliance on Saddam's Fedayeen and Quds Army thugs as cannon fodder, enabling large numbers of hardcore members of the security services, the Special Republican Guard and the Ba'ath Party to survive the war unscathed.[1]

The United States, moreover, did not prepare adequately for "the war after the war." Insufficient effort and resources were devoted, at least initially, to the pursuit of many of the second- and third-tier regime personalities who went on to play key roles in the postwar insurgency. Likewise, because the coalition went in "light" in order to ensure surprise, it lacked (and still does) the numbers needed to secure large expanses of Iraq's borders against foreign jihadists entering the country from abroad, or to ensure security, law and order in the so-called "Sunni triangle" and elsewhere. As a result, local, tribal and party militias have proliferated to fill the security void.

The coalition now faces terrorist challenges from foreign and homegrown jihadists, and threats to stability from the militias.[2] While the number of foreign jihadists may not be great, they often bring to bear expertise, experience, a perceptive grasp of how to cause mayhem and a commitment to die a martyr's death, all of which enable them to have an impact out of all proportion to their numbers. To their ranks should be added thousands of Iraqi salafists from the villages and towns of the "Sunni triangle", whose numbers swelled in the past decade as a result of official encouragement of religion (Saddam Hussein's so-called "faith campaign") and infusions of money and religious propaganda from Saudi Arabia and elsewhere. The exis-

[1] A supporting attack from Turkey (as had been planned) would probably have not made a difference in this outcome. Although more Fedayeen and Ba'athi militiamen would almost certainly have been killed, the regime's loyalists in the north would have gone under ground, just as hardcore members in the south did when overrun.

[2] For more on the jihadist threat in Iraq, see Alexis Debat's article in our symposium.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

tence of the militias will likewise create a heightened potential for violence as Iraqis jostle for political advantage as the transfer of sovereignty and elections draw near.

The attitude of many Iraqis toward the coalition has been a major complicating factor. While some Iraqis are indeed staunchly pro-American (especially the Kurds), the attitudes of most range from ambivalence to open hostility, due to past betrayals, recent and ongoing humiliations and U.S. support for Israel.

Shi'a in particular remember the failure of the United States to come to their rescue after encouraging them to revolt in 1991, while many Iraqis, particularly Sunnis, were humiliated by the defeat and dissolution of the Iraqi army and the heavy-handed tactics sometimes used by American occupation forces. Many Iraqis are apprehensive about U.S. plans for democracy; some Shi'a believe that the United States might eventually install a new Sunni strongman to ensure stability (the recent rehabilitation of former Ba'ath Party members have fed these fears), while many Sunnis believe that democracy will lead to their marginalization. These suspicions have been compounded by the perception that the failure to halt looting after the fall of the old regime and delays in restoring basic services are an American tactic to keep Iraqis down while it exploits Iraq's oil wealth. Recent revelations concerning abuse and torture of Iraqi detainees by American personnel deepened the hatred some Iraqis feel for the United States. Such resentments and the fear of retribution by former regime elements have almost certainly deterred many Iraqis from assisting the coalition.

The new Iraqi interim government will inherit the insurgency, the foreign terrorist threat and, most likely, the challenge of dealing with the militias, but will lack the means to deal with these problems on its own. For this reason, Coalition forces will almost certainly remain in Iraq for the foreseeable future, though this will likely be a source of friction between the Coalition and the Iraqi interim government, which will probably seek to limit the Coalition military's freedom of action. Populist politicians and extremists will likely use the issue to discredit political rivals, and the longer Coalition forces stay, the more the resentment against them is likely to grow.

Ties between Washington and Baghdad will likely be tense and difficult. A pro-American Iraq is not in the cards; the best that can be hoped for now is an uneasy partnership based on an unsentimental assessment of shared interests. Moreover, it is not impossible that an elected Iraqi government will seek the early departure of coalition forces—through peaceful or violent means. Indeed, there can be little doubt that the country's security problems will stress its fragile new institutions of governance and greatly complicate the transition from dictatorship to democracy in a country that faces numerous other problems.

American Credibility in the Aftermath

THE IMAGE of American power and competence evinced by the rapid coalition military victory has been badly tarnished by the failure of the coalition rapidly to halt postwar looting, restore order, repair the country's crumbling infrastructure, face down anti-coalition insurgents and halt terror attacks. This might affect the credibility of future American deterrent and coercive threats. Likewise, flawed pre-war claims regarding Iraq's WMD have raised questions about the credibility of American intelligence.

Ironically, while the coalition has not yet found WMD in Iraq, the war may have implications for proliferation elsewhere. There are persistent reports that Iraq

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

transferred WMD or related equipment to Syria prior to the war and that some Iraqi weapons scientists may have left the country, finding refuge and, in some cases employment, in other states of former or current proliferation concern, like Libya, Syria and Iran. For now, it remains unclear whether the WMD programs of neighboring states benefited from regime change in Baghdad, although for Iran and North Korea, the war probably confirmed the importance of a nuclear deterrent when dealing with the United States. North Korea's apparent decision to expand its nuclear arsenal in the aftermath of OIF probably reflects this concern.

Conversely, by inducing Libya to dismantle its WMD programs and Iran to reveal nuclear procurement data in order to avert international pressure or U.S. military action, the war may have helped U.S. intelligence to grasp better the scope of the international supplier network run by Pakistani nuclear scientist Abdul Qadeer Khan.

Finally, the invasion of Iraq has undoubtedly complicated the War on Terror. The invasion and events connected with it (such as the abuse of Iraqi prisoners by U.S. personnel) deeply humiliated many Iraqis and Arabs, and for many, confirmed Osama bin Laden's image of the West. The Iraq War will likely provide a new crop of recruits for jihadist groups in the Middle East, Europe and Asia.

Due to a lack of border controls and a functioning central government, Iraq has emerged as a principle arena of operations for jihadist groups committed to the fight against the United States and the establishment of democracy in Iraq, and a staging ground for attacks against neighboring states such as Turkey and Jordan. Reestablishing control over Iraq's borders and halting the activities of such groups will pose major challenges to a new Iraqi government.

Reshaping the Middle East

THE UNITED States went into Iraq with the declared intention of transforming it into a democracy that could serve as a model for the region. However, developments in Iraq since the war have served to underscore the formidable obstacles facing such an undertaking in a deeply divided society that continues to be wracked by communal tensions and political violence.

The influential role played by Shi'i and Sunni clerics in post-Saddam Iraq has raised concerns that Iraq may be on the way to becoming an Islamic republic. Because Saddam Hussein tolerated—and after the Gulf War encouraged—religious observance, while ruthlessly suppressing secular parties other than the ruling Ba'ath, the mosque networks and the Islamists were the best-organized entities in Iraq after his fall. These groups and their associated militias moved quickly to fill the void of authority in Iraq that followed the demise of the Ba'ath regime. The coalition's willingness to treat clerics as authority figures has likewise reinforced the role of religion and the clergy in post-Saddam Iraq (although the Islamists among them remain wary of the coalition's perceived commitment to secular democracy.)

For now, however, an "Islamic Republic" of Iraq seems an unlikely outcome. What is more certain is that Islam and Islamists are likely to play a greater role in public life in post-Saddam Iraq than at any other time in the modern history of the country, adding another layer of complexity to efforts to build a stable democracy based on cooperation and compromise among Iraqi's disparate sects and ethnic groups.

Furthermore, the unprecedented participation of Kurdish and Shi'a personalities and political parties in Iraq's cultural and political life is generating pressures for political change in neighboring states.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

This is likely to have dramatic implications for Iraq and the region. The enfranchisement of Iraq's Kurds has engendered concern by other Iraqis (particularly Turkomen and Shi'a) who fear that Kurdish gains will come at their expense, and may embolden Kurds in Syria, Turkey and Iran to demand greater political freedoms. The Shi'a revival has likewise alarmed many Iraqi Sunnis who fear marginalization and a loss of privilege and has apparently prompted foreign jihadists in Iraq to attack Shi'a worshippers and religious shrines in an effort to foment civil war. The rise of the Shi'a as a political force has also produced tensions with the Kurds concerning the role of religion in public life and the issue of federalism.

AT THE same time, there have been countervailing tendencies. In April 2004, Sunni and Shi'a insurgents fighting coalition forces made common cause, at least on a rhetorical and symbolic level. It remains to be seen whether a shared interest in fighting and expelling coalition forces can provide the basis for a military alliance.

The ascendancy of the Shi'a in Iraq has major implications for Iran. The re-emergence of Najaf and Karbala as centers of Shi'i religious learning and bastions of the dominant quietistic tradition within Shi'i Islam could undermine the pre-eminent status that Qom (in Iran) has enjoyed in the Shi'i world since the 1920s, further delegitimizing Iran's doctrine of clerical rule.

On the other hand, the rise of the Shi'a could lay the groundwork for the expansion of Iranian influence in Iraq. During the war and after, operatives of Lebanese Hizballah were reportedly sent to southern Iraq to gather intelligence concerning coalition forces—likely at the behest of Tehran. Likewise, the Badr Organization (formerly the Badr Corps militia) of the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq, which enjoys strong ties to Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, has established a significant presence in southern Iraq and Baghdad, potentially giving Tehran a degree of leverage over developments in Iraq. As a result, the Islamic Republic could, through its agents and allies, do great harm to coalition forces in Iraq, should it desire to do so. The ironic result is that the coalition military presence in Iraq limits, rather than enhances, Washington's ability to pressure Tehran regarding support for terror and its nuclear program.

As to the future, an Iraq in which Kurds and Shi'a hold senior government positions is unlikely to consider Iran a significant threat and is apt to have normal, if not cordial, relations with Tehran—an outcome that might not be completely to Washington's liking.

Finally, the rise of Iraq's Shi'a could embolden Shi'a communities in the Gulf to press for greater political rights. While in some places this might generate momentum for change, in others it might engender a backlash by Sunnis who view Shi'a political aspirations with trepidation. The United States may well be blamed by both friends and enemies in the Arab-Islamic world for any social and political tensions generated by such demands, just as it has been accused of conspiring with the Shi'a to corrupt and undermine orthodox (Sunni) Islam by some Al-Qaeda types. In this way, U.S. policy in Iraq could affect relations with allies in the Middle East and efforts to encourage political reform throughout the region.

In response to U.S. efforts to democratize Iraq, several Arab regimes have announced their intention to pursue reforms or have introduced what are in many cases token measures calculated to accommodate popular demands for change and deflect American pressure for reform (though some of these steps had long been contemplated).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

American calls for democracy have, however, been greeted with skepticism by some Iraqis, and by the numerous critics of U.S. policy in the Arab world. These critics suspect U.S. motives, reject the neo-imperial aspects of the "imposition" of democracy from without, and fear that political reform will empower Islamists. Despite these qualms, 9/11 and OIF have placed the issue of political reform and democratization front and center on the Arab political agenda, fueling demands for reform and change.

The opposition of autocratic elites to this new strand in American Middle East policy is not surprising. They have much to lose should democracy take root. The United States, however, has to find ways to continue to work with its autocratic allies in Egypt, Saudi Arabia and the Gulf—while prodding and pressing them to engage gradually in real reform and to open up their political systems without fomenting instability. Failure to do so will only ensure the perpetuation of a status quo that does not serve the long-term interests of the United States, its allies or the peoples of the region, deepening cynicism toward the United States. Having come this far, Washington cannot back off without doing additional harm to its interests in the Middle East, though recent revelations concerning the abuse of Iraqi prisoners by U.S. military personnel will further complicate these efforts.

The Way Ahead

THE EPOCHAL events of the past year have already had a profound effect on the Arab-Islamic world. The long-term impact of these events, however, will be influenced, more than anything else, by whether the Coalition and the UN succeed in overseeing the formation of a legitimate (that is, elected) Iraqi government in the coming months.

The prospects for such an outcome are at best uncertain, and it seems likely that for the foreseeable future, Iraq will have a weak and divided central government. The demise of strong central government, in conjunction with the rise of local politics, may in fact prove to be Iraq's political salvation by providing a more healthy basis on which to build a viable, humane polity—if Iraq can avoid a descent into rampant political violence or civil war in the meantime.

Such an outcome will not, however, happen on its own. Coalition forces will continue to play a key role in preventing the political transition from being derailed by violence or hijacked by extremists. For this reason, they should stay in Iraq as long as they are needed and welcome. Growing impatience with the coaltion presence, however, has already begun to limit its political and military influence (which was never as great as coalition officials liked to think.) Iraqis should be encouraged, when feasible, to find Iraqi solutions to their problems, and when coaltion forces are needed, they should be used only after consulting with local and national Iraqi leaders. Care should be taken to avoid political collateral damage that could undermine the ability of the coalition to continue to play a critical role in shepherding the transition. Failure to do so could render the coalition presence untenable before the necessary Iraqi political and security structures have been put in place.

The Bush Administration must reconcile itself to its diminishing influence in Iraq and its inability to control or master the forces unleashed by its war there. But if the Administration acts with a realistic grasp of what is possible and intervenes only when and where essential, it may yet succeed in helping to create a new Iraq that may be far from a model democracy but still worthy of America's support. □

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The Democratic Imperative

Adrian Karatnycky

SPORADICALLY, chaotically, at times violently, the inexorable force of democratic hegemony is reshaping the world. Long gone is the East-West divide.

In the wake of communism's collapse, no array of closed societies or illiberal ideologies can seriously challenge the predominance of democratic states and liberal ideas. As a result, democracies are free to project their influence and values through diplomatic, military, economic, technological and cultural power. Increasingly, global affairs are shaped by the hegemony of democratic ideas and values, the acceptance of which has grown dramatically around the globe. Through "hard" and "soft" power, the world's cohort of democratic states aids indigenous democratic movements in toppling tyrannies, intervenes against rogues and tyrants, promotes democratic practices, and expands democratic governance through conditional foreign aid.

Often, such engagement reflects the pursuit of specific national interests. At times, democracies use their hegemonic power to end or preclude a humanitarian disaster that could otherwise send floods of refugees across their borders. At other times, they pre-empt threats to their national security. As often, the powerful democracies exercise hegemony on behalf of something larger—a genuinely new system of power rooted in liberal principles.

As a result of such interventions, intercessions and diplomatic pressure, a wave of tyrants has recently fallen. Since 2000, Serbia's Slobodan Milosevic, Liberia's Charles Taylor, the Afghan Taliban's Sheikh Omar, Peru's Alberto Fujimori, and Iraq's Saddam Hussein have been swept aside by the force of democratic hegemony. More recently, Georgia's president Eduard Shevardnadze succumbed to civic protest and external pressure, resigning in November 2003 after his government had doctored election results, while in March 2004, Haiti's Bertrand Aristide was forced from office amid mass civic protests and armed insurgency. Central to both resignations was the demand by key democracies that their departures were a condition for further engagement.

While the United States is perceived—and denounced—as the world's sole hegemon, it was not the leading force in several of these recent transitions. Indeed, in a wide range of settings, European, Latin American, Asian and African democracies—alone or in concert—assertively use their power to promote democratic outcomes and press illiberal regimes, often without the

Adrian Karatnycky is counselor and senior scholar at Freedom House. He serves as the principal analyst for *Freedom in the World: The Annual Survey of Political Rights and Civil Liberties*.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

encouragement or participation of the United States.

Democratic hegemony does not come without risks. Because it exerts explicit and implicit pressures on dictatorships and anti-democratic movements, these have increasingly looked to the asymmetrical power represented by weapons of mass destruction and terrorism.

Democratic Predominance

SINCE THE early 1970s, liberal democracies have grown at the rate of nearly one and a half per year. Today, there are 88 such liberal states, constituting nearly half the world's polities and 45 percent of its population.[1] The liberal democracies generate 89 percent of the world's economic output and are the main sources of international entrepreneurship, invention and innovation. The economic and technological dominance of the democracies also translates to the military and security sphere: liberal democracies account for nearly 85 percent of global military expenditures. As a result, democracy has achieved a geo-economic and geopolitical critical mass that now appears to ensure its perpetuation and expansion around the world.

As importantly, established, prosperous democracies tend to have trustworthy democratic neighbors and enter into cooperative security alliances with other democracies. And while authoritarian states often use militaries at home to preserve illegitimate rule, liberal democracies have sufficient legitimacy that their militaries are devoted exclusively to the defense of borders and the projection of power. This means most of the "hard" power of democracies can be projected externally.

Of the world's ten most populous states, seven are governed by leaders whose power derives from free and fair elections. Only one—China—is an outright tyranny. Two, Pakistan and Russia, claim they are in transition to democratic rule and offer some space for opposition political parties and media. Of the world's twenty largest economies as measured by gross national income, only one—China—is an outright dictatorship. Eighteen of the world's largest economies are liberal democratic states.

So powerful is the economic, technological, cultural and military might of liberal states that they are increasingly capable of shaping the international system, countering threats, protecting fundamental rights and promoting the values of freedom. As the power and influence of the democracies grows, with the notable exception of China, most tyrannies are stagnating and falling further behind the liberal democratic world. Indeed, even with China's large and vibrant economy, the 48 countries Freedom House rates as "not free" account only for 6 percent of global economic output.

Today, increased trade and growing cross-border economic relations in the context of democratic predominance places constraints on how non-democratic states behave in the international system. Even powerful tyrannies like China are unlikely to act in a disruptive and aggressive way against liberal states that provide the direct investment and import markets on which those tyrannies rely. It is not accidental that rogue states have been either autarchic economies unconnected to the international system or self-sufficient states, usually deriving their wealth from exporting vitally important energy resources.

The overwhelming global predominance of the democracies means they can project power, even when they are sharply divided on tactics. Despite strained relations between the United States and major European states over Iraq, such

[1]Data from Freedom House's latest survey of "Freedom in the World" can be accessed at www.freedomhouse.org

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

foreign policy disagreements did little to abate the force of democratic hegemony. Paradoxically, the fact that democracies sometimes act in the absence of consensus increases the frequency of interventions and leads to a more active foreign policy.

Writing in these pages 15 years ago, Francis Fukuyama argued that "the victory of liberalism has occurred primarily in the realm of ideas or consciousness and is as yet incomplete in the real or material world." But the overwhelming economic success of the liberal democratic idea is now tangibly felt in the real, material world.

As a result, authoritarian values are increasingly threatened by the growing power of democracies and democratic ideas. Indeed, widespread global terrorism and efforts to procure weapons of mass destruction can be understood as responses by illiberal movements and states to democratic hegemony. Terrorism and weapons of mass destruction represent asymmetrical power in the face of democracy's growing strength.[2]

Democracy's Many Interventions

SO WIDESPREAD and frequent are democratic engagement and intervention that—major wars apart—we are inured to the phenomenon. Yet by any measure, the pace of intervention by liberal democracies in the affairs of other states and societies is breathtaking. At times, such interventions occur under the aegis of the United Nations; at other times they are carried out through regional organizations; sometimes they are unilateral or launched by coalitions of the willing. In almost all cases since the end of the Cold War, the liberal and emerging democracies have been the driving force behind military interventions and peacekeeping operations—lobbying for them, committing military forces, and financing, staffing and shaping the post-conflict nation-building agenda.[3]

In the last decade, the democracies have led military interventions and occupations in Haiti in 1994, Bosnia in 1995, Kosovo in 1999, Afghanistan in 2001, Iraq in 2003 and Haiti, a second time, in 2004. Each time, whether under UN aegis, through NATO, or through coalitions of the willing, the military leadership and the post-intervention rebuilding has been firmly in the hands of the established democracies. Similarly, an array of peacekeeping and post-conflict interventions have also been launched mainly at the instigation and under the command of the liberal democracies including: Mozambique in 1994, Albania in 1997, Sierra Leone in 1997 and 2002, East Timor in 1999, Liberia in 2003, and Cote d'Ivoire and the Democratic Republic of Congo in 2003.[4]

AS HAITI and Iraq demonstrate, not all military and peacekeeping actions easily lead to stable democracy. Still, nearly all contemporary military interventions are accompanied by ambitious democratic state-building initiatives, including support for free media, independent civic groups and internationally supervised or monitored democratic elections.

---

[2]It is no accident that in his 2003 book, *Revolutionary Islam*, the notorious terrorist Carlos the Jackal urges revolutionaries to embrace radical Islamism, the terrorist tactics of which he sees as the only force capable of striking back at the United States and its allies.

[3]Since the collapse of the USSR in 1991, there has been no full-scale occupation of a neighboring state by a tyranny.

[4]The liberal democracies also dominate virtually all the UN's other peacekeeping operations, including those in the Golan Heights, Lebanon, the Western Sahara, Cyprus, and Ethiopia-Eritrea—either through financing of the missions or deploying the overwhelming proportion of military and police personnel.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Additionally, democracies exert influence through the regional bodies they now dominate.[5] In organizations like the Organization of American States (OAS), the European Union, NATO, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, as well as the Commonwealth, agendas are shaped by the most influential regional powers (which as a rule are democratic) or by regional democratic majorities.

For example, in 2003 Nigerian President Olusegun Obasanjo, on behalf of ECOWAS, risked personal safety when he traveled to Sao Tome and Principe and berated junior military officers who had staged a coup against the island democracy's government. His intervention led to a stand-down and the collapse of the coup. ECOWAS is now engaged in a vigorous effort to rebuild democratic electoral processes in Guinea-Bissau, where a coup toppled an elected government in 2003. In 2002, following a coup against Venezuela's President Hugo Chavez, the OAS exerted pressure that helped reverse the military takeover. A coup in Fiji in 2001 triggered suspension of aid by Australia and New Zealand, two major donors, who later provided assistance for new elections. West Africa's regional group, ECOWAS, likewise reacted sharply to a 1999 coup in Cote d'Ivoire and was instrumental in the return of civilian rule to the still troubled country. While international pressure does not always succeed, in most recent cases, military rulers are pressured to return their countries to elected leadership—making long-term military rule increasingly unsustainable.

Pressure and isolation are another part of the interventionist tool box of democratic hegemony. The OAS pressed Peru's authoritarian president Alberto Fujimori, encouraging opposition political forces that eventually forced his resignation after a corruption scandal. In recent years, the OAS had withheld aid from the Aristide government for electoral violations and relentless intimidation of opposition parties. This sanction paved the way for efforts by France and the United States to press Aristide to step down from office in March 2004.

Liberal democracies also assertively press new democracies to settle internal conflicts and ensure regional stability. In 2001–02, the EU and the United States demanded that the Macedonian government peacefully settle a violent insurgency involving its Albanian minority, threatening suspension of aid. After forcing a settlement on the Macedonian government, NATO peacekeepers were deployed to disarm Albanian terrorists and were replaced by EU peacekeepers.

The European Union has acted as a progressive democratic hegemon in relations with emerging democratic central and eastern European states that were eager to join its ranks. It successfully pressed post-communist states to eliminate the death penalty, settle unresolved border disputes and improve human rights protections for ethnic and linguistic minorities as a precondition of entry into the EU. And in 2000, the EU imposed diplomatic sanctions on Austria in an effort to exclude the populist nationalist leader Jorg Haider from a governmental leadership post on the grounds that his

[5]The picture at the United Nations is far less favorable. At the UN, global consensus for effective action against tyrannies often is elusive. Liberal democracies at the world body are frequently stymied by the close cooperation of tyrannies and solidarity among developing countries—whether autocratic or democratic—that is maintained through the Non-Aligned Movement. At the Security Council, veto-wielding states can block action. And China and quasi-democratic Russia—not to speak of democratic France—are often reluctant to support liberal interventions. The UN's culture of trading favors also often trumps principle.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

platform did not comport with the European values.

Foreign aid is another frequent instrument of democratic hegemony. In 2002 President Bush announced his commitment to the creation of a Millennium Challenge Account, which will provide enhanced foreign aid to countries that perform better than their counterparts in ruling justly and protecting basic political and civil liberties. This year, the program will provide $1 billion in new assistance to developing countries that, in the words of President Bush, "rule justly."

While democratic hegemony is at times asserted through military force or economic incentives, often its most effective means of influence is support provided by governments and private sources to non-governmental democratic movements.

In the two decades since President Ronald Reagan delivered his landmark speech at the Houses of Parliament in Westminster calling for an international effort to promote democracy, states have created or encouraged dozens of government-funded foundations to offer training and significant resources to indigenous democratic groups around the world. Such foundations include the U.S. National Endowment for Democracy, Germany's political foundations (the *Stiftungen*), Australia's Center for Democratic Institutions, Britain's Westminster Foundation, Canada's International Center for Human Rights and Democratic Development, Poland's Freedom Foundation, and the Swedish-based Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance.

At the same time, nearly 20 percent of foreign aid provided by the OECD states is now targeted to support democracy-building programs. The European Commission today funds a broad array of global democracy initiatives, often implemented by non-governmental organizations. Such aid, augmented by state-funded uncensored broadcasts to closed societies, and coupled with private sector support from sources like George Soros's Open Society foundations, means that cumulative international democracy assistance amounts to several billion dollars each year.

Such private and government assistance supported civic-led democratic transitions in Georgia (2003), Peru (2002), Serbia (2000), Croatia (2000) and Slovakia (1998). Democracy assistance also helped facilitate the collapse of communism in Central and Eastern Europe. In South Africa, Chile and the Philippines, "people power", augmented by external resources from democracies and non-governmental support originating in the democratic world, assisted civic movements that used a combination of electoral processes and non-violent protests to force democratic openings.

Democracy's "Soft" Hegemony

THE FORCE of democratic hegemony extends far beyond financial and military power. It is as much, if not more so, a cultural and political phenomenon—hegemony as the Marxist theoretician Antonio Gramsci expressed it. For Gramsci, hegemony consisted of the consensual dominance of one group in society, attained through moral and intellectual leadership in a society and achieved through cultural and civic institutions. In this Gramscian sense, democracy's hegemony is exerted by the widespread popularity of and support for democratic ideas and values in much of the world. The ideological hegemony of democracy is disseminated by a globally linked intelligentsia, by global media and the Internet, and by like-minded non-governmental democracy activists united in cross-border networks of mutual support. Through such networks, techniques of civic mobilization are taught to activists

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

in closed societies with the aim of achieving democratic openings.

The electoral and protest techniques used by Slovakia's civic advocates in 1998 to build opposition to the authoritarian prime minister Vladimir Meciar were taught to Serbian anti-Milosevic activists in 2000. In 2003, Serbian activists, in turn, helped train civic activists from Georgia, who used these techniques to protest massive election fraud and force the resignation of the country's elected president, Eduard Shevardnadze.

Tactics used in civic struggles in Serbia, South Africa and Chile are shared across borders with activists from a broad array of closed societies. No technique can guarantee success, which depends on indigenous public support. Still, external technical assistance, financial support and international pressure all empower civic movements in closed societies and are crucial to new democratic openings.

Because democracy thrives amid and promotes prosperity, democracies are today the most important powers in most regions of the globe. With the exception of the Arab world, which has no liberal democracies, and east Asia, where China is a major factor, democracies are the most influential regional actors. Populous and powerful democracies exert their own economic, strategic and diplomatic influence in South Asia, the Pacific Islands, the Americas, Europe and Africa, while the United States further tips the balance by playing a global role as a powerful democratic hegemon.

Latin America's two most important states—Brazil and Mexico—are dynamic democracies. Western Europe's powerful established democracies have exerted their hegemonic influence on eastern and central Europe by linking EU integration to democratic reforms and the rule of law. Nigeria's emerging democracy and South Africa's liberal democracy are the most important indigenous powers in sub-Saharan Africa. In the Asia-Pacific region, Indonesia, a restored electoral democracy, and Australia, a stable liberal democracy, are the predominant powers—a role filled by democratic India on the subcontinent.

Not all these powers interpret their responsibilities identically. India's conservative foreign ministry, for example, has been reluctant to support activism on behalf of democratic values and human rights at regional and global institutions. And Brazil under President Ignacio Lula da Silva has thus far refrained from playing an active role as a regional voice for democracy. On a visit last year to Cuba, Brazil's president even declared: "I don't comment on the internal policies of other countries." Among European states, France has been traditionally less interested in supporting a foreign policy based on democracy promotion than other EU states.

Nonetheless, there is a variety of reasons why democracies tend to pursue actively interventionist foreign policies on behalf of basic rights and democratic practice. One factor is a sense of solidarity and shared values that democracies feel with insurgent democratic movements. New democracies in particular, which often are led by revolutionary democrats, tend to be highly active in supporting their counterparts in neighboring states. Moreover, within democratic polities, foreign policy is subject to the pressure and influence of media and non-governmental lobbies, which frequently urge humanitarian intervention, press governments to uphold global human rights and urge support for counterpart civic movements. This is why, although many democratic states prefer to act with the mandate of the United Nations or regional bodies, democratic legitimacy and accountability spurs some of them to unilateral action.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Hegemony and the Non-Democracies

NON-DEMOCRATIC polities cannot today ignore the pressure exerted by liberal states and by the popularity of democratic ideas.[6] Consequently, authoritarian and tyrannical states have adopted a variety of responses to democratic hegemony.

Some traditional monarchies in the Arab world are taking halting steps toward elected legislatures with limited powers. Other countries—referred to as hybrid states—mimic democratic practices with elections and a nominal opposition, while retaining absolute control through patronage, the use of state resources, domination of the media and political repression. Among such pseudo-democracies are Ukraine, Malaysia, Egypt and Russia. Yet in many cases attempts to "manage democracy" carry within them the seeds of fundamental change. A number of such illiberal and pseudo-democracies have fallen in recent years as a result of peaceful transition resulting from civic mobilizations (Slovakia under Meciar and Mexico, formerly ruled for seven decades by the Institutional Revolutionary Party). Sometimes, fraudulent elections in pseudo-democracies spark mass unrest that overthrows corrupt or authoritarian rulers (such as Ferdinand Marcos in the Philippines). Of course, many non-democracies resist even a modest liberalization or the introduction of rudimentary imitations of democracy and multiparty politics.

Non-democratic states that are reliant on exports and foreign investment may often engage in a high degree of internal repression, even as they open up to economic, cultural and commercial penetration by the democratic world. But as a rule, many such states tend to pursue generally cooperative foreign policies and do not provoke conflict with the interests of the democracies. By contrast, non-democracies that are self-reliant because they possess energy resources (such as Saudi Arabia, Iran or Libya) are free to support radical political (and in some cases terrorist) movements. Impoverished, autarchic autocracies try to pressure the democratic world by supporting or sheltering terrorist movements and have sought to preserve their systems by trying to obtain weapons of mass destruction to act as deterrents from possible attack or pressure—North Korea being the classic example.

At the same time, the difficulties in reforming Iraq and Afghanistan may well lead democracies to retreat from the ambitious aim of democracy building, especially in the Middle East. Already, U.S. presidential candidate John Kerry has suggested that the aim in Iraq should be stability rather than the more ambitious aim of democratic rule. And while President Bush has elevated rhetoric in behalf of the democratization of the Muslim Middle East, he has refused to challenge the repressive status quo in Egypt and Saudi Arabia, the two most important Arab countries.

There are also worrying signs that the broad expansion of democracy has resulted in the emergence of many fragile polities. Freedom House's annual survey of political rights and civil liberties, indicates there are 117 electoral democracies with meaningful, competitive multiparty elections. Of these procedural democracies, only 88 are rated as "free", meaning they have secured a broad array civil liberties and rights amid the strong rule of law.

---

[6]After all, external support for democratic regime change has an illustrious and longstanding pedigree. As historian Adam Zamoyski has scrupulously documented, democracies and democratic activists have inspired and supported democratic movements and democratic revolutions since the late 18th century. See *Holy Madness: Romantics, Patriots and Revolutionaries 1776–1871* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 1999).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

This means that for a variety of reasons, including insurgencies and ethnic strife, 29 elected democratic governments fail to secure for their citizens a number of fundamental rights.

Poverty and poor economic performance by many new democracies are also a growing challenge. Of the world's 88 free and liberal democracies, 38 have a per capita gross national income of $3,500 or less, and 18 have a per capita GNI of less than $1,500. A report released in mid-April by the UN Development Program found that a majority of Latin Americans would welcome the replacement of democratic government with authoritarian rule if the trade-off were economic gains, suggesting rising disenchantment with elected governments that fail to achieve growth.

Even long-time democracies face new difficulties. In Italy, for example, under Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi, excessive concentration of broadcast media in the hands of the incumbent government has raised serious questions about whether the lack of media diversity is corrosive of pluralism. And all of the established democracies face the challenge posed by the transfer of significant democratically-accountable authority to international organizations that are less directly accountable to the people.[7]

The Democratic Advantage

ESTABLISHED and new democracies will need to confront all these issues if democracy is to continue its ascendancy—yet there are few reasons to think that the force of democratic hegemony will abate in the coming years. Indeed, there are many more factors that favor the further projection of power by democracies and the spread of democratic values. Not only do democracies have a better track record at adapting to difficulties and finding workable solutions, the populations currently living under tyrannies continue to display a powerful will to democracy. This creates forward momentum to open closed societies—and weakens traditional arguments employed in favor of non-intervention.

In 2001 the Independent Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, convened at the request of UN Secretary General Kofi Annan, put forward an expansive rationale for wide-ranging international intervention. The Commission asserted:

> Where a population is suffering serious harm, as a result of internal war, insurgency, repression or state failure, and the state in question is unwilling or unable to halt or avert it; the principle of non-intervention yields to the responsibility to protect.

The statement went on to warn that if the UN Security Council fails to act in such cases, "concerned states may not rule out other means to meet the gravity and urgency of that situation. . . ." Europe's championing of the imperfect International Criminal Court places significant attention on genocide and other mass "crimes against humanity", and it is yet another instrument likely to spur the projection of democratic hegemony as the new court goes after tyrants and mass murderers.

Furthermore, ongoing efforts to defeat global terrorism and reverse the spread of weapons of mass destruction to rogue states will create new opportunities for democratic nation-building. This idea is embodied in its most raw form in the latest incarnation of the doctrine of preemption. The corollary of this security-driven agenda is the Administration's growing acceptance of the view that terrorism and the extremist ideologies that propel it thrive in environments in which

[7]This is a subject addressed by John Fonte in the essay that follows this one.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

open democratic discourse is stymied.

Some commentators tend to view a widening chasm between Europe and America, arguing that under the Bush Administration, the United States tends to emphasize security arguments on behalf of democratic hegemony, while the European Union emphasizes the humanitarian argument to support interventions. In the end, both arguments lead in the same direction: increased pressure and more interventions by the world's liberal democracies.

The Future of Democratic Hegemony

SOME CRITICS and commentators see in the wide array of cultural, political, military and economic pressures exerted by democracies the expression of a new form of colonialism or imperialism. But the phenomenon of democratic hegemony is distinctly different. The projection of hegemonic power by the democracies is usually exercised not on behalf of specific policies or in support of specific indigenous political actors but on behalf of democratic political processes and market economic systems. As Ronald Reagan observed in his Westminster speech on the promotion of democracy: "This is not cultural imperialism; it is providing the means for genuine self-determination and protection for diversity."

Indeed, democratic choice sometimes empowers insurgent political forces that are deeply critical of established democracies and of the global market system. In recent years a range of electoral victories by insurgent, anti-establishment political movements has occurred in places as diverse as Turkey, Brazil and Ecuador. In each case, leaders came into power that had been critical of the United States.

Despite its immense influence on global affairs, democratic hegemony has emerged almost accidentally and has exerted its immense influence episodically and inconsistently. Frequently, democratic hegemony has often been projected by shifting and unstable coalitions of the willing. Thus, despite their geo-economic and geopolitical global predominance, democracies have rarely acted as a cohesive force. Democracies have tended to respond to emergencies and crises rather than to anticipate and manage conflict and instability or to advance a systematic agenda for global political change.

The present moment of hegemony offers an opportunity for democracies to move toward greater cohesion in expanding and deepening the democratic project. To do so will require new forms of institutional cooperation, including the strengthening of the nascent Community of Democracies, launched in 2000 to improve international coordination on human rights and political reform and currently coordinated by a group including Chile, the United States, Poland, the Czech Republic, Mali, Portugal, India, Mexico, South Africa and the Republic of Korea.

It will require establishing a working caucus of democracies at the United Nations to ensure that the global body works consistently and effectively in support of political rights and civil liberties. It will also require more diligent efforts to enable the World Bank to work more openly and explicitly in pursuit of democratic governance.

At the United Nations and global conferences organized under UN auspices, democracies routinely are outmaneuvered by tyrannies and dictatorships. Last year's election of Libya as chair of the UN Commission on Human Rights, and this year's election to that monitoring body of Sudan—whose government is engaged in the ethnic cleansing of Africans from its Darfur province—are emblematic of the poor coordination among democracies. Such symbolically important political failures make clear that nascent initiatives like the Community of Democracies and a UN Democracy Caucus are weak and have not yet had serious impact.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

THE POWER of democracies is predominant for the near future—but continued predominance is not preordained. America's domestic political turmoil engendered by the difficulties encountered in Iraq has led some to question America's commitment to aggressively promoting democracy around the world, particularly if intervention is required. Europe's population is aging, and the continent may soon face major economic challenges to further economic growth.

Weak democracies will need economic aid, foreign investment and access to developed markets. Evidence suggests that disillusionment with liberal institutions can set in if poor democracies are mired in economic stagnation. There already are worrying signs pointing to public disappointment with democratic institutions in countries where long periods of authoritarianism left a legacy of huge disparities in wealth.

In the end, the further expansion of democracy will largely be determined by events in China and the Arab world, which together account for the overwhelming majority of those who live under tyranny. In China, the 1989 protests in Tiananmen Square indicated the potential for mass support of democratic principles. More recently, however, there have been few manifestations of mass public opposition to China's one-party system and fewer signs Beijing is headed toward serious political liberalization. In the Arab world, too, there are few signs of momentum toward democratic rule. Although polling data suggests significant sympathy among Arab citizens for democratic governance, tightly controlled one-party states and reform-resistant monarchies predominate, and mass civic protest is rare.

With economically dynamic China exhibiting no signs of serious democratic reform, with Russia tilting toward authoritarianism, and with the defeat of Islamist extremism and terrorism by no means certain, the perpetuation and expansion of democracy is not assured.

All this makes clear that democratic hegemony, in the end, is not some inevitable endpoint of historical development. It may only be an opportunity, an opening in history when there is a chance utterly to vanquish and banish the worst forms of tyranny and autocracy and replace them with an order rooted in the rule of law and democratic accountability before the people. Such an effort to press democracy's expansion clearly is not without peril. Tyrannies will certainly seek weapons of mass destruction to stave off the force of democratic pressure and extremist anti-liberal movements will attack the democratic world with the asymmetrical power of terrorism. But despite these dangers, the failure by democracies to press their advantage would be far more dangerous and would confer on succeeding generations a more terribly violent and tumultuous world. □

> This singular man [the Abbé de Saint-Pierre], an honor to his age and his kind—the only man perhaps since the human race has existed, who has had no other passion than that of reason—nevertheless wandered from one error to another in all his systems, in his desire to make men like himself, instead of taking them as they are, and as they will continue to be. He labored for imaginary beings, while believing that he was working for his contemporaries.
>
> —Jean-Jacques Rousseau, *Confessions*, IX

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Democracy's Trojan Horse

John Fonte

JUST BEFORE the new century began, Marc Plattner, co-editor of the influential *Journal of Democracy*, wrote of the brave new globalized world coming into existence:

> A borderless world is unlikely to be a democratic one. For while the idea of "world citizenship" may sound appealing in theory, it is very hard to imagine it working successfully in practice, Indeed, some aspects of globalization, "point to a long range danger to democracy."

While Plattner is uneasy about these developments, other observers, such as Strobe Talbott, largely discount the risks. An entire industry of transnational agencies and non-governmental organizations is pushing forward changes designed either to deny or override the national sovereignty of democratic states against surprisingly muted or inchoate opposition. Taken together, these changes amount to a serious political and intellectual challenge to democratic sovereignty vested in the liberal democratic nation-state.

It is a distinctly new challenge. Until now, democrats have faced two major opponents: pre-democrats and anti-democrats. The pre-democrats, adherents of some form of *ancien regime* (of throne, altar, tribe or clan), have been mostly vanquished over the past several hundred years. Since 1917 three anti-democratic ideologies have presented an alternative vision to liberal democracy: first Nazism/fascism, then communism, and today militant Islam or Islamism.

The radical Islamist threat is both deadly and serious, and it could last for a considerable period of time. Islamists might gain powerful weapons and thereby cause much death and destruction. Nevertheless, it is in the highest degree unlikely that they will in the end conquer liberal democracy.

Yet the 21st century could well turn out to be not the democratic century, but the "post-democratic" century—the century in which liberal democracy as we know it is slowly, almost imperceptibly, replaced by a new form of global governance.

The ideology and institutions already exist in embryonic form and are developing rapidly. The philosophical basis for global governance begins with the premise that all individuals on the planet possess human rights. International law is the paramount authority that determines those rights, while international agreements establish and expand new rights and norms. International institutions (for example, the UN, the International

John Fonte is director of the Center for American Common Culture and a senior fellow at the Hudson Institute in Washington, DC.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Criminal Court and the World Bank) monitor, adjudicate, negotiate, cajole and administer the international agreements and laws in varying degrees. International non-governmental organizations (NGOs) claim to represent "global civil society", or the "peoples" of the planet. And the NGOs work with international institutions and participate in international conferences helping develop the new norms for global governance. Moreover, global governance is not really "international", but "transnational" in the sense that it is not concerned strictly with relations between nations, but with political arrangements above and beyond nation-states. Indeed, it could also be described as "post-international."

The global governance regime is promoted and run by complimentary and interlocking networks of transnational (mostly Western) elites including international lawyers, international judges, NGO activists, UN and other international organization officials, global corporate leaders, and some sympathetic officials and bureaucrats from nation-states. These transnational elites are, for the most part, ideologically compatible. They could be described as "transnational progressives" (many are "Sixty-Eighters") supporting what they perceive as "progressive" causes across national boundaries (that is, supporting the "other", the oppressed, minorities and opposing the death penalty, unilateral military action by the United States, and so on).[1] Denationalized corporate elites who are non-ideological, but seek economic advantage, often have a symbiotic relationship with the transnational progressives. Global governance is not to be confused with world government. Nation-states (both democratic and undemocratic) continue to exist, but their authority is increasingly circumscribed by the growing strength of the global institutions, laws, rules, networks and ideological norms noted above.

Unlike democratic sovereignty, global governance can provide no straightforward answers to the most important questions of political science (Who governs?, Where does authority reside? How is legislation enacted?). In a democracy, authority resides in a self-constituted people ("government by consent of the governed"). These self-governing people choose their rulers through elections and can replace them if they are not responsive to the people. The people limit the power of rulers through a constitution and basic laws. Bad laws can be changed by elected national legislatures.

In theory, human rights and international law are the moral basis for the global governance regime, but both of these concepts are fluid, porous and constantly "evolving." They are, at any given moment, what transnational elites tell us they are. NGOs participate in the writing of global treaties alongside democratic and non-democratic governments, but they are essentially pressure groups, elected by no one and responsible only to themselves. Nor are the other elites, the international lawyers, judges, activists and officials who participate in the global governance system responsible or accountable to any self-governing "people." How can these rulers be replaced? How can "the governed" repeal bad laws and regulations that their "governors" have imposed upon them? Global governance provides no democratic answers to these questions.

Global governance is implicitly a grand ideological project (and a utopian and coercive one, with universal aspirations). It is post-democratic in the sense that it originates from but transcends democracy just as the "postmodern" orig-

[1]For an examination of transnational progressivism see Fonte, "Liberal Democracy vs. Transnational Progressivism: The Ideological War Within the West", *Orbis* (Summer 2002), pp. 449–67.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

inates from but transcends modernity. Its success would mean that liberal democracy very well might be replaced with a new form of regime.

NOW LET us more closely examine post-democracy in practice. Understandings of human rights and international law have been transformed in the past several decades. New concepts of human rights and the "new" international law have been heavily influenced by the de facto post-democratic ideology and material interests of transnational elites. In the immediate aftermath of World War II, human rights were associated with the values of the Anglo-American democracies in the struggle against totalitarianism: the rights of free speech, free elections, the rule of law, freedom of religion, freedom of association and the like. Many Americans, in particular, wanted to qualify and narrow the concepts of social, cultural and economic rights that were incorporated into the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948.

Today, the idea of what constitutes "human rights" has been vastly expanded. For example, an international agreement on "children's rights" ratified by most nations in the world (but not the United States) and enthusiastically supported by leading NGOs, declares that it is a basic human right that any child, "shall have . . . freedom to seek, receive, and impart information of all kinds . . . in print, in the form of art or through any other media of the child's choice;" and that "no child shall be subject to arbitrary . . . interference with his or her privacy . . . or correspondence."

The concept of international law has undergone considerable alteration as well. In an important article in *The National Interest* (Winter 2000/01), international lawyers David B. Rivkin and Lee A. Casey argue that instead of concerning itself with relations among nations (the traditional Law of Nations),

> This new international law purports to govern the relationship of citizens to their governments, affecting such domestic issues as environmental protection and the rights of children.

It also seeks the power to "promote the criminal prosecution of individual state officials by the courts of other states and international tribunals . . . ."[2]

Two major NGOs, Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International USA, are exemplars of the conflict between democracy and post-democracy. These two organizations have waged what could be characterized as "lawfare" against the exercise of democratic sovereignty by the American nation-state. They continuously pillory America's liberal democracy as an "oppressive" regime that routinely violates human rights.[3]

Immediately following the attacks of September 11, they objected to describing the conflict as a "war", preferring to characterize them as a "crime" that should be pursued under the auspices of international law. As American planes began bombing the Taliban in Afghanistan in October 2001, the NGOs sought ways to

[2]Rivkin and Casey also declare that, "the new international law is profoundly undemocratic at its core" and a "real and immediate threat to U.S. national interests." They write, "First, as a philosophical matter", the new international law is an "attack on the principle of sovereignty", thus it "threatens the very foundation of American democracy." They state that if current trends "are allowed to mature into binding rules, international law may prove to be one of the most potent weapons ever deployed against the United States."

[3]For example, they have charged that: The American nation-state is guilty of "a persistent pattern of human rights violations" domestically (AI-USA); American courts are involved in "calculated killings" and "cruel-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

limit American military operations by complaining about possible collateral damage and the use of weapons of which they do not approve, such as cluster bombs.

Again and again, the NGOs have charged that civilian deaths in Afghanistan and Iraq could have been prevented by the U.S. military. For example, the HRW website condemned air strikes aimed at Saddam Hussein and other Iraqi leaders because they resulted in a small number of civilian deaths. HRW admitted they did not try to find the exact numbers of civilian deaths and retorted that, "focusing on the exact number of deaths misses the point. The point is the U.S. military should not have been using these methods of warfare."

It is important to note that the NGO attack is not simply opposition to the policies of the Bush Administration. America was also pilloried during the Clinton era as a "persistent" violator of human rights and international law. In a 1999 report, Human Rights Watch complained that

> the United States continued to exempt itself from its international human rights obligations, *particularly where international human rights law grants protections or redress not available under U.S. law.* In ratifying key human rights treaties it has typically carved away added protections for those in the United States by adding reservations, declarations, and understandings. Even years after ratifying key human rights treaties, the U.S. still fails to acknowledge human rights law as U.S. law [emphasis added].

In contrast, the NGOs believe that if international human rights laws and U.S. laws are in conflict, international laws supersede U.S. laws, even though these international laws have not been approved or enacted into American law by the relevant legislative bodies (Congress or a state legislature) through the normal processes of American constitutional democracy. What these "reservations" declare is that nothing in the international agreement supersedes the U.S. Constitution and laws of the United States. For example, the United States ratified a UN treaty to eliminate racial discrimination but attached reservations stating that hate speech restrictions on free speech in the treaty that were incompatible with the First Amendment would not be accepted by the United States.

One of the clearest examples of post-democratic action by NGOs occurred in connection with the UN Durban Conference Against Racism. About a year before the UN conference, a large group of American NGOs sent a letter to then UN Human Rights Commissioner Mary Robinson calling upon the UN to "hold the U.S. accountable" for the "persistent" problems of discrimination that minorities "face at the hands of the U.S. criminal justice system."[4] A spokesman for the group declared that the NGO demands, "had repeatedly been raised with federal and state officials but to little effect. . . . In frustration we now turn to the United Nations." In other words, NGOs are attempting to make an end run around the democratic process by implementing through international pressure measures that were rejected by

---

thousands of American workers "cannot exercise a basic human right: freedom of association" (HRW).

[4]The NGOs that signed the letter included: Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International-USA, the Arab-American Institute, National Council of Churches, Mexican-American Legal Defense and Educational Fund, the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, the American Civil Liberties Union, the International Human Rights Law Group, the Lawyers Committee for Civil Rights, the American Friends Service Committee, and the Leadership Conference on Civil Rights.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Americans in the domestic democratic process.

Take, for example, the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW). CEDAW has not been ratified by the Senate, even though Senators Joseph Biden (D-CA) and Barbara Boxer (D-DE) have argued that the treaty is simply an "international bill of rights" for women. But the experience of Britain and other democracies with CEDAW is quite illuminating.

The British were told to "reconsider" their Sex Discrimination Act "in light" of CEDAW and implement gender preferences or quotas, euphemistically described as "temporary special measures." They were also told that the UK's Equal Pay Act was "outdated", because it did not employ "the vast amount of research in the United States on equal pay for work of equal value" or "comparable worth." Furthermore, they were told that to get men to take parental leave on a rate of parity with women, "forceful measures were sometimes needed." In 1999 the UN Committee monitoring Britain expressed "concern" that the percentage of women in Parliament was too low. (CEDAW calls for measures to ensure equal representation of women and men in all decision-making bodies, including national legislatures.)

The Israelis were chastised because their public health system allocated considerable resources to *in vitro* fertilization, yet contraceptives were not free. They were also told by UN monitors to develop programs for "gender sensitization of the judiciary, police, and health professionals." The Slovenians were told that the number of children in day-care facilities (30 percent) was too small (apparently too many children were being taken care of at home by their parents); and even the compliant Belgians were admonished because (despite gender preferences) some elements of their work force were still dominated by men.

CEDAW is not simply an "international bill of rights for women"—as its adherents claim. Surely, questions of parental leave, the cost of contraceptives, day-care policy, gender parity in parliament, and sensitivity training for police are issues that liberal democracies can work out for themselves. Missing in the CEDAW treaty is any concept of "government by consent of the governed."

Symbiotic Relationships

WHILE THE evolving concepts of human rights and the "new" international law provide the ideology, NGOs supply the interest groups and activists, and international agreements the regulatory framework. At the same time, international organizations including the UN and its related agencies assist in the promotion of new structures of post-democratic governance. What Professor Kenneth Anderson has called a "symbiotic relationship" exists among the UN, its agencies, the NGOs, human rights lawyers and the international law community. The transnational elites and their activist allies are part of the same networks, share the same ideological predispositions and have similar material interests (career advancement, influence, power) in strengthening transnational institutions and norms at the expense of the institutions and laws of liberal democratic nation-states.

This is why they agree that the UN is the "sole source of legitimacy" for deciding when a democratic nation state can use force; promote unelected NGOs as representatives of "global civil society" in an attempt to create a type of democratic legitimacy that they do not possess; and work to strengthen the "new" international law and intrusive international agreements that transfer power (even on domestic issues) from democratically

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

elected governments to transnational authorities.

Challenging Democracy

WHAT DOES the challenge of post-democracy mean philosophically for the advance of genuine democracy in the world, and practically for American global strategy? This essay suggests that ultimately the greatest challenge to liberal democracy in the 21st century will come from within. What I have described as "post-democracy", is, unfortunately, a serious alternative regime to the liberal democratic nation-state and the principle of democratic sovereignty. Thus, history may not end with the ideological triumph of liberal democracy.

As noted, this alternative regime would consist of networks of overlapping transnational institutions, organizations, agreements, treaties, laws, regulations, and rules; run by transnational elites and informed by a transnational progressive ideology. This ideology is an amorphous and eclectic mix of soft academic Marxism or Gramscian thinking, social democracy (minus its George Orwell-Tony Blair "armed democracy" wing), multiculturalism, radical feminism, environmentalism, or whatever else constitutes the latest in progressive thought at a particular moment. That said, the public face of transnational progressivism is slick and PR-savvy. Its sophisticated advocates (for example, Human Rights Watch's Kenneth Roth or Amnesty International USA's William F. Schulz) work with corporate heads, foundation officials, and American, EU and UN bureaucrats, who provide funding and with whom they are locked in a symbiotic relationship.

If this sounds incoherent, a good part of the strength of post-democracy lies in its incoherence. By disguising what and how political decisions are made, it renders them unstoppable and perhaps irreversible. As noted above, global governance provides no serious democratic means for the "governed" to repeal decisions that they may find repellent, but that their new "governors" have, nevertheless, imposed upon them without their consent.

Another strength is that post-democracy has support from elites of the Right as well as the Left. It should not surprise us that the transnational project has been rhetorically (and sometimes financially) embraced by many multinational American-based corporations. It is perhaps understandable that transnational corporations should seek to emphasize that they are global rather than national entities. Yet it was also rather unseemly for the corporate counsel of Motorola to denounce as "nationalistic" Ralph Nader's suggestion that American-based corporations begin their stockholder meetings with "The Pledge of Allegiance" to the "country that bred them" and "defended them."

Likewise, it was unseemly when the late Carl Gerstacker, chairman and CEO of Dow, wrote several decades ago that he dreamed of establishing the world headquarters of this American chemical giant on the "truly neutral ground" of an island "beholden to no nation or society." Of course, Dow, Motorola and a host of other corporations, whose executives have made foolish comments about their company's relationship to America, are, indeed, "beholden" to the American nation. Without American sovereignty, mores, culture, laws and military power, they would be neither prosperous nor protected.

It should not surprise us that corporations that accept the progressive agenda at home (racial/gender preferences, multiculturalism, etc.) are willing partners of NGOs who promote this agenda abroad. Nor is it surprising that that a Supreme Court justice like Sandra Day

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

O'Connor (who was apparently guided by corporate attitudes in deciding the major domestic affirmative action case) has praised "transjudicialism" and called for a more robust "transnational jurisprudence." O'Connor states that foreign judicial opinions "although not formally binding" should "at times constitute persuasive authority in American courts." Three other Supreme Court justices (Ginsberg, Breyer and Kennedy) appear to have embraced this view as well.

If present patterns of discourse continue, in the end, the transnational regime would claim to be the ultimate fulfillment of democracy. Democracy, it would be explained, has simply "evolved", like "human rights" and the "new international law." It no longer means what it used to mean—majority rule with limited government based on equality of citizenship within a nation-state—in much the same way that "civil rights" no longer means equality of opportunity for individuals but rather "substantive" equality of condition for groups. Outward forms and symbols of 20th-century liberal democracy would be maintained (devoid of their original understandings) just as Augustus maintained old Roman Republican forms and symbols even though they had lost their substantive meaning. And no doubt a weakened and hollowed out shell of a nation-state would still exist.

In some respects the European Union is the model of post-democratic governance. If there is one thing that both friends and foes of the European Union agree upon, it is that the EU has a "democracy deficit." Although power is technically supposed to reside with the member nation-states through the Council of the EU (that is composed of representatives from the nation-states) and the European Parliament (elected by citizens in the nation-states), in actuality a great deal of the authority is wielded by the unelected bureaucracy—the European Commission (EC) in Brussels. The EC has a monopoly on initiating legislation, in essence, an advance veto. In contrast, the Council and Parliament—theoretically responsible to voters—can only withhold approval of policies already formulated by the Commission, something they rarely do in practice.[5]

Many Continental European elites are already committed to slowly and steadily building some form of transnational post-democratic regime, that would—as its top priority—limit and constrict the democratic sovereignty of the United States. They would also like to limit the sovereignty of other democracies, particularly those allies of the United States that are outlier democratic nation-states, like Britain and Israel, who in different ways, have stood aloof from the continent's politics and modes of thought.

One of the more clever arguments for transnationalism revolves around the concept of the American nation-state leading the world to its transnational future. Of course, in achieving this goal, the American democratic regime slowly metamorphizes into a different type of entity. The American caterpillar becomes the transnational butterfly, but "don't worry", elites tell us, the withering away of American constitutional democracy and American national identity serves "our interests and our values." In the end, American "leadership" comes from "following" the "international community", i.e., the worldview of transnational progressive elites.

Thus, American foreign policy would "lead the world" by following

[5] "[W]e must beware the pretense of democracy when, in truth, the voice of the people does not reach decision-makers in any regular and constitutional way." Ralf Dahrendorf, "Can European Democracy Survive Globalization?" *The National Interest* (Fall 2001), pp. 17–22.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

transnational elite opinion on such as issues as the necessity of UN approval for the use of force, downgrading support for the security of Israel, abandoning constitutional protections for American soldiers in order to adhere to the International Criminal Court, the abolition of the death penalty, and the like. In order to "lead", the United States would voluntarily put itself in harness and embed itself in the network of agreements, treaties, arrangements and new forms of law. As Madeline Albright put it in 1999:

> I think that we are in the process of developing different kinds of entities, and that great nations who understand the importance of sovereignty at various times cede certain portions of it in order to achieve some better good for their country. . . . The way we are all operating as a global community means that we are looking at how the nation-state functions in a totally different way than people did at the beginning of this century and will be doing at the beginning of the next.

In this new system, the United States would become the key actor, the primary engine of a different type of regime, but hemmed in on all sides by constraints to its democratic sovereignty. Gradually, after decades, (or perhaps, as Strobe Talbott predicted in July 1992, sometime near the end of the 21st century), it would cease to be an independent democratic nation, in the sense that it is today. Thus, "America" would become in reality Post-America, the core of a new post-democratic system of global governance. The "international community" would dictate policy on issues such as national defense, the Middle East, and the like, to liberal democratic nation-states. America (having brought about this state of affairs) would have betrayed the great principle of self-government (consent) upon which (along with natural rights) our nation was founded.

What Is To Be Done?

BUT DEMOCRACY can defeat post-democracy. The first step is the recognition and intellectual conceptualization of the post-democratic threat. Forgive me for writing this in one of our nation's premier realist journals, but to get a firm grip on the post-democratic problem we must think ideologically—even more ideologically than the neoconservatives have to date. Ironically, the current neoconservative critique is insufficiently ideological. It offers an incomplete dialectic that abruptly stops after democracy triumphs. Following Hegel (and Kojève and Fukuyama), the critique roughly posits that the dialectic (and thus serious ideological conflict) is completed with the victory of modern democracy.

Ironically, Mao was more perceptive in recognizing that even after the revolution, the dialectic (that is, history and ideology) continues, and that therefore, "there is always a Right and always a Left" and "things always divide one into two." Today, democracy begets post-democracy. Thus, we must say to our neoconservative friends (paraphrasing the Trotsky-Burnham exchange of the late 1930s), "You may not be interested in post-democracy, but post-democracy is interested in you."

Fortunately, for practical policymakers the conceptual tools needed to grasp the serious nature of the post-democratic threat to American principles and American interests are available. The intellectual spade-work identifying and conceptualizing this challenge has already been accomplished by specialists in international law, including John Bolton, Jeremy Rabkin, David B. Rivkin, Lee A. Casey, Robert Bork, Jack Goldsmith, John Yoo, Stephen Krasner, Curtis Bradley, Jed Rubenfeld and Kenneth Anderson. Policymakers need to read, absorb and build upon their

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

work, some of which has appeared in the pages of this magazine.[6]

The United States should be prepared to champion not simply generalized notions of building democratic institutions and promoting "human rights" and "democratic values" that are susceptible to post-democratic manipulation, but the principle of democratic sovereignty within the institution of the liberal democratic nation-state. Hence, the concept of democratic sovereignty as a core American value should be officially incorporated into the *National Security Strategy of the United States* and promoted by the State Department, the National Security Council and the other institutions of the President's foreign policy apparatus.

Post-democratic challenges to American democratic sovereignty should be clearly identified and resisted. NGOs that consistently act as if they are strategic opponents of the democratic sovereignty of the American nation should be treated as such. They should not be recognized or supported at international conferences, not permitted to roam battlefields, and not given special briefings or access to U.S. government officials.

In particular, these NGOs should not be given the legitimacy and credibility that comes from a certain status as quasi-allies of American democracy in human rights arguments in non-democratic and developing countries. Most importantly, the post-democratic NGOs and their allies in the self-designated "international human rights movement" actually harm the cause of genuine human rights. They claim to speak for "humanity", as other utopian elites once claimed to speak for the "workers" or the "people." Yet like previous utopian elites they speak for a particular ideological movement. They purport to support the "rule of law." Yet they denigrate the "rule of law" as it is actually practiced in functioning liberal democracies, while constantly reinventing new utopian versions of "law." At the same time, this so-called "law" (really ideological politics or agitprop by other means) is—at the particular moment that it is evoked—touted as absolute bedrock human rights law. The astute Kenneth Anderson has labeled this phenomenon "serial absolutism." Thus, what is absolute human rights law today, was not human rights law in 1994 and will be different again in 2014. Apparently, "absolute" human rights law is, from decade to decade, or day to day, whatever "human rights" activists tell us it is.

As the United States expands its initiatives to foster democracy abroad these post-democratic NGOs and "human rights activists" should not be given federal funds and grants to promote what they will surely claim is "democracy building", but is, in realty, their own narrow ideological agenda. This issue has direct practical consequences since President Bush has called for a major effort and increased funds to promote democracy and democratic institutions. It is crucial that this initiative and these funds are not co-opted and captured by post-democrats.

For the most part, European support for American policies comes from countries acting as nation-states (for example Britain, Poland, Italy, Spain, Portugal or Denmark), in opposition to the policy of the European Union. If a "common European foreign and defense policy" had existed, it would not have supported U.S. action in Iraq. Prudence and principle dictate that U.S. policy tilt toward the democratic nation-states of Europe and away from any further encouragement of the political (as opposed to the economic) integration of the European Union.

---

[6]For example, Rabkin, "International Law vs. the American Constitution: Something's Got to Give", *The National Interest* (Spring 1999), pp. 30–41, and Rivkin and Casey, "The Rocky Shoals of International Law", *The National Interest* (Winter 2000/01) pp. 35–45.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

At the same time, the principle of democratic sovereignty means that the United States should not gratuitously oppose the domestic policy of democratic nation-states. For example, the recently announced French secular education policies (banning head scarves and overt religious symbols in schools) may not be consistent with our notions of religious pluralism, but they are consistent with French democratic and national traditions, and are being implemented within the context of the democratic nation-state. Our State Department should have remained silent on this issue, just as the French government should mind its own business on the U.S. death penalty.

Likewise, friends of democracy on both the Right and Left should be cheered by Sweden's "No" vote on the Euro, which concerned democratic politics, much more than economics. The "No" vote appears to have been a revolt of the Swedish people against their elites in order to protect their democratic right to maintain the Swedish social welfare state (*Folkhemmet*). We may not favor their policy preferences, but the Swedish vote constituted a victory for "government by consent of the governed."

The *National Security Strategy* rightly promotes free trade as an important foreign policy tool of the United States. It is important that both the World Trade Organization (WTO) and the North American Free Trade Association (NAFTA) remain instruments to liberalize trade among nations and not expand into areas properly left to democratic decision-making. As the American Enterprise Institute's Claude Barfield has warned, the WTO needs to ensure that its judicial bodies do not indulge in "legislating new rights and obligations through judicial interpretation" that weaken democratic sovereignty. He has also recommended measures to "rein in" the WTO's judges.

Affirming Democracy

IN THE END, an affirmation of democratic sovereignty should stand on principle and morality, as well as interests. Democratic sovereignty is consistent with the morality and universal values of the American Founding. It is consistent with the idea of "government by consent of the governed" in which that government is limited by a constitution, which is the ultimate source of democratic legitimacy. Surrendering, or "ceding", or "pooling" democratic sovereignty beyond the authority of the Constitution and the American people would be government without the consent of the people and would be inconsistent with our democratic morality.

There is nothing particularly "universal" about the agenda of much of what passes for the "international community." On the contrary, their agenda (on group rights, new definitions of "human rights", limiting democratic sovereignty, abolishing the death penalty, and so on) is, for the most part, simply the views of "progressive" transnational elites. These are very rarely the views of democratic majorities in democratic nations. Opinion polls suggest that the elites would have considerable difficulty in winning majority support for their position on the death penalty in countries such as Britain, Italy, France and Sweden.

This is not to imply that raw majoritarianism within a nation-state is the ultimate moral position. But it is to suggest that the interpretation of what constitutes universal values should not be decided solely by international elites. It is also to suggest that the definition of "human rights" is too important to be left to human rights activists, just as the interpretation of "international law" is too important to be left to international lawyers. Finally, democratic procedures within democratic nation-states are a

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

more effective, more comprehensive, and above all, more just way of deciding what are universal human values.

The next great ideological struggle for democracy will be against post-democracy. But democrats must recognize that they will be engaged in a two-front war. For even as they struggle violently against the anti-democrats of militant Islam, they will, at the same time, also have to fight peacefully, but fight nonetheless (through intellectual arguments and politics at home and abroad) against the post-democrats of the West. This situation of a "two-front ideological conflict" is similar to the Cold War, in which serious anti-communists not only fought against the communists, but, at the same time, had to engage in an ideological struggle with powerful anti-anti-communist elements among Western progressives, who considered their main adversaries Western anti-communist democrats, not the communists themselves, whom the progressive Left chose mostly to ignore.

For better or worse, the conflict between democracy and post-democracy will be, in large part, decided by Americans. In Clausewitzian terms, American opinion (elite and popular), is the "center of gravity", the crucial point on which all hinges, in the battle between democrats and post-democrats. American foreign policy should stand forthrightly for the principle of democratic sovereignty within the liberal democratic nation-state. As Abraham Lincoln knew, democracy's destiny and America's destiny are intimately intertwined. And we have been there before. As George Washington reminded us,

> the preservation of the sacred fire of liberty and the destiny of the republican model of government are justly considered, perhaps, as deeply, as finally, staked on the experiment entrusted to the hands of the American people. □

Good Diplomats

[Good diplomats] are people of sound but straightforward intelligence, people of simplified and limited sensitivity and a cool heart, but not without heart or any sensitivity; capable of deception, but not closed and mysterious, still less underhand; strong, but not rough; quick and decisive, but not hasty or impulsive; realistic, sober, but not dry and dull.

They need to know a certain amount, but there should be no trace of erudition or pedantry in what they know, and their knowledge should agreeably surprise and perhaps impress those with whom they are speaking, but never embarrass, offend or shame them.

It is the same with their courage: they need to have it, and it should be sound and reliable, but they should display it only in extreme circumstances and bear it as they bear arms which everyone knows they have, but are never seen.

They must also have imagination, but only in a certain degree, enough for a man to see every issue from every point of view and with all its possibilities and immediate consequences; anything more than that is both dangerous for them and damaging to the work they are doing.

—Ivo Andric, *Notebooks*

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

POLICY *Review*

"Vogue and influence"

— *The New Yorker*

ROBERT KAGAN LEE HARRIS MARY EBERSTADT LARRY DIAMOND RONALD D. ASMUS & KENNETH M. POLLACK STANLEY KURTZ HOLMAN W. JENKINS JR. SEBASTIAN MALLABY DAVID DAVENPORT ROBERT W. HAHN E.D. HIRSCH JR. PETER BERKOWITZ DANIEL PIPES CHESTER E. FINN JR. JOHN MICKLETHWAIT & ADRIAN WOOLDRIDGE MICHAEL MCFAUL LEE A. CASEY & DAVID RIVKIN JR. EINER ELHAUGE CHRISTOPHER CALDWELL JAMES M. GOLDGEIER RONALD W. DWORKIN RHODA RABKIN TOD LINDBERG SOCIAL CRITICISM POLITICS

To subscribe, call toll-free:
1-877-558-3727
Or subscribe online at:
www.policyreview.org

One Year (6 Issues) $26.95
Two Years (12 Issues) $49.95

A PUBLICATION OF THE HOOVER INSTITUTION
STANFORD UNIVERSITY

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Behind the Silk Curtain

Joe Bob Briggs

ISLAM KARIMOV was such a happy and contented Communist Party leader that, when his domain inconveniently became the independent republic of Uzbekistan in 1991, he simply took all the trappings of Soviet Communism—one-party rule, state control of the press, secret surveillance of the populace, five-year plans, government monopolization of the means of production—and converted them, lock, stock and political prison, into a well-oiled banana republic—or, to speak more properly, a cotton republic, since Uzbekistan was completely denuded and environmentally destroyed during its decades as the designated cotton supplier to the rest of the USSR.

Of course, there were little niggling problems for Karimov. He had to get a new flag. He had to invent a new name for the KGB. (He settled on National Security Service.) He had to learn Uzbek, since that's what some of the natives actually speak. He had to take the oath of office with one hand on the Quran and one hand on the new democratic constitution, which must have thoroughly revolted him since, in the intervening 13 years, he's never actually paid attention to either one.

You would think at some point he would have changed his first name, since he believes that most Islamists are threats to civilization and, more to the point, to his own life. But since the country is 86 percent Muslim, he's got that General Custer feeling in the pit of his stomach all the time. He deals with it by forcing all mosques to be approved by the state. Anyone caught worshipping at home (the official charge is being "too pious"), or praying in public (he forbids the mosques to broadcast the call to prayer), or wearing a beard (the symbol of what he inevitably calls "Wahhabism"), is subject to summary arrest and interrogation.

Karimov's most telling act of political symbolism was to take down all the statues of Marx and Lenin (and let's not forget Stalin, who had an especially strong statuary presence in Uzbekistan) and replace them with Tamerlane the conqueror.

Tamerlane had a way of uniting warring Central Asian tribes—with the sword—and Karimov feels a philosophical, if not spiritual, kinship. In one of Karimov's typically endless speeches to his parliament (the kind that are reported *Pravda*-style with notations of "unanimous ovation"), he said of the outlawed Muslim organizations: "Such people must be shot in the head. If necessary, I'll shoot them myself, if you lack the resolve." This is the kind of public strongman chutzpah we haven't been

Joe Bob Briggs is a Texas satirist whose latest book is *Profoundly Disturbing: Shocking Movies That Changed History* (Rizzoli, 2003).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

able to enjoy since the days of Nikita Khrushchev.

Islam Karimov's biography reads like a Monty Python skit about a humorless Bolshevik climber. Raised in a Tashkent orphanage (thereby realizing the early Soviet ideal of being educated entirely by the state), he was trained as an engineer (the prototypical job of the aspiring party member) and took his first job as assistant foreman at the Tashkent Farm Machinery Plant. (Say "Tashkent Farm Machinery Plant" with a John Cleese accent. Right, then. See what I mean?) He was quickly promoted to design engineer at the Chkalov Tashkent Aviation Production Complex, which supplied most of the cargo planes to the Soviet Union, and in 1966 started his party career as First Secretary of the Kashkadaria Regional Committee, which qualified him for a job at the State Planning Office.

That would be the same planning office that consistently met its cotton quotas on five-year plans—until satellite photos in the 1980s revealed that most of the cotton had never been planted, much less harvested. The cotton that *did* exist had been sold on the black market. By that time, Karimov was head of the State Planning Committee, so he bravely took to the offensive and, according to his official website, "resolutely defended his nation, rejected all criminal myths and defamations from outside by those who, for the sake of their career aspirations, tried to set up interrogation rooms in the ancient land of the Uzbeks." More than 50,000 bureaucrats were fired, but Karimov, at the top of the pyramid, survived and thrived, becoming Uzbek First Secretary in 1989.

Of course, that devotion to the "ancient land of the Uzbeks" is entirely a post-1991 phenomenon, occasioned by the failure of his Geezer Bolshevik pals to carry out their coup. Before independence, Karimov was part of the hardcore wing of the party, so much so that terms such as *glasnost* and *perestroika* were never used in Uzbekistan. "If we remain part of the Soviet Union", said Karimov as the tanks rolled through Moscow, "our rivers will flow with milk. If we don't, our rivers will flow with the blood of our people." As soon as the coup was suppressed, though, Karimov became a diehard nationalist—and started filling Uzbek rivers with the blood of his people.

For much of the rest of the 1990s he amused himself by hounding the political opposition into prison or exile, and inventing new ways to deal with this pesky constitution thing.

For his first election in 1991, he banned the Unity Party (founded by Tashkent intellectuals in 1989 and claiming a membership of 1.5 million) and the Islamic Renaissance Party on the grounds that they might put forward actual candidates who could receive actual votes. But to keep some semblance of democracy he found an opponent: a poet named Mohammed Solih, representing the Erk Party (I'm telling you, it's a whole Python episode).

Islam Karimov's biography reads like a Monty Python skit about a humorless Bolshevik climber.

The result was Karimov receiving 86 percent of the vote. Two points about this: 1) The fact that 12 percent voted for the Erk poet is pretty amazing in a country that has no idea what democracy is. 2) Karimov was so scared by that 12 percent that he drove the poet into exile, banned the Erk newspaper, drove Erk supporters out of legislatures, and made sure anyone else associated with Erk would be fired from his job, detained or interrogated. (Presumably he also banned the complete poetical works of Mohammed Solih, although there's no evidence that the public was clamoring for his stanzas.) Karimov's one concession: he allowed the

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

party to continue to exist. No doubt they gather on Wednesdays to read Kahlil Gibran under the watchful eye of a government agent.

For the 1995 election Karimov decided that, rather than being irked by Erk again, he would set up his own opposition party—the National Progress Party—but then apparently thought even that was too dangerous to public order. So the National Progress Party magnanimously decided not to run a candidate at all, and the voting was characterized as a "referendum" as opposed to an election, because Karimov had discovered, to his horror, that the constitution only allowed him to serve two terms.

Karimov maintained that the word "referendum" meant that his *first* term had merely been extended five years, so that he could run again in 2000. He did, of course, but he'd taken so much international heat for his "referendum" that he promised the next trip to the polls would be "an election with choices." That choice came in the form of a wimpy guy named Abdulhasiz Dzhalalov, who was so naive that he told reporters he was only in the race to make it appear democratic, and then proudly announced that he cast his own vote for Karimov. With such fierce opposition, Karimov was only able to garner 91.9 percent of the vote.

The Good Ol' Soviet Model

AS DICTATORS go, Karimov follows the Soviet model of persecution in that any international outcry can be characterized as meddling in the nation's internal affairs. He's old-fashioned about interrogation, favoring electric shock, rubber truncheons, rape of family members of those who won't reveal where the fugitive is, asphyxiation, suspension from wrists or ankles, needles under the fingernails and toenails, and that old favorite of the Hollywood thriller, burning with cigarettes. His sole innovation in this respect seems to be the recent boiling alive of two troublesome Muslims. Unfortunately the mother of one of the dead men, shopkeeper Fatima Mukhadirova, persuaded the British embassy to investigate her son's death, and the University of Glasgow conducted an autopsy on the body concluding that, yes, the man had been boiled (probably in water), but only *after* his head and neck had been severely beaten and all of his fingernails ripped off. For her pains, Fatima Mukhadirova was sentenced to six years hard labor—and was only released after an international outcry preceding Donald Rumsfeld's visit to Tashkent.

Which brings us to the point. Perhaps no world leader has benefitted more from 9/11 than Islam Karimov. Since most of his waking hours are spent figuring out how to eliminate Islam from his part of the planet, the U.S. declaration of war on the Taliban must have seemed like a gift from God (if not from Allah). Turkmenistan has a dictator even more iron-fisted that Karimov. Tajikistan is still bursting into periodic tribal warfare. Uzbekistan, on the other hand, has a capital city with a Le Meridien and an Intercontinental—in other words, just Western enough in a region that makes it its policy to hate the West.

So when Karimov granted the U.S. permission to use the Khanbad military base, he suddenly became America's best friend. (If you have any doubts, check the Uzbekistan website, which has ridiculously gleaming smiles on the faces of President Bush, Donald Rumsfeld, Colin Powell and Paul O'Neill as they gladhand the dictator.) In fact, making a pact with Karimov did accomplish three things for America: It provided the U.S. with a base for pursuing the Taliban, made inroads into the Kazakh and Turkmen oil and gas market (Caspian Sea pipeline politics), and gave America major influence in the most populous, settled and central of all

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the Central Asian republics. That's got to tick off Russia and China big-time.

For Karimov, the deal was just an open checkbook. When he met with Bush at the White House in March 2002, he went away with $500 million in aid and credit (more than 15 times what he would get in the normal course of things), $25 million in military assistance, $18 million for "border security", and $1 million for police. Bush called him one of America's "foremost partners in the fight against terrorism"—a sentiment that's been repeated by a parade of dignitaries that have made the trek to Tashkent, including Generals Tommy Franks, Richard Myers and Anthony Zinni, and Senators McCain, Lieberman and Daschle. Of course, while all this was going on, there were between 7,000 and 10,000 prisoners being held on religious and political charges in Uzbekistan.

The political charges Karimov didn't have to worry about. "Member of an Islamic terrorist organization", was pretty much all the explanation he had to give, although under Uzbek law they might have been imprisoned for such crimes as "encroachment on the constitutional order", "anti-state activities", "subversion" or "infringement upon the honor and dignity of the president"—an umbrella of terms that pretty much allows him to shackle up anyone—nutjob Islamist, simple believer or pro-Western secularist—who looks at him the wrong way.

The prisoners held on religious charges were a little bit more embarrassing for the United States, especially since one of America's stated goals in fighting the Taliban was to establish freedom of religion. To give you some idea of the schizophrenia of Karimov, he first established a human rights organization, then abducted the founder of it from a conference in Bishkek, and then charged him with sedition. No doubt the man had acted beyond his charter, like the Erk Party.

In other words, the War on Terror for Karimov is a bureaucratic convenience. Since his nation is full of outlawed parties run by Muslims, any one of them can be characterized as terrorist simply by its existence. To be fair, there are some scary Islamic parties in Uzbekistan, the kind that want to establish *sharia* and bring back the caliphate, but the majority of the underground movements just want simple democracy, which would result, of course, in an Islamic government of some kind, but not a theocracy, and certainly not the retro-Soviet model that Karimov upholds by sheer force of will. There are even parties that call for a secular government on the Turkish model, but those are lumped in with the others because Turkey, for Karimov, is just entirely too anarchic.

KARIMOV has quite a few things going for him as he exerts minority rule. For one thing, Uzbekistan is the most settled and populous of all Central Asian countries, with most of the people concentrated in Tashkent and the Fergana Valley, where the aforementioned cotton fiasco took place and where the ethnic broth has caused centuries of bloody strife. (The other two-thirds of the country is wasteland, including the Aral Sea, which was once the fourth-largest inland body of water in the world. Since 1961, it has lost more than 60 percent of its water as its feeder streams were used for cotton irrigation. It became so polluted with insecticides and fertilizers that it salinized, killing all the fish, grounding ships, poisoning the drinking water and the vegetables, and leaving a salty lethal dust throughout a moonscape of dead ponds and sandbars.) The people in the eastern third live in towns and villages that have changed little for two centuries, making surveillance easy. For example, each neighborhood still has its elder, called a

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

"white beard", who gets his authority from the community, but his wages from the government. Since no one in the neighborhood can do anything without the white beard's permission, these figureheads are used by Karimov as enforcers and informants. There's no intelligentsia to speak of; it was originally wiped out by Stalin, then periodically purged by subsequent Soviet leaders. The purge of the Unity Party was the latest successful effort to drive the liberal democrats into exile. The mean monthly income is $50—high by Central Asian standards, but not high enough to create a dangerous middle class. The "sum", as the currency is called, is not convertible, so there's virtually no foreign investment and, by necessity, a barter economy. (The sum is devaluing at the rate of 30 percent per year.) The country's biggest highway runs from Tashkent to Termiz on the Afghan border—literally a dead end in terms of trade. Just as the Iron Curtain protected the Bolsheviks for seven decades, Uzbekistan's isolation (the Silk Curtain?) protects Karimov.

And so Karimov is able to rule a nation of 24 million with relative ease because it's full of extremely large families (more women with ten or more children under the age of twenty than any other former Soviet republic; half the population under age 15 have no upward mobility nor means of migration (although 60,000 do manage to leave the country each year). In some respects the population lives as it did 15 centuries ago. (Silkworms, for example, are raised in homes, a literal cottage industry.) Although the population is overwhelmingly Sunni Muslim, there is one extremely important Shi'i shrine in Shakhimardan—the resting place of Ali, son-in-law of Mohammed and fourth caliph, whom all Shi'a consider second only to Muhammad himself in holiness. The mosque and tomb there were torched in the early 1920s, probably by Bolsheviks, and during the Soviet era it was renamed in honor of a secular Communist poet (I'm not making this up), but the desecration of the site rankles the Shi'a and makes for some strange alliances with their nominal Sunni rivals.

In other words, there's just enough radical Muslim unrest for Karimov to justify any level of suppression to his War on Terror friends in the West. His number one enemy is the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), a largely secret organization that wants to establish a theocracy. Two IMU rebels have been sentenced to death in absentia, and many other members are languishing in prison. These are real terrorists, suspected in six bomb attacks in Tashkent in 1999 that killed 16 people, and they have also been known to trade Western hostages for money.

Karimov uses these bad guys to extend his xenophobia to other groups, including people who aren't Muslim at all. Jews, Crimean Tatars, Germans, Greeks, Meskhetian Turks and Slavs have all been leaving the country rather than expose their bosses to the embarrassing chore of firing them. Censorship was officially abolished in 2002, but press restrictions still forbid mentioning corruption, drug trafficking, Islam or anything resembling criticism of Karimov. Five journalists are currently in prison, including the freedom-of-the-press activist Ruslan Sharipov, serving four years.

Getting Away with It

FOR THE most part, Karimov has been allowed to get away with it. Even when he has appeared at Western press conferences, usually alongside U.S. leaders, he's gotten softball questions. The sole exception I know of was Andrea Koppel of CNN, who used Colin Powell's visit to Tashkent to ask Karimov, "What do you say to your critics who say that you are nothing more than a brutal, repressive, authoritarian dictator?"

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Karimov's reply could best be described as indignant confusion. "I am very surprised to hear the question you posed", said the man who longs for the simplicity of communist times.

> And I believe that these questions that are asked are due to be asked and probably we cannot circumvent these questions. We have to answer them. What can I answer? My answer is that one is to see things rather than hear them one hundred times. I would like to invite you for communication with me on a more permanent basis and believe that I will not disappoint you.

For some reason I find this answer, in all its opaque evasion, strangely unsettling. It's the answer of a man who's not used to being asked questions at all, much less questions that suggest his performance is subject to review. It's almost delusional in its raving complexity, the reaction of a man in the first moment after he's been shot.

Of course, we should have expected that. Karimov is one of those old-school Tyrants of the Book who, like Lenin and Stalin, has his every utterance recorded as holy writ. We don't have space here to list all eleven of the books he's published since 1996, but suffice it to say, they begin with the page-turner *Uzbekistan: National Independence, Political Ideology*. After that, they get progressively longer and denser, reaching a kind of apex of prolixity with his 2000 masterwork, *Our High Goal Is the Independence and Prosperity of Our Motherland, Freedom and Welfare of Our People* (I checked Barnes & Noble, but they're all sold out.)

The only other person who speaks publicly in Tashkent about the freedom and welfare of the Uzbeks is this fellow Craig Murray, the British ambassador, who had the bad manners to say in an October 2002 Tashkent speech that Uzbekistan is not a democracy, that it's not becoming a democracy, and that Karimov's war against terrorism is simply an excuse for persecution.

The American embassy, which had gone to great pains to portray Uzbekistan as an "emerging" democracy, was extremely upset. Uzbek leaders demanded an apology. Ambassador Murray refused to stand down, continuing to rail against the government as late as August 2003, speaking about repression of political activity, lack of free speech, the inequality of wealth, the absence of reform, and, by the way, the systematic use of torture. Eventually he caused so much alarm in London that he was investigated by the Foreign Office for misconduct. In October 2003 he returned to London for "medical reasons", but he's continued to make speeches about Karimov's government, and the U.S. embassy in Tashkent has made no secret of loathing him.

Of course, Murray is not saying anything that hasn't been said already by various international aid agencies. The Amnesty International report from 2000 recounts the torture of five members of the Party of Liberation (a banned Islamic group that professes to be non-violent) through such means as suffocation with a plastic bag, hanging upside down, needles under the nails, burning of the hands and feet, and electric shocks administered via devices fitted to their heads. The top United Nations official on torture, Theo van Boven, said in December 2002 that such treatment—in order to force confessions—is "not just incidental but has a nature of being systemic in this country."

Everything started to get messy around 1999, after a failed attempt on Karimov's life (always a wakeup call for a dictator), resulting in more roundups, summary trials, detentions—and an emboldened resistance. A few months back, 43 people were killed in Tashkent and Bukhara over three days, when the nation's first suicide bombings took place. And there are indications that the Islamic militants are mobilizing for more. But the

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

dissidents may have overplayed their hand. President Bush, no doubt at Karimov's urging, issued a statement, saying,

> These attacks only strengthen our resolve to defeat terrorists wherever they hide and strike, working in close cooperation with Uzbekistan and our other partners in the Global War on Terror.

In other words: the West doesn't regard these as liberation movements.

But had Karimov pulled a bait-and-switch? The official Uzbek press blamed the bombings on the Party of Liberation, which had hitherto been non-violent and issued a denial of involvement from its London office. The much more likely assassins would have been the IMU, which is pretty well tied to terrorism throughout the region but is less of a long-term threat to Karimov. (The IMU is mostly made up of impoverished farmers, whereas the Party of Liberation is made up of college-educated urbanites.) Karimov used the attacks to link the Party of Liberation to "international terror", whereas Human Rights Watch and other groups said it was simply a homegrown insurgency in response to secret police practices such as parading prisoners before their neighbors and forcing them to publicly confess themselves as traitors and enemies of the state, or arresting entire families in order to gain the surrender of a relative. The truth in Central Asia is always hard to sort out, but Karimov made clear where he stands:

> I'm prepared to rip off the heads of 200 people, to sacrifice their lives, in order to save peace and calm in the republic. . . . If my child chose such a path, I myself would rip off his head.

The week before he said that, Karimov and his ministers had formally declared 2004 "The Year of Kindness and Mercy" in Uzbekistan. Presumably this means they had dismantled one of their flesh-boiling cauldrons as a prelude to reform. □

Islam's Despotism by the Numbers

Overall megalomania rating: 94
Sexual proclivities: Lifelong marriage, 2 daughters
Meetings with Jimmy Carter: 0 (but after 9/11, he did meet with Zbigniew Brzezinski, Jimmy's former National Security Adviser)
Death index: 24 (prefers dungeons and frowns on starvation)
Destruction index: 82 (supervised the Planning Office when the Aral Sea was destroyed, and millions of acres became unusable for generations)
Depletion of natural resources index: 100 (see above)
Preferred form of elections: One candidate "with choices"
Parliamentary façade index: 97
Toys: The kind of baronial mansion favored by the commisars of old
Preferred weapons: Electrical devices, truncheons, cigarettes
Preferred structure of goon squads: Faceless secret policemen
Theory of government: I am the people
Sartorial preference: English-cut suits, circa 1985
Preferred housing: See *Toys*, above
Nepotism index: 48. A low figure due primarily to his lack of extensive familial relations. Most of his appointments would be more accurately described as cronyism.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

IN THE NATIONAL INTEREST

Weekly
Commentary and
Analysis on
Foreign Policy

www.inthenationalinterest.com

In the National Interest (ITNI), an online weekly magazine produced by *The National Interest* and *The Nixon Center*, combines provocative interviews with American and foreign decision-makers and opinion-leaders, insightful commentary from leading practitioners and analysts, and original reporting from around the world with an unabashed realist perspective on the issues of the day.

Log onto **www.inthenationalinterest.com** to read the current issue or to review the archives. And register online for a free email subscription, delivered to your inbox every Wednesday.

Internship Opportunities at THE NATIONAL INTEREST

THE NATIONAL INTEREST seeks an editorial intern to assist in magazine production and business management. Editorial opportunities commensurate with abilities. Strong organizational skills, an ability to work independently and a flexible schedule are preferred.

An internship at THE NATIONAL INTEREST is an excellent way to learn more about contemporary foreign policy issues and the publishing process. It can also provide important opportunities to meet influential people in government, think tanks and the media.

To apply, please send a résume and cover letter to the MANAGING EDITOR by email to editor@nationalinterest.org, by fax to 202-467-0006, or by mail to THE NATIONAL INTEREST, 1615 L Street, NW, Suite 1230, Washington, DC 20036.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

China's Growing Appetites

David Hale

THERE IS a major new issue looming in global geopolitics which has so far attracted little attention from either policymakers or pundits. It is the emergence of China as the world's largest consumer and importer of many industrial raw materials. After several years of robust growth, China has displaced the United States as the dominant market and price setter for copper, iron ore, aluminum, platinum and other commodities. This development has occurred so quickly that governments have not yet had time to ponder its implications. But just as the need for commodities has driven the foreign policy of Britain and the United States on many occasions since the mid-19th century, so now will China's need for commodities force it to develop a new strategy for foreign policy and security policy. China's appetite for raw materials will also have profound implications for the foreign policies of the United States, China's Asian neighbors, and the countries in the Third World that will soon emerge as China's primary suppliers.[1] Economic factors have long played a role shaping foreign policy and security policy. The transformation now occurring in China's economic status is likely to be as transforming an event in geopolitics as America's arrival as a world power during the early decades of the 20th century.

FEW WOULD argue that China has not emerged as one of the world's economic powerhouses. It has enjoyed several years of output growth in the 7–9 percent range. In late 2003 its year-on-year growth of industrial production was 18 percent, while export growth exceeded 40 percent. China's share of world exports is now approaching 6 percent and will probably overtake Japan's this year. The great growth engine of China during the past two years has been capital spending. China's investment share of GDP is now approaching 45 percent, the highest in the world. During the east Asian economic boom of the early 1990s, some countries had investment-to-GDP ratios as high as 42 percent, but most developing countries today are clustered in the 20–30 percent range. China's investment spending is so robust that it raises disturbing questions about the allocation of capital: the country may create so much excess capacity that profitability declines. But in contrast to east Asia six years ago, China's investment boom is unlikely to produce a

David Hale, a global economist, is the founder of Hale Advisors, LLC and is also chairman of the board of China Online, LLC.

[1]See Nikolas K. Gvosdev, "Competing for Power", *The National Interest* (Winter 2003/04–S, Special Energy Supplement).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

financial crisis because it is being financed primarily by domestic savings. The Chinese savings rate is so high that the country is still running a modest current account surplus, despite one of the highest investment rates ever recorded in world economic history.

As a result of this boom, China has developed a voracious appetite for raw materials. Its commodity imports cost $140 billion last year, and its trade deficit on them was $100 billion. China's imports of iron ore have increased from 14 million tons in 1990 to 148 million in 2003. China's imports of aluminum have shot up from 1 million tons to 5.6 million tons. Imports of refined copper have risen from 20,000 tons in 1990 to over 1.2 million tons last year. Imports of platinum have leaped from 20,000 ounces in 1993 to 1.6 million last year. Imports of nickel have risen from zero to 61,500 tons during 2003. The impact of China's raw material demand on global trade has been so dramatic that shipping rates have quadrupled during the past 18 months.

There are now some commodities in which China is a larger consumer than the United States. In late 2003 China accounted for 20.6 percent of global copper demand compared to 16 percent for the United States. In 2005 China will probably account for 21 percent of global aluminum demand compared to 20 percent for the United States. China also accounts for 35 percent of global coal production, 20 percent of zinc output, 20 percent of magnesium output and 16 percent of phosphate output. This is all the more remarkable given that China's real GDP is probably half of America's.[2] And since the real incomes of China's people are only now rising to levels that generate large demands for material goods such as autos, appliances and houses, its consumption of raw materials is poised for explosive growth.

Steel is a sector in which China has emerged as the world's dominant player. China's steel production is now running at 220 million tons per annum, more than the United States and Japan combined. Since it is also importing 40 million tons, China's steel companies are planning to add another 200 million tons of capacity during the next few years. The stock market capitalization of China's steel industry is now $41 billion compared to $11 billion for the United States, $50 billion for Japan, and $12 billion for Korea.

The growth of China's steel industry is highly correlated with the country's pace of urbanization. As the experiences of the United States and Japan have demonstrated, urbanization creates tremendous demand for raw materials. Between 1900 and 1970, America's urban population grew from 30 million to 154 million. At the same time, America's per capita steel consumption increased sixfold. Between 1950 and 1970, Japan's urban population increased by 70 percent and per capita steel consumption increased eightfold, reaching a peak 20 percent higher than America's. As China is currently only 40 percent urban and 60 percent rural, there will be huge pent-up demand for steel to build new cities and expand existing ones.

The urbanization factor is producing explosive growth in China's demand for cement as well. China has been the world's largest consumer and producer of cement since 1985. It represents 40 percent of world cement production and already has an intensity of per capita use higher than America's. In fact, China's cement consumption is over 640 million tons per annum, a level six times higher than U.S. consumption.

China's steel boom has also changed its role in the world coal market. As a result of the robust domestic demand, China's exports of thermal coal have fallen from 80 million tons in 1991 to 74 mil-

[2]The nominal GDP figures are $1.3 trillion for China and $10 trillion for the United States.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

lion tons in 2003 and numbers potentially as low as 55 million tons this year. China is also now importing coking coal rather than exporting it. Given that China was an important coal exporter, the result of these declining sales has been large price increases. World thermal coal prices rose by 20 percent last year and are likely to increase another 40 percent this year.

China has large reserves of some raw materials but is very dependent upon imports for others. It has 54 percent of the world's manganese reserves, 23 percent of lead reserves, 22 percent of silver reserves, 12 percent of coal reserves, 11 percent of vanadium reserves, and 6 percent of copper reserves. China is also a growing factor in the market for agricultural commodities, having recently displaced Japan as the number-two market for rubber imports. Despite U.S. trade sanctions on imports of its textile products, China increased imports of cotton from the United States by 700 percent during 2003.

China's appetite for food imports is likely to expand because of increasing urbanization and water shortages. China is trying to feed 20 percent of the world's population on 7 percent of its arable land. It currently employs 370 million people to produce as much food as 2 million American farmers. The amount of land being harvested has declined from 90 million hectares in 1998 to 76 million last year. There is also a serious water shortage in the north, where grain production is largest. China has four-fifths of its water in the south, while two-thirds of its cropland is in the north. Water per acre of cropland is therefore only one-eighth of that in the south. The supply of water is also being depleted because of diversion of water from rivers to cities, the depletion of underground supplies in aquifers, and the increasing pollution caused by industrialization.

After a remarkable expansion of grain production from 90 million tons in 1950 to 392 million tons in 1998, China's grain harvest has fallen in four of the last five years—dropping to 322 million tons in 2003 (a decline in output exceeding the entire grain production of Canada). Production of rice and corn has declined as well. As a result of the increasing constraints on China's agricultural production, the World Bank is forecasting that China's net grain imports will rise to 14 million tons in 2005, 19 million tons in 2010, and 32 million tons in 2020. The USDA is forecasting that China's grain imports could be as high as 57 million tons in 2020. In February and March of this year, Chinese trade delegations came to the United States and signed contracts to purchase 1.38 million tons of wheat for delivery in 2003–04 and a further three million tons during 2004–05. China's imports of soya during 2003 also exceeded production for the first time ever. At present, China's food imports represent about 4 percent of domestic agricultural value-added, very similar to the ratios for other developing countries such as Brazil, India and Indonesia.[3] China's ratio of imports to agricultural value-added will probably rise to 15–20 percent during the next twenty years, producing a growth rate for food imports of at least 24 percent.

THE OTHER commodity market where China is rapidly emerging as a major factor is oil. The International Energy Association is projecting that China's oil demand will rise to 6.2 million barrels per day (BPD) this year from 5.49 million last year. As a result of this surging demand, China has displaced Japan as the world's second-largest oil consumer and will become a progressively larger importer in

[3]The figures in developed countries are much higher, falling at about 35 percent in the European Union and United States and over 65 percent in Japan despite controls on rice imports.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the future. China became a modest oil importer during the mid-1990s and in 2000 imported about 1.3 million BPD. Analysts expect this number to rise to 2.5 million BPD in 2005 and 3.3 million BPD in 2010. By 2030 China's oil imports could reach 7.3 million BPD compared to 6.8 for Japan, 14.6 for Europe, and 24.3 for the United States. China is also making plans to import large quantities of liquid natural gas (LNG) from Australia, Indonesia and Iran.

China's oil demand is being driven by the industrial boom and rapid growth of car ownership. Private auto sales have increased from only token levels ten years ago to 2 million per annum recently. It is estimated that China could have 28 million private autos by 2010. As a result, autos could account for 40 percent of China's oil consumption in six years compared to only 10 percent in 1995.

Despite the large increases in demand, China's per capita consumption of raw materials is still very modest compared to America. In 2002 China's per capita consumption of copper was less than one-third of America's, while per capita consumption of aluminum was only one-fifth. It would not be difficult to imagine scenarios in which China could account for 30–40 percent of global metal consumption by 2025, as per capita consumption moves closer to the global average.

DOES THE world have an adequate supply of raw materials to satisfy Chinese demand? The world is well endowed with some minerals but could experience shortages of others if current growth rates of consumption persist for another decade. According to industry analysts, the world currently has 85 years of bauxite reserves, 55 years of iron ore reserves, 14 years of copper reserves, and 11 years of zinc reserves. The potential scarcity of copper could encourage more competitive bidding by global mining companies—including China's—for reserves.

China could be especially vulnerable to copper shortages because it satisfies only 18 percent of its consumption with domestic supplies. China is becoming a huge consumer of copper for the same reason it has done so for steel. Construction is the largest consumer of copper, accounting for 36 percent of global demand, followed by electronics (27 percent) and a variety of durable goods industries, such as autos. China has already made one investment in the Zambian copper industry and is searching for others. As a result of its domestic supply shortage, the odds are high that Chinese companies will scan the world for new deposits to develop in order to ensure an adequate supply for the domestic market when global supply conditions tighten during the next decade.

China's need for raw materials has led to large price increases during the past two years for iron ore, steel, copper, soybeans and other commodities. Since October 2001, the *Economist*'s "All Items" index of commodity prices has increased by 59 percent. The prices of industrial raw materials have jumped by 73 percent. These price gains are not yet dissimilar to those that occurred during the cyclical economic upturns of the late 1980s and mid-1990s. In real terms, commodity prices are still far below their previous peaks. But if the global economy recovers further this year, there could be larger price gains.[4]

China's demand for raw materials has also created concerns about commodity shortages in some sectors. Companies in North America and Europe have become concerned about steel supplies. In the United States, scrap-metal dealers have

[4]Indeed, China's demand for these materials could work to offset the downward pressure on global prices caused by future American recessions.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

appealed to the Commerce Department to restrict exports of scrap metal to China because of the large price increase caused by Chinese demand. The Nixon Administration used to restrict exports of commodities during the high-inflation era of the early 1970s, but the current administration will be reluctant to ration exports to China at a time when the United States is running such a large trade deficit with the country, opting instead to let China reallocate commodity supplies by driving prices higher.

Options

THESE developments will, in turn, lead to a variety of political and economic consequences. First, like previous Great Powers, Beijing will develop a foreign policy and military strategy to protect its access to raw materials. As its trade ties expand with commodity exporting countries in Latin America, Africa and the Middle East, China will want to ensure that they are reliable suppliers of critical raw materials. While the sheer growth of trade should help to promote good political relations, there are a number of ways in which China can be expected to hedge its bets.

As the experiences of the United States and Great Britain have shown, the capability to project military power outside the near abroad is essential to securing access to natural resources. Though it has been over 500 years since China last deployed naval vessels far from the country's territorial waters, if it becomes dependent upon raw materials from regions as diverse and complex as those mentioned above, it will have to develop the forces necessary—most importantly a blue-water navy—to protect its interests in these strategically vital areas.

China's current involvement in Sudan demonstrates both the type of situation in which China might find itself in the future and Beijing's potential response. China has already deployed 4,000 troops to Sudan to protect its investment in an oil pipeline developed with the Malaysian firm Petronas. China is concerned that Sudan's ongoing civil war could disrupt the pipeline, so it has moved to ensure the project's security. While there has been little international attention focused on China's role in the Sudan, it could set an important precedent.

China may also attempt to enhance its political relationship with the commodity producing countries in various parts of the world by promoting bilateral free trade agreements (FTA). Beijing, for example, is now holding talks with the Australian government about a potential FTA because of Australia's large reserves of natural gas, coal, iron ore and other raw materials. And at a recent Africa-China summit conference in Addis Ababa, China pledged to boost its two-way trade with Africa to $30 billion by 2005 from $12.4 billion during 2002. China intends to broaden its imports of oil and a variety of other commodities as well as to promote more investment.

Brazil, for example, is very excited about the potential for developing a "strategic partnership" with China. Brazil views a close relationship with China as a pillar of its foreign policy because it wants to promote a network of alliances with other developing countries to challenge American hegemony.[5] The Brazilians believe China can play a major role in such a system. China actually regards itself as an emerging superpower, not just a developing country, but it will accommodate Brazil's ambitions because it plans to expand massively its trade with Brazil. Chinese firms are planning a $2 billion investment in Brazil's aluminum industry and a $1.5 billion investment in the steel sector.

[5]See Luisa Angrisani, "More Latin, Less America?", *The National Interest*, (Fall 2003).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

China has already moved from being Brazil's 15th-largest trading partner in 1999 to being its second-largest last year because of large increases in imports of soybeans and iron ore. Brazil hopes to boost its China exports to $10 billion by 2005 because of demand for many commodities, including dairy products, cotton, tropical fruit, fish and coffee. Brazil also has the potential greatly to increase its output of soybeans. In 2003 China accounted for one-third of global trade in soy products and 20 percent of soy oil. As a result of China, Latin America now sends a rapidly growing share of its exports to east Asia, including 13 percent of pulp sales, 13 percent of steel, 43 percent of iron ore, and 26 percent of copper. As a result, Chile also plans to launch FTA talks with China.

CHINA'S NEED for petroleum could also transform its relationship with Russia. Trade between Russian and China is booming. It is likely to reach $22 billion this year, a level four times higher than it was five years ago. The countries are also planning infrastructure investments that could further enhance trade. In February China announced that it would embark upon a 15-year project to build a railroad that would run 870 miles from eastern Russia to Dalian, a seaport in Manchuria. China is anxious to develop corporate relationships with Russian energy companies to obtain petroleum. The Chinese also attempted to purchase a medium-sized Russian oil company, Slavneft, in 2002, but the deal was blocked by the Russian government. (The delegation from the Chinese National Petroleum Company was arrested when they arrived in Russia.)

China's ambitions in Russia, however, are complicated by the fact that Russia is highly insecure about its eastern frontier. The Russians fear that China could someday threaten their eastern territory because much of it was controlled by China before the conquests of the 19th century.[6] There is also a huge imbalance of population. The Russian provinces in the Far East have lost 2 million people during the past decade, while it is estimated that 3 million Chinese have crossed the border. There are also 127 million people in the three adjoining Chinese provinces. At present, 66 percent of Russia's oil production and 91 percent of its gas production comes from fields in western Siberia. But oil analysts estimate that eastern Siberia and the Russian Far East could contain 110 billion barrels of oil.

During 2003 China and Japan competed for the right to develop an oil pipeline in Russia for their respective markets.[7] The Chinese formed an alliance with YUKOS while the Japanese focused on the government pipeline monopoly, Transneft. YUKOS agreed to sell China 300,000 BPD starting in 2006, an amount triple the level of China's oil imports from Russia in 2003 and six times higher than in 2002. When the Chinese chose YUKOS as a partner, it was regarded as Russia's most successful and transparent oil company. Since then, YUKOS's star has fallen with the decision of Vladimir Putin to arrest its CEO, Mikhail Khodorkovsky, for meddling in politics. The Russian government has subsequently announced that it will support the construction of an oil pipeline following the proposed Japanese route but with a branch extending to Daqing, China's largest oilfield. The new pipeline will stretch over 4,000 kilometers and run close to the border of the autonomous region of inner Mongolia, where the branch to Daqing will peel off.

---

[6]See Rajan Menon, "The Sick Man of Asia", *The National Interest* (Fall 2003).

[7]One Western oil company conducted an opinion survey of Russian attitudes towards foreign investment and found far more acceptance of Japanese than Chinese investment.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Russia will be able to satisfy the new demand for oil only by developing deposits in eastern Siberia closer to the Chinese border. Although China perceives that Russia stole land from it during the 19th century, it has not yet begun to demand the return of lost territory. Indeed, the greater risk to Russia's territorial security could ultimately prove to be American and European trade policy. Beijing currently plans to pay for its commodity imports by exporting a growing volume of manufactured goods. If the United States and Europe attempt to curb China's exports, Beijing will have no way to pay for its rapidly growing imports of oil and other raw materials. In such a scenario, China could decide that the most attractive way of securing adequate energy supplies would be to reclaim lost territory in the Russian Far East with large oil reserves. Russia could thus become the casualty of protectionist trade policies in North America and Europe.

While Russia has been ambiguous about its relationship with China, Kazakhstan has given China a warm welcome. The Chinese National Petroleum Company has invested $700 million in oil development. China is about to spend $3 billion on a new pipeline from Atasu to China's Xinjiang Autonomous Region. The three section trunkline of over 3,000 kilometers will ultimately be able to deliver 20 million tons of Caspian Sea crude to western China. As Kazakhstan currently exports 70 percent of its oil via pipelines passing through Russia, it is anxious to develop new markets.

OTHER REGIONS that could be vulnerable to Chinese territorial claims are the Senkaku Islands (the Chinese call them the Daiyous) and the Spratly Islands in the South China Sea. It is widely perceived that both sets of islands could provide access to large oil reserves. In the 1970s Deng Xiaoping declined to pursue territorial claims in China's neighborhood. He said that conflicts over the islands should be "left for the next generation." In November 2002 ASEAN and China concluded a treaty that called on all claimants to avoid actions that might heighten tensions in the flashpoint region. This was further reinforced last winter by a non-aggression pact with ASEAN. But in recent months, Beijing has once again begun to speak out about its claims. It has criticized Vietnam for attempting to give oil drilling rights to foreign companies and promoting tourism on the Spratly Islands, and it recently allowed a group of Chinese nationalists to land on the Senkaku Islands and plant a flag. The Chinese were promptly arrested by the Japanese police and then sent home to a hero's welcome. The new regime of Hu Jintao has been constantly stressing to other Asian countries that China's emergence as a great power will not threaten them, but China's concern about securing adequate oil supplies could encourage Beijing to become more assertive again over territorial claims in regions which adjoin large oil supplies. As with Russia, the ultimate determinant of how far China will go in pursuing its claims may depend upon western trade policy. If the United States and Europe make it difficult for China to pay for oil imports with exports of manufactured goods, China could decide to pursue a more aggressive foreign policy to obtain oil from disputed territories.

A second potential development is China's likely emergence as a more important player in financing the development of natural resources. The Chinese regard ownership as an important element of control. In the United States, for example, they purchased cutting rights over large tracts of timberland nearly 25 years ago. The big Chinese oil companies are now investing in oil development projects in Indonesia, Latin America, Africa and Australia. China's steel industry has made large investments in Australia's iron ore

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

mines and is planning to develop a joint venture to produce steel in Brazil. The Chinese bought a Zambian copper mine during the late 1990s. The government of Papua New Guinea has invited Chinese firms to bid for a major nickel development project and to acquire a large shareholding in a pipeline that it wants to construct in Australia.

In the past, the largest corporate players in the development of global commodity production have been companies from the United States and the Commonwealth, especially Canada, Australia and South Africa. These companies are currently holding negotiations with China about both investing in new Chinese projects as well as forming joint ventures with Chinese firms to develop mines in other countries. Rio Tinto has several joint ventures with China in Australia. BHP recently announced plans for a 25-year iron ore supply contract to China which will include large Chinese investments in its mines. Four Chinese steel companies will own 40 percent of the mines. As a result of China's obsession with the issue of control, the odds are high that China will emerge as an important partner, if not full owner, of many new natural resource projects.

Chinese firms could also emerge as competitors with American and European firms. Saudi Arabia, for example, recently allowed Chinese firms to invest in its new natural gas industry while excluding American firms from the project. The Saudis were attracted to China because it could be a huge market and there were no tensions over issues such as Israel and terrorism. China also supplied intermediate range ballistic missiles to Saudi Arabia several years ago and collaborated in a Saudi-financed project to develop nuclear power in Pakistan. If the U.S. relationship with the Saudis continues to deteriorate, China could emerge as a more important player in providing them security.[8] President Hu Jintao recently conducted a tour of Algeria, Egypt and Gabon to discuss plans to purchase more petroleum from each country and to expand Chinese investment. In July 2003 the China National Petroleum Corporation spent $350 million acquiring several oil refineries in Algeria. China also just announced plans to purchase 2.5 million tons of LNG per annum from Iran starting in 2008. This project is worth $20 billion and is the largest LNG contract in the world.

Third, China's huge demand for raw materials could produce a sustained improvement in the terms of trade with the developing countries. Since World War II, the developing countries have often suffered from declining commodity prices, especially during periods of recession in the U.S. economy. There were major developing-country debt crises during the early 1980s because of a severely restrictive U.S. monetary policy that depressed commodity prices. Russia defaulted on its debt during 1998 because of a large drop in the oil price that crippled tax revenues. In the future it is possible that Chinese monetary policy might play a more critical role than American monetary policy in determining commodity prices. What remains to be seen is whether China will be more sensitive to its global monetary role than the Americans were in the past.

Fourth, China will emerge as an important factor in the conduct of monetary policy by the G-7 countries. During the past year, China's boom has produced a 25 percent increase in America's crude-materials price index. In the past such large increases in commodity prices might have provoked the Federal Reserve to raise interest rates. But the Fed has not tightened in part because China's exports of manufactured goods are helping to restrain America's consumer price index. Wal-Mart, for example, is

[8]For more on the emerging Sino-Saudi relationship, see Martin Sieff's article in this issue.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

now purchasing $14 billion of goods from Chinese companies and $26 billion from American, Japanese and Korean companies using China as an export base. The import of low-priced goods from China is limiting the ability of American firms to raise prices despite rising raw material costs. But at some point, rising commodity prices could cause higher inflation and force central banks to raise interest rates. In the past, the G-7 central banks focused primarily on their own business cycles and the American economy. In the future, they will have to take account of how fluctuations in the Chinese economy are affecting global commodity prices.

DURING MUCH of China's history, it was difficult for western countries to pay for their imports of silk and porcelain because China did not want western products. (The British introduced opium in order to reduce their trade deficit with China.) In the modern era there are no such constraints on China's trade. In contrast to the era before the industrial revolution, China has an immense appetite for both manufactured goods and commodities from the rest of the world, and it plans to expand exports of manufactured goods in order to pay for these imports. The great risk to this equilibrium is trade policy in the industrial countries. Some countries want to impose trade barriers on Chinese imports. The U.S. Treasury is calling upon China to revalue the country's currency in order to reduce its export competitiveness. China has joined the World Trade Organization (WTO) in order to demonstrate its willingness to open its own markets, but WTO entry does not guarantee that markets will always remain open for China's exports: the United States and Europe have reserved the right to declare trade emergencies and unilaterally constrain Chinese exports of textiles as well as other products.

China's response to the demand for exchange rate revaluation has been a dramatic increase in currency market intervention in order to promote exchange rate stability. During the past year, China has purchased $100 billion of U.S. government securities in order to maintain a stable exchange rate *vis-à-vis* the dollar. China is not unique in pursuing such a policy: Japan has also spent nearly $300 billion during the past year attempting to maintain a stable exchange rate for the yen against the dollar. The east Asian countries have become so concerned about currency stability that they are prepared to finance 50–60 percent of America's budget deficit.[9]

In fact, it would not be an exaggeration to suggest that the financial underpinning of the Bush Administration's economic and foreign policies is the ownership by east Asian central banks of vast quantities of U.S. government debt. These banks now have $2.1 trillion of foreign exchange reserves which are nearly 90 percent invested in U.S. government securities. Indeed, it is the willingness of the east Asian central banks to fund the U.S. budget deficit which has permitted the Bush Administration to pursue a highly expansionary fiscal policy without any adverse consequences for the domestic bond market. The Bush Administration is so concerned about manufacturing job losses that it does not want to acknowledge its unusual financial dependence upon east Asia, but the reality is that their currency intervention has become a *de facto* form of burden sharing for the Bush foreign and defense policies. China is anxious to maintain a stable exchange rate because of concerns about the stability of its financial system and the fact that it has lost ten times as many manufacturing jobs as the United

[9]See David M. Lampton, "The Stealth Normalization of U.S.-China Relations", *The National Interest* (Fall 2003).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

States during the past six years due to the restructuring of its state-owned enterprises.[10]

CHINA'S ECONOMIC take-off and new role in the global commodity markets has occurred so quickly that the United States and other countries have not yet fully come to terms with it. All are extremely sensitive to the risk of job losses resulting from China's export growth, but they have not devised a strategy for coping with the larger consequences of China's new role. There are many questions that loom. If China accounts for 30–40 percent of global metal consumption in 15 years, what will be the consequences for commodity prices and trade flows? Will China become the dominant trading partner of countries as diverse as Australia, South Africa and Brazil? If China assumes such a role, will it attempt to develop a larger blue-water navy to protect the ships providing critical supplies of oil, iron ore and other raw materials? Will China become a major investor in developing countries in order to finance the development of new natural resource projects? Will China follow in the footsteps of the United States and Britain by intervening in the domestic political affairs of countries vital to its national interest? Will China offer arms supplies to developing countries in order to enhance its access to their commodity production? Is the intervention in the Sudan only the first step to a much larger Chinese military role all over the Third World?

The United States has clashed with China in the past over its policy in the Middle East. During the late 1990s, China offered to sell military technology to Iran in order to enhance its access to energy supplies. The United States protested, and China ultimately backed down. But as a result of China's new circumstances, the temptation will be strong for China to pursue a variety of diplomatic strategies for enhancing its access to raw materials. The challenge for the United States will be to demonstrate that it can accommodate China's need for raw materials and play a cooperative role in helping Beijing to assure adequate supplies. The United States has always supported a policy of open sea lanes and protection of private property, and it should now reassure China that it will use its own military forces to assure the safety and security of Chinese vessels and others carrying critical raw materials. The United States should also attempt to collaborate with China in developing a common policy for third world countries. As with the Sudan, it is not difficult to imagine countries as diverse as the Congo, Papua New Guinea or even Saudi Arabia turning to China for help in suppressing rebellions or protecting political elites. In the past, the United States would have reacted adversely to the deployment of Chinese troops anywhere. But as a result of China's new role in the global commodity markets, the United States will have to recognize that China has new security concerns that it should attempt to manage rather than simply reject.

China announced a major breakthrough in its third world relationships in April when it said that it would join the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG). China's application to the forty-nation club is an important recognition that it is in China's interest to be seen working with other leading countries in regulating the transfer of nuclear technology and material. China also wants to improve its own access to nuclear technology from the United States because of its plans to increase the role of nuclear energy within China. As a result of this decision, China will no longer be able openly to offer Middle Eastern countries access to nuclear technology as a *quid pro quo* for oil supplies.

---

[10]See Ian Campbell, "Retreat from Globalization", *The National Interest* (Spring 2004).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

In the 1950s and 1960s, the Chinese relationship with the Third World was heavily influenced by the 1954 Bandung summit conference in Indonesia. At that summit, the leaders of newly independent countries of Asia and Africa pledged to work together on behalf of a non-aligned Third World. During the 1960s China helped Zambia to cope with Rhodesian trade sanctions by constructing a railway from Dar es Salsam to Lusaka. In the future, China will have a different relationship with developing countries. It will become both their primary export market and an investor in their natural-resource industries. China's negotiations with them over commodity contracts will have a major impact on their terms of trade and national income. If commodity prices fall sharply and they experience recessions, they might blame China; in the past they would have blamed American imperialism.

AT PRESENT only a few things appear to be certain. The transformation apparent in the commodity markets during the past year is likely to persist for some time. China will increasingly become a more important influence on commodity prices than the old industrial economies of North America, Europe and Japan. China could drive commodity prices higher as it develops larger reserves of oil, grain and other critical raw materials. When investment in China finally slows down, commodity prices will decline. But as China is unlikely to experience a full-scale recession anytime during the next decade, there will be a steady—if not always spectacular—growth in its demand for raw materials. Indeed, by the period 2015–20 China's share of global metal consumption could be 50 percent larger than America's.

Such a large change in the composition of global commodity demand and trade flows will have political consequences. China is going to develop far more intimate relationships with many developing countries than have existed before. It is going to redefine its national security strategy to include protection of critical raw material supplies. It is too soon to speak of a new era of Chinese imperialism in the Third World, but China will certainly play a more influential role in the affairs of many developing countries. The domestic political environment in the United States has pushed trade into the spotlight at the expense of a long-term strategy for managing the consequences of China's requirements for strategic resources. The United States can regard China's new role as an opportunity for cooperation on many geopolitical issues or as a further threat to its own economic interests. There is no way to predict exactly how policymakers will respond to these developments. At this point only one thing is certain: China's new role as the world's largest consumer of many industrial commodities will force everyone to rethink assumptions about foreign policy, military policy and even the conduct of monetary policy during the early decades of the 21st century. □

> Learn everything that the Poles know. Learn everything there is to know about the Poles. Then you will be ready to fight them; and that day will come.
>
> —Yul Brenner as Taras Bulba, *Taras Bulba* (1962)

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The Cult of Precaution

Roger Scruton

THE EUROPEAN Union is seeking a "common foreign policy", which will not be the policy of a nation-state, based in national interest and realpolitik, but a policy suitable to its transnational identity and universalist aims. Environmental protection will therefore be high on the agenda, and policy will be guided by principle rather than expediency, and shared concerns rather than national self-interest. Which principles, therefore, in relation to which shared concerns?

Early on in the debates over environmental protection, the European Greens began to refer to something called the *Vorsorgeprinzip* (Foresight Principle). This Principle appears to have begun life in pre-war Germany, and was invoked later in the 1960s as the blanket justification for state planning. Re-issued in the 1970s under the name of the Precautionary Principle, it is now being advocated at every level of European politics as a guide to regulation, legislation and the use of scientific research.[1] Great Britain's prime minister has invoked it, addressing the Royal Society in 2002, when he told the assembled body of distinguished scientists that "responsible science and responsible policymaking operate on the Precautionary Principle." Yet nobody seems to know what the principle says. Does it tell us to take no risks? Then surely it is merely irrational, since everything we do has a risk attached. Or does it tell us to balance the benefits of risk-taking against the costs? Then it is merely reminding us of a fundamental law of practical reasoning. Or is it adding some new axiom to decision theory that will enable us to deal with the hazards of modern technology in a way that will safeguard the future of mankind? If this be the case, then we need a clear statement of what it says and clear grounds for believing it.

A footnote to the 1982 Stockholm environmental conference recommended the Precautionary Principle as the acceptable approach to scientific innovation—but did nothing to define it. Thereafter the principle was repeatedly mentioned in European edicts as authority for a creeping regime of regulation which ostensibly

Roger Scruton, former columnist for the *Times* (London) and the *Financial Times*, is a conservative thinker and the author of over thirty books, including *The West and the Rest: Globalization and the Terrorist Threat (ISI Book, 2003).*

[1] A distinction ought to be drawn here between the "Precautionary Principle" as a guide to economic and environmental regulation and the precautionary principle in international relations—as Niall Ferguson discusses in his contribution to the Iraq symposium in this issue—which recommends action against possible threats to international peace and security.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

had the protection of the public as its rationale but which also had the stifling of innovation as its consequence. In 1998 a gathering of lawyers, scientists, philosophers and green activists in the United States produced the Wingspread Statement defining the principle thusly:

> When an activity raises threats of harm to the environment or human health, precautionary measures should be taken even if some cause and effect relationships are not fully established scientifically.

This is a definition of nothing, since any activity can be deemed to comply with it. Finally, in 2000, the European Commission published a 29-page communication on the principle, purporting to clarify its use, but again answering the need for a definition with a fudge. The principle, it said, may be applicable

> where preliminary scientific evaluation indicates that there are reasonable grounds for concern that the potentially dangerous effects on the environment, human, animal or plant health may be inconsistent with the high level of protection chosen for the Community.

The words "preliminary", "potentially", "may" betray the essential retreat from precision that this statement involves. And the reference to a "high level of protection chosen for the Community" naturally leads to the question, "chosen by whom?" The statement is in fact a license to forbid any activity that a bureaucrat might judge—on whatever flimsy grounds—to have a possible cost attached to it.

The astonishing fact is that, although nobody knows what the Precautionary Principle says, it has now become a doctrine of European law. A recent decision of the European Court of Justice, having invoked the Precautionary Principle, concluded that the government of Italy is justified in preventing the sale of GM food on the basis that "no human technology should be used until it is proven harmless to humans and the environment." Taken literally, that would forbid every innovation in food technology that we have recently witnessed. Personally, I am entirely in favor of a law that forbids non-biodegradable packaging, since I know that this is intensely damaging to the environment. But the ruling of the Court has not been applied to that case, since the attempt to apply it would bring our entire food economy to a standstill. Moreover, the ruling, because it forbids everything, permits everything too, since it compels us to construe everything that we do as an exception. The ruling can therefore be used arbitrarily to prevent whatever initiatives the bureaucrats momentarily take against, regardless of any serious study of the effects on health, on the environment or on the life of the planet. This is the inevitable result of making a meaningless nostrum into a rule of law.

BUT THERE is an underlying issue here that needs to be addressed. As the bureaucrats take over the task of legislation, and our European parliaments are reduced to public relations exercises, the law changes character. Instead of creating the framework in which human beings can take risks and assume responsibility for doing so, law becomes a universal obstacle to risk-taking—a way of siphoning responsibility from society and transferring it to the impersonal state, where it can be safely dissolved and forgotten. As soon as there is the faintest suspicion of risk, the bureaucrats will step in with an edict, in the form of a "directive" issued by the European Commission. These directives are non-negotiable commands, which cannot be amended by national parliaments. But nor can their authors be held to account for them. The Precautionary Principle justifies everything that they do, since they need nothing more than "preliminary" scientific evaluation, giving

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

"grounds for concern" that the "potential" effects "may" be inconsistent with the "high level of protection" that the bureaucrats themselves have chosen.

The result is illustrated by the directive banning the use of certain phthalates, which are PVC softeners used in making children's dummies, teats and so on. The "preliminary" scientific evaluation consistent in slight evidence from one Danish researcher indicated that phthalates may be carcinogenic. His research has never been confirmed by peer review and was rejected by the European Commission's own scientific committee. However, the Precautionary Principle got to work on this non-evidence and converted it at once into conclusive grounds for panic. For what the principle really says, when examined in the context of its use, is this: "If you think there may be a risk, then there is a risk; and if there is a risk, forbid it." Once again we are dealing with a principle that forbids and permits everything. Its effect is both arbitrary and absolute, silencing all counter-argument. It is therefore an extremely effective political weapon, and can be used not only by bureaucrats, but also by all unrepresentative and unaccountable pressure groups, to enforce their point of view on the rest of us. Behind the edict forbidding phthalates there marches the regiment of self-appointed environmental guardians, who see the chemical industry as Public Enemy No. 1. Even if nobody gains from the edict, at least the industry that has invested so much in this product will suffer. And for the activists that result is a good in itself.

THE Precautionary Principle clearly presents an obstacle to innovation and experiment. But there are deeper reasons for being troubled by it, reasons that bear on the very essence of human life and on our ability to solve practical problems. First, there is the tendency of the principle to disaggregate risks in ways that defeat the possibility of reasonable solutions. Risks are never single, nor do they come to us only from one direction or from one point in time. By not taking the risk of angering my child, I take the risk of dealing, at some later stage, with a spoiled and self-centered adolescent. All practical reasoning involves weighing risks against one another, calculating probabilities, ring-fencing uncertainties, taking account of relative benefits and costs. This mode of reasoning is instinctive to us and has ensured our extraordinary success as a species. There is a branch of mathematics—decision theory—devoted to formalizing it, and there is nothing in decision theory that looks like the Precautionary Principle. For the effect of this principle is to isolate each risk as though it were entirely independent of every other. Risks, according to the principle, come single-wrapped, and each demands the same response—namely—Don't! If, in obeying this command, you find yourself taking another risk, then the answer again is "Don't!"

The principle is therefore logically on a par with the command given by an American president to his senior civil servant: "Don't just do something, stand there!" But, as the president realized, standing there is not something that civil servants are very good at. Bureaucrats have an inveterate need to be seen to be doing something. The effect of the principle therefore is to forbid the one identified risk, while removing all others from the equation. What this means can be vividly seen from a recent instance. A European directive, responding to the slight risk that diseased animals might enter the human food chain, insists that all slaughter should now take place in the presence of a qualified vet, who must inspect each animal as it arrives at the abattoir. There is no evidence that veterinary examination in these circumstances is either necessary or (in the rare cases when infected animals come to the

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

abattoir) effective. Nevertheless, the Precautionary Principle delivered its usual result, and the edict was imposed. Small abattoirs all over Britain were forced to close down, since their profit margins are as narrow as those of the farmers whom they serve, and qualified vets require fees that reflect their qualifications.

The effect of this on husbandry, on the social and economic life of farming communities, and on the viability of small pasture farms has been devastating, the effect on animal welfare equally so. Instead of travelling a quarter of an hour to the local abattoir, our herds must now travel three or four hours to one of the great processing plants that enjoy the presence of a permanent vet. Farmers who have taken pride in their animals and cared for them through two or more winters are distressed to part with them on such terms, and the animals themselves suffer greatly. This damage done to the relation between farmer and herd has further adverse effects on the landscape. Unable to take full responsibility for the life and the death of his animals, a farmer ceases to see the point of his unprofitable trade. The small pasture farms that created the landscape of England are now rapidly disappearing, to be replaced by faceless agro-businesses or equestrian leisure centers. This damages our landscape, and in doing so damages our sense of nationhood, of which the landscape has been the most potent symbol.

As if those long-term costs were not bad enough, we have also had to endure the short-term cost of hoof-and-mouth disease, which in the past would usually be contained in the locality where it broke out. In its latest occurrence, the disease was immediately carried all over the country by animals on their way to some distant abattoir. The result was the temporary, but total, ruination of our livestock farming.

Now, a responsible politician would have taken into account, not only the small risk addressed by the directive, but also the huge risks posed to the farming community by the destruction of local abattoirs, the risks posed to animals by long journeys, the benefits of localized food production and local markets for meat, and so on. And he would have a motive for considering all those things, namely, his desire to be re-elected, when the consequences of his decision had been felt. As a rational being, he would recognize that risks do not come in atomic particles, but are parts of complex organisms, shaped by the flow of events. And he would know in his heart that there is no more risky practice than that of disaggregating risks, so as one by one to forbid them. Even bureaucrats, in their own private lives, will take the same line. They too are rational beings and know that risks must constantly be taken and constantly weighed against each other. However, when a bureaucrat legislates for others and suffers no cost should he get things wrong, he will inevitably look for a single and specific problem and seize on a single and absolute principle in order to solve it. The result is the Precautionary Principle and all the follies that are now issuing from the unconscionable use of it.

By laying an absolute edict against risk, we court the greatest risk of all—that we shall face our next emergency without that which enables us to survive.

This suggests another and deeper irrationality in the principle. It is right that legislators should take risks into account, but not that they should automatically forbid them, even when they can make a show of isolating them from all other relevant factors. For there is an even greater risk attached to the habit of avoiding risks—namely, that we will produce a society that has no ability to survive a real emergency when risk-taking is the only recourse.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

It is not absurd to think that this is a real danger. How many a soporific Empire, secure in its long-standing abundance, has been swept away by barbarian hordes, simply because the basileus or caliph had spent his life in risk-free palaces? History is replete with warnings against the habit of heeding every warning. Yet this is the habit that the Precautionary Principle furthers. By laying an absolute edict against risk, it is courting the greatest risk of all, namely, that we shall face our next collective emergency without the only thing that would enable us to survive it.

If Clausewitz teaches us nothing else, he must surely persuade us that strategy in war proceeds according to principles of practical reasoning that are equally valid in peacetime. Victory does not come through taking no risks, but through balancing risks against each other and recognizing the limits to certainty. Strategic thinking in war is no different from strategic thinking in business. Moreover if, during times of peace, we allow the capacity for reason to atrophy, then we shall feel the consequences in war. Unwilling to take the risk of fighting on terms that were not overwhelmingly favorable, President Roosevelt found himself forced to fight nevertheless, but without a Pacific fleet. This does not mean that a "high risk" strategy is always the wisest one. It means only that risk is the premise of strategic thinking, and strategic thinking the *sine qua non* of success. In war the cost of failure is the loss of everything. In peace it is the loss of something. But in both cases rational decision-making does not mean avoiding risks, but choosing between them.

ALTHOUGH THE Eurocrats have made the Precautionary Principle into the foundation of their legislative program, we should not think that this disease of practical reason is confined to the Continent. Environmental NGOs have made repeated use of another non-definition, which is found in the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development of 1992. According to Rio,

> the Precautionary Principle states that: where there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty shall not be used as a reason for postponing cost-effective measures to prevent environmental degradation.

Looked at in one way, that makes the common-sense claim that, when taking a risk, we should take reasonable measures to reduce the cost of it. Looked at in another way, however, it merely says "Don't!" And it is in this second way that the principle is always interpreted by the activists, so that instead of contributing to the solution of our collective problems, it merely prevents us from addressing them. This has led governments everywhere to abandon nuclear energy programs, even though they provide the best hope for a clean and renewable source of energy.

Nor should we assume that the principle is effective only where it is officially recognized. American legislators are unlikely to invoke the principle, since they recognize the extent to which it impinges upon entrenched civil freedoms. But American litigiousness has the same effect as the European nanny state. There are places in America where no doctor will take the risk of delivering a baby for fear of a malpractice suit that will cost him all that he has. Scouting trips and adventure sports are now rapidly disappearing as people acquire the habit of suing for every injury. And local legislatures try to forestall litigation by laws that have the same mad absolutism as the European edicts. The state of Massachusetts has even passed a law against sushi—that is to say, you will be allowed to eat sushi only if it has first been either cooked or frozen, so ceasing, in effect, to be sushi. This is because there is a miniscule risk that sushi, in its normal condition, will make you

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

sick. And this is a risk that the citizens of Massachusetts are no longer allowed to take. Manufacturers of children's playgrounds now predict that swings in public playgrounds will become a thing of the past, since safety regulations require prohibitively expensive padding beneath them. The regulations surrounding children's toys, clothes, and activities are now so strict that it is no longer possible to have the kind of childhood that we read about with such longing and wonder in American classics like *Huckleberry Finn*.

When assessing the Precautionary Principle, therefore, we should recognize that it is one aspect of a risk-denying and risk-averting culture. American litigation and European regulation both have the same effect: to increase the cost of risk to the point where risks really do become irrational. The cost is financial in America, penal in Europe. But the effect is the same.

Rational beings, who are risk-takers by nature, no longer take the risks that they ought to be taking, since the cost has been artificially elevated by litigation and law. The result does not damage adults only: It damages their children far more, threatening the very possibility of what was once considered a normal childhood. Boys used to join the Scouts, to go on camping holidays in which they learned the arts of survival, to take part in athletic sports that strengthened the body and also occasionally injured it, to expose themselves to hardships in order to enjoy the sense of overcoming them, and in all kinds of ways to surround themselves with character-forming dangers. Sometimes accidents happened, and sometimes bad things were suffered or done. Still, there was a widely shared sense not only that young people were strengthened by this kind of activity, but also that they enjoyed it, learned from it, and were better able as a result to cope with the stresses of adult life and the demands of ordinary decision-making.

There is no evidence that people were wrong to think in that way. On the contrary, they were sensible of the truth, elaborately defended by Aristotle, that success in action requires virtuous habits, and virtuous habits must be acquired early if they are to be acquired at all. Young people brought up to think their way through practical difficulties acquire the art of survival. The risk-averse and timorous have no capacity to confront, still less to survive, a real emergency, nor are they likely to do well in ordinary competitive business. In love, as in war, they will be the losers, and only where they can fall back on the nanny state will they be sure of protection. Yet the nanny state itself depends upon the risk-takers, since it is on their taxes that the whole structure of institutionalized timorousness is built.

THIS DOES not mean that we should dismiss the anxieties to which the Precautionary Principle is proposed as an illusory solution. It is very clear that we must distinguish risks in which the cost falls on the person who takes them from risks in which the cost is exported to the rest of us. We can manage risks of the first kind, by providing suitable warnings, such as the health warnings affixed to alcohol and tobacco, and which many might wish to affix also to junk food, televisions and all the other products that rot the minds or bodies of those who consume them. But risks of the second kind cannot easily be managed, since no individual is wholly responsible for the damage, or solely able to repair it. Hence we need policies to reduce the cost of what we do by distributing the power to repair it. That was the principle behind the old bottle-deposit habit, which rid the world of glass bottles and could rid it too of the far more damaging plastic bottles that are now clogging up our waterways, ditches and landfill sites. According to this principle, each person who enjoys the benefit of an innovation is made to pay a proportionate amount of the socially distributed cost.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The innovation goes ahead, and the damage is rectified. This kind of solution has recently been generalized by Robert Costanza, an economist at Maryland University, who is trying to put something precise in place of the Precautionary Principle.

Until rendered precise in this way, however, the Precautionary Principle is merely a brake on the kind of research that we need to undertake if we are to manage our growing environmental problems. In the circumstances in which we now find ourselves, there can be no riskier policy. If we are to apply the Precautionary Principle at all, therefore, we should apply to itself. And the answer will be "Don't!" □

Taking Precautions Against America

On April 1, 2004, not inappropriately, the Minority Staff, Special Investigations Division of the U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Government Reform issued a report criticizing the Bush Administration for its lobbying against a European legislative proposal for chemicals management. The report, prepared for Representative Henry Waxman (D-CA), alleged that the Bush Administration's activities were "improper."

The EU policy in question was REACH (Registration, Evaluation and Authorization of Chemicals). REACH is premised on the Precautionary Principle and would effectively protect the competitiveness of EU industry by requiring that all global industry share in its higher costs of regulatory compliance and product standardization. The Clinton Administration's position largely reflected the support of environmental NGOs for extending EU regulations internationally.

The Waxman Report, too, was based mainly on a September 2003 paper issued by the Environmental Health Fund, critical of Bush environmental policy. Waxman himself is hardly an ally of U.S. industry. In 1998, he had intervened to prevent the State and Commerce Departments from campaigning against EU regulations on the use of chemicals in the manufacture of toys. U.S. industry argued that the EU had failed to conduct an objective, science-based risk assessment and thus lacked empirical evidence showing actual risk. After a letter from Waxman, then-Vice President Al Gore instructed those agencies to cease their anti-EU lobbying.

Waxman's report conveniently fails to mention that the involvement of interested foreign stakeholders such as the U.S. chemical industry in the EU's REACH regulatory review is actually called for in WTO law. To be precise, Article 2.9.4 of the Technical Barriers to Trade Agreement expressly permits WTO members whose trade will be significantly affected by regulations proposed by other WTO members "*to make and submit comments in writing*" reflecting their objections about such legislation [emphasis added]. Were the EU to have adopted the REACH legislation in its original form, all global industry would have suffered severely.

So the Waxman Report should be viewed as a partisan ideological effort to garner EU and environmentalist support. Since the EU's REACH is intended to serve as a *global* template for chemicals management with implications for industry within all WTO member countries, it was not even slightly improper for the government and industry to lobby against it. But Waxman might himself be legitimately asked if colluding with domestic special interests to extend the sway of foreign regulators over U.S. industry for ideological reasons is not itself far more "improper" than anything done by the Bush Administration.

—Lawrence Kogan

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Reviews & Essays

Not the Faith of Their Fathers

Martin Walker

Peter Stothard, *Thirty Days: An Inside Account of Tony Blair at War* (New York: Harper Collins, 2003), 240 pp., $13.95.

Philip Stevens, *Tony Blair: The Making of a World Leader* (New York: Viking, 2004), 265 pp., $24.95.

Peter Schweizer and Rochelle Schweizer, *The Bushes: Portrait of a Dynasty* (New York: Doubleday, 2004), 524 pp., $27.95.

Craig Unger, *House of Bush: House of Saud* (New York: Scribners, 2004), 356 pp., $26.

Kevin Phillips, *American Dynasty: Aristocracy, Fortune and the Politics of Deceit in the House of Bush* (New York: Viking, 2004), 397 pp., $25.95.

ON THURSDAY, March 20, 2003, when the American stealth bombers launched the war a trifle ahead of schedule with the decapitation attempt on Saddam Hussein, Britain's Prime Minister Tony Blair told his staff that he wanted to end his televised address to the nation with the words "God bless you." The staff erupted in protest until Blair grumbled, through brushes and sponges as his make-up was applied, "You are the most ungodly lot I have ever...." His speechwriter, Peter Hyman, who is Jewish (and less than fully employed since Blair writes his important speeches himself), objected "Ungodly?—count me out." Somebody else on the staff suggested it was not quite the same God. "It is the same God", said Blair firmly. In the end, Blair closed his speech with a tame "Thank you."

Shortly before the "God bless you" suggestion, which would have startled British viewers accustomed to hearing such invocations of the Almighty only in the speeches of American presidents, Blair had asked his staff how he should begin the broadcast. His then-press secretary and close adviser Alastair Campbell dryly suggested "My fellow Americans...."

Blair did not even dignify that jest with a reply, but this anecdote, recorded

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

by the former editor of the *Times*, Sir Peter Stothard, who was enjoying fly-on-the-wall status with Blair for a period of thirty days, neatly encapsulates two of the salient characteristics of Blair's time in Number 10, Downing Street. First, he is the most openly and devoutly religious prime minister Britain has known in a century. Blair is a member of the Church of England, but his wife and children are Roman Catholics, and Blair in his ecumenical way would on occasion take Holy Communion with them. Eventually Cardinal Basil Hume, head of the Catholic Church in England, wrote to Blair asking him to desist from taking the sacrament when he attended a Catholic mass. Blair complied, but in his reply wrote a mild theological rebuke, asking the Cardinal, "I wonder what Jesus would have made of it?"

Second, even his staff is uncomfortably aware that Blair's support of the highly unpopular President George W. Bush is not just a political liability, but reflects a widespread suspicion in Britain that Blair is far too pro-American in general. More than any prime minister before him, Blair runs Downing Street as if it were the White House, depending to an unusual degree on personal and party loyalists rather than the customary apolitical civil servants, and on his skill in raising campaign funds from wealthy donors rather than subjecting himself to Labour's traditional debt to the trade unions. Critics complain that Blair is far too casual in his dealings with the Labour Members of Parliament, relying instead on his quasi-presidential relationship with the British voters, and that his economic policies tend more to the entrepreneurial American model rather than the traditional welfare state dependence that characterized previous Labour leaders and many of Britain's partners in the European Union.

Onward Christian Soldiers

IT IS AN extraordinary trick of fate that as the War on Terror got under way, and as Britain (along with Israel and the United States) found itself on the receiving end of Bin Laden's jihad, the United Kingdom should be led by a man so openly devoted to the American alliance and to the Christian faith. The Christianity was an act of mature choice; he first took Communion at the age of twenty and was admitted to the Anglican Church by the chaplain of St. John's College, Oxford. This was unusual in the early 1970s, particularly for an undergraduate who played in a rock band and at least once played strip poker until both he and a female friend had shed their entire clothing. But one of Blair's great college friends was Peter Thomson, an Australian mature student and Anglican priest in his thirties. Thomson's inspiration (and subsequently Blair's) was John Macmurray, a Scottish thinker of the mid-20th century. Macmurray argued that the individual was shaped by the family and community in which the person grew and acted, and that strong families and strong local communities that demanded responsibilities from their members built a strong and supportive society. "We are not stranded in isolation, but owe a duty both to others and ourselves", Blair wrote in 1993. The idea of community lay at the heart of Christianity. "The act of holy Communion is symbolic of this message. It acknowledges that we do not grow up in total independence but interdependently."

This he wrote in a short book, the purpose of which was to convince the British voters that Labour had indeed learned its lesson and rethought its political message, while also suggesting to party activists that the old traditions of Christian socialism had much to offer a modernized Labour ideology, especially after having lost four elections in succes-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

sion. Labour's commitment to society (the very existence of which Margaret Thatcher famously doubted) was for Blair a foundation of his political belief. The core values of the Labour Party, he maintained, were "closely intertwined with those of Christianity."

BOTH PETER Stothard's *Thirty Days* and the excellent new biography of Blair by Philip Stephens, a *Financial Times* columnist, rightly focus on Blair's religious faith as an unusual and distinctive characteristic of the first Labour leader to win two successive full terms as prime minister. Stephens, however, goes into much greater depth and argues persuasively that Blair's faith provided a crucial political breakthrough. In 1993 the abduction by two older boys of a two year-old child was filmed by a shopping center's security camera. The little boy was then gruesomely murdered, and the haunting image of the trusting child being led to his doom became a staple of television news, stunning Britain. Blair's response, which gave him prominence as a different kind of politician of the Left, contrasted sharply with the traditional view of the Labour Party that crime was the fault of an unjust society.

> I have no doubt that the breakdown of law and order is intimately linked to the breakup of a string sense of community. And the breakup of community in turn is, to a crucial degree, consequent on the breakdown of family life, [Blair said]. It is largely from family discipline that social discipline and sense of responsibility is learned.

Together with his striking and memorable sound bite, that he would be "tough on crime, tough on the causes of crime", this stance, more than anything else that Labour did in its 18 years in the political wilderness, made the Party electable again. At the time, Blair did not make any overtly religious argument, but subsequently he put the case for Labour's robust new approach to law and order within a clear religious context by addressing the concept, now notably out of fashion, of sin. "Yet the concept is simple and important. In theological terms, it is alienation from God. In everyday terms, it is acknowledgement of right and wrong", Blair said. "This is an area that will become of increasing importance in politics."

Politicians in Britain had not spoken in such terms for decades, and even longer. Stephens suggests that not since the great Liberal statesman William Ewart Gladstone, who along with Disraeli dominated British political life from the 1850s to the 1880s, had the twin themes of morality and religion been so prominent in the speeches and actions of a prime minister. Many political commentators, products of a more secular and irreverent time, found Blair's beliefs hard to take seriously, despite their rather obvious postmodernist twist. One notably aggressive TV interviewer asked Blair, live on camera, whether he and Bush prayed together, in tones that implied he had scored a devastating hit.

The almost-Catholic Englishman and the born-again American no doubt practice very different styles of Christianity. It is hard to imagine Blair praying on the telephone with the family of a serviceman, as then-Governor Bush prayed with the family of Steven Gonzales when he was captured by Serb forces. Perhaps Blair would not have been quite as self-effacing as Bush in 1999, when the then-Governor of Texas returned from fundraising in Michigan to join a memorial service for the seven worshippers killed by a gunman in a Fort Worth church. Bush refused to speak or go onto the podium, saying it was a religious event, not a political one. Instead, he sat and prayed with the crowd. But the two men share a profound religious conviction, and a clear sense of the way that faith illuminates their political lives and actions. It should, therefore,

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

come as less of a surprise that Bush and Blair have forged such a close personal bond, reinforcing all the deep institutional ties through intelligence and nuclear and military cooperation that have given "the special relationship" its unique and mutually useful character throughout most of the past sixty years.

It has become fashionable in Britain to mock this bond. And while I have yet to meet any serious British journalist or official who has worked in Washington who has not been impressed or even awed by its durability and potency, it is easy to understand why. Britain's commercial and institutional ties are increasingly with the European Union. Blair's Foreign Office last year produced a White Paper on British foreign policy in which two telling charts defined the direction in which British self-interest currently points. The EU provides 48 percent of Britain's inward investment, while the United States provides only 35 percent. And while the United States accounts for 15 percent of British trade, the EU now accounts for 53 percent, a figure likely to approach 60 percent after the EU's May 1 enlargement with ten new member states.[1]

This sense that the Anglo-American relationship was a dwindling asset, which had been marked during the first Bush Administration with its powerful commitment to German unification, fueled some querulous demands back in Britain to know just what reward British interests received in return for Blair's devotion. (The mass-market tabloid, *Daily Mirror*, ran a now-infamous front-page headline describing Blair as "Bush's Poodle.") The answer is that in the buildup to the war, Britain became a part of the American inter-agency process, reminding one senior Bush Administration official of the remark of Henry Kissinger in his memoirs that, while President Nixon's national security adviser, he "took the British more into my confidence than I did the U.S. State Department." Furthermore, Bush knew, even though some members of Blair's government did not, that Blair on the eve of the crucial pre-war vote in the House of Commons had written his letter of resignation and entrusted it to the Cabinet Secretary. Bush said that if it would help, he would be happy for the British forces to stay out of the invasion. Blair replied that there were some causes more important than one's political career.

And given that Blair was a believer, warning publicly of the danger of weapons of mass destruction in Saddam Hussein's hands since the Clinton era and was never shy of using force (he was more of a humanitarian hawk on Kosovo than was Clinton), Bush almost certainly would have had Blair's support even had he paid less attention to his domestic difficulties. In the event, through persuasion rather than any threats to deny British support, Blair got quite a lot. He was able to convince Bush of the need to attempt a second United Nations resolution (which infuriated Vice President Dick Cheney). And a week before the Iraq War broke out, Blair had succeeded, at least in his own mind, in winning an important concession from the White House.

President Bush had agreed, at Blair's persistent urging, to publish the road map to a renewed peace process in the Middle East, a step that Blair saw as an essential signal to Muslim opinion as British and American troops prepared to invade Iraq. Indeed it was Blair who made the announcement on the road map from Downing Street. As he chose which tie he would wear for the television cameras,

[1]However, when one looks at fixed investment, the pattern is markedly different, with Britain by far the largest foreign investor in the United States, and vice versa. Almost a fifth of U.S. overseas investment goes to Britain, more than three times that to France and Germany combined. More than a million Brits work for U.S. affiliates in Britain, compared to some 200,000 Chinese working for U.S. affiliates in China.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Alastair Campbell entered with Blair's text in hand. "Sorry", Campbell said, according to the Stothard account. "President Bush doesn't like your text. He's rewriting it now."

"One day your sense of humor will get you into big trouble. Or, more important, me into big trouble. Now, where was I?" Blair replied, and returned to choosing his tie. (Campbell, who later resigned from Blair's service pleading exhaustion, at least owes one remarkable souvenir to his prime minister's closeness to Bush. When they were all in Northern Ireland on April 8, 2003, just as Basra fell to the British troops and American forces penetrated Baghdad, and when Bush made yet another concession to Blair by promising "a vital role" for the United Nations in postwar Iraq, Campbell received a $100 personal check from the American president, a contribution to Campbell's marathon run for charity.)

AT LEAST one of the American books now being reviewed, the sound and thorough account of the Bush political dynasty by Peter and Rochelle Schweizer, appreciates the importance of the British connections to the Bushes; Margaret Thatcher for Bush 41, and Blair for Bush 43. Indeed, the Schweizers unearth one genuinely new nugget of information that seems to have eluded British journalists. In the 1950s, one of the investors in Bush the Elder's Zapata oil firm (and a member of its board of directors) was James Gammell. The Bushes and Gammells became friends, and young George W. Bush's first trip to Britain came in 1959, when he stayed at the Gammells' Scottish estate outside Perth. Young George W. became friends with young Bill Gammell, and the friendship, as the Bush family's friendships usually do, endured; he flew to Gammell's wedding in Scotland in 1983. Gammell attended the elite Scottish school of Fettes, where he befriended a young Tony Blair, and later became an important donor to the Blair campaign funds. When Gammell opened a new headquarters for his thriving Cairn Energy (which has recently struck it very rich in India), Prime Minister Blair cut the opening ribbon. When most observers on both sides of the Atlantic reckoned that Bush's election would end that special personal relationship that Blair had enjoyed with the White House, Gammell was able to reassure both Bush and Blair that they would and should be friends.

The Schweizer book, which appears well sourced and had the benefit of sixty hours of interviews with the extended Bush family and another forty hours with close family friends, gives the most complete account so far of the current President Bush's journey to his religious faith. They note one pivotal moment when he joined a Bible study group in Midland on Monday evenings, which meant giving up the local masculine rite of Monday night football. In one exchange, another member of the group was complaining of how tough it had been growing up as the son of a preacher; George retorted that was nothing compared to growing up in the shadow of a vice president. The weight of family expectations, with its tradition of success and fierce competition, must have been daunting. And just as he took refuge from the family's patrician tradition in a countrified Texan persona at Yale and at Harvard Business School—where he carried a paper cup to class for his spitting tobacco—so he seems to have found another kind of relief from family pressure first in drinking, and then in the religion that broke his drinking habit. Billy Graham played a central role, and at one point when Bush was arguing with his mother that Jesus Christ was the only way to salvation, Barbara Bush went to the source and telephoned the preacher. Bush's

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

faith appears to be plain and profound, an essential step in overcoming his long devotion to what the young man called his "four Bs"—beer, bourbon and B&B (brandy and Benedictine).

The Schweizer book is a classic family biography, reliable and thorough, cautious in its judgments, and not deterred by the family's help with their research from probing some of the more tense periods, like the at least briefly ugly rivalry between the two political heirs, George W. and Jeb Bush. W. himself has spoken of his pain when he announced that he was running for Governor of Texas and his family laughed. He has also suggested a sense of grievance that his parents preferred Jeb. On the night that he won his Texas race and Jeb lost Florida, W. noted, "their heads may have been in Austin, but their hearts were in Tallahassee."

Jeb's turn may yet come. This is indeed a dynasty in the Kennedy mold, and perhaps the Clintons may yet follow, since the name recognition, the family connections and the political *comitatus* that tends to gather around such proven winners are distinct assets in American democracy. Indeed, it does not take much imagination to see a kind of War of the Roses developing in American politics, if Hillary Clinton follows W. and Jeb then follows Hillary and young Chelsea awaits her turn at the family inheritance. The occasional rebellion from the Kennedy or Cuomo and Bayh clans among the Democrats would fit neatly into the 15th-century English pattern. (The grand Republican bloodlines of Tafts and Lodges seem to be exhausted; perhaps the rich mix of Kennedy and Schwarzenegger genes may yet give the GOP a rival to the Bush dynasty.)

The Schweizers conclude,

> In a world where political fundraising drives media coverage, which in turn drives national attention, even popular figures in the GOP cannot help but feel that they are a small merchant shop up against Wal-Mart.

It is an arresting and thoughtful metaphor, except that the essence of Wal-Mart is to be everywhere and to appeal to mass markets, whereas the Bushes have proved a somewhat divisive breed. Bush 41 managed to split the Republican Party; Bush 43 has proved to be a remarkably polarizing president. Norman Ornstein of the American Enterprise Institute cites polls that suggest Bush has broken all records in splitting the country: among Republican voters, 91 percent approve of Bush's performance, but only 17 percent of Democrats. The resulting "polarization index" of 74 percent is the widest since such polls began.

THE LAST two books reviewed here suggest that the Bush family may yet pay a price for its ability to forge friendships outside the realm. Craig Unger's *House of Bush, House of Saud* starts with the now-familiar story of the Bin Laden family being rushed out the country immediately after the September 11 attacks, when other aircraft were grounded. He goes on in considerable and often wearisome detail to describe the family connections with oil and the Arabs, from the 1960s, when Bush 41's Zapata company built Kuwait's first offshore oil well, to the 1990s when Bush 43's Harken company escaped its difficulties with investments that seem to have been connected to the infamous Bank of Credit and Commerce International, and then the tiny Harken was able to beat the giant Amoco corporation to win exclusive offshore drilling rights in Bahrain.

"Never before has an American President been so closely tied to a foreign power that harbors and supports our country's mortal enemies", Unger concludes. In an appendix, he spells out what he suggests is a billion-dollar connection, a total of

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

$1,477,100,000, which he says are

> financial transactions through which individuals and entities connected with the House of Saud transferred money to individuals and entities closely connected to the House of Bush.

Unger casts his net very wide, but the vast bulk of this money, over $1.2 billion, is attributed to the Carlyle Group, for which Bush 41 is a consultant. The Bin Laden family were early investors in Carlyle. Another $180 million is attributed to Halliburton; $25 million is said to be the financing of Harken, and a final puny $3.5 million is listed as "charitable donations." They are $1 million from King Fahd to Barbara Bush's literacy campaign, $1 million from Prince Bandar to the Elder Bush's Presidential Library, plus another $1 million oil painting of a buffalo hunt, also to the Bush Library, and a $500,000 scholarship to Bush's old school, Andover, donated by Prince Talal.

What does one make of this, given that one of Unger's stories, of another Saudi evacuation flight after 9/11, has itself been discredited by the 9/11 Commission? It does not seem to prove a great deal beyond the astuteness of Saudi investors, the ability of the Carlyle Group and Halliburton to use their contacts and skills to make money, and the intelligence of the Saudis in directing their charity to maximum effect. The rich around the world share what a Marxist would call a class interest. They want to protect their money and to make more of it, and powerful and influential Americans profitably cooperated with the Saudis to their mutual benefit. For Unger—whose familiarity with Saudi history, the Wahhabis, Islam and the al-Saud family seems but half-digested from secondary sources—all this amounts to a great scandal.

It can be put more simply. The United States wants Saudi oil and also wants access to the money the Saudis get for it. The Saudis want protection, and the Americans are happy to provide it. The Saudis have also sought protection from their own Islamic militants, which they first secured by buying them off. But then when the Americans asked the Saudis to help finance and support the jihad against the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, a period when the Carter and Reagan Administrations were supporting the young volunteer Osama bin Laden, Americans and Saudis alike created a sorcerer's apprentice, a dangerous tool they could no longer control. And within the obvious political constraints of Saudi politics, they are now cooperating to destroy that threat to them both, and not making a very impressive job of it.

AT LEAST Unger sticks to the Saudis. Kevin Phillips, a first-rate historian (*The Cousins' Wars*) and the brilliant political analyst who predicted and defined *The Emerging Republican Majority* back in 1968, covers the global waterfront in his vendetta against the Bush family. This book is not an easy read, and Phillips, for all the credit he has built up with his previous work, began to lose this reader when he delved deeply into comparisons between the rise of the Bush dynasty and the restoration of European royal houses. He found it particularly sinister that the ancestors of some of those seeking to be restored to their thrones these days had fascist links in the 1930s and 1940s. This way madness lies.

Phillips takes the rise of the Bush family dynasty as a personal affront and a mockery of the grand republican principles of meritocracy. He sees in their CIA connections the shadowy influence of the national security state, and makes much of Bush 41's term as CIA director (and possibly as a CIA asset in his time running Zapata), and of his father. Senator Prescott Bush, Phillips writes, "of Yale, Skull and Bones, and Brown Brothers Harriman, was an off-the-books emi-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

nence grise, a Man Who Could Be Trusted, perhaps even a shadow CIA Director."

The evidence of Prescott Bush's intelligence connections—other than being a member in good standing of the New York financial establishment, a member of Yale's Skull and Bones club, and a friend of the Dulles family—is thin. (What evidence there is points to him having even closer connections to British Intelligence, with one source claiming Prescott had been "trained by Stewart Menzies, later head of the British secret service during World War II.") Phillips makes much of Prescott Bush's financial connections with Nazi Germany before 1941, through Brown Brothers Harriman, a banking house which also worked closely with Soviet Russia—thus confirming the obvious, that money is money, and can be made in the most unsavory places. Like Bush 41 with the Carlyle group (which trades in weaponry, among other things), Prescott (and George Herbert Walker, described by Phillips as "the founding father and spiritual progenitor of the Bush clan") were connected to the arms trade, through the Remington Arms group, Union Banking Corporation, the Hamburg-Amerika shipping line and so on.

From these various connections, which are not exactly unusual for international banking houses, Phillips sees a monstrous precursor of Eisenhower's "military-industrial complex", complete with Nazi gold and Soviet oil. His shotgun scattering of guilt by association can get confusing: it is not clear whether Phillips is trying to imply that Prescott Bush was a covert Nazi, a British agent, a Soviet cat's-paw, all three, or just a ruthless and ambitious American financier making contacts and money wherever he could. Phillips goes on to cover much of the same ground as Unger on the Saudi connection, and concludes somewhat over-heatedly that the republic is in danger:

> National governance has, at least temporarily, moved away from the proven tradition of a leader chosen democratically, by a majority or plurality of the electorate, to the succession of a dynastic heir whose unfortunate inheritance is privileged, covert, and globally embroiling.

WHATEVER VIEW one takes of the messy outcome of the 2000 election, Bush is hardly an illegitimate president. He has been sworn to the office with the blessing of the Supreme Court, the body constitutionally empowered to resolve the unfortunate difficulties that attended the Florida vote (which he clearly won in the official and unofficial recount process). He has the backing of Congress and has a good chance of being re-elected. The safeguards of the Constitution, along with the unwritten traditions of the British system, mean that if Anglo-American voters want to evict Bush and Blair for leading them into dubious battle, they can do so. The same freedoms that protect the American republic and the British kingdom also protect the rights of Phillips and Unger to produce the kind of woolly and malevolent tosh now under review.

It may be significant that Unger's publishers decided not to issue his book in Britain, where the libel laws are a great deal less forgiving. It may also be significant that Unger's book has no reference to Blair nor to Margaret Thatcher, which seems curious in a book about the Saudi connection, when the British fought two wars in the region in alliance with successive Bush presidents. Phillips has one passing reference to Blair and three to Thatcher, only one of which is useful. He cites her urging Bush to go to war at Aspen in 1990 for political reasons: "George, I was about to be defeated in England when the Falklands conflict happened. I stayed in office for eight years after that." Characteristically, Phillips does not ask the obvious question: If Bush was so locked

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

into the Saudi connection, why did he need Thatcher to stop him going wobbly?

One final anecdote from the admirable Stothard-Stephens books may help to put the personal qualities and the relationship of the current president and prime minister into a useful perspective. Bush, it is no secret, is no admirer of Bill Clinton, the man who defeated his father, and in Bush's phrase "dishonored" the White House. So when Clinton offered to write an op-ed article for a British newspaper, to appear on the morning of the crucial vote on the Iraq War in the House of Commons, Blair judged that courtesy and protocol required him to ask whether this open letter of support for Blair from the last president would be a problem for the current one. Not in the least, Bush replied: an excellent idea. □

Martin Walker is editor-in-chief of United Press International.

Where Have All the Cowboys Gone?

Harvey Sicherman

John Lewis Gaddis, *Surprise, Security, and the American Experience* (Boston: Harvard University Press, 2004), 150 pp., $18.95.

Owen Harries, *Benign or Imperial?* (Adelaide, Australia: ABC Books, 2004), 138 pp.

Richard A. Clarke, *Against All Enemies* (New York: Free Press, 2004), 304 pp., $27.

Walter Russell Mead, *Power, Terror, Peace, and War* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2004), 226 pp., $19.95.

David Frum and Richard Perle, *An End to Evil: How to Win the War on Terrorism* (New York: Random House, 2003), 284 pp., $26.95.

THESE DAYS, American foreign policy analysis revolves around two vast and far-reaching surprises. On the morning of December 25, 1991, the United States was one superpower in a two-superpower world; by day's end, as the Soviet Union dissolved, it became the sole survivor. At dawn, September 11, 2001, America was arguably the most secure of nations. By noon, it appeared among the most vulnerable. The first was an unalloyed American victory. The second was an unalloyed American defeat.

The American people reacted to these disturbances in most revealing ways. They

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

declined the invitation to empire offered by sole superpower status after they elected Bill Clinton in 1992, a man not only inexperienced in foreign policy but also fairly promising to ignore it ("It's the economy, stupid!"). They remained oblivious to dangers from abroad, electing at the end of the decade the equally inexperienced George W. Bush, after a ferocious campaign dominated by domestic issues.

Neither Bush's initial plans for his presidency nor American complacency survived 9/11. The United States has now pledged, through the War on Terror, to rehabilitate Afghanistan and Iraq as democracies and to transform the Middle East, among other things. The Bush Administration has compared this campaign to change the world with America's historic efforts in post-1945 Europe and Japan.

What to make of it all? The books under review are eager to instruct Americans on the proper course of action. Authored by an eminent historian, a former diplomat and former editor of *The National Interest*, an analyst and several former officials, they focus on the war, or more precisely, Mr. Bush's version of it. They are a contentious lot with contentious conclusions. Fortunately, most are short.

John Q. and George W.

JOHN LEWIS Gaddis, one of America's most eminent diplomatic historians, reflects on American reactions to the burning of Washington in the 19th century, Pearl Harbor in the 20th, and 9/11 in the 21st. The book, a collection of lectures, sustains Gaddis' reputation for eloquent yet affable prose, a skill honed no doubt by the vagaries of his student audience.

In discussing America's experience with such surprises, Gaddis also aims to surprise. And so he does, discerning beneath George W. Bush's Texas drawl the formal New England accents of John Quincy Adams. He asserts that, after the 1814 disaster, John Q. developed what Gaddis terms a pre-emptive, unilateral and hegemonic foreign policy—although limited to the Western Hemisphere, given America's very modest military power. George W. is pursuing a variation of Adams' biggest achievement, the Monroe Doctrine, on a global rather than hemispheric scale. This comparison allows Gaddis to put Bush squarely into American diplomatic traditions.

Gaddis admires Bush but does not think he has gotten it entirely right. He advises the President to emulate FDR rather than Adams. Gaddis offers a brilliant analysis of Roosevelt's post-Pearl Harbor blending of Wilson (whom FDR served as Assistant Secretary of the Navy) and his cousin Theodore, he of soft speech and big stick fame. By reconceiving the stillborn League of Nations on a "cold-blooded, at times even brutal, calculation of who had power and how they might use it", FDR made Wilsonian ideals practical.

Or so he hoped. I fear Gaddis has succumbed to Saint Frank's charm (who has not?), mistaking the great improviser for a visionary statesman. Like most presidents, FDR's foresight consisted largely of avoiding past disasters—he backed into the future with 1919 in mind. Great coalition builder that he was, he began (and ended) with one, Great Britain, and another, Stalin's Soviet Russia, that hardly agreed with his plans. Still, Gaddis wants Bush to exercise hegemony the Roosevelt way, clothed in the disguise of coalitions and international organizations, the (sound) theory being that leaders of inferior powers still like to be asked and consulted. A kinder, gentler approach (as in George the father) makes it easier for others to agree.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

"With Us"

BUT WILL these other leaders agree? We turn now to a book that offers advice not only on the war itself but also what to expect from allies.

When Bush announced his criterion for coalition in the war, he said in effect you're either with us or against us. This omitted a group of significant states who were both with the United States on some aspects of the war and against it on others. Pakistan and Saudi Arabia come to mind. Russia is also among them, critical to the affairs of Central Asia and a unique source of nuclear technology for Iran. Most notoriously, of course, were the cases of France and Germany, opposed to the Iraq War at the UN but which facilitated America's effort by allowing the use of their airspace, roads and ports, among other things.

Australia, however, offers an example of a country entirely with the United States. But do not take any allies, even Australia, for granted. This is the insistent warning of Owen Harries, founding editor of *The National Interest*, one-time Australian diplomat and now senior fellow at the Centre of Independent Studies in Sydney. *Benign or Imperial*, consisting of the Boyer Lectures plumped out by several reprints from this magazine, exemplifies Harries's skill at concise, clear expression, and his ability to combine profound scholarship with sprightly prose. He, like Gaddis, finds Bush's policy deeply rooted in American tradition. But he worries about exercises in naked hegemony, and he catalogues errors that could debilitate American policy. Among the most serious is to mistake transient episodes for permanent trends. Worse yet are exercises in "alleged cultural traits" whether Hindu or Muslim. Worst of all is to confuse cultural sentimentality with hard interests, such as the "Anglosphere", a latter-day version of Churchill's imaginary English-speaking union.[1] By these lights, it should not surprise us that Harries holds a dim view of Tony Blair.

All of these lectures bear Harries's call for caution and modesty. But for my money, the most interesting essay is "Punching Above One's Weight", a brilliant analysis of Australian foreign policy that addresses directly the question of just how much the country should be "with" the United States in the war against terrorism. Harries wants Australian statesmen to mind the country's resources, its ratio of means to ends, and the real threats it confronts. By his lights, Canberra should concentrate on regional terrorism, not global; the Iraq War is "not compelling;" the Anglosphere will not guarantee gratitude for America; and the UN is useful for the Aussies and therefore not to be unduly weakened. In short, the ends-and-means ratio dictates that Australia side with the United States but not sign onto every American global initiative. This is a sober reminder that Washington should not expect lapdog obedience from its allies.

Traison de Clarke

AS AMBASSADOR Harries notes—no doubt outraging many multipolarists:

> the really interesting and important debate is not between anti-American and pro-American; it is between two different American traditions concerning how the United States can best promote its values and ideals.

These are well represented here by the Mead and Frum-Perle books. But Harries has overlooked a third: the bureaucratic traditions whereby political ideals are wrestled into policy. In the absence of such skills, administrations are merely exercises in empty rhetoric.

---

[1]See James C. Bennett, "Networking Nation-States", *The National Interest* (Winter 2003/04) pp. 17–30.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Such a wrestler was Richard Clarke. Three administrations managed to overcome their distaste for his enemy-making personality because of his bureaucratic efficiency. Clarke took on the orphaned cause of anti-terrorism in the late 1980s and created a unique situation: Chief analyst on the NSC, he was also chief crisis action officer in the Counter-terrorism Coordinating Group. This gave him a seat at the top table.

Against All Enemies makes abundantly clear that Clarke preferred Clinton's top table to Bush's. The main charges are that Bush, unlike Clinton, gave the Al-Qaeda threat lower priority before 9/11, and then after 9/11, diverted to Iraq. In other words, Bush should have pre-empted Bin Laden and not pre-empted Saddam. The proof of priorities? Clinton (and his staff) held many meetings with Clarke in attendance; Bush but few. Clinton went after the danger vigorously; Bush had not even approved a strategy until September 4. And Clinton kept his eye on the ball while Bush strayed to Saddam's Iraq, a presidential fixation and a diversion from the War on Terror.

Clarke's pious hope that his efforts might result, as he wrote recently, in an "energetic and mutually respectful public discourse" is belied by the record. *Against All Enemies* often reads like the fury of a bureaucrat scorned, and Clarke himself turned the otherwise staid 9/11 Commission hearings into a political theater that compelled even Condaleezza Rice to take the stage. The idea that a meeting a day (with Clarke) would have kept Al-Qaeda away in summer 2001 is ridiculous, especially when Bush was getting his information directly from the CIA Director's daily briefings, a practice Clinton had discontinued. And Clarke's hyperventilation about Bush's action against Iraq ("an oil rich country that posed no threat to us, while paying scant attention to the Israeli-Palestinian problem") is factually incorrect.

Still, Clarke *was* wrestling with a problem that for thirty years had bedeviled U.S. counter-terrorism. How could one attack terrorists who enjoyed state-sponsored sanctuaries? Basically, once Bin Laden bought Afghanistan, the only way to get him was through a CIA assassination or war.

Clinton failed to do either, and much of Clarke's advice to Bush was to try both. But Clarke has admitted that by 2001, his ideas, even if they had sped through the interagency slow-motion machine, would not have prevented 9/11. For by that time Al-Qaeda had metastasized, and America's last line of defense was soon to fail.

Here lies the real peculiarity of *Against All Enemies*. The courageous, decisive Bill Clinton conjured by Clarke somehow cannot get his story straight to a suspicious and dispirited FBI director whose agency bungled its job. Clinton's directive to kill Bin Laden somehow never makes it down to CIA working ranks. Terrorism was such a priority that the CIA Directorate of Operations suffered serious budget reductions until 1996, after which it remained flat for the balance of Clinton's term. And then there was the "wall" separating the FBI and CIA on intelligence sharing, reinforced by Clinton's appointees at the Department of Justice; an INS that neglected it own rules; a JCS that balked at dramatic action; and an FAA and the airlines that only pretended to protect the airways. Either Clarke is fibbing about Clinton's priorities, or Clinton was an astonishingly ineffective president.

Bush, too, repeated Clinton's (and Clarke's) error of concentrating on some solution to the Afghan problem while doing little about the easily pregnable last lines of defense. Thus, Bush perpetuated for a few months the vulnerabilities he inherited. The sobering conclusions of the 9/11 Commission will presumably be "mutually respectful" unlike Clarke's polemic.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

"Forward Containment"

THE MEAD and Frum-Perle books represent two distinct approaches important to any understanding of U.S. policy. Both are at war—with terrorism and with each other, including their respective writing styles.

Mead, the Kissinger Senior Fellow in U.S. Foreign Policy at the Council on Foreign Relations, has previously written on U.S. foreign policy traditions. Aided by a brigade of assistants and consultants, Mead spent the two years since 9/11 in quest of that Holy Grail, an American Grand Strategy for a world at risk. We need one, Mead argues, because 9/11, like Pearl Harbor, has taken us once more on a "terrible turn." And we face a crisis because American foreign policy has gone off the tracks.

Like Gaddis, Mead grounds his observations in deeply rooted American traditions. Unlike another historian, Walter McDougall, who identified those traditions by theme (for example, "progressive imperialism"), Mead uses well-known American names (Hamiltonian, Jeffersonian, Jacksonian, Wilsonian) to symbolize the differences. But most of these men made their mark on domestic politics and, as one struggles to recall Mead's distinctions, the author heaps on a whole new (and unfamiliar) lexicon. American power, for example, is hard, soft, sweet and sticky. The U.S. economy evolves from (Henry) Fordism to "millennial capitalism." Human rightists and European realpolitikers are respectively the Party of Heaven and the Party of Hell. In the preface, Mead introduces himself as "an odd duck", but this terminological quackery is too odd, too often.

Still, the author should be congratulated for his courage. He tackles economics, a rare subject among grand strategists. Mead warns us of confusing complexity, and certainly fulfills his promise. The new lexicon interferes again as he stretches it too far—trying to make the case for the prevalence of Fordism. Consider this whopper: ". . . the years from about 1923 to 1973 saw an unusual degree of stability in American enterprise, except for the turmoil of the Great Depression." He could have fooled most Americans.

On more recent events, Mead writes brilliantly about the French pratfalls on the eve of the Iraq War, and Franco-German relations. He extols most of Bush's "hard power" (military) actions, but he thinks Bush has gone too far. Mead asks: "Is there a world order in which all states have an equal stake, or is it an American empire that the United States imposes on others?" And Mead answers:

> In reality, the American project is and will remain an uneasy combination of the two. . . . Managing the balance . . . is one of the most delicate and critical tasks American policymakers must address.

Mead argues that this balance has been so badly fumbled by Bush that the "American revival" begun by Reagan could be jeopardized.

What then to do? As the book nears its conclusion, Mead's rhetorical imagination fails him. He calls the new balance "Forward Containment", not exactly a bell-ringer. He wants an international consensus against terrorism and a war of ideas against "Arabian fascism." (Islamicism is too easily misunderstood). The United States needs more emphasis on softer power. International institutions such as the UN must be made more representative (more vetoes in the Security Council). He likes the idea of micro-capitalism (small loans for entrepreneurs) in the Third World, where injustice and explosive population growth are disasters in the making. Mead would also like the United States to lead a "buy-out" of the Palestinian refugees in lieu of an overall Arab-Israeli agreement if only to assure the Arabs that America cares about the Palestinian future.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Mead ends on a high note of American *noblesse oblige* to the rest of the world, quoting Endicott Peabody and, inevitably—you guessed it—FDR. Overall, Mead's book is an interesting try with a message similar to those of Gaddis and Harries, namely, that hegemonies need good manners to ease the friction of leadership.

DAVID FRUM, briefly a Bush speechwriter, and Richard Perle, a Reagan-era Assistant Secretary of Defense and more recently the former head of the Defense Intelligence Advisory Board, agree with Mead that America faces a crisis. But the problem isn't manners. Instead, "we can feel the will to win ebbing in Washington." They tell us "there is no middle way for Americans. It is either victory or holocaust." Their book is a "manual for victory."

Clearly, balance and containment are not their style for dealing with the evil of terrorism, and the prose reflects it. Occupying the simmering middle ground between indignation and outrage, the authors occasionally ascend to apocalypse or drop into a withering sarcasm. Indeed, the authors seem happiest when they flagellate the wimps, pimps and feeble-minded so well represented abroad (allies, Russians) and at home (State, Defense, CIA, academics, media). Nor do they fear to enter current controversies, attributing our postwar problems in Iraq to CIA-State sabotage of Ahmad Chalabi and his Iraqi National Congress, who presumably were ready to run the country after Saddam, thereby making occupation unnecessary. These expectations, popular among the Pentagon's civilian masters, may explain a policy that assumed the worst case going into the war and the best case coming out of it.

The biggest problem with this "manual for victory" emerges when one tallies the actual or potential hostilities advocated by an *End to Evil*, which includes, among other things, a military buildup to intimidate and blockade North Korea. Outgoing Army Chief of Staff Eric Shinseki's words come to mind: beware of a twelve-division foreign policy with a ten-division army. The United States has already reached that point, to judge by our difficulties in sustaining manpower levels in Iraq. What Frum and Perle suggest would require a much larger military. After all, if we had 18 divisions (as we did in the Cold War), we wouldn't be hesitant about taking on Iraq, Iran, Syria or Korea, would we?

They may very well be right about the military needed to win this war their way. But recruiting and training such forces will take some time and lots of money. The authors, however, fail to correlate costs and force structures. It is true that wars are waged on borrowed money and that domestic spending should take a backseat to national security, as they argue. We have done 18 divisions before, even without a draft. But the president must ask for it, Congress must authorize it—and then the ranks must still be filled.

Meanwhile, what's an administration to do? When apprised of Al-Qaeda's presence in over sixty countries at the Camp David strategy meeting the weekend following 9/11, President Bush (or maybe "President" Woodward) supposedly said: Fine, one by one. That strategic wisdom means not opening too many fronts at once, especially if you have only ten divisions. But the Frum-Perle manual counsels taking on all of the fronts simultaneously and takes for granted that high technology can always substitute for boots on the ground. Well, sometimes not.

The book ranges far and wide, the authors never short of self-confidence. Many, many scores are settled here. When they are not dismantling or revamping State, the CIA, the Pentagon and Congress, they have many recommendations designed to protect our home front from terrorists (and, one suspects, to infuriate the ACLU). There are defenses of Israel and analyses of Arab outrage and modest

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

appeals for allied or UN help—"but we should not make the mistake of relying on it." They conclude with the ultimate accolade to America's sense of right. "America's vocation is not an imperial vocation. Our vocation is to support justice with power . . . the hope of the world." Certainly.

The Perils of Cheap Hawkery

THESE BOOKS are indeed variations on American traditions but not the tired realist versus idealist. Pearl Harbor and World War II taught Americans that the Germans and Japanese, if left alone, would do grievous harm to their neighbors and American interests. The great title deeds of U.S. leadership after 1945—the UN, the Marshall Plan, the Truman Doctrine, NATO, the U.S.-Japanese Security Treaty, the opening to China—were all intended to transform continents and regions. And they were also backed by large American forces, still deployed forward. It was a reluctant imperium—maybe that explains part of its success—that kept the national interest crowd and the Wilsonians in tenuous balance at home.

Confronted by international terrorism, Bush has indeed fashioned a similar strategy. Unlike John Q., George W. has the power to project military force worldwide. Like FDR, he has a basic if fluctuating coalition that, if handled skillfully, adds real strength. But is it yet enough to win and transform or only to contain? How far are we prepared to go with a foreign policy doctrine that hails enforcing "a balance of power that favors freedom"? Must we do as we did after Korea, mobilize "for the duration" of a long war of attrition? Timidity will guarantee defeat. But so will cheap hawkery—excessive rhetoric supported by underwhelming force. □

Harvey Sicherman is president of the Foreign Policy Research Institute in Philadelphia. He served Secretaries of State Alexander M. Haig, Jr., George P. Shultz and James A. Baker, III.

Russia's Straight-Talk Express

Nikolas K. Gvosdev

Yevgeny M. Primakov (Foreword by Henry A. Kissinger), *A World Challenged: Fighting Terrorism in the Twenty-First Century* (Washington, DC: The Nixon Center/Brookings Institution Press, 2004), 150 pp., $22.95.

"IF THE United States works toward creating a viable, multipolar world; if it ceases to think itself capable of and responsible for unilaterally resolving critical issues of international stability and security; and if it stops trying to set unilateral rules of conduct for the international community, then Russia can be a true and loyal partner to the United States."

Substitute "France" or "Germany" (or even "Europe") in place of Russia, and this sentiment could have just as easily been expressed by any major foreign policy thinker, inside or outside of government, from any country on the Continent. In writing *A World Challenged*,

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Yevgeny Primakov, by expanding on and developing arguments made in an earlier Russian-language version, assumes a leading role in the ongoing tranatlantic debate over the future of the international system and America's leadership.[1]

Primakov is a figure regarded with some suspicion in Washington circles. His advocacy of policies, particularly as foreign minister and prime minister of the Russian Federation (1996–99), with the express aim of resuscitating Russian power and Russia's ability to act more decisively in the international arena, was not welcomed by those who wanted to construct a new world order predicated on permanent Russian weakness. Meanwhile, his vast expertise on the Middle East—including in-depth personal contacts of the region's "rogues" that far exceeds that of any U.S. official or business executive—was used as the reason to discount any advice he proffered about the region. In this issue of *The National Interest*, he himself notes that his prescient observations about the pitfalls of postwar Iraq were laughingly dismissed by the Bush Administration's national security team.

This mistake should not be repeated. Whether one agrees with Primakov's assessments or conclusions, he is one of Russia's "elder statesmen" and an unofficial adviser to Vladimir Putin. His opinions not only reflect what much of Russia's political and economic elite think (after all, he is president of the Russian Chamber of Commerce and Industry), but also resonates very strongly with what many Chinese and Europeans think as well. Primakov, as the chair of Russia's corps of "grey eminences", has the freedom to speak bluntly and say out loud what many diplomats on current active duty can only think.

Primakov brings together in this book a number of themes he has touched upon in his speeches and articles over the last several years: the current threats to international peace and order, especially transnational terrorism, are too great for any one nation, even one as gifted in power and resources as the United States, to solve. Unilateral action (usually ill-conceived) by one state or a coalition under its aegis inevitably creates more problems than it solves. A viable and stable international order can be constructed only on a concert model, in which all the major powers have a voice. As he notes,

> the United States is presently the world's most powerful and influential nation economically, militarily and politically. . . . But that does not mean the United States has become the sole nation that determines the course of world events.

Primakov realizes that the concert model, with its emphasis on consultations and compromise, is a hard sell in Washington. His chapter on the Middle East peace process, particularly developments over the last five years, is meant, in part, to make the case that the United States, even with its overwhelming advantages, is unable to produce any lasting settlement so long as it feels it can operate as the sole mediator for, and guarantor of, any arrangement.

Primakov is also concerned about an American tendency to view cooperation as a sign of weakness. In his opinion, Vladimir Putin helped to facilitate the deployment of U.S. military forces into Central Asia and the Caucasus because he believed this to be a necessary step in dealing with the terrorist threat emanating from Afghanistan. But, Primakov warns, "this should not be taken as a sign that Russia will not defend its national interests."

---

[1]This book is the second in a series produced by The Nixon Center, in cooperation with The Brookings Institution, whereby key books on international politics already published in Russian are made available to an American audience in English translation.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Even though Primakov says that "Russian-American relations have entered a new phase of greater mutual trust", it is clear that a significant "trust deficit" still exists. Russia, for its part, continues to have very real doubts about the continued U.S. military presence in Eurasia when it is not clear to Moscow whether the United States recognizes whether Russia has any legitimate security or economic interests in its neighbors. Primakov is also annoyed with the American tendency to point fingers at Russia as being a prime contributor to international insecurity ("the United States must cease unjustifiably accusing us of poorly managing our nuclear material and working with other countries to build nuclear power plants . . . ") while ignoring its own complicity in spawning Al-Qaeda. ("Oddly enough, American intelligence participated in establishing Bin Laden and his organization", he observes.) He would prefer that "demarches like these" should become "a thing of the past."

At the same time, there is little enthusiasm in Washington (on both sides of the aisle) to move to any sort of multilateral arrangement that would appear to take the initiative for maintaining the security of the United States out of American hands. To some American ears, what Primakov advocates sounds very much like proposals that have emanated from Paris and Berlin. In the Spring 2004 issue of *The National Interest*, Walter Russell Mead summed up the American reaction (and here one can just as easily substitute "Russia" for "Europe"):

> The Bush Administration is not alone in the perception that Europe . . . asks too much and offers too little. "Europe" wants real political control over vital matters of American foreign policy in exchange for kind words at the UN, mostly symbolic military support and limited financial aid. For Bush, the price is simply too high. He chooses not to pay. . . . If the price of a good relationship with Europe is the acceptance of a non-reciprocal European veto over American actions, no American president will ever accept it.

AND THERE is a final question. Primakov makes a case that there is an increasing "trend toward a multipolar world." This assertion is open to debate. Even with "greater global interconnectedness", which Primakov believes may "push us toward greater multipolarity", it may still be possible for the United States to retain leadership within the international system without having to face any sort of counterbalancing coalition.

It is also not automatic that the Russian Federation would remain one of the world's key actors. Since the 1998 crash, the Russian economy has recovered; its GDP now totals more than $346 billion. But, in comparison, the United States and the European Union both have a GDP of more than $10 trillion, and China's GDP is $1.4 trillion. By 2050 India is expected to become the world's third-largest national economy (behind the United States and China). Primakov himself cites a statistic that the United States is responsible for two-fifths of the global market share in science and technology, followed by Japan with 30 percent and Germany with 16 percent. No one expects that Russia will be a prime mover in the international system of the 21st century. Indeed, the fact that Russia might be "left out" of the top-tier is a major concern. In quoting the comments of Steven Everts, a senior fellow at the London-based Centre for European Reform, where he advocates a joint American-EU solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, Primakov rhetorically asks "the author to examine his own conscience as to why he thinks it possible to exclude Russia as a guarantor in this process." My guess is that Everts does so

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

because he concludes that Russia would have very little to offer in concrete terms.

But Primakov believes that there is more to influence in the international system than being able to deliver suitcases of cash or have a high-tech military machine. In essence, his argument is that Russia will continue to play a major role in the international system because it is willing to take upon itself the responsibilities of a major actor, that "Russian foreign policy can do much to help stabilize conflict situations in regions around the world." He also engages in a bit of geographic determinism, that Russia's "unique position as a bridge between Europe and Asia gives it a more prominent geopolitical role to play" in the world.

The jury is still out, however. Putin's ambitious reform agenda for Russia's economy, military and political institutions might not succeed. Instead of functioning as a bridge, Russia could just as easily be subdivided into "Asian" and "European" spheres of economic and political influence. By 2025, in economic terms, Russia's peers in the international system might be South Africa and Brazil—important regional powers in their own right, but not major global actors—rather than the United States, China or the European Union.[2]

However that may be, the quality of Primakov's counsel to the United States should not be assessed on Russia's future ranking among the world's powers. And to the extent he points out mistakes that the United States is making, as well as ways to correct those errors, policymakers in Washington should welcome rather than discount his perspective. □

[2]"In any forecasting, Russia is and will remain the second largest nuclear power in the world", Primakov notes, and it is very true that in this area, Russia will remain a peer of the United States and a major player in the global security architecture. But possession of nuclear weapons alone does not sustain the position of a great power, and in other areas of power projection, Russia is likely to have declining influence in the coming decades.

Nikolas K. Gvosdev is executive editor of *The National Interest*.

Prudence and the Prince

Fred E. Baumann

Carnes Lord, *The Modern Prince: What Leaders Need to Know Now* (Yale University Press: New Haven, 2003) 275 pp., $26.

UPDATES OF Machiavelli's *Prince* are not unknown. Dick Morris's recent *New Prince* (Renaissance, 1999) is a low but representative example of the genre, in which a self-advertised tough guy shows you how important it is to be tough and invokes Old Nick as his patron devil. Carnes Lord's *Modern Prince*, by contrast, is a book of great value to the serious student.

Machiavelli said of the original *Prince* that it was the sum of the understanding he had acquired over the years. The same may be true for Lord's, reflecting his impressive career both as political theorist (a translator of Aristotle's *Politics*) and

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

leading national security policymaker (on the Reagan NSC and in the first Bush Administration). As Lord suggests in a footnote, his book can be understood as arising from Harvey Mansfield's *Taming the Prince* (Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993), as it traces, through modern thought and practice, the institutionalization of the Machiavellian insight that everything, even domestic policy, is war—the move from the prince-executioner to "the Executive Branch." To oversimplify, Lord's plain message is that the taming has gone too far, that leaders can do a lot more than they think they can, and had better begin to realize it. In this, one might think that he is echoing Max Weber's fear of routinization and bureaucratization. That would be partly true, but mostly misleading.

For Lord neither seeks to return to Machiavelli simply nor in some breathlessly Nietzschean voluntarist or "charismatic" way. His own roots are in Aristotle and the traditional political science that Machiavelli both revolted against but still shared, and which knew important things that the taming of the prince, for all its virtues, perhaps necessarily had to forget. The commonality is that both knew and took seriously the reality of politics that is lived beneath the level of institutions and the rules of the game. As such, this book, combined perhaps with James Ceaser's *Liberal Democracy and Political Science* (Johns Hopkins University Press, 1990), provides the best introduction to the practical side of that traditional political science.

It is useful to know Machiavelli's *Prince* when reading Lord. There are, for instance, instructive correspondences of chapter topics. Chapter 11, which Machiavelli uses to describe the despised ecclesiastical state, Lord devotes to a critique of contemporary political science. Where Machiavelli's priests skillfully use political means to frustrate the true goals of politics and pretend (and worse, even believe) that there is a spiritual realm that transcends the merely human, Lord blames contemporary political science for an unspirited, essentially technical and materialistic understanding that in the end has similar effects in concealing the real possibilities of political life. But while you might miss some of the fun if you don't keep checking your Machiavelli, the essential argument of the book is straightforward.

That argument proceeds through a series of brief but nuanced expositions of topics that each merit a long book. Lord orders them, however, so as to give both a remarkably complete overview of what leadership in the full sense would involve and a cumulative argument in favor of it. He begins simply, making the case that political leadership is both possible and necessary. This means taking on the claim that we are entering a post-historical, post-political, administrative and economic world. He concedes that there is strong evidence for the tendency, but he reasonably insists that we are far from being able to dispense with politics. He is thus compelled to distinguish between the serious political leadership that is called for when stakes are high, and the comfy-cozy kind of "leadership" that CEOs like to talk about and which facilitates, administers and takes as given all the rules of the democratic game. It also means rehabilitating the Aristotlean concept of the "regime", as opposed to our notion of the "system", inasmuch as the former includes, along with the formal institutions, what we today call "political culture", the way of life of a political order. It is the real job of political leaders to found, re-found and preserve not just formal, political arrangements but ways of life, if (and not) only because the former depend so heavily on the latter. Hence the task of leadership is far more extensive and challenging than either politicians or political elites today tend to understand.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The second stage of Lord's argument comprises examples of contemporary statesmanship to show that Machiavelli's claim that good arms matter more than good laws still applies. Of course "arms" and "laws" aren't the simple opposites they at first appear. Properly understood, laws can be arms and arms can give laws. But Machiavelli's aphorism means that modern statesman cannot passively accept the rules of the game as they find them, and as social developments and the elites that they bring forward transform them under the statesman's feet.

The case is simple enough in many contemporary countries, where having "one's own arms" literally means that. But, though subtler, a similar lesson applies to the American Constitution. Here Lord makes an important distinction he will emphasize both at the end of the book and in his chapter on "autocratic democracy." There is a way in which we have a much stronger, more active government than the "energetic" executive the Founders proposed. But this apparent strength expresses itself increasingly in the powers of a largely independent bureaucracy and the courts. It actually paralyzes political doing and, perhaps worse, the possibility of real political thinking. Similarly, where Lord praises Lee Kuan Yew for reforming Singapore's government from the top down and recruiting an elite whose real purpose was to strengthen the legislative and deliberative parts of government, he criticizes the quasi-monarchical Gaullist model for a paradoxical weakening of the apparently all-powerful presidential state. (This is a criticism, however, that readers of Tocqueville's *The Old Regime and the Revolution* will quickly recognize.) For Lord is no Big Government buff. He understands well the ways in which Machiavelli is a republican. Real energy of government is inseparable from a high level of political understanding. That means deliberation, and that in turn means disparate viewpoints and powers, and the real conflict that goes with genuine republican politics. The kind of flaccid compromising that characterizes Japanese government comes in for severe handling: the Nakasone effort to break out of the colloidal goo of Japanese nonpolitics appears noble, but doomed.

Lord reminds us that a corollary of the perspective of the regime, as opposed to the system, is that the goals of politics are higher than the technical ones our elites usually think about. Morale, self-confidence and honor matter a great deal, however hard to quantify they may be. (This is a point that may not seem so archaic after the Madrid bombing and the election results of a few days later.) Thereafter, he gives some brief applications of his view to a number of institutions that amount to resources for real leaders and constraining excuses for inadequate ones. Law, education, the economy, diplomacy, the military, the intelligence services and the media all represent institutions and their respective elites who, on the one hand, constrain both political action and understanding, and on the other, can be overcome and used by sufficiently able leaders. Lord stops short, for instance, of calling for government intervention into higher education, but his contemptuous description of "the alternately lunatic and sinister pursuit of the agenda of political correctness" which "raises fundamental issues, including ones of legal due process" and his remarks about the tenure system leave little doubt about his preferences.

READERS OF *The National Interest* will be especially interested in his support for Eliot Cohen's case advocating civilian leadership in overriding the often technical perspective of the military. Similarly, Lord's proposal to abolish the CIA deserves thoughtful consideration. It seems ill-timed right now, when the CIA appears in the media

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

as the brave doubter of Iraqi WMD capacities. Still, Lord's summary of the CIA's track record in warning of incipient catastrophes (its original, post-Pearl Harbor purpose) gives one pause, as does his criticism of the insistence of the CIA on providing sociological rather than political information, as though it were the schoolmaster of government rather than its instrument.

The last section of the book puts all the tools together in the name of strategy, which comes into its far-sighted, well-coordinated and thoroughgoing own against mere Kennedy-style crisis management. Here Lord comes up against the problem of advisers. Machiavelli finally cuts the Gordian knot by insisting that the leader has to be the superior of the adviser if the adviser is not to rule him. In the end, Lord pretty much goes along with this. Leaders have to be able to control the elites. But this means that they have "to rise to a level of intellectually and morally informed argument that is for the most part sadly lacking in our political leaders and elites alike." Barring that, he suggests we face an ugly future, one in which the surface activity of government, featuring much use of the bully pulpit (and aircraft carrier), will mask the slow petrifaction into rule by bureaucrats, courts and the elite factions to which they listen. But how likely are we to get such leaders?

The very power of Lord's case, rising as it does to an almost despairing conclusion, suggests the obvious Madisonian counter-argument. Since Lord, like Machiavelli, depends on what Madison called "enlightened statesmen", and since they are even more likely to be lacking now than in 1790, maybe, for all its weaknesses, there is much to be said for the tamed, institutionalized prince, the nonentity facilitator, where the true authority of the regime lies in the faith in due process, in the outcome, whatever it may be, of the factional disputes among, mainly, the elites. Temperamentally, I tend to that view, the true slogan of which may be "God looks out for children, drunks and the United States of America", and which thus confesses its poltroonery by Machiavellian standards of self-help. Still, I remember that it was Caligula who banned the poets from Rome, thinking that he was thus exemplifying the statecraft of Plato's *Republic*, and I wouldn't much like to see, for instance, the principle of academic freedom subjected to political necessity as interpreted by, say, Howard Dean.

The proper degree of tameness for the prince is, however, not an abstract matter, separate from context. The current drift towards the power of deeply irresponsible elites, who do not even know what there is to be responsible to, reminds of Leo Strauss's response to the charge that he had compared American social scientists to Nero fiddling while Rome burned: He hadn't, because they didn't know that they were fiddling or that Rome was burning. Along with the current concomitant and essentially subpolitical elite discourse, compounded of technique and utopian fantasy and not moored to regime questions, it makes Lord's call to the memory of what political leadership really involves extremely timely. If the book falls into the hands of the next president, all the better. But its greatest benefit is likely to be bestowed on the very elites it castigates. If the older, fuller understanding of politics that Machiavelli largely shared with Aristotle—even as he began the process of undermining it through the forgetfulness that can-do thinking produces—can be revived in the minds of serious students of politics, future practitioners will find it easier to understand what the nature of their activity already suggests to them. □

Fred E. Baumann is professor of Political Science at Kenyon College and author of *Fraternity and Politics: Choosing One's Brothers* (Praeger, 1998).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Requiem for a Genocide

Neil McInnes

IN HIS *Brief Description of New York* (London, 1670), Daniel Denton says, in the quaint English of a son of a Presbyterian manse on 17th-century Long Island,

> To say something of the *Indians*, there is now but few upon the Island, and those few no ways hurtful but rather serviceable to the *English*, and it is to be admired, how strangely they have decreased by the Hand of God, since the *English* first settling of those parts; for since my time [Denton was born in 1644], where there were six towns, they are reduced to two small villages, and it hath generally been observed, that where the *English* come to settle, a Divine Hand makes way for them, by removing or cutting off the *Indians* either by wars one with the other, or by some raging mortal Disease.

Elsewhere in his panegyric of New York, which is really a plug for immigration, Denton praises its "sweet and pleasant Air, and a continuation of such Influences as tend to the Health both of Man and Beast." He notices no contradiction between the blooming health of the English and their livestock, and the fact that the Indians are dropping dead from raging mortal diseases. The remarkable decline in the Indian population that he reports has nothing to do with interracial conflict, for he describes the treaties and the trade that bind the communities as being mutually "serviceable." He would know all about that, because in 1662 and 1663 his job was to negotiate the purchase of lands from the natives. So the Divine Hand was encompassing the convenient reduction of the Indian population by means of (here Denton got them in the wrong order) internecine conflict between tribes, and diseases to which the English were immune and the Indians were not.

These two causes have continued to be the preferred explanation of the catastrophic decline in populations that attended all of Europe's encounters with the New World. Of course, there is a third cause to be invoked, the murder by Europeans of such of the natives as dared resist the loss of their land and its fruits. For those who press this argument, imported diseases are just excuses that spare the invader's responsibility on the grounds that, like Daniel Denton, he usually did not suspect what havoc his cough, his sneeze, his touch were wreaking. In this view, Denton's sanctimonious Divine Hand too often hides the bloodshed of the "wild frontier." And yet even when this powerful argument is pressed to the limit—and the limit is the cruel Spanish usurpation of established regimes in Central and South America—we are left with a massive loss of life that cutlass, musket and arquebuse could never inflict, least of all under a hail of spears and arrows.

The losses were enormous and by now beyond exact reckoning, because we do not know what the pre-contact populations were. Estimates for all the Americas range from 8 million to 112 million (and still rising); for America north of the Rio Grande from 900,000 to 18 million; for the Australian mainland from 300,000 to 1 million; and for tiny

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Tasmania from 500 to 7,000. In each case the bigger number comes from the critics of imperialism, who might be tempted to exaggerate the carnage, the smaller number from its apologists. (A scholar who analyzed these figures, David Henige, wisely called his book *Numbers from Nowhere.*) We do know that, starting from the most reliable estimates, native populations fell by about three-quarters in the first thirty or so years of contact (some by much more), and they continued falling steadily, because of disadvantage and alcohol, for 150 years, until an upturn began in the first half of the 20th century. Naturally, because of miscegenation, the descendents are genetically a quite different race from those who fell before the settlers, but they claim a cultural continuity that entitles them to reparation from the heirs of those guilty of the frontier murders (which engage responsibility more directly than the infections).

THE STUDY of these claims and responsibilities is a proper one for historians, though one constantly threatened by callous racism on one side and sentimental sloppiness on the other. It needs to be carried on in the light of two considerations: First, that it is a side issue, not the main matter; and second, that it is in a way irrelevant.

It is a side issue in that those "raging mortal diseases" were the main killer everywhere from the Valley of Mexico to California to the Australian outback. As to relevance, let us suppose that young Daniel Denton had stayed in the business of negotiating treaties and buying land, that he had made his peaceful way across the continent, a leonine treaty here, a shonky deal there, glass beads for priceless acres everywhere, and never a cross word. Let us suppose that when he had pacified California, the Canadians had borrowed him, and then (if only he had lived so long) the Australians, so that the British could build their second empire, all without spilling a drop of blood. Where would we be today? Just about exactly where we are. Three-quarters of the native peoples would have died on first contact with Europeans; sterility induced by venereal disease, alcohol, neglect and malnutrition would have reduced their numbers further; the invading herds and flocks would have displaced traditional food sources as the hunter-gatherers were everywhere pushed aside into reserves by the advancing cultivators and pastoralists. It did not happen that way, but this thought experiment is a reminder that any story of colonial settlement as first and foremost a series of massacres is bad history because it misses the main point. Murders were not uncommon, usually as revenge for livestock rustling or crop burning, but they are not the theme of the story of settlement.

But some stories tell it otherwise. Their favorite locale is Tasmania (Van Diemen's Land until 1855), where the British hastily founded a penal colony in 1803 for fear the French were about to claim it. Here, on empire's farthest shore, they proceeded, it is said, to massacre the natives. After years of warfare, in 1830 they formed a line of convicts, settlers and red-coated soldiers that advanced across the island and sought to corral the whole remaining population on to a peninsula. When that exercise failed ludicrously because they were no match for the blacks' bushman skills, they rounded the Aborigines up in small groups and shipped them offshore to windswept Flinders Island, where the last of the race died in 1876. In *The Fatal Shore* (Vintage, 1986), Robert Hughes called it the one instance of genocide in the history of the British empires. Others have called it a dry run for the Holocaust, a low-tech anticipation of concentration camps. Comparison with Pol Pot's killing fields has not been wanting. The doyen of Tasmanian historiography, Lyndall Ryan, authorized this rhetoric by declaring that the colonial

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

government in Hobart had launched "a conscious policy of genocide."

In more temperate language, the Bullets-not-Bacteria school of colonial history has argued that the Aborigines of Tasmania were the legitimate defenders of their traditional territories against a violent British invasion; that many of them were killed in a long guerrilla war that was marked by repeated massacres of blacks; that the Aborigines demonstrated political savvy and, incidentally, good health throughout a brave but futile resistance; and finally, that unsupervised "borderers" (convicts working as shepherds and stockmen, sealers, bolters and bushrangers) raped, abducted or killed countless black women. That is why a precontact population of probably 2,000 (though some now say 5,000 to 7,000) had shrunk to 351 when they were rounded up for exile on Flinders Island.

AGAINST THIS received version, a devastating attack has been launched by a Sydney historian, Keith Windschuttle, first in a series of articles in the Australian magazine *Quadrant* and then in *The Fabrication of Aboriginal History* (Macleay, 2002). In 480 pages of meticulous and occasionally mind-numbing detail, he claims to show that Britain's colonization of Australia was Europe's least violent encounter with the New World; that it met no organized resistance, only sporadic conflict; that mass killing by either side was rare and involved tens not hundreds of souls; that sustained frontier warfare was a fiction; and that there never was anything even resembling a genocide. He arrived at these conclusions by a method that was simple but tedious: He checked the footnote references of the orthodox histories. He discovered a tangle of mistakes and misinterpretations, references to documents that did not exist, quotations that had been twisted and truncated to mean the opposite, numbers that had been plucked out of the air, and a whole series of "fictions", "fabrications" and malicious inventions by academic historians who were also political militants.

Whereas these pro-Aborigine activists argued that thousands of natives were killed in a full-scale war (and, mysteriously, none by disease), Windschuttle did a careful body count of all recorded violent deaths on Tasmania. He found trace of 185 white deaths between 1803 and 1834 and, in the same period, only 118 black deaths, or about four a year. This was no war, because the primitive Tasmanians were incapable of organizing one. It was a series of thieving, murderous raids in quest of the white man's coveted tea and sugar, followed by limited revenge attacks, usually unsuccessful for want of bushman skills. True, the full-blood Aborigines died out during this wave of violence, but that was because they persisted in inter-tribal warfare (usually disputes over women) and because they prostituted their womenfolk to sealers, convict shepherds and anyone who would give in return tea, sugar, flour, blankets—and a dose of venereal disease.

This sordid version of events seems designed to outrage every progressive sensibility. So, as comic relief, as it were, one might look at the political reception it got. As Windschuttle's book was launched, a crowd demonstrated outside a Sydney bookshop shouting "Racism!" A former Labour prime minister, Paul Keating, launched another book offering a left-wing account of the "history wars" and implied that the ruling Liberal Party was behind the slanderous new history. A professor of politics solemnly explained that American neoconservatives were to blame, for they had encouraged Prime Minister John Howard to declare war on what they called political correctness in questions of race and gender. The tone of

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

outrage had already been set by a High Court judgement that colonization had been, as it wrote,

> a conflagration of oppression and conflict which was, over the following century, to spread across the continent to dispossess, degrade and devastate the Aboriginal peoples and leave a national legacy of unutterable shame.

One of the judges who handed down that condemnation of the civilization of Enlightenment Britain later went into the wilds to express to Aborigines a profound apology for one particular massacre that, it was soon shown, had never occurred.

ONE MIGHT have hoped that the academic response would be more measured. In fact it was pathetic, but it has an interest that goes beyond the primitive Tasmanians. It goes to the question of how postmodernist historians, who deny there is any one truth about the past, behave when they are accused of telling untruths. Like any other reasonable human being in an argument, they must want to say they are right and the other fellow wrong, but their philosophy forbids that. One replied to Windschuttle,

> For us the "truth" is made up of countless contradictory, ironic and provocative elements, woven together into an allegorical, sometimes fictive documentation of what it is to live our lives.

In other words, "No facts please, we're postmodernists!" Charged by Windschuttle with fabricating history, Professor Lyndall Ryan retorted that history was

> a complex terrain in which multiple stories and interpretations are represented [and not] a one-dimensional discipline in which all ambiguity must be removed. . . . Two truths are told, is only one truth correct?

Asked about her fanciful black death tolls in Tasmania, she said, "Yes, but historians are always making up figures."

This sounds like a plea of No Contest, which was largely confirmed when the profession produced 19 replies by historians and related specialists (including one who lectures in Genocide Studies) and compiled them into *Whitewash: On Keith Windschuttle's Fabrication of Aboriginal History* (Black Inc., 2003). Some of the most serious challenges, notably to supposed massacres and body counts, were simply ignored by their authors, as though they were walking away from positions they knew they could not defend. Other pieces of guesswork were insolently repeated with no new evidence. Asked how she got such a count as one hundred Aborigines and twenty Europeans killed in one place, Professor Ryan said, "I deduced it" without revealing her premises. Of another incident she said, "I surmised that a massacre of Aborigines had taken place . . . and had been hushed up", without revealing how, in the admitted absence of evidence, one surmises a massacre. In cases where Windschuttle advanced a smaller number of deaths, a common retort in *Whitewash* was, "We will never know with any certainty" (James Boyce), or "It is not remotely possible to find a precise figure for Aboriginal mortality" (Henry Reynolds), although they had been alleging big numbers for years past; the uncertainty, it seems, only affects other, lesser estimates.

Suddenly, too, "genocide" disappeared from the vocabulary. After years of talk about a holocaust and ethnic cleansing, the charge of genocide is nowhere pressed in *Whitewash*. Contributors concede they have moved away from "seeing the conflict as a series of one-sided mas-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

sacres" (James Boyce) or from regarding racial conflict as "many large-scale massacres [rather than] pervasive but small-scale violence" (Dirk Moses). Henry Reynolds recalled that he had earlier warned that to exaggerate the carnage out of sympathy with the blacks just made them look stupid and the Europeans clever. In historical fact, by the time the European with his slow-to-reload musket got off his second shot, the native had put several spears through him and disappeared into the bush. The gory slaughters imagined in "genocide studies" were physically impossible 200 years ago in Tasmania. Windschuttle is entitled to crow in *Quadrant*,

> So, despite all the sound and fury raised by this debate, we have actually made some progress. The case for genocide in Tasmania has not been sustained. Indeed, its principal advocates have walked away from the topic, unwilling to defend it. So, my first thesis, there was no genocide in Tasmania, I now take as proven by default.

ONE POINT on which there has been no meeting of minds, and probably never will be, concerns the cultural relativism that is nowadays an article of faith in progressive history circles. In this view, one culture is as good as another, there is no hierarchy of civilizations, no development from one stage to the next. Thus there could be no room for Windschuttle's notion of a dysfunctional society doomed to be pushed aside by a more advanced one; no room, indeed, for my references to "primitive Tasmanians." Such reprehensible ideas, it is said, betray white supremacy or social Darwinism or plain racism. But no one is denying that the Tasmanians were intelligent human beings, quick on the uptake and inclined to be friendly (too friendly for their own good when it came to lending out their wives to visitors). Nevertheless, 8,000 years of isolation since the seas rose around their island had left their little tribal society divided, quarrelsome, ignorant, poor and perverse; they had lost abilities they once had, like how to catch fish or make fire easily, and the wheel was beyond their dreams. In the eyes of colonial officials, all children of the Enlightenment, they were the most primitive people on earth. Windschuttle still thinks so, and that is what offends his critics—all children, they, of 1968 and the Vietnam War.

In his *Fate of a Free People* (Penguin, 2004), Henry Reynolds depicts them not as primitive tribes but as a united people rising against the oppressors of their fatherland. He resiles from no anachronism as he idealizes them in language once reserved for "freedom-loving friends of socialism." He imagines them using guerrilla warfare tactics of a sort discovered by some third-world nations only in the 20th century, although the British governor of the day said they never once attacked a band of even three armed men, and only one red-coat lost his life in Tasmania. Staying closer to the evidence, Windschuttle says flatly, "The actions of the Aborigines were not noble; they never rose beyond robbery, assault and murder." That may be too harsh a judgement, but the resistance of the Aborigines did seem to the settlers so unpredictable and uncoordinated that it was more like individual acts of treachery than an organized military campaign.

The cultural relativists are especially affronted by the argument that the ready prostitution of the women impaired the survival of the Aboriginal race. Reynolds says this "crude analysis rests on censoriousness and sensation." Censoriousness? Is it prudish and fuddy-duddy to say that certain practices damaged fertility? Apparently it offends feminist beliefs of a particular sort, for Marilyn Lake says in her contribution to *Whitewash* that "Windschuttle simply recapitulates 19th-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

century moral judgements and sexist double standards" when he deplores primitive sexual mores. Double standards? So is there a *single* standard that actually endorses trading a wife's sexual favors for tea and sugar?

In Windschuttle's view there has been a veritable academic industry for the past thirty years manufacturing a false history of British colonization, designed to throw maximum discredit on the settlers and their descendants. It is staffed by Left-leaning academics who have gained control of history schools in most universities. If that sounds too conspiratorial, one would have to allow that Windschuttle has shown that the subject of Aboriginal history has become enveloped in an atmosphere of militant sentimentality, which has encouraged sloppy conformism and careless research bordering on dishonesty. How did this happen? After all, the facts and attitudes that Windschuttle adduces, which seem so disconcerting to the prevailing consensus, were all perfectly familiar to the settlers and officials of the day and were adopted by academic historians throughout the 19th century. Then, somewhere around 1900, the Aborigines virtually disappeared from the history books, not because there was a guilty cover-up (as now supposed) but because there were so few of them left, they had bequeathed not a single tangible monument to remind men of their culture, and they were thought to be doomed to total disappearance. What changed first were the population statistics, the recovery of the dispossessed races worldwide, or more accurately of their mixed-race descendants.[1] By the 1960's these new forces were armed, again worldwide, with a combative ideology that mixed Marxism and romanticism with a shrewd awareness of the money value of land rights.

Double standards? Is there a* single *standard that endorses trading a wife's sexual favors for tea and sugar?

The valet's view, as Hegel would say, of the particular Tasmanian case points to the surprising fact that 130 years after the death of the last Tasmanian Aborigine there are today more than 15,000 people on the island who claim to be Aborigines and want compensation for the misfortunes of their race. These people are mainly descendants of European sealers who camped on neighboring islands and took up with native women who were only too glad to escape the rigors of tribal life. (Some of them, according to the community's own leaders, have no Aboriginal ancestry at all and are only there for the government assistance.) They have taken to the courts the university historians' stories of massacres and laid claim to the lands where the atrocity was supposed to have occurred. So far they have not been successful, but their community receives millions of dollars a year as compensation for disadvantage.

The only reason the courts grant native title is that they have already been convinced that there were atrocities, that the Aborigines were dispossessed in a cruel war of invasion and aggression. And *that* is where the academic historians come in: It was they who told the courts that this was historical fact. Their history has been a weapon in a political and legal battle, which is probably why they have not been too fussy about checking their sources and weighing the evidence. Henry Reynolds actually boasts of the role he played in preparing the cases that won landmark victories for the Aborigines in the highest courts, and

[1]See, for example, Nancy Shoemaker's *American Indian Population Recovery in the Twentieth Century*, (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1999).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Lyndall Ryan says that opponents of land rights are apologists for British invasion. There is not the least pretense of objectivity in this cabal of activists. They would no doubt say that the task of bringing about a "reconciliation" between white and black Australians is more important than writing accurate history (which, as we have seen, some of them do not believe is possible anyhow), but Windschuttle asks

> how a story about violence and warfare between blacks and whites, if untrue, can help reconciliation at all. What good does it do Aboriginal people to tell them the whites wanted to exterminate them, when they never did?

The debate is far from over. Windschuttle's *Fabrication* is sub-titled *Volume 1: Van Diemen's Land 1803–1847*; he is preparing several subsequent volumes dealing with mainland Australia, where he will argue against Henry Reynolds's theses, namely that the "violence was ever-present along the ragged line of early interaction", that "invasion and conquest prepared the way for settlement", and that the Aborigines put up a brave but futile resistance through a century-long campaign of guerrilla warfare. Already, inspired by his example, dissident or counter-revolutionary historians have re-opened the files on several supposed massacres and found only invention or exaggeration. It has been noted above that the tendency of the most recent scholarship is to revalidate the views of 19th-century historians, who were nearer the events and yet to be affected by the Black Power romanticism of the 1960s. So it is with massacre stories. In 1875 James Calder wrote in *The Native Tribes of Tasmania:*

> That many hostile collisions occurred between the two races during the 30 years that succeeded the first colonization of the country is true enough; but I know of no trustworthy record of more than one, two, three or at most four persons being killed in any one encounter. The warfare, though pretty continuous, was rather a petty affair, with grossly exaggerated details—something like the story of the hundred dead men, reduced, on inquiry, to three dead dogs.

Not all the atrocity stories will turn out to concern three dead dogs. It is beyond doubt that there were brief episodes, notably in the colony of Queensland in the second half of the 19th century, of savagery on both sides: cattle rustled, punitive expedition, Aboriginal revenge murders and mutilation of women and children, and finally the Native Police called in. These were Aborigines who donned the uniform and combined native bushman skills with European arms and discipline. Unlike the red coats in Tasmania, they could be deadly. But they were also a sign that other things were happening on the frontier besides bloodshed, something the settlers called "coming in." Right from the start, some natives realized that the new and superior power was

Letters to the Editor

We welcome brief comments (under 300 words) from our readers.
Due to space constraints, all letters are subject to editorial revision. Remarks should be addressed to:

Managing Editor ◆ THE NATIONAL INTEREST ◆ 1615 L Street, N.W., Suite 1230 ◆ Washington, DC 20036
◆ editor@nationalinterest.org ◆

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

implacable, irresistible and in some ways attractive. They joined it, settling on its fringes, taking work from it, accepting many of its ways. This was the beginning of the process of assimilation that for long promised, and still promises, the best future for the tribes dispossessed of their vast hunting territories by the new civilization of shepherds and cultivators. The Native Police were perhaps not the most glorious of those who "came in" but they were the forerunners of a campaign of integration, religious conversion (three-quarters of Aborigines say they are Christian today) and adaptation to the modern world, which progressed solidly until it hit the slogan, "Assimilation is cultural genocide."

This cry was raised by devotees of the "culture cult", as Roger Sandall called it in his 2001 book of that name: people who want the Native Americans, Canada's First Nation, Australia's Aborigines, the Maori and all the dispossessed and detribalized of the world to hive off from modern civilization, to refuse assimilation and to cling to the tattered remnants of their ancient cultures. For the white academics who press this case, it is a cruel self-indulgence at the expense of the dispossessed. Windschuttle thinks it is also the secret origin of those massacre myths that the academic historians have accepted uncritically: missionaries, former missionaries and other self-appointed protectors of the natives were out to prove that assimilation would never work, that black and white could never get along together, and that the only solution was to isolate the natives in reserves under the authoritarian management of the "protectors." What better support for this campaign than the myth of the bloody frontier and inevitable racial wars, rumors of hidden atrocities and hushed-up massacres?

Like some of Windschuttle's other theories, this one remains to be tested. What is sure in advance is that laborers in this vineyard must henceforth meet standards of honesty and accuracy quite unfamiliar to the credulous, the sentimental and the political activists who have ruled too long. Truth, it seems, may yet win out in the marketplace of ideas. □

Neil McInnes is a long-time contributor to *The National Interest.*

When a subject population rises in revolt, you have got to suppress it, and you can only do so by methods which make nonsense of any claims for the superiority of western civilization

—George Orwell, *Time and Tide* (1936)

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Response

Can NATO Survive Europe?

This magazine invited four distinguished analysts to respond to my "Therapy's End" essay (Winter 2003/04). They did so in the Spring 2004 issue. This is my response to them.

When the USSR imploded, General Lee Butler suggested that his own Strategic Air Command be disbanded and America abandon MAD. He saw both this institution and that doctrine as inappropriate after the conditions which created them had fundamentally changed. Parkinsonian inertia has triumphed over Butler's wisdom. So too with NATO.

Radek Sikorski wants to keep hold on America's apron strings, arguing "we can be Europe and America, but we are also the Western civilization, with NATO as our invincible arm." I see much less common purpose or shared values, but then I do not regard America as a European country. Hans Binnendijk and Richard Kugler, although openly incredulous that my heresy could be genuine, argue NATO just needs rejuvenation to extend its benign influence to the Middle East. Our current efforts to engage Europe in transforming the Arab world have already substantially strained the transatlantic relationship.

Then there is John Hulsman's anathema. We learn I am a "utopian" NATO "romantic", plus that I am a product of the 1968 generation of "rebellion" against American policy; young Hulsman himself represents "a realist Hegelian synthesis" on the Alliance. Whew! For the record, in 1968 I was a student volunteer in Johnson's abortive reelection campaign and supported the Vietnam War (youthful follies). I regard Hegelian thought as the breeding ground for most of the modern world's tragedies. Hulsman's high-flown exegesis on NATO, when stripped of rhetorical flourish, is just a bonding of Madeleine Albright's notion of American "virtuous power" with Donald Rumsfeld's principle that the mission determines the coalition (both concepts have done NATO far more damage than my best efforts).

Hulsman is correct that I am a romantic, but about America rather than Europe. Where I differ from the NATO faithful is in their view that America should be permanently harnessed to Europe. Despite many years in Europe I feel none of the sense of cultural dependency which infests much of the American foreign policy elite. In this regard, my conceptual origins include John Quincy Adams and Ralph Waldo Emerson.

Over the course of the 20th century, the United States played an increasing role in European security affairs. We did so because the catastrophic failure of the European state system at times reached beyond Europe to challenge American interests. This was not inevitable. The struggle among the European imperial powers might well have remained limited to their own continent and colonies. I regard Woodrow Wilson's policies as tragic for America, and perhaps also for Europe. I do not believe that it was in our interest to send our boys to France in 1918. Our later engagements in Europe were driven by necessity and valid self-interest. Today, both factors are fundamentally altered by the twin developments of European integration (however imperfect) and the collapse of the Soviet empire. There is no longer any need for American power in Europe.

Can NATO serve "Western civilization" by projecting common military power into non-Western regions? Even if the undertaking were sound, the transatlantic gap in culture and values is far deeper than a debate over use of armed force. Europeans and Americans differ on the basic role of the state, the status of the citizen and their visions of society and the future. I do not seek to impose American values on Europe. But when Gerhard Schröder sought votes by announcing that "America is different than Europe", my response was "Yes, and thank God."

I see the Atlantic Alliance as a phase of American external policy driven by interests and circumstances now changed. My critics want NATO to define America's role in the world through a link with Europe that, I believe, neither party can or should sustain. Thus, we differ. □

E. WAYNE MERRY
Senior Associate
American Foreign Policy Council

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

On Newsstands Now

"No other magazine has had a comparable effect in keeping the social sciences honest." — Francis Fukuyama

THE Public Interest

Summer 2004 • Number 156

Considerations on Gay Marriage

The Liberal Case Against
Susan Shell

Conservative Policy Dilemmas
Charles Murray • Jonathan Rauch • Michael Novak

The Politics and Realities of Medicare	***Eric Cohen***
Bioethics and the Constitution	***Diana Schaub***
The Homeland Security Bureaucracy	***Eli Lehrer***
Why Talk Radio is Conservative	***William G. Mayer***
The Economics of Obesity	***Inas Rashad & Michael Grossman***

Books In Review: ***Thomas F. Powers, Christian D. Brose, Michael Barone, and Diana West***

Subscribe today! • Call (888) 267-6030
$25.00 for one year (4 issues) • $42.50 for two years
Read highlights of our current issue at **www.thepublicinterest.com**

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PRACTICALLY THE ONLY RISK THE AIG COMPANIES CAN'T MANAGE IS THE ONE YOU TAKE BY GOING ELSEWHERE.

- All forms of property-casualty insurance for companies of all sizes
- Life, accident and health insurance
- Retirement savings products including fixed and variable annuities
- Auto and other personal insurance products
- Commercial auto insurance
- Mergers and acquisitions insurance services
- Reinsurance and retrocessional coverages
- Internet security and cyber-risk insurance
- Political risk and trade credit insurance
- Economic and political assessment advisory services
- Captive management services
- Loss control and engineering services
- Claim management and cost-containment services
- Emergency evacuation and security services
- Mortgage guaranty insurance
- Mutual fund and investment advisory services
- Third-party asset management
- Direct equity investment funds
- Infrastructure finance in emerging markets
- Global employee benefits and pension management
- Consumer finance
- Premium financing
- Interest rate, currency, equity and credit derivative transactions
- Trading and market making in foreign exchange, precious and base metals, and commodity indices
- Aircraft leasing for airlines

With 85 years of international experience and the highest ratings, the AIG companies have more ways to help manage risk and more financial solutions than any other organization on earth. And our list of ways to manage risk continues to grow—all so you're better able to take the risks needed to succeed in your business and in your personal life. For more information about insurance and financial services provided by the AIG companies, visit www.aig.com.

AIG

WE KNOW RISK.℠

Insurance and services provided by member companies of American International Group, Inc. (AIG), 70 Pine Street, Department A, New York, NY 10270.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED